The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program of the United States assists
the states of the former Soviet Union in controlling and protecting their
nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, and delivery systems. To aid
in the implementation of arms control agreements, CTR also contributes
to the dismantling and destruction of a number of nuclear weapons and their
associated delivery systems. The CTR program began in 1991 and is projected
to continue until at least 2001. The US Congress has allocated from the
defense budget approximately $400 million each year to CTR-related programs,
which are administered by the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of
Energy (DOE), Department of Commerce, and the Department of State.
Projects of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program have included strategic
offensive arms elimination; nuclear warhead dismantlement; nuclear weapons
storage security; chemical weapons destruction; biological weapons proliferation
prevention; reactor core conversions; nuclear material protection, control
and accounting; export control initiatives; defense conversion; and others.
Click here to see details about specific CTR programs in Russia,
Ukraine,
Kazakhstan,
and Belarus,
to view a list of CTR accomplishments
from the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program website, or to see an August
1997 CTR brochure which summarizes the CTR program.
The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program otherwise known as the "Nunn-Lugar"
legislation (named for sponsoring Senators Sam Nunn [D-GA] and Richard
Lugar [R-IN]) began in 1991 as a piece of US legislation entitled "The
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991" (Public Law 102-228, 12/12/91,
Title II Soviet Weapons Destruction) which stemmed from Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev’s request for assistance in dismantling Soviet nuclear
weapons, and US President George Bush’s subsequent proposal to assist in
the disposition, dismantlement, and destruction of nuclear weapons in the
Soviet Union. In the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, Congress noted
that aid to the Soviet Union and its potential successor states would be
in the national security interest of the United States as a means to address
the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. This threat was comprised
of three components: 1) substandard materials protection, control, and
accounting measures for nuclear weapons and materials; 2) the possibility
of smuggling nuclear weapons and/or components; and 3) potential transfer
of actual weapons, components, and weapons-related knowledge. With these
threats in mind, the Act delineates a two-fold objective: "A) to facilitate
on a priority basis the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction
of nuclear and other weapons in the Soviet Union, its republics, and any
successor states; and B) to assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation."
For Fiscal Year 1992, the Act allotted $400 million of transferred Department
of Defense funds for this purpose. (For cumulative funding to date see
chart below.) In October 1992, an additional $400 million was allocated
to establish the Safe and Secure Dismantlement (SSD) Talks under the Former
Soviet Union Demilitarization Act. However, allocation of all funds to
the NIS is contingent upon a US presidential certification that the recipient
country is:
-
"making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying
such weapons;
-
forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense
requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass
destruction;
-
forgoing any use of fissionable and other components of destroyed nuclear
weapons in new nuclear weapons;
-
facilitating United States’ verification of weapons destruction carried
out under section 212;
-
complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and
-
observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection
of minorities."[1,2]
On 11 October 1993, the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act evolved into
the "Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993" as part of the FY94 National
Defense Authorization Act. The CTR program’s main objectives were enhanced
to reflect an emphasis on the following five areas:
1. Warhead removal from the Soviet successor states to Russia
2. Destruction and dismantlement of weapons systems
3. Chain of custody projects
4. Chemical weapons destruction assistance
5. Demilitarization support.[3,4,5]
The CTR Program has evolved in three stages: Stage one, from 1992-93, established
the program through negotiations outlining the framework, developed a working
relationship, and provided early assistance to the NIS. Stage two, from
1994-95, implemented agreements, devised a management structure, and solidified
an acquisition strategy. The final stage, from 1996-2001, is the
program’s "multiyear strategy" which will aim to complete the agreed projects.
Structural changes in CTR oversight and funding responsibilities were recommended
in the FY 1996 budget request, which delegated the
material
control and accounting projects to the Department of Energy, the ISTC
projects to the State Department, and export control efforts to the Department
of Commerce.[6]
Click here for CTR Organizational
Charts
Click
here for table
For more recent
developments, see the CTR
developments in Russia and
CTR developments in Ukraine sections.
10/17/98: PRESIDENT SIGNS FY 1999 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL
INTO LAW
On 17 October 1998, President Clinton signed into law the FY 1999 National
Defense Authorization Bill.[1] The bill allocates a total of $440,400,000
for Cooperative Threat Reduction Funds. Of that amount, $384,900,000
is allocated for programs in Russia, $47,500,000 is allocated for strategic
nuclear arms elimination in Ukraine, and $8 million is allocated for administrative
support. The bill authorizes funding for strategic offensive arms elimination,
warhead dismantlement, chemical weapons dismantlement, nuclear weapons
transportation and storage security, reactor core conversion, fissile material
storage, and for biological weapons proliferation preventions activities.[2]
11/11/97: CONGRESS PASSES FY 1998 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL
The House, on 30 October 1997, and the Senate, on 7 November 1997, passed
the FY 1998 National Defense Authorization Bill which provides $382.2 million
for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Specifically, the bill allocates
$77.9 million for strategic offensive arms elimination in Russia, $76.7
million for strategic nuclear arms elimination in Ukraine, $7 million for
fissile material storage containers in Russia, $36 million for weapons
storage security, $8 million for defense and military-to-military contacts
for Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, $2 million for nonproliferation programs
for post-Soviet Republics other than Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus,
and $20.5 million for administrative support. The $41 million request
for continued support to convert the reactor cores at Seversk
(Tomsk-7) and Zheleznogorsk
(Krasnoyarsk-26) was also approved. (The reactor core conversion at
these sites was recently agreed upon during the ninth meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin
Commission.) Finally, while the bill allocates $57 million for the
fissile material storage facility at Mayak, it refuses obligation of those
funds until agreements with Russia are concluded regarding transparency
issues at the site and until total US costs at the facility are determined.
Also, within 90 days of the bill's enactment, the Secretary of Defense
is required to submit to Congress a report detailing any taxes placed on
CTR assistance to Russia and the means by which the resulting disputes
over the taxes were resolved.[1] A Sense of Congress Clause was also added
to the bill. It requests that Russia provide a detailed plan and possibly
a US tour of a very large underground facility at Yamantau Mountain in
the Urals. The construction of this site has been a cause for concern for
some in Congress who question the underground complex's purpose.[2] The
bill also allocates $55.4 million for chemical weapons dismantlement and
the construction of a facility to achieve those ends. However, obligation
and disbursement of that $55.4 million is contingent upon several restrictions.
First, Congress must be provided with an accurate total cost of the program.
Second, a site for the facility must be chosen, and third, the Russian
government must approve the plans for the facility and commit to paying
a portion of its costs. In addition, no funds may be obligated or spent
until the President eithers certifies that US national security would be
comprised by not obligating these funds, or certifies that Russia is making
progress toward the Wyoming MOU, is implementing the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement, and has completely declared all information regarding its chemical
weapons and facilities. (The full text of this bill (H.R. 1119) can be
found through the Library
of Congress homepage.)
9/30/96: PRESIDENT SIGNS FY 97 APPROPRIATIONS BILL INTO LAW
President Clinton signed into law the FY 97 Omnibus Appropriations Bill
which includes $427.9 million in DoD funding for the CTR program. Of this
amount, $327.9 million will be allocated to already established CTR programs.
It is estimated that DoE will allocate $16 million for continuing core-conversion
studies at the Russian plutonium production reactors in Krasnoyarsk
and Tomsk , $20 million for its lab-to-lab
program, and $15 million for MPC&A at NIS facilities. DoD will most
likely allocate $10 million to further MPC&A efforts, $6 million to
tighten security around Russian naval propulsion HEU, and $2 million for
military-to-military efforts in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In addition,
$66 million will go towards the Mayak
fissile material storage facility, $38.5 million will be allotted for
fissile material storage containers, $15 million for Russian chemical weapons
stockpile destruction, and $52 million to eliminate strategic offensive
arms and related infrastructure in Russia and Ukraine. In a separate request,
the DoE will allocate $17 million for technologies monitoring the dismantlement
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the NIS. Under the Nunn-Lugar
II amendment or the "Defense Act of 1996," $100 million will be set aside
to enhance weapons security and safeguard activities both in the NIS and
the US, but allocations for specific projects have yet to be finalized.
Nunn-Lugar II, sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar, and Pete
Domenici, includes provisions to enhance the security of weapons of mass
destruction, increase border control assistance, and further develop verification
technologies in the NIS. It is unclear what role the US "Office of the
National Coordinator for Non-Proliferation Matters" will play in coordinating
CTR efforts, if it is indeed established pursuant to the recommendation
in Nunn-Lugar II legislation.
95-96 HOUSE MEASURES TO CURB CTR FUNDING FAIL
The amendments sponsored by Rep. Gerald Soloman (R-NY) in 1996 and Rep.
Robert Dornan (R-CA) in 1995 requiring a presidential certification that
Russia is in compliance with all arms control treaties and is not pursuing
biological weapons research, among other things have both failed to become
law, and therefore have not affected the funding schedule of the CTR program.
Rep. Soloman’s amendment was defeated (220-202) in the House on 5/15/96.
While Rep. Dornan’s amendment passed (244-180) in the House on 6/13/95,
it was not approved by the President.
5/15/96: HOUSE CERTIFICATION AMENDMENT TO NDAA FAILS
A House amendment that would have prohibited any CTR funding to Russia
and Belarus narrowly failed to pass (220-202). The amendment proposed by
Rep. Solomon (R-NY) called for a presidential certification that Russia
was among other things, in compliance with the CFE Treaty, had ended the
war in Chechnya, and aborted the Ural mountains complex near Beloretsk
(Bashkortostan) before any aid would be granted.
Last updated 22 March 1999
For more recent developments, see the
CTR developments in
Russia and CTR
developments in Ukraine sections.
Comments or questions? E-mail Cristina Chuen at MIIS
CNS: Cristina.ChuenATmiis.edu
This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.
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