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OVERVIEW: UKRAINE'S HEAVY BOMBERS

Sasha Pursley, CNS Research Associate
May 1998

For updated information on this topic, including items on the delivery of Ukrainian bombers to Russia in late 1999 and early 2000, please see the Ukraine: Nuclear Weapons: Bomber Developments and the Russia: Nuclear Weapons: Bombers: Bomber Developments files.

After four years of failed talks with Russia, Ukraine has decided to destroy 40 heavy bombers that it inherited when the Soviet Union collapsed.[9, 10, 11, 12] The decision was made at a meeting of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, chaired by President Leonid Kuchma, on 17 April 1998.[10, 12] Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Volodymyr Horbulin called the decision "a balanced and optimal solution" to resolving the fate of the 19 Tu-160 and 25 Tu-95MS strategic nuclear bombers that remain on Ukrainian soil.[12] Ukraine's new plans involve destroying 40 Tu-160 and Tu-95MS aircraft, putting two planes on display, and fitting two for other uses.[9, 10] The United States has promised Ukraine financial assistance in destroying the nuclear bombers.[9, 10, 11, 12] Ukraine had initially hoped to sell the aircraft to Russia, but negotiations faltered on the issue of the heavy bombers' cost and condition. Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council decided to settle the matter once and for all by destroying the heavy bombers. 

History of Negotiations with Russia
On 14 January 1994, the presidents of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States signed the Trilateral Statement and Appendix "On the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on Ukrainian Territory," in which Ukraine declared itself a nuclear-free power. Despite this, 19 Tu-160 and 25 Tu-95MS strategic nuclear bombers remained on Ukrainian soil in early 1998,[1] due to Russia and Ukraine's inability to reach an agreement on the value of the aircraft. Russian and Ukrainian officials conducted twenty rounds of meetings over the course of four years (1994-April 1998), but failed to produce an agreement acceptable to both sides. At issue was not only the cost of the heavy bombers, but the number of aircraft included in the sale, their condition, and terms of payment.

The Tu-160 heavy bombers are based in Pryluki and the Tu-95MSs are based at the Uzin air base. Ukrainian officials put a high price tag on the nuclear bombers. According to several sources, a single Tu-160 is worth $300 million dollars.[4, 7] Ukraine, however, had reduced the price from $300 million dollars for a single Tu-160 to $800 million dollars for a package deal, although it was never clear how many planes were included in the proposed sale. But Russian officials, after pointing to the deteriorating condition of the aircraft, offered only $75 million dollars.[7] Closely connected with the issue of cost was the number of aircraft included in the deal. Originally Ukraine insisted on including all 44 of the heavy bombers in the sale, but Russia excluded two of the aircraft stored in Uzin, due to obsolesence. As time passed, Russia became less interested in purchasing the fleet of 42 planes. An agreement signed in December 1995, which subsequently fell through, included 10 Tu-160s and 15 Tu-95MSs.[3] In March 1998 Russia only seemed interested in 8 Tu-160s and 10 Tu-95MSs.[8] While Russia and Ukraine continued to haggle over the price, the nuclear bombers remained idle at their bases.

In May 1997, the Ukrainian and Russian Defense Ministries agreed upon a sum for compensating Ukraine for the nuclear bombers.[5] Terms of the proposed sale involved cancelling energy debts owed to Russia, but Ukraine continued to press for its preferred method of compensation, namely, for Russia to pay by providing spare parts for other Ukrainian military aircraft.[8] Several months later, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Serov suggested that the Russians were reconsidering the proposed deal. Serov had consulted with experts who considered it inappropriate to purchase bombers that were not combat-ready and which were designed primarily with nuclear weapons in mind. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin also supported this position, and the Russian government did not appear eager to spend almost $1 billion to acquire the aircraft.[3] But in March 1998 Ukraine and Russia resumed talks on the aircraft, this time including only 18 heavy bombers in the sale (8 Tu-160s and 10-Tu95MSs).[8] At a press conference, Anatoliy Kornukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force, expressed a desire to acquire some of the aircraft. "I think that we should obtain a small part [of the bombers]." Yet this statement was followed by an announcement on 26 March that Russia would not buy the aircraft. Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, Yeltsin's press secretary, said that "the President's position is that Russia doesn't want to purchase the strategic bombers from Ukraine that have remained there after the collapse of the USSR."[7]

Status and Condition
Experts from the Russian Air Force Long-Range Aviation made several inspections of the bombers, and concluded that the physical condition of the aircraft was, in fact, deteriorating.  These experts pointed to the gradual breakdown of sensitive components and assemblies of the fuel system, as a result of the aircraft standing idle without fuel. During one inspection, a Russian officer noted that water was gathering under the carpet in a Tu-95MS cockpit. According to these experts, only 7 out of 19 Tu-160s and 14 out of 25 Tu-95MSs were operational.[1] Ukrainian officials disputed the Russian experts' findings, claiming instead that nearly all the aircraft were safe, in good condition, and capable of flight. The same officials stated that the heavy bombers flew once a year, circling the skies to celebrate Independence Day.[2] To disprove the Russian officials' assertions, Ukraine scheduled a test flight of Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers in June 1997 from Pryluki to Poltava. The test flight was cancelled, however, due to poor weather conditions. In an interview three days after the cancelled flight, Ukrainian Air Force Commander Volodymyr Antonets stated that the "bombers have not taken off precisely due to difficult meteorological conditions." The Air Force Commander emphasized that "there are no other reasons" for aborting the test flight. In part, Antonets planned the test flight to address a statement made by Russian Air Force Commander Petr Deynekin, who claimed that the bombers were not able to fly. Antonets stated that "the bombers were in good technical and combat condition," and that he "was surprised to hear from [Deynekin] that our strategic aviation was not airworthy." According to Antonets, the sale and transfer of the aircraft "has become a political issue. Long-distance strategic bombers have become a means to resolve political rather than military issues."[6]
 
Meanwhile, the cost of maintaining the aircraft had become a drain on Ukraine's budget. According to Horbulin, annual upkeep for the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS cost Ukraine $1.3 million.[10, 11, 12] Since the sale to Russia did not go through, the aircraft would have to be converted or destroyed. It would cost between $167,000 and $200,000 to destroy a single bomber. While Ukraine considered the possibility of using the aircraft to launch missiles into space, Antonets decided that the project was "too expensive."[2] Another stumbling block to conversion to conventional missions was that the aircraft's mission plans and technical documentation related to target sites were removed to Russia, and would be extremely difficult to recreate.[2, 3]

An additional obstacle to the deal was the cruise missiles that came with the heavy bombers. The several hundred AS-15 cruise missiles fitted to the heavy bombers could potentially be used by Ukraine to restore its nuclear forces. More likely, the missiles or parts of them could be sold to other countries, a prospect that greatly concerned Western officials. In the final round of talks with Russia, held in March 1998, the issue of the AS-15 cruise missiles was included in the negotiations.[8] However, it remains unclear how the National Security and Defense Council's decision to destroy the heavy bombers will effect the AS-15 cruise missiles.

For four years, Ukraine and Russia conducted negotiations of the proposed sale of the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS heavy bombers. Several times the parties seemed close to reaching an agreement, yet each time, one or both of the parties found reason to suspend or postpone the sale. In the meantime, the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS nuclear bombers remained idle at their bases in Uzin and Pryluki, while on-again, off-again negotiations attempted to resolve their fate. In the end, Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council decided in April 1998 to destroy the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS heavy bombers, finally closing the book on the aircraft.
Sources:
[1] Leonid Kostrov, "Nuclear Delivery Vehicles Still in Nuclear-Free Ukraine," Novyye izvestiya, 15 January 1998, p. 2; in "Strategic Aircraft Remain Bone of Contention," FBIS-UMA-98-015.
[2] Yanina Sokolovskaya, "Strategicheskiye bombardirovshchiki ne nuzhny ni Rossii, ni Ukraine," Izvestiya, 10 July 1997, p. 2.
[3] Yevgeniy Krutikov, "Russko-Ukrainskaya narodnaya igra "blekdzhek'," Segodnya, 11 June 1997, pp. 1, 3.
[4] "Informatsiya, Rossiya-Ukraina," Yaderny kontrol, no. 36, December 1997, p. 8.
[5] "Ukraina pogasit dolgi bombardirovshchikami," Segodnya, online edition, no. 90, 6 May 1997.
[6] Oleksandr Ilchenko, "Bogataya, krasivaya...da nikto zamuzh ne beryet," Kiyevskiye vedomosti, 24 June 1997, p. 4.
[7] Aleksandr Yegorov, "Ukrainskim Tu-160--ne letat. Kreml ne vykupit sovetskiye bombardirovshchiki u Kieva," Kommersant Daily, 26 March 1998.
[8] Piotr Butowski, "Kiev-Moscow Talks Resume on Cash Dispute," Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 March 1998, p. 6.
[9] RFE/RL NewsLine, 20 April 1998, "Ukraine to Destroy 40 Strategic Bombers."
[10] Intelnews, 21 April 1998; in "Ukraine to Dispose of Strategic Bombers," FBIS-UMA-98-111.
[11] Interfax, 17 April 1998, "Ukraine to Decommission 44 Strategic Bombers."
[12] Interfax, 17 April 1998, "Ukraine Sees Destruction of Bombers as Optimal." {Entered 4/24/98 SP}
 


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Last updated 12 June 1998

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