The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program or the Nunn-Lugar agreement (named for sponsoring Senators Sam Nunn [D-GA] and Richard Lugar [R-IN]) began in 1991 as a piece of US legislation entitled "The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991" (Public Law 102-228, 12/12/91, Title II Soviet Weapons Destruction), which stemmed from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s request for assistance in dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons, and US President George Bush’s subsequent proposal to assist in the disposition, dismantlement, and destruction of nuclear weapons in the Soviet republics. In the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, Congress noted that aid to the Soviet Union and its potential successor states would be in the national security interest of the United States as a means to address the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. This threat was comprised of three components: 1) substandard materials protection, control, and accounting measures for nuclear weapons and materials; 2) the possibility of smuggling nuclear weapons and/or components; and 3) potential transfer of actual weapons, components, and weapons- related knowledge. With these threats in mind, the Act delineates a two-fold objective: "A) to facilitate on a priority basis the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and other weapons in the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor states; and B) to assist in the prevention of weapons proliferation." For Fiscal Year 1992, the Act allotted $400 million of transferred Department of Defense funds for this purpose. ++For cumulative funding to date see chart below+ In 10/92, an additional $400 million was allocated to establish the Safe and Secure Dismantlement (SSD) Talks under the Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act. However, allocation of all funds to the NIS is contingent upon a US presidential certification that the recipient country is:
• "making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying such weapons;
• forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction;
• forgoing any use of fissionable and other components of destroyed nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons;
• facilitating United States’ verification of weapons destruction carried out under section 212;
• complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and
• observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of minorities."
On November 10, 1993, the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act evolved into the "Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993" as part of the FY94 National Defense Authorization Act. The CTR’s main objectives were enhanced to reflect an emphasis on the following five areas:
1. Warhead removal from the Soviet successor states to Russia
2. Destruction and dismantlement of weapons systems
3. Chain of Custody projects
4. Chemical Weapons Destruction Assistance
5. Demilitarization Support
The CTR Program has evolved in three stages:
Stage one, from 1992-93, established the program through negotiations outlining the framework, developed a working relationship, and provided early assistance to the NIS. Stage two, from 1994-95, implemented agreements, devised a management structure, and solidified an acquisition strategy. The final stage,
beginning in 1996, is the program’s "multiyear strategy" which aims to complete the agreed projects.
Structural changes in CTR oversight and funding responsibilities were recommended in the FY 1996 budget request, which delegated the
material control and accounting projects to the Department of Energy, the
ISTC projects to the State Department, and
export control efforts to the Department of Commerce.
NIS CONCERNS
While the CTR has set a precedent in post-cold war arms control efforts and has striven to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation by securing materials and dismantling weapons through joint-assistance programs, it has nevertheless acted as a lightning rod for harsh criticism from both sides. The recipient officials in the Newly Independent States have complained of sluggish implementation efforts and a self-serving US policy which gives preferential treatment to US companies in awarding contracts, even when NIS firms are often willing to do the same work for less money. In addition, some NIS officials have called into question US intentions and whether the CTR program is a means to strip the successor states of their power.
US CONCERNS
Equally harsh criticism abounds from the United States. Some members of Congress claim that CTR money would be better spent on the US military, especially at a time when there are many US military base closings, and also note domestic budget concerns in general. This type of sentiment has led to an unwillingness to support aspects of the CTR not directly related to the physical threat of nuclear weapons such as: conversion, decommissioned officer housing, and site-cleanup. Instead, some in Congress would prefer to focus solely on actual weapons dismantlement and destruction. Additional concerns cited from the US camp include fear of inadvertently subsidizing Russian military modernization and a perceived deficiency in Russia’s commitment to nonproliferation efforts, specifically in the chemical and biological sphere.
PROPONENTS
Proponents of CTR argue that the program has reaped invaluable benefits in the form of improved relations, reduced defense expenditure, and most importantly reduced threat. Examples often cited include more meaningful contacts made between NIS and US officials and the depth of understanding that has been formed; the opportunity to dismantle a threat that the US was spending trillions to counter, for a fraction of the cost; and a quantitative reduction of weapons in the successor states. Instead of four nuclear successor states, eventually there will be only one--and since Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine pledged to become non-nuclear weapon states, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have already followed through on that promise, on 4/25/95 and 5/31/96 respectively. Belarus transferred its remaining SS-25 ICBMs to Russia in November 1996.
All of the project descriptions listed below give a general overview of the goals of each project and some include the current status of the project where information was available. Projects are listed alphabetically under their respective headings of "Chain of Custody," "Demilitarization," "Destruction and Dismantlement," or "Other." Since some projects only apply to a few countries, rather than all, countries where a project is in effect will be indicated by the letters B, K, R, and U.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY
Chain of Custody programs promote and assist the denuclearization of the Soviet successor states. Related achievements have included the transfer of over 2,000 weapons and their components to Russia, safe storage of fissionable material, the transfer of 600kg of HEU from Kazakhstan to the United States-"Project Sapphire," as well as accession to the NPT by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING/EQUIPMENT
Provides safety equipment to cope with accidents during the transport of nuclear warheads to Russia, the destruction and removal of ICBMs, and the destruction of silos. Equipment in this category includes: rail-mounted and road-mobile cranes, VHF portable radios, portable command and control computers, chemical and fire fighting protective clothing, personal dosimetry equipment, Violinist III x-ray and gamma ray instrument kits and air sampling monitors. Transportation and logistics support are also provided. This program will run through the fourth quarter of FY 01.
EXPORT CONTROL
Provides policy advice, training, technical assistance, equipment, and facilities to establish effective export controls.
MATERIAL CONTROL & ACCOUNTABILITY (MC&A)
Projects are intended to acquaint the recipient with US material control, accountability and physical protection equipment and practices, as well as to assist in the creation or strengthening of similar systems. In addition, the project includes hardware implementation of MC&A systems to resolve short-term problems as well as training to address long-term MC&A needs. Training involves local specialists in designing systems and understanding their implementation, provides common framework for US and NIS specialists, and addresses specific facility needs. The MC&A project has grown from one project in 1994, to securing 8 tons of fissile material in 1995, to securing "hundreds" of tons of fissile material in 35 projects in 1996. For FY 97, the DoE has requested $94.2 million--up from $70 million the previous year. In FY 97, the DoE plans to complete MC&A programs at 13 sites in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, while it will expand efforts to include 10-15 additional Russian civilian and military sites including Dmitrovgrad, Elektrostal, Obninsk, Luch, and Mayak; in addition to expanding to 5-7 naval bases, if Congress approves.
NUCLEAR SAFETY INITIATIVE
A multilateral project designed to increase the safety of reactors in Ukraine. This includes a provision to build a Western-style training center for reactor plant personnel at Khmelnitskiy.
DEMILITARIZATION
Demilitarization programs are meant to shift sections of the former Soviet defense complex to the civilian sector.
DEFENSE & MILITARY CONTACTS
INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION*
*Formerly, Industrial Partnership Program; formerly Industrial Partnering Program.
IPP projects aim to promote technological and commercial development in the NIS while creating entrepreneurial opportunities and employment prospects for scientists and engineers who have lost their jobs since the demise of the Soviet Union. The IPP participants, an Inter-Laboratory Board (ILAB) comprised of 10 DoE laboratories and the United States Industry Coalition (USIC), representing 88 US companies and universities, seek investments from private US firms to assist in the privatization and conversion of former Soviet defense industries. Authorized through the FY 94 Foreign Appropriations Act with an initial $35 million, the IPP attempted to shift its funding source to CTR accounts in FY 95, but Congress denied the DoE request of $10 million, leaving the IPP with zero funding for that year. Nevertheless, the initial focus of the Industrial Partnering Program in FY94 led to the approval of over 180 lab-to-institute projects and an allocation of $19.1 million of the original $20 million available for these projects. As the program moved into FY95, the emphasis shifted to industrial partnerships, with 24 projects approved by March 1995. Funds obligated through the CTR program total over $126 million for Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine combined. For FY 97, IPP was allotted $15 million from the DoE, and hopes to receive an additional $14 million from the private sector. In Belarus and Ukraine, this assistance is focused on construction of housing for former officers and defense industry conversion.
Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU)
The STCU is to aid in the transition of scientists
formerly involved in weapons activities to peaceful endeavors in an effort to
help prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and expertise.[1]
In 1998 the STCU budget totalled $28 million. Georgia and Uzbekistan
also participate in STCU projects.[2]
DESTRUCTION & DISMANTLEMENT
Destruction and Dismantlement projects aim to eliminate all strategic offensive weapons and infrastructure from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. These projects assist Russia in keeping to the START I dismantlement timeframe and also in establishing and implementing programs for the destruction of its chemical weapons.
CONTINUOUS COMMUNICATION LINK (B) (GOVERNMENT-TO GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINK)
Provides the equipment and technical assistance necessary to establish continuous government-to-government communications between the United States and the recipient country in order to facilitate compliance with arms treaty reporting obligations.
NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE ELIMINATION
Assists in the elimination of infrastructure directly related to supporting strategic offensive weapons.
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS ELIMINATION
Provides the initial training to operate equipment, one year of parts and maintenance, and consultation for the destruction of the recipient's strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and facilities. Equipment in this category includes: incinerators to destroy liquid rocket fuel and oxidizer derived from weapons destruction, cranes to help prepare missile silos for dismantlement, plasma cutters to cut up missile and heavy bomber airframes, and hydraulic shears to cut up the hulls of nuclear submarines. In Belarus, SOAE aid supports fixed structure foundation elimination, liquid rocket propellant disposition, nuclear infrastructure elimination, and retraining centers. In Kazakhstan, this project focuses on SS-18 silo elimination, strategic bomber elimination, liquid propellant disposition, ICBM/Heavy bomber related infrastructure elimination, and nuclear infrastructure elimination at Degelen mountain. In Ukraine, the project focuses on SS-19 liquid propellant disposition, SS-19 neutralization facility, SS-19 silo elimination, SS-19 housing, SS-24 solid rocket motor disposition, and emergency response support equipment.
(Click here for table)
This file is no longer
being updated. For more recent funding allocations, please see the
Funding Summary section of the Controlling Nuclear Warheads & Materials
database, at
http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/funding.asp.
FISCAL YEAR 1997
9/30/96: PRESIDENT SIGNS FY 97 APPROPRIATIONS BILL INTO LAW
President Clinton signed into law the FY 97 Omnibus Appropriations Bill which includes $427.9 million in DoD funding for the CTR program. Of this amount, $327.9 million will be allocated to already established CTR programs. It is estimated that DoE will allocate $16 million for continuing core-conversion studies at the Russian plutonium production reactors in Krasnoyarsk and Tomsk, $20 million for its lab-to-lab program, and $15 million for MPC&A at NIS facilities. DoD will most likely allocate $10 million to further MPC&A efforts, $6 million to tighten security around Russian naval propulsion HEU, and $2 million for military-to-military efforts in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In addition, $66 million will go towards the Mayak fissile material storage facility, $38.5 million will be allotted for fissile material storage containers, $15 million for Russian chemical weapons stockpile destruction, and $52 million to eliminate strategic offensive arms and related infrastructure in Russia and Ukraine. In a separate request, the DoE will allocate $17 million for technologies monitoring the dismantlement of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the NIS. Under the Nunn-Lugar II amendment or the "Defense Act of 1996," $100 million will be set aside to enhance weapons security and safeguard activities both in the NIS and the US, but allocations for specific projects have yet to be finalized. Nunn-Lugar II, sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar, and Pete Domenici, includes provisions to enhance the security of weapons of mass destruction, increase border control assistance, and further develop verification technologies in the NIS. It is unclear what role the US "Office of the National Coordinator for Non-proliferation Matters" will play in coordinating CTR efforts, if it is indeed established pursuant to the recommendation in Nunn-Lugar II legislation.
95-96 HOUSE MEASURES TO CURB CTR FUNDING FAIL
The amendments sponsored by Rep. Gerald Soloman (R-NY) in 1996 and Rep. Robert Dornan (R-CA) in 1995 requiring a presidential certification that Russia is in compliance with all arms control treaties and is not pursuing biological weapons research, among other things have both failed to become law, and therefore have not affected the funding schedule of the CTR program. Rep. Soloman’s amendment was defeated (220-202) in the House on 5/15/96. While Rep. Dornan’s amendment passed (244-180) in the House on 6/13/95, it was not approved by the President.
Comments or questions? Contact Contact Cristina Chuen at MIIS CNS:
Cristina.ChuenATmiis.edu
This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.
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