3/6/2003:
SENATE CALLS FOR ENGAGEMENT ON TNW In its resolution providing advice and consent for ratification of the
Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty concluded in Moscow in May 2002, the US Senate adopted a
declaration encouraging President Bush to engage Russia on the issue of tactical
nuclear weapons (TNW). In the opinion of the Senate, US-Russian cooperation on
TNW would help address the uncertainty about the scope and status
of Russian stockpiles of these weapons. Furthermore, measures such as US assistance to help
Russia catalogue and secure its TNW would lead both countries to have increased
confidence in the accounting and security measures in place. [Record of US Senate Advice and Consent to Ratification of
the Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions; in Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet Web Site,
http://thomas.loc.gov] {Entered
3/13/2003 EMC}
7/25/2002: US TO SEEK INFORMATION
ON RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS Testifying before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on 25 July 2002, US
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he would like Russia to increase its
nuclear warhead transparency measures, including those concerning tactical nuclear
warheads. Rumsfeld said that he intended to bring up the issue of nuclear
warhead transparency during a meeting between US and Russian officials in
September 2002. [Pamela Hess, "US in the dark on Russian tactical nukes,"
United Press International, 25 July 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.] {Entered 8/26/2002 MJ}
4/8-19/2002: RUSSIA TO COMPLETE TNW
ELIMINATION BY 2004
At the First Preparatory Committee to the 2005
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, held 8-19 April 2002 in New
York, the Russian Federation
promised to complete the elimination of its tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) by
2004. Previously Russia had tied TNW
discussions to progress on strategic arms control treaties. At the conference,
however, the Russian delegation requested that the United States withdraw all of
its tactical nuclear warheads from Europe. Most of the Russian TNW
have reportedly been eliminated, particularly the TNW
belonging to the Air Force, the Navy, and the former Air Defense Forces.
However, the elimination of the TNW
belonging to the Ground Forces has been delayed by budgetary problems, and the
need to fulfill strategic nuclear and chemical weapon treaty and agreement
obligations. [Yuriy
Golotyuk, "We Don't Have To Follow What America Does," Vremya novostey,
23 April 2002; in "Russia Wants US Tactical Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn From
Europe," FBIS Document CEP20020425000392.] {Entered 8/23/2002 MJ}
10/31/2001: ALL "SUITCASE NUKES" CLAIMED
DESTROYED On 31 October 2001, Argumenty i fakty reported that
General Igor Valynkin,
head of the 12th Main Directorate,
had told the newspaper's military analyst that all RA-115 and RA-115-01 30kg
"nuclear briefcases" developed during the 1970s had been eliminated in accordance
with international agreements. According to Valynkin,
there is triple accounting of all nuclear munitions in Russian custody. Valynkin
also denied General Aleksandr Lebed's
claim that a large number of portable nuclear munitions went missing, and said
that the military did not wish to bring a slander suit against Lebed. ["Atomnoye oruzhiye u ben Ladena?" Argumenty i fakty,
31 October 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.] {Entered 8/23/2002 MJ}
10/9/2001: RUSSIA MAY RECONSIDER DEPLOYING
TACTICAL NUCLEAR MISSILES IN KALININGRAD Following the Latvian government's decision to
permit ships carrying nuclear weapons to enter its territorial waters,[1] Vremya
novostey speculated that this might cause Russia to reconsider its policy
of not deploying tactical nuclear warheads in the Kaliningrad Oblast.[2]
Sources: [1] Neatkariga Rita Avize, 3 October 2001;
in "Latvian Decision on nuclear ships overly hasty - newspaper," FBIS Document
CEP20011004000018. [2] "Moscow Again Raises Ethnic Issue in
Estonia, Latvia," RFE/RL NewsLine-Russia,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/10/1-RUS/rus-091001.html,
9 October 2001.{Entered 10/23/2001 IA}
3/9/2001: RUSSIA DOES NOT HAVE TACTICAL NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN KALININGRAD, BUT RESERVES RIGHT TO Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stated on 9 March 2001
that no nuclear weapons are deployed in Kaliningrad at present. Ivanov added, however, that Russia
reserves its legal right to deploy nuclear
weapons on its own territory. ["Moscow Reserves Right to Put
Nukes in Kaliningrad," ITAR-TASS, 9 March 2001.] {Entered
9/19/01 RG}
1/3/2001: RUSSIAN OFFICIALS DENY REPORTS OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR
WEAPON TRANSFERS TO KALININGRAD The Washington Times reported on 3 January 2001
that during 2000 Russia transferred tactical nuclear warheads to its Baltic Sea base
in Kaliningrad Oblast.[1]
Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon declined to comment on the accuracy of the
report, but stated that "if the Russians have placed tactical nuclear weapons
in Kaliningrad, it would violate their pledge that they were removing nuclear
weapons from the Baltics, and that the Baltics should be
nuclear-free."[1] Other US officials have declined to comment on the
report.[1,2] Russian President Vladimir
Putin denied the reports and called them "rubbish."[3] Russian
Foreign Ministry representative Aleksandr Yakovenko also denied the reports
and stated that tactical nuclear warheads are not stored at Baltic fleet bases, neither
were they stored there in the past.[4] Lithuanian Minister of Regional Security Linas
Linkevicius
declared that nuclear weapons have not been transported through the region.[5]
Sources: [1] Bill Gertz, "Russia Transfers
Nuclear Arms To Baltics," The Washington Times, 3 January 2001, p.
1. [2] "Madlen Olbrayt nazvala 'ochen
polozhitelnym aspektom' rossiysko-amerikanskogo dialoga obsuzhdeniye problem,
svyazannykh s takticheskim yadernym oruzhiyem," RIA "Novosti",
5 January 2001; in Integrum techno, http://www.integrum.ru. [3] "Rossiya-Atom-Oruzhiye-Putin,"
Interfax, 6 January 2001. [4] "Rossiya-MID-Oproverzheniye,"
Interfax, 6 January 2001. [5] "Litva oprovergayet svedeniya o
perebroske yadernogo oruzhiya v Kaliningrad," RIA "Novosti", 4
January 2001; in Gazeta.Ru, http://www.gazeta.ru/2001/01/04/yaderor.shtml.
{Entered 1/5/2001 RG}
8/24/2000: STAFF EXERCISES IN THE FAR EAST FEATURE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS According to a 24 August 2000 Vremya novostey
article, the Siberian and Far Eastern Military Districts conducted command and
staff exercises aimed at developing methods of "localizing and
neutralizing" armed conflicts and tactics for fighting "large bandit
formations" in border regions. The exercises were conducted under the personal leadership of
Chief of the Russian General Staff General Anatoliy
Kvashnin and involved Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs,
Ministry of Emergency Situations, and Federal Border Service units. Prior to
the start of the exercises, Chief of the General Staff's Main Operational
Directorate Colonel-General Yuriy Baluyevskiy stated that depending on
the situation, the exercise may involve simulated use nuclear weapons.
[Yuriy Golotyuk, "Uchebnyy
yadernyy udar po banditam," Vremya novostey, 24 August 2000, p. 2;
in WPS Oborona i Bezopasnost, No. 100, 28 August 2000.]{Entered
12/1/2000 MJ}
7/11/2000: RUSSIAN ARMY PLANS TO ADOPT ISKANDER
IN DECEMBER 2000 In an interview with ITAR-TASS on 11 July 2000,
General Designer and Head of the Kolomna Machine Building Design Bureau
Nikolay Gushchin stated that the Russian Army plans to adopt the new
Iskander tactical missile in December 2000.
Gushchin also stated that tests of the Iskander were being conducted at the
Kaspustin Yar test site. For more information about the Iskander-E ('E' signifies that it is the export
version), see the
8/17-22/99 entry below.
[Nikolay Novichkov, ITAR-TASS, 11 July 2000;
in "Russian Army To Adopt Newest Semi-Strategic Missile System in
Dec," FBIS Document CEP20000711000014.]{Entered 12/4/2000 RG}
11/4/99: TWO TOCHKA-U TESTS The Russian military has conducted two tests of the
Tochka-U [NATO designation SS-21 'Scarab'] tactical ballistic missile at the
Kapustin Yar test range located in Volgograd Oblast. The first test was
conducted on 22 October and the second on 4 November 1999.[1,2] According to Strategic Rocket Forces
Commander Vladimir Yakovlev, the purpose of the tests was to
evaluate the possibility of extending the missiles' service life to 22
years.[1]
Sources: [1] Interfax, 4 November 1999; in "Russia
Successfully Tests Tochka-U Missile," FBIS Document FTS19991104000852. [2] TV-6, Novosti news broadcast, 22 October
1999; in "S-400 Missile Tested at Kapustin Yar," FBIS Document
FTS19991105000630. {Entered 11/22/99 VT} 8/17-22/99: ISKANDER-E MISSILE DISPLAYED
FOR FIRST TIME AT MAKS-99 AIR SHOW NEAR MOSCOW The Iskander-E ('E' signifies that it is the export version)
tactical missile was displayed for the first time at the MAKS-99 air show, held
in Zhukovskiy from 17 through 22 August 1999.[1,2] Developed by the Kolomna
Machine Building Design Bureau, the Iskander-E was advertised as the
most advanced tactical missile on the world export market. The Iskander-E
is an upgraded variant of the 9K714 'Oka' [NATO designation SS-23 'Spider']
tactical ballistic missile, and
was designed by Oleg Mamalyga, who previously participated in designing the
Oka and the 9K79-1 'Tochka-U' [NATO
designation SS-21 'Scarab'] missiles.[3] The Iskander-E
is a one-stage, solid-fuel short range ballistic missile (SRBM). It is
reported to have a range of 280km and carries a payload of 480kg,
characteristics which put it in compliance with the the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR).[1] The variant under development for the Russian military will likely
have a longer range and larger payload. It is also highly likely that
the Russian military version will be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. The
Iskander-E is advertised as capable of delivering conventional cluster, penetrating, and
fragmentation-HE warheads. Its Transporter-Erector-Launcher carries two missiles
and can launch them within one minute of one another.[1] The missile is guided by an optical seeker and a terrain imaging system. It
also has the ability to perform in-flight maneuvers, use a satellite guidance
systems, and have a high anti-ballistic missile defense penetration
ability.[3]
Sources: [1] Sergey Sokut, "Iskander-E
Attacks the Rivals: Russia's Leading Role in the Surface-to-Surface
Class of Missile Weaponry Is Being Restored," Nezavisimoye voyennoye
obozreniye, No. 38, 1-7 October 1999, p. 6; in "Tech Specs of
Iskander-E Missile System," FBIS Document FTS19991007001708. [2] Alexander Andrianov, Vyacheslav
Afonin, Yevgeny Bulakevich, " Moscow Aerospace Festival," Military
Parade online edition, http://www.milparade.com/1999/36/06_01.shtml,
No. 36, November-December 1999. [3] "Rossiyskaya armiya vooruzhayetsya 'Iskanderom',"
Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, No. 8, 11 August 1999.{Entered 11/22/2000
RG}
6/99: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS MEANS TO DE-ESCALATE
MILITARY ACTIONS The Russian military journal Voyennaya mysl
in its May-June 1999 issue published the views of Major General V.I. Levshin, Colonel
M. E. Sosnovskiy and Colonel A.V. Nedelin on the role of tactical nuclear
weapons in Russia's defense doctrine. According to the article, given the
current weakness of Russia's conventional forces and insufficient numbers of
precision-guided munitions, its nuclear weapons represent the main pillar
of its security. The article concentrates on the use of tactical nuclear weapons
as a means of averting defeat in a conventional regional conflict and forcing
the enemy to de-escalate the conflict through selective use of nuclear weapons
to demonstrate resolve and/or to destroy enemy forces. The authors criticize the
term "tactical nuclear weapons" on the grounds that it addresses only
one aspect of their use, namely delivery range, and ignores the key
consideration of who has the authority to use them, the Commander-in-Chief or
the theater commander. Instead, the authors prefer the term
"operational-tactical nuclear weapons," or "theater nuclear
weapons" (TNW), which denote nuclear weapons at the disposal of the theater
commander, as opposed to the "strategic nuclear weapons" which would
remain under the control of the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C). TNW
can be delivered by tactical aircraft, ground forces missile and artillery
systems, naval missiles (excluding submarine-launched ballistic and cruise
missiles) and torpedoes, surface-to-air missiles, helicopters armed with nuclear
anti-submarine munitions, and mines. Ideally, the theater commander would have several different delivery means at his disposal.
Nuclear
weapons ought to be considered not only as a means of inflicting a crushing
defeat on an enemy, but also a means of de-escalating an armed conflict. According to the authors, TNW are better
suited for use in de-escalatory mode than strategic weapons because they
are less likely to lead to a mass nuclear exchange, and the fear of guaranteed
nuclear annihilation will dissuade the enemy from using own strategic weapons
and will compel him to cease military operations. At
the same time, the article notes that de-escalatory use of TNW ought to be
considered only in cases where there are indications that the enemy will not
consider such nuclear strikes a prelude to a full-scale nuclear attack. The
authors
distinguish "single" (using a single nuclear weapon),
"group" (using several munitions against a single target),
"concentrated" (near-simultaneous use of several munitions to defeat
an operational-tactical formation), and "mass" (against an
operational-strategic formation) TNW strikes. They also list the following
stages of TNW use: "demonstration" (single strikes against unpopulated
areas or secondary military installations, designed to minimize the loss of
life), "deterrence-demonstration" (single strikes aimed at
interdicting enemy movement, isolating the theater of operations, and minimizing
the loss of life), "deterrence" (group strikes against the enemy's main
formation along one operational direction to halt his advance into friendly
defenses), "deterrence-retaliation" (concentrated strikes along one or
more operational directions to prevent the defeat of one's own forces, eliminate an
enemy breakthrough, and restore advantageous force ratios),
"retaliation-deterrence" (a mass strike against the entire enemy force
in the theater with the goal of annihilating it) and
"retaliation" (a mass strike or strikes against enemy forces in the
theater of operations, with possible coordination with strategic nuclear
strikes). Under the system proposed by the
authors, the initial use of TNW would be subject to approval
by the C-in-C and would be ordered by the Minister of Defense or the
General Staff. Subsequent use may be authorized by individuals designated by the
C-in-C, who may also limit types of targets and numbers and types of munitions
to be used. The authority to use TNW may devolve to lower-echelon commanders once
higher stages of TNW use are reached. De-escalatory TNW use may also require
strikes against targets not located in the theater of military operations. The
authors emphasize the need to limit collateral damage and ensure the secrecy of preparing
such TNW strikes and note that sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) may be the
ideal means of delivery for such strikes on account of their long range combined
with low risk of provoking massive retaliation.
[V.I. Levshin, A.V. Nedelin, M.E Sosnovskiy,
"O primenenii yadernogo oruzhiya dlya deeskalatsii voyennykh deystviy," Voyennaya
mysl, May-June 1999, pp/ 34-37.] {Entered 10/12/99 VT} 4/29/99: RUSSIAN SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERS
NUCLEAR TESTING AND STOCKPILE The Russian Security Council meeting of 29 April
1999 considered the reliability and maintenance of nuclear weapons, including
the issue of nuclear testing. It also discussed plans for modernization
of tactical nuclear weapons. For more information please see the
Overview:
The April 1999 Russian Federation Security Council Meeting on Nuclear Weapons.
{Entered
7/29/99 JL}
2/18/99: MINATOM PROPOSES 1999 SUBCRITICAL TEST
SERIES According to Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov,
the Russian ministries of defense and atomic energy have prepared a report
on subcritical testing plans for 1999 that was to be presented to President
Boris Yeltsin. Adamov noted that if the report was approved the subcritical
testing work would proceed. (For more information on subcritical testing
please see the Novaya Zemlya
file.]
["Minatom i Minoborony RF namereny
prestavit Yeltsinu predlozheniya o provedenii neyaderno-vzrynykh eksperimentov
na poligone na Novoy Zemle," Interfax, 18 February 1999].{Entered
7/29/99 JL}
1/24/99: RUSSIA DEVELOPING NEW TACTICAL NUCLEAR
WARHEAD? According to a report in the Washington Post,
citing US government intelligence analysts, three subcritical tests conducted
in Russia in 1998 may have been intended to help design a new generation
of tactical nuclear warheads. [The basis for singling out three of
the reported five tests was not indicated.) However, the report also
quoted a US intelligence official as stating that "the Russian tests were
so small that we can only speculate what they were doing." Brookings
Institution analyst Bruce Blair noted that Russia recycles (or remanufactures)
its nuclear weapons on a 10-year cycle and that old tactical nuclear weapons
are being replaced by new ones. (For more information on subcritical
testing please see the Novaya
Zemlya file.]
[Walter Pincus, "Russian Tests
Raise U.S. Speculation About New Nuclear Design," The Washington Post,
24 January 1999, p. A24].{Entered 7/29/99 JL}
11/19/98: NO TACTICAL WEAPONS DEPLOYED AT ARMY
BASES All tactical nuclear weapons for the Russian army's
artillery and rocket systems are in storage sites controlled by the General
Staff, according to Lieutenant General Mikhail Kozlov, chief of staff of
the Russian Army's Rocket and Artillery Troops.[1] His comments were confirmed
in an interview with the commander of the Rocket and Artillery Troops,
Lieutentant General Nikolay Mukhin, who stated, "At present, while tactical
nuclear weapons are being gradually destroyed, we do not have them in storage."[2]
The weapons are presumably located at special storage sites under the control
of the Twelfth Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, which
is responsible for warhead security. The Twelfth Main Directorate
is not part of the General Staff, however permission of the General Staff
would presumably be required in order to deploy the weapons to army bases.
[1] "Russia to Commission New Tactical Missile in 1999,"
Interfax, 19 November 1998. [2] Sergey Sokut, "Osnovnoye sredstvo porazheniya protivnika,"
Nezavisimoye
voyennoye obozreniye, No. 43, 13-19 November 1998, pp. 1, 3. {Entered
2/5/99 jl}
11/19/98: NEW TACTICAL MISSILE TO BE FIELDED IN
1999 Lieutentant General Mikhail Kozlov, chief of staff
of the Russian Army's Rocket and Artillery Troops, told a press conference
that a new tactical missile with a 400km range is expected to be deployed
in 1999.[1] The missile is to replace the Oka(NATO designation
SS-23 'Spider'), which was destroyed under the terms of the Intermediate
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and will also replace the army's aging Scud
missiles, which are being withdrawn from service. The Rocket and
Artillery Troops also field the modern Tochka-U and Tochka (NATO
designation SS-21 'Scarab') short-range missile systems.[2]
[1] "Russia to Commission New Tactical
Missile in 1999," Interfax, 19 November 1998. [2] Sergey Sokut, "Osnovnoye sredstvo
porazheniya protivnika," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, No.
43, 13-19 November 1998, pp. 1, 3. {Entered 2/5/99 jl}
10/1/98: ENGINEERING TROOPS
EQUIPPED TO USE NUCLEAR MINES The Engineering Troops of the Russian armed forces
are currently equipped to use nuclear land mines, according to an article
published in the October 1998 issue of Tekhnika i vooruzheniye.
In a survey of the weapons systems used by engineering troops, the article
included "nuclear mines with a TNT equivalent from two to 1000 metric tons."
The article said that the mines could be used as a "multipurpose weapon
against the advancing troops of an opponent." Buried in concrete or earthen
shafts, the mines could be used to create zones of destruction and contamination
that would limit and channel attacking enemy formations, exposing them
to conventional or nuclear attack by other weapons systems. The article
argues that nuclear land mines can be especially useful for blocking and
channelling the advance of enemy armored forces.[1] According to recent
estimates of the Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, only
a few, if any, nuclear land mines remain in the Russian arsenal, although
their exact number remains uncertain. Nuclear land mines, like other
land-based tactical nuclear weapons, are now presumably
located not with operational units, but at special central storage sites
run by the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense,
which is responsible for the safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons.
In a September 1997 news conference, Colonel General Igor Valynkin, head
of the 12th Main Directorate, said that the Soviet Union did produce nuclear
land mines. However, Valynkin said that these mines are not small enough
to be carried by one person, and should not be confused with the alleged
"nuclear suitcases" that former Russian Security Council Secretary Aleksandr
Lebed claimed Russia possesses. Valynkin and other Russian officials have
denied that the Soviet Union or Russia ever produced small "suitcase-sized"
atomic demolition munitions that could be transported by one person.[2]
Sources: [1] M. Rastopshchin, "Inzhenernyye
boyepripasy," Tekhnika i vooruzheniye No. 10 (October 1998), pp.
1-6; in WPS Vooruzheniye i voyennaya tekhnika, 17 February 1999. [2] Scott Parrish, "Are Suitcase Nukes
on the Loose? The Story Behind the Controversy," Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, November 1997; in
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/lebedlg.htm.{entered 3/22/99 SDP}
2/13/97: BATURIN: FIRST USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS POSSIBLE The Secretary of the Russian Defense Council, Yuri Baturin, asserted that
the new Russian military doctrine, currently under development, would contain
provisions for the first use of nuclear weapons "in emergency situations."
[Ilya Bulavinov, "Baturin: West Need Not Fear Russian Nuclear
Weapons," Kommersant-Daily, 2/13/97.]
2/11/97: TREATY ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUGGESTED At a roundtable conducted by RIA Novosti, several speakers (including assistant
to the President for international relations Dmitri Ryurikov, Deputy Foreign
Minister Nikolai Afanasyevski, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee
Aleksey Arbatov, and Chief of the Main Directorate of International Military
Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense, Colonel General Leonid Ivashov)
asserted that the December 1996 NATO declaration, which states that it
has no intention of deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of new members,
is insufficient. They suggested that a formal treaty to this effect be
concluded. The Director of the USA and Canada Institute, Sergei Rogov,
pointed out that such a treaty would be unacceptable for NATO. Rogov added
that new members could unilaterally declare themselves nuclear weapons-free
states, while a treaty on tactical nuclear weapons could be concluded between
Russia, the United States, and France.
["Russia Hardens Campaign against NATO Plans," Reuters, 2/12/97.]
1/30/97: NATO GUARANTEES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SOUGHT The Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, General Lev Rokhlin, demanded
that NATO guarantee the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory
of new member states, possibly in a special treaty. "The story of the unification
of Germany must serve as a lesson to us," he said, recalling that the West's
promises regarding East Germany were never put on paper.
["General Lev Rokhlin is sure...," RIA-Novosti, 1/30/97]
{Entered 3/97 NS}
1/10/97: GUARANTEES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE STATUS FOR NEW MEMBERS SOUGHT First Deputy Speaker of the Duma Alexander Shokhin listed guarantees that
no nuclear weapons would ever be deployed in the territories of new NATO
members as one of the conditions for acceptance of NATO enlargement by
Russia.
[RIA Novosti, 10 January 1997] {Entered 3/97 NS} 1996: IMEMO YEARBOOK PROPOSES TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTIONS A 1996 Yearbook published by IMEMO proposed that the number of tactical
nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and Russia be reduced to
500-600 warheads, of which no more than 200-300 warheads would be stationed
in Europe. The authors also propose redeploying tactical nuclear warheads
in such a way that they could not reach the territory of the other side
(i.e. so that NATO nuclear-capable aircraft would not be able to reach
Russia from the bases where nuclear warheads are stored, and Russian nuclear-capable
aircraft would not be able to reach NATO member states ). Storage facilities
with tactical nuclear warheads would be located no closer than 100 km from
the nearest air force base. At the same time the authors believe that "Russia
needs some tactical nuclear weapon potential as one of guarantees of national
security, to guard against radical shifts in the European or Asian security
arenas." According to the authors’ estimates, the 1991 unilateral obligations
provided for elimination of about 5,000 nuclear artillery munitions, mines,
and warheads for tactical missiles; 1,250 nuclear warheads for air defense
missiles; 1,200 sea-based warheads, including anti-submarine depth charges,
torpedoes, and various types of missiles; 1,750-2,000 gravity bombs; and
warheads for air-launched missiles.
[O. Amirov, "Sokrashcheniye nestrategicheskikh yadernykh
vooruzheniy," in Aleksey Arbatov, ed., Rossiya: v poiskakh strategii
bezopasnosti, (Moscow: Nauka, 1996), p. 61-63.] {Entered 3/97 NS}
11/28/96: MINISTER OF DEFENSE ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT Discussing the potential military consequences of NATO enlargement, Russian
Minister of Defense Igor Rodionov listed "building up tactical nuclear
weapons along western borders" as one of the items on a short list of possible
Russian countermeasures. Nuclear missiles would be retargeted to the territories
of new member-states of NATO, he said.
[Igor Rodionov, "Kakaya oborona nuzhna Rossii?" NEZAVISIMOYE
VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, supplement to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, no. 22, 11/28/96,
p. 1] {Entered 1/24/97 JL}
9/28/96: TREATY BASED ON 1991 INITIATIVES PROPOSED Sergei Rogov, Director of the US and Canada Institute of the Academy of
Sciences, proposed concluding a US-Russian treaty on tactical nuclear weapons
that would formalize the situation created by the unilateral initiatives
of 1991 regarding tactical nuclear weapons. Such a treaty, he claimed,
could preserve the de-facto non-nuclear status of the East European states.
[Sergey Rogov, "Neobkhodim konstruktivnyi dialog," Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, 9/28/96, p. 2] {Entered 3/97 NS}
9/26/96: 1991 INITIATIVES TO BE COMPLETED BY THE YEAR 2000 A Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Alexander Demurin, said that Russia
is continuing to implement the unilateral obligations on tactical nuclear
weapons undertaken in 1991-92. All nuclear missiles have been removed from
surface ships and multipurpose submarines. All nuclear warheads from land-based
tactical and medium-range missiles, as well as "nuclear ammunition" [presumably
artillery shells] are being eliminated in accordance with a pre-established
schedule. The nuclear warheads of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) have also
been withdrawn and partially eliminated. The completion of the process
is scheduled for the year 2000. Demurin mentioned that at recent consultations
in Washington, Russia proposed adopting similar measures (identical unilateral
obligations) relating to all air-based nuclear weapons, but the US declined.
[Interfax, 9/26/96, in "Disarmament Initiatives to be Fulfilled
by Year 2000," FBIS-SOV-96-189.] {Entered 3/97 NS}
9/20/96: MIKHAILOV CALLS FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUILDUP An article by Viktor Mikhailov (Minister of Atomic Energy), Igor Andruyshin
(Head of the Theoretical Laboratory of VNIIEF), and Alexander Chernyshev
(Deputy Research Director of VNIIEF) suggested that if NATO admits new
members into its military organization, Russia would need to strengthen
its strategic and tactical (theater) nuclear capability. They proposed
two measures. First, withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty and redeployment of the SS-20 (Pioneer) medium-range nuclear
missile (MRBM) and SS-23 (Oka) short-range ballistic missile (SRBM).Second,
development and production of 10,000 small nuclear warheads (with yields
from dozens to several hundred tons of TNT equivalent). They estimated
that Russia would need 300 MT of HEU and 30 MT of weapons-grade plutonium
to produce these weapons; the materials could be obtained from the weapons
eliminated under START I and II treaties. The authors stated that new warheads
could be developed and produced without significant additional expenditures.
In an interview with Izvestiya, Vice-President of the Russian Academy
of Sciences Yevgeniy Velikhov said the proposals of Chernyshev and others
were referring to neutron bombs and called them "wild ideas."
[Viktor Mikhailov and Alexander Chernyshov, "Rashireniye
NATO i bezopasnost Rossii," Vek, 9/20/ 96, No. 37, p. 5; Sergei Leskov,
Izvestiya,
10/30/96, p. 1] {Entered 3/97 NS}
8/9/96: CONSERVATIVE BOOK ON START II ELABORATES ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR
WEAPONS A book on START II ratification, published by the conservative "Spiritual
Heritage" movement and the RAU-Corporation, elaborated on the role of tactical
nuclear weapons in Russian security policy. The authors of the book argued
that tactical nuclear weapons are the preferred method of compensation
for Russia’s inferiority in both land and sea-based conventional forces.
Consequently, they ruled out symmetric reductions of Russian and American
tactical nuclear weapons. Under the conditions of NATO enlargement, Russia
will have to ensure its security through reliance on tactical nuclear weapons.
The following recommendations were made: (1) creation of new theaters of
military operations and corresponding operational army groups; (2) revision
of the unilateral obligations of the Soviet Union and Russia regarding
reduction of tactical nuclear weapons; (3) creation of new [operational]
groups of tactical nuclear weapons; (4) redeployment of tactical nuclear
weapons on surface ships of the Baltic and other fleets. An alternative
to these proposals is the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons into
the national territories of the nuclear weapons states, and the creation
of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe that would
include the Baltic states, the Visegrad Group, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova,
Romania, and Bulgaria. (See also the 8/9/96 entry in the section "START
II: Ratification Developments.")
[A.I. Podberezkin, ed., Ratifikatsiya dogovora SNV-2:
resheniya, problemy, perspektivy, (Moscow:Dukhovnoye naslediye, 1996),
pp. 58-61.] {Entered 3/97 NS}
5/16/96:ARTICLE SUMMARIZES TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTIONS In response to the autumn 1991 initiative by US President George Bush concerning
reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union pledged to carry
out a large-scale reduction of these weapons. Experts estimate that, in
conformity with this pledge, Russia should dismantle 9200-9450 tactical
warheads, including 5000 nuclear artillery shells, mines, and warheads
of tactical missiles; 1250 antiaircraft missile warheads; 1200 naval tactical
nuclear warheads, and 1750-2000 air-delivered bombs and missiles. According
to the announced schedule, the elimination of tactical nuclear warheads
will be completed by the year 2000. Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye
reports that after the planned reductions, Russian air-based and sea-based
tactical weapons systems will be left with approximately 2000-3000 warheads
each. This, reportedly, leaves Russia at a disadvantage in air and naval
arms compared to the US and its NATO allies. According to the treaty on
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF), Russia can retain operational-tactical
missiles with a range of up to 500 kilometers. However, the sophisticated
Russian Oka (SS-23) system, with a (claimed) range of less than 500 km,
was included in the confines of the treaty and eliminated.
[Colonel Sergey Modestov, "The Kremlin's Aria Has Been Sung,
but No Applause Is Heard: The West Is not Ready to Discuss RF President
Boris Yeltsin's Initiative That Was Proposed by Him at the Nuclear Summit
In Moscow," NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Supplement to NEZAVISIMAYA
GAZETA, No. 9, 5/16/96, p. 6; "Soviet Nuclear Arms Deployment Examined,"
FBIS-SOV-96-125-S, 5/16/96.]
3/26/96: REPORT CALLS FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT IF NATO
EXPANDS Igor Andryushin and Aleksandr Chernyshev, specialists from the Arzamas-16
nuclear research center, issued a report which stated that if NATO expands,
Russia will have to deploy "nuclear air-defense and sea-defense weapons
on its western borders, as well as tactical and operational missile systems,
including the Pioneer (SS-20) and Oka (SS-23) systems." The latter two
systems were banned under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty.
[Doug Clarke, "Banned Missiles Would Counter NATO Expansion,"
OMRI DAILY DIGEST, vol. 2, no. 62, 3/27/96, p. 2.] {Entered 3/97 NS}
3/26/96: MIKHAILOV SUGGESTS TREATIES COULD BE REVERSED Speaking at a meeting with Joseph Rotblat, president of the Pugwash movement,
Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov suggested that in response
to NATO enlargement Russia might consider it necessary to redeploy nuclear
air-defense and sea-based tactical systems, as well as the SS-20 Pioneer
intermediate-range missiles (IRBM) and SS-23 Oka short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBM) eliminated under the 1987 INF Treaty.
[ITAR-TASS, 26 March 1996]{Entered
3/97 NS}
2/20/96: FOREIGN MINISTRY REJECTS MIKHAILOV COMMENTS ON NUCLEAR TARGETING Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigoriy Karasin stated at a briefing
that Russia's position on foreign policy issues, including targeting of
nuclear missiles, can be communicated only by the President, Prime Minister,
or Minister of Foreign Affairs and that statements issued by individual
governmental bodies do not necessarily reflect Russia's official position.
Karasin made the statement in the light of the international reaction to
Minatom's announcement of targeting nuclear weapons at Eastern Europe in
case of NATO expansion.
[INTERFAX, 2/20/96; in FBIS-SOV-96-035, 2/20/96.] {ENTERED
11/1/96 KVY}
2/16/96: MIKHAILOV THREATENS PREEMPTIVE ATTACKAGAINST NATO TACTICAL
WEAPONS According to the Washington Post, an apparently intoxicated Minister
of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov stated that Russia would preemptively
attack any tactical nuclear weapons deployed in former Warsaw Pact countries
that hope to join NATO. US Department of State Spokesman Nicholas Burns
condemned the comments as "highly irresponsible" and expressed his hope
that Russian leaders would not support such a statement.
[Scott Parrish, "Mikhailov Comments Stir Controversy," OMRI
DAILY DIGEST, no. 35, pt. I, 2/19/96, p.2.]
9/2/95: PLAN TO COUNTER NATO EXPANSION WITH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS Komsomolskaya pravda, citing as its source a member of the Russian
General Staff, reported that the Russian military drafted a contingency
plan that included the possible redeployment of nuclear forces to counter
NATO expansion. The plan was reportedly in response to a NATO policy document
stating that NATO reserves the right to station tactical nuclear forces
in the territory of future NATO members, including Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic. The Russian plan recommends that nuclear weapons be
stationed in Belarus, Kaliningrad, and on naval ships in the Baltic and
Black Seas. The plan also recommended that if the Baltic states become
NATO members, Russia should immediately move its forces into those three
states. Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Deputy Minister Andrey
Kokoshin were reported to have tentatively approved the plan.
[Richard Beeston, "Russia 'Has A Nuclear Answer To Wider
NATO,'" THE TIMES, 9/3/95; "In Russia," POST-SOVIET NUCLEAR & DEFENSE
MONITOR, 10/13/95, p. 19.]
12/95: NEW TACTICAL MISSILE TESTED AT KAPUSTIN YAR A new solid propellant missile with a 400 km range has been tested at the
Kapustin Yar test site. The missile will not be subject to provisions of
the INF treaty. The missile was developed to substitute for the Oka (SS-23
Spider) tactical missile system which was eliminated in 1989 under the
terms of the INF treaty.
[YADERNYY KONTROL, 2/96, pp. 10-11.]
1/29/92: YELTSIN ADDS TO BUSH-GORBACHEV INITIATIVES In a televised statement, Russian President Boris Yeltsin outlined additional
unilateral measures on tactical nuclear weapons. He said Russia would eliminate
one-third of the warheads taken from sea-based tactical nuclear weapons,
one-half of the warheads taken from anti-aircraft missiles, and one-half
of the warheads for tactical aircraft.
[SIPRI Yearbook, 1992, pp. 89-92; President of the Russian
Federation Boris Yeltsin, record of televised statement, 29 January 1992.]
{Entered 3/97 NS}
12/30/91 TIMELINE FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHDRAWAL SET The Agreement on Joint Measures Relating to Nuclear Weapons (Almaty, 21
December 1991) established July 1, 1992, as the deadline for the withdrawal
of tactical nuclear weapons from the former Soviet republics to "pre-production
facilities" for dismantlement "under joint control."
[Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, 1992] {Entered 3/97 NS}
9-10/91: BUSH AND GORBACHEV EXCHANGE INITIATIVES ON TNW REDUCTION Speaking on September 27, 1991, US President George Bush announced that
he was directing the United States "to eliminate its entire worldwide inventory
of ground-launched short-range, that is, theater nuclear weapons." Including,
all artillery shells and short-range ballistic missile warheads were slated
for elimination. He also declared that the United States would "withdraw
all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships, attack submarines,"
and nuclear weapons on aircraft carriers. A large portion of the withdrawn
warheads would be eliminated and the rest stored in central areas. (On
17 October 1991, the NATO defense ministers’ meeting in Taormina, Italy,
agreed to reduce NATO’s remaining stockpile of nuclear gravity bombs by
half, from about 1,400 to 700. Together with the September 27 initiatives,
NATO’s nuclear stockpile was reduced by approximately 80 percent.) On 10/5/95,
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev responded to the initiatives and said
that the Soviet Union would: eliminate all nuclear artillery munitions
and nuclear warheads for tactical missiles; withdraw to central storage
facilities and partially eliminate nuclear warheads for air defense missiles
(SAMs) and eliminate all nuclear mines; remove all tactical nuclear weapons
from surface ships and multipurpose submarines, as well as nuclear weapons
of land-based naval aviation, eliminating part of those warheads.
Sources: [1] President of the United States George Bush, announcement
from the White House, 9/27/91. [2] President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev, televised
announcement, 10/5/91 in SIPRI Yearbook 1992, p. 85-88. [3] S. Jacobsen, "NATO agrees to slash nuclear arsenals by
80 percent," WASHINGTON TIMES, 10/18/91. {Entered 3/97 NS}
This file is no
longer being updated. For major recent developments, see the 