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by Dr. Nikolai Sokov, CNS Senior Research Associate, October 2003 (revised July 2004)
At a 2 October 2003 meeting at the Ministry of Defense, in the presence of President Vladimir Putin, the top military leaders, legislators, and a plethora of other dignitaries, Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov unveiled a report entitled "Immediate Tasks for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,"[1] which some news services have dubbed the "White Paper." The report formally represents only the views of the Ministry of Defense, but its implications are broader: in effect it develops and details the 2000 Military Doctrine.[2] Where nuclear weapons are concerned, the report provides important insights into nuclear posture planning in the aftermath of the summer-fall 2000 debate on the future of Russia's strategic forces.[3] The report did not contain many novel ideas. Probably the only serious innovation was the proposition that the Ministry of Defense "can no longer completely rule out the preventive use of force if demanded by the interests of Russia or its alliance commitments."[4] This statement did not specifically refer to nuclear weapons, but given their overall role in Russia's defense policy, it might imply that threat too. Deterrence and De-escalation Like the 2000 Military Doctrine, the "White Paper" postulates two missions for nuclear weapons: deterrence of a large-scale attack against Russia and de-escalation of a limited conflict in case deterrence fails. In contrast to the earlier document, the new guidance elaborates on these missions in considerable detail. During the Cold War, the notion of deterrence generally applied to a large-scale nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union—a war that could not be won and would have meant the end of the world. Now global war is considered a low probability, almost a theoretical event. The Russian military is much more preoccupied with preventing the threat that force could be used against Russia for political purposes ("silovoye davleniye" - compellence by force) and deterring limited attacks. Both scenarios are deterred by the threat that Russia might use nuclear weapons. The document states, specifically:
De-escalation and, implicitly, deterrence of limited conflicts is based on the notion that Russia should be able to inflict just the right amount of damage to the attacker to make sure that aggression is not worthwhile. The central tenet of this policy is the notion of "pre-determined damage," which in the 2000 National Security Concept and Military Doctrine was one of very few indications that Russia was considering the limited use of nuclear weapons. In the White Paper, references to limited use are explicit and detailed. Predetermined damage is defined as "damage, subjectively unacceptable to the enemy, which exceeds the benefits the aggressor expects to gain as a result of the use of military force."[6] At the same time, the document emphasizes that in the context of limited conflicts nuclear deterrence requires modern and capable conventional forces; "only in that case will the threat of nuclear use in response to an attack be credible."[7] (This postulate brings to mind one of the seminal documents in U.S. nuclear policy from the 1950s, NSC-68.) Guidance for Limited Use of Nuclear Weapons Although the main threats to Russia listed in the report are international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), military planning is geared toward the capability to fight any potential enemy, and this means the ability to defend against an attack by economically, technologically, and militarily advanced states (including, by default, the United States as the most powerful state in the world). Given the weakness of Russia's conventional forces today, the Defense Ministry document implicitly suggests that Russia cannot face a militarily advanced state or a coalition of states without engaging its nuclear capability. It also appears that the document assumes that an army that can fight the United States and NATO can fight any other enemy. The wisdom of this assumption seems dubious, however. The White Paper's guidance on strategies for fighting regional and local wars suggests ways in which nuclear weapons might be utilized for the purposes of de-escalation. The section on the "nature of contemporary wars and armed conflicts" emphasizes that at the early stage of wars in the 1990s, the central role belonged to long-range strike weapons, including airborne delivery systems. It also notes that domination at the early stage of conflict ensured victory.[8] This means that, according to the Russian military's analysis, U.S. victories in a string of conflicts in the 1990s were ensured primarily by delivery vehicles operating outside the immediate theater of war. Accordingly, the new document postulates "the utmost necessity of having the capability to strike military assets of the enemy (long-range high-precision weapons, long-range Air Force) outside the immediate area of conflict. To achieve this, [we] need both our own long-range high-precision strike capability and other assets that enable [us] to transfer hostilities directly to enemy territory."[9] These guidelines fit well with the pattern seen in a series of military exercises starting with the Zapad-99 maneuvers. A more recent example is the 2003 exercise in the Indian Ocean in the wake of the war in Iraq that involved the use of long-range air-launched cruise missiles against naval and land targets in the Indian Ocean. It is a fair guess that the Russian Air Force simulated strikes against U.S. naval vessels carrying sea-launched cruise missiles and the U.S. base at Diego Garcia. These assets were used during the war in Iraq and might be used in a hypothetical U.S. military action against Russia or its neighbors. Response to the Evolution of U.S. Nuclear Policy The Ministry of Defense report, along with some earlier official statements, indicates how Russia might react to anticipated changes in U.S. policy toward nuclear weapons. The U.S. policy shift began with the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and became more visible recently with discussions about the development of a new, low-yield nuclear weapon. The Defense Ministry document notes efforts by unnamed parties "to restore nuclear weapons as an acceptable military instrument by using 'breakthrough' scientific and technical developments, which are supposed to turn nuclear weapons into a relatively 'clean' weapon from the point of view of the consequences of its use." Following that assertion, the document somewhat cryptically declares that "the lowering of the nuclear threshold will demand that Russia revise the system of command and control of troops and its approaches to the deterrence of threats of various levels."[10] The oral statement of Minister Ivanov at the October meeting offered additional details. He said that developments in U.S. nuclear policy were "undermining global and regional stability" and that he had directed his subordinates to closely monitor these trends. "Even miniscule" lowering of the nuclear threshold, he stated, might trigger a revision of the existing guidance on the employment of nuclear weapons.[11] This statement closely correlates with an earlier remark by President Putin: speaking at one of Russia's two nuclear laboratories, in Sarov, on 31 July 2003, he emphasized that Russia would continue to refrain from nuclear testing "under certain obligatory conditions, one of the most important of which is a similar attitude on the part of other nuclear states toward obligations they have undertaken."[12] In effect, this meant that Russia would not resume testing until other states do. This represented a partial change in the standard Russian position. Previously, Russian officials usually emphasized that Russia had signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and hoped that the treaty would enter into force soon. Now the emphasis has shifted to conditions under which Russia might withdraw from the moratorium. Putin's statement did not specify other possible conditions for termination of the moratorium. The Future of the Nuclear Triad The new document contains an overview of plans with regard to Russia's strategic nuclear posture. Information is scanty, but nevertheless the document offers useful insights into what has been a volatile issue since 2000. In summer and fall 2000, a series of meetings of Russia's Security Council revised earlier decisions with regard to the nuclear triad, providing for a radical reduction of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the land-based leg of the triad, and shifting priority to the naval leg. Apparently, these decisions were partially revised in early 2002 following the U.S. notification of its intent to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (the withdrawal became final in June 2002). Reportedly, the main change was the decision to keep old types of land-based missiles, inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), to the very end of their service lives, including all possible extensions (in 2000 the General Staff wanted to reduce them at a much faster pace). The White Paper reveals that by 2007-2008, the Strategic Rocket Forces will consist of 10 missile divisions (reduced from the current 19) in line with an 11 August 2000 Security Council decision, but contrary to the original plans of the General Staff.[13] These divisions will consist primarily of old types of ICBMs, whose service lives will be extended; gradually these ICBMs will be replaced with "prospective missile complexes." As an illustration, President Putin, in his closing statement at the conference, mentioned UR-100NUTTKh ICBMs (known in the United States as SS-19s). He said that dozens have been kept in so-called "dry storage" (i.e., the missiles were not filled with fuel) and could be put into silos for combat duty.[14] Subsequently, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Yuriy Baluyevskiy added that these missiles could last as long as until 2030,[15] indirectly indicating that the projected pace of deployment of modern ICBMs will be rather slow. Minister Ivanov explained a few days later that at the moment Russia did not have plans to transfer SS-19s from dry storage to combat duty and that Putin's statement was only intended to make Russia's ability to do so known "both to domestic and international audiences."[16] Some commentators hastened to declare that Putin's words at the October 2 Defense Ministry meeting explained his reference in the State of the Nation address to the Federal Assembly last spring to some unnamed "new strategic weapon,"[17] but such speculations do not make sense—SS-19s are old, late 1970s-early 1980s weapons. Other commentators also called these missiles "heavy," which is incorrect since only SS-18s (the R-36 family of ICBMs, including R-36UTTKh and R-26M2, currently deployed) are officially classified as heavy ICBMs. A few months later it became clear that Putin meant a maneuvering ICBM front section, which was tested during large-scale maneuvers in February 2004. The air-based component of the strategic forces will emphasize modernization of the Tu-160 heavy bomber, which should be able to carry high-precision cruise missiles with both nuclear and conventional warheads, as well as gravity bombs (including a Russian analogue to American Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs)) and support a variety of other missions. This is little news: for years now the Russian Air Force has concentrated its efforts on developing new weapons for the existing fleet of long-range aircraft as well as on modernizing these aircraft by adding new avionics, communications equipment, targeting capabilities, etc. The Air Force approach seems the most cost-effective and the most stable compared to the unending rivalries and often waste in other two legs of the triad. The discussion of the naval leg of the strategic triad simply mentioned what is well known already: Russia plans to complete development of a new sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and of a new submarine to carry this new missile. Clearly, the new SLBM mentioned in the document is Bulava, a new missile reportedly capable of carrying up to 10 warheads. The Bulava should also be deployable on land. The new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine is the Borey class. The first submarine in that class, Yuriy Dolgorukiy, was launched in mid-1990s, but was then put on hold to wait for a new missile. The Defense Ministry document and Putin in his closing remarks confirmed that Russia intended to utilize the flexibility accorded to it by the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002 (also known as the Moscow Treaty) in drafting its plans for the future composition and size of the nuclear triad. Conclusion In the final analysis, the new document published by the Ministry of Defense demonstrates that Russia's nuclear policy has stabilized after the somewhat tumultuous first two years of Putin's presidency. Missions assigned to nuclear weapons have been confirmed and detailed; the future shape of the nuclear posture does not seem to hold any surprises. One remaining element of uncertainty is related to future U.S. policy on nuclear weapons: if the United States proceeds with the development of a new, more "usable" nuclear weapon and especially if it resumes nuclear testing as many expect, then Russian nuclear policy might begin to change and Russia will strive to acquire similar capabilities. The official U.S. position remains, however, that there has been no decision to resume testing. Although the new document lists the proliferation of WMD and international
terrorism as the gravest threats to Russia's security, the military still
regards the U.S. military capability and the ability to repel a hypothetical attack
by the United States as benchmarks for planning. On the one hand, this
orientation reflects a simple (maybe even simplistic) premise: an army that can
fight the United States can fight any other state or coalition of states. At a
different level, however, it betrays deeply seated concerns about the future of
Russia's relations with the United States and a feeling of vulnerability
vis-à-vis the most powerful state in the world. In the end, the Ministry of
Defense seems to believe that nothing but military power can guarantee Russia's
security and interests, especially given the their view of the U.S. propensity for unilateral, often not fully logical military escapades. Partnership
is one thing, guaranteed security is another. In Moscow's estimation, nothing can reliably contain
political and military pressure, much less the use of force, except nuclear
weapons.
Page last updated 16 November 2004 Comments or questions? E-mail Nikolai Sokov: nsokovATmiis.edu. 
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