ABSTRACT 

The nuclear power industry is an important part of the Ukrainian national economy, having accounted for approximately 45 percent of the total electricity produced in 1997. The commercial power grid consists of five nuclear power stations with fourteen reactors. In addition to nuclear power production, research involving nuclear materials is conducted in several national institutes in Ukraine. Improving the security of the nuclear material under its control is an important goal for the Ukrainian nuclear community. 

Several IAEA member states are collaborating with Ukraine to improve the protection, control and accounting of its nuclear materials. The focal points of US collaboration with Ukraine on nuclear safeguards are the national regulatory authority, a nuclear power station, two national science centers, and a nuclear industry training institute. 

The US Department of Energy has delivered equipment and software that support material control and accounting (MC&A) to the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety, the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant, the Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research, the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology, and the Sevastopol Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry. This paper summarizes MC&A accomplishments of the program to date and our plans to complete MC&A upgrades. 

BACKGROUND 

Discussions between the governments of the United States and Ukraine on US assistance in nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) were initiated in April, 1992. On October 25, 1993, these discussions culminated in the signature of the Safe, Secure Dismantlement (SSD) Program Umbrella Agreement needed to provide assistance to Ukraine in the elimination of Strategic Nuclear Arms from its territory and in efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

On December 18, 1993 the United States Department of Defense and Ukraine's State Committee for Nuclear Radiation Safety signed a document "...concerning development of state systems of control, accounting, and physical protection of nuclear material to promote the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation from Ukraine." Commonly referred to as the Implementing Agreement, the document initiated the SSD Program in the areas of nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A). In early 1994, the SSD initiative was renamed the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, but it is most commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar program, after the senators who led sponsorship of the authorizing legislation. 

The Department of Energy Russia/NIS Nuclear Material Security Task Force is focused on the MPC&A portion of the Nunn-Lugar program. MPC&A is separate from other program areas of the Nunn-Lugar program, such as export control assistance, silo dismantlement, and defense conversion efforts. 

Safeguards systems are comprised of four principal and complementary components: physical protection, material control, material accounting and human reliability. MC&A aims to deter or prevent theft or diversion of nuclear materials through the installation of various detection and monitoring upgrades. For example, various tracking methods are being used to adequately document nuclear material quantities and locations as the materials are handled, processed, and stored. If the nuclear materials are controlled and accounted for in a careful, thorough, and timely manner, the deterrence of "insider theft" is increased. 

Physical Protection (PP) is designed to deter and detect unauthorized acts by "outsiders" through the use of monitoring devices, physical barriers, and force. These measures include a wide range of technical and personnel responses to attacks. Ukraine PP upgrades are discussed in a separate paper in these proceedings [1]. The human reliability aspect of a safeguards system deals with the integrity and sense of personal responsibility of staff members employed at the facilities whose jobs provide them with access to special nuclear materials. 

In August of 1994, US teams performed MPC&A site surveys at the Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research (KINR) and the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (SUNPP) [2]. This experience revealed a discrepancy of views between the United States and Ukraine regarding which facilities require the greatest MPC&A considerations. Exemplary of this is the Government of Ukraine's view of nuclear power plant facilities. The Government of Ukraine regards power plants as vital to their national security because the country relies on nuclear power for over half of its electricity supply during the winter. From a US nonproliferation standpoint, however, nuclear power facilities using LEU are not regarded as high priority facilities; facilities where weapons-useable nuclear materials are used or stored are of greater concern. 

KIEV INSTITUTE FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH 

The Kiev Institute for Nuclear Research (KINR) has a 10 MW (thermal) VVR-M research reactor that uses high-enriched uranium fuel. Fresh fuel is held in a special storage area and spent fuel is stored in a spent-fuel holding pool adjacent to the reactor. 

MC&A upgrades at KINR focus on automation of the old manual inventory system, providing tamper-indicating devices (TIDs) for material containers, developing facility-specific MC&A procedures, and training the facility staff to implement these procedures using modern equipment [3]. KINR technical staff have collaborated with US experts to design and prototype a computerized nuclear materials accounting system (AIMAS; see Nuclear Materials Accounting Software, below). 

Nondestructive assay equipment was delivered to support isotopic analysis of the nuclear materials on site. It includes a high-resolution gamma spectroscopy system, a low-resolution gamma spectroscopy system, and a radioactive source set for energy calibration. Uranium enrichment standards will be delivered in the near future. 

KHARKIV INSTITUTE OF PHYSICS AND TECHNOLOGY 

The Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) is located in Kharkiv, Ukraine, a large city near Ukraine's northeastern border. KIPT contains several important experimental facilities, including a number of electron and ion accelerators and the largest linear accelerator in the Commonwealth of Independent States. In 1993, KIPT was designated the first Ukrainian National Science Center [4]. 

The isotopic composition of many of the materials on site is unknown. The most significant step in the materials accounting upgrade process is repackaging of the weapons-useable materials. KIPT produced suitable, reusable containers at a very competitive price and procured other equipment necessary for the repackaging operation [5]. US experts were prepared to repackage the material, but our Ukrainian partners at KIPT have cited security reasons for doing the work themselves. Repackaging finally began at the end of June 1998. 

Equipment for nondestructive assay of the materials was provided to the facility and a comprehensive inventory is being compiled during the repackaging. The nondestructive assay equipment includes a high-resolution gamma spectroscopy system, a low-resolution gamma spectroscopy system, and a radioactive source set for energy calibration. Uranium enrichment standards will be delivered in the near future. To support the inventory-taking as nuclear materials are repackaged, an active-well coincidence counter was provided. Data are being entered into the AIMAS system as the inventory is repackaged and verified. 

SEVASTOPOL INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND INDUSTRY  

The Sevastopol Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry (SINEI), formerly under the jurisdiction of the Navy of Ukraine, is now affiliated with the Ukrainian State Committee on Nuclear Power Utilization, Energoatom. Its mission is to provide training for nuclear power reactor operators. SINEI, previously a part of the Sevastopol Naval Institute, includes the IR-100 Laboratory, which contains a 200-kWh light-water cooled and moderated research reactor fueled with 10 percent enriched uranium (as UO₂) and an adjacent critical assembly. 

Progress at SINEI has been confounded by several chronic problems. First, because of the territorial dispute between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, access to Sevastopol has been restricted on several occasions. Second, the transfer of SINEI's oversight from the Ministry of Defense to Energoatom necessitated the identification and establishment of a new set of collaborators. Third, telephone, fax, and modem communication with SINEI is difficult because a sufficient number of phone lines for reliable communication with the facility has not been installed. Last, misunderstandings with respect to the customs immunity clause in the Umbrella Agreement resulted in the impounding of shipments of MPC&A equipment and materials for as long as 19 months. 

MC&A procedures for SINEI will be developed in cooperation with the technical staff of the facility. The US has provided or is providing badging and access control systems, computers, the AIMAS software, and tamper-indicating devices. Nondestructive assay equipment was delivered to support isotopic analysis of the nuclear materials on site. It includes a general-purpose high- and low-resolution gamma spectroscopy system and a radioactive source set for energy calibration. Uranium enrichment standards will be delivered in the near future. Appropriate training will also be provided. 

SOUTH UKRAINE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 

The South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (SUNPP) is located approximately 400 kilometers south of Kiev, Ukraine, at Yuzhnoukrainsk. SUNPP produces about 25 percent of the nuclear-generated power for the nation. The plant has three operating VVER-1000 nuclear reactors, each with a rated generating capacity of 1000 megawatts of electrical power. Fuel for the reactors is uranium dioxide (UO₂) that is 3-4 percent enriched in 235U. 

The United States has furnished two low-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy systems for nondestructive assay and a radioactive source set for energy calibration. The version of the AIMAS software provided to SUNPP features a burn-up program so that estimates of fissile material lost/gained can be entered automatically. The United States. is providing underwater video cameras with remote zoom, focus and iris for spent-fuel inventory-taking at SUNPP. 

TRAINING 

In addition to physical improvements, an important component of a program of MPC&A upgrades is enhancement of the safeguards culture of the recipients. To facilitate this culture enhancement, safeguards training courses in the following areas have been identified and provided: 

• Fundamentals of MC&A 
• Fundamentals of NDA 
• Statistics, Variance Propagation, and Measurement Control 
• Structure and Management of a Safeguards Seals Program 
• ADP training ( MicrosoftÒ Windows, Office, and Access) 

Lesson plans and presentation materials for a number of safeguards courses developed for the Russian Methodological and Training Center will be provided to the new training center. Its staff has already made a Russian-language translation of a self-paced course on nuclear materials measurements (MCA-104D) developed by the US DOE Central Training Academy. The training center staff will participate in an instructor development course in the near future. 

NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING SOFTWARE 

A software prototype has been developed for an MC&A inventory system for Ukrainian facilities [6]. This software, the Automated Inventory / Material Accounting System (AIMAS), has been installed on computers delivered to the nuclear facilities. The prototype was designed to provide a starting point for joint US / Ukraine system development. AIMAS was created using Microsoft Access, a relational data base management system in a graphical environment. The current prototype offers basic, generic, functionality for tracking the physical inventory and maintaining a historical record of additions or changes to the inventory. AIMAS incorporates a burn-up program (LEOPARD-VENTURE) to estimate fissile material loss/gain due to reactor operation. It also provides basic reporting capabilities consistent with IAEA requirements. On-line help and users manuals will be provided in the Russian language. 

URANIUM ENRICHMENT STANDARDS 

For the National Institute of Standards and Technology, New Brunswick Laboratory has developed a set of standard reference materials (SRMs) for uranium enrichment. It covers a ₂₃₅U abundance range from 0.7 percent to 4.5 percent, and is useful in calibrating for measurements in the low-enrichment range. A set of these standards will be provided to KINR, KIPT, SUNPP, SINEI, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety (MEPNS). Recently, New Brunswick Laboratory has developed three additional SRMs to extend the range of coverage into the high-enrichment region. A set of these SRMs will be provided to KINR, KIPT, SINEI, and the MEPNS. 

REFERENCES 

1. A. Djakov, C. Hine, R. Ortiz, L. Romesberg, A. Knox, T. Fornek, and T. Zinneman, Physical Protection Upgrades in Ukraine, Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 39th Annual Meeting, Naples, FL, July 26-29, 1996. 
2. G. Kuzmycz, C. Bingham, R. Chen, R. Ceo, T. Ewing, C. Hine, C. Horley, K. Thompson, J. Miranda, C. McWilliams, A. Olson, R. Ortiz, C. Roche, L. Romesberg, D. Shaw, G. Sheppard, G. Walters, and T. Zinneman, The U.S. DOE MPC&A Assistance Program to Ukraine, Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 38th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 20-24, 1997. 
3. I. M. Vishnevsky and V. I. Gavrilyuk, Cooperative Efforts to Improve Accounting, Control, and Physical Protection of Nuclear Material at the Institute for Nuclear Research of the National Academy of Sciences and the State Atomic Energy Commission of Ukraine, Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 37th Annual Meeting, Naples, FL, July 28-August 1, 1996. 
4. V. Zelensky and V. Mikhailov, Cooperative Efforts to Improve Accounting, Control, and Physical Protection of Nuclear Material at the National Science Center 'Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 37th Annual Meeting, Naples, FL, July 28-August 1, 1996. 
5. R. Ceo, L. Flyghed, V. Mikhailov, and T. Zinneman, MPC&A Upgrades at the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 39th Annual Meeting, Naples, FL, July 26-29, 1996. 
6. T. Ewing, C. McWilliams, A. Olson, C. Roche, H. Forsmann, G. Walters, R. Chen, G. Sheppard, R. Ceo, K. Thompson, and G. Kuzmycz, MC&A Software Assistance to Ukraine, Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 38th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 20-24, 1997.