It is a pleasure to address this Conference on a possible Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

The United States looks forward to consultations with states of the region on their proposal for a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. Indeed, we believe the willingness of the Central Asian states to consult early and frequently with the United States, as well as the other Nuclear Weapon States, to address any concerns is crucial. A zone arrangement that reflects the views of all affected parties could make a useful contribution to regional and global nonproliferation goals.

The U.S. supports in principle the creation of nuclear weapon free zones, consistent with our longstanding criteria for such zones and with the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As that document stated, and as I wish to underscore, the support of the nuclear weapon states is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such zones.

Nuclear weapon free zones can give greater institutionalization in their regions of the global norms and commitments of nuclear nonproliferation, and compel states of a region to take responsibility among themselves to ensure the non-nuclear status of their region. However, nuclear weapon free zones also raise a host of complex issues for us and for our allies. The specific legal and security implications of the text of a proposed NWFZ for regional and international security and international legal regimes can be far-reaching, and can even affect international legal and security arrangements that at first glance seem unrelated to the goals and intentions of the zone's drafters. Therefore, the United States examines each proposed nuclear weapon free zone carefully and on its own merits, but also giving due weight to toward its larger global legal and security responsibilities.

The United States has developed seven long-standing and public criteria that any proposed nuclear weapons free zone treaty or convention would have to meet before receiving U.S. support. These criteria reflect the basic characteristics that the U.S. has determined a nuclear weapon free zone must possess to be an effective nonproliferation tool without impinging on vital national security and foreign policy interests.

First, the initiative for the creation of the zone should come from the states in the region concerned. The primary responsibility for the conception, negotiation, and drafting of a nuclear weapon free zone lies with the states of the region who would be asked to assume its commitments and responsibilities.

Second, all states whose participation is deemed important should participate in the zone. Nuclear weapon free zone treaties can only be meaningful and potentially successful when all regional states of political and/or military significance regarding the production, acquisition, or deployment of nuclear weapons participate both in the negotiation in the zone and become Members of the final treaty.

Third, the zone arrangement should provide for adequate verification of compliance with its provisions. No treaty that mandates the complete absence of nuclear weapons can be successful without a strong and independent verification mechanism. Existing nuclear weapon free zones take advantage of the independent expertise of the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify that Member states use nuclear energy purely for peaceful civil purposes. To this end, the IAEA should be consulted frequently, and its concerns satisfied, during the negotiation of any such treaty.

Fourth, the establishment of the zone should not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security or otherwise abridge the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense guaranteed in the U.N. charter. Nuclear weapon free zone treaties are meant to enhance regional and international security. They cannot undermine or conflict with bilateral, regional and international arrangements, alliances, and institutions which support, and in some instances underlie, international security and stability.

Fifth, the zone arrangement should effectively prohibit its parties from developing or otherwise possessing any nuclear device for whatever purpose. The very definition of a nuclear weapon free zone requires this. It is important that the Treaty prohibit all devices which are capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled fashion, regardless of the announced intent or purpose for such devices. For this reason, the recent nuclear weapon free zones prohibit "nuclear explosive devices" generally, rather than just "nuclear weapons."

Sixth, the establishment of the zone should not affect the existing rightsof its parties under international law to grant or deny other states transit privileges within their respective land territory, internal waters and airspace to nuclear powered and nuclear capable ships and aircraft of non-party nations, including port calls and overflights.
A nuclear weapon free zone should not seek to impede or prohibit the exercise of the basic sovereign rights of the Central Asian states -- rights they already possess -- to decide according to their own policies whether to allow or deny innocent passage of territorial waters and airspace by foreign vessels or aircraft, or visitation by such vessels and aircraft to airfields and ports. Such passage and visitations should not be construed as a deployment or stationing of nuclear explosive devices. Such transit, however, should not be equated to the transport of nuclear explosive devices on land territory or inland waters, which other NWFZ treaties have appropriately prohibited.

Seventh, the zone arrangement should not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise of rights recognized under international law, particularly the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight. the right of innocent passage of territorial and archipelagic seas. the right of transit passage of international straits. and the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage of archipelagic waters. As a general rule, a proposed nuclear weapon free zone treaty should not conflict with existing international regimes concerning the general rights and privileges of states under international law. The zone should not seek to impose obligations and commitments over those areas, such as international waters, over which no treaty party exercises sovereign control.

These criteria have guided U.S. policy toward nuclear weapon free zones for nearly thirty years. They are intended to ensure that any new nuclear weapon free zone treaty meets not only U.S. security requirements, but also promote regional and international security. They are meant to ensure that any nuclear weapon free zone that the U.S. considers supporting is one which fully serves regional nuclear nonproliferation and security goals while not infringing on certain rights under international law.

The U.S. welcomes the desire of the states of Central Asia to undertake steps toward regional cooperation and security. Careful, deliberate actions that foster regional security will benefit Central Asian states and the international community as a whole. A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, which can make an important contribution to enhancing regional security, is one element of a regional security system. Other measures, such as confidence and security building measures, can increase openness, trust, and transparency about the intentions of neighbors, especially their military forces and activities, thus increasing the predictability of other states' actions and behavior. Another area vital to regional and global security is preventing the spread of nuclear material and equipment across borders; enhanced export control regimes and increased security and protection of nuclear materials, especially in the Newly Independent States of Asia and Europe, can greatly enhance regional and global nonproliferation regimes. We are encouraged by these regional developments and seek to encourage them when appropriate by sharing our arms control experiences and providing technical assistance when asked.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

HOME  |  CONTACT US  |  SITE MAP