This is an archived page. Please visit the new Ukraine country profile

HISTORY OF THE PROPOSAL FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE IN EUROPE

Martin Kelly
Created: February 1996

Various proposals calling for the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the European region, e.g. Nordic, Baltic and Balkan/Black Sea NWFZs, have appeared since the late 1950s. Such unsuccessful initiatives include the 1957 Rapacki Plan (named for the then-current Polish Foreign Minister), the 1958 Tito Plan, and the 1963 Kekkonen Plan (named for the Finnish Foreign Minister at the time). The impetus for a NWFZ in the northern part of Europe -- the most viable area for such a regional arrangement -- dissipated as Norway, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Iceland each decided unilaterally not to acquire nuclear devices or allow the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories in peacetime. (Norway was the first country to do so, thereby creating a precedent within the NATO framework for a new country to join without accepting the deployment of nuclear weapons.)[1]

 

Proposals for other NWFZs, configured within the region of Europe, have not been taken seriously due to NATO’s nuclear deterrence strategy, as David Fischer has pointed out. NATO wanted to maintain

 

• flexible response,

• deterrence against the superior conventional forces of theWarsaw Pact,

• freedom of movement on the high.[1]

 

The Soviet Union favored the creation of an NWFZ, for with sufficient conventional forces to overwhelm Central and Eastern Europe, the USSR perceived a clear strategic advantage in pushing back the Western nuclear threat.[1]

 

The Belarusian Proposals.

In 1990, Belarus resurrected the idea of a Central and Eastern European NWFZ (CEENWFZ), floating a proposal at the UN General Assembly, albeit to little effect. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) in New York, Belarus reiterated the proposal in an 18 April 1995 plenary statement, explaining that a zone "in the center of Europe" might prevent NATO's nuclear expansion into Eastern Europe.[2,3] At that time, however, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) preferred seeking full military alliance with NATO and immediately rejected the Belarusian proposal. Similarly, the proposal was also dismissed in diplomatic circles due to lack of adequate preparation or elaboration of the concept and its modalities for realization.[2,3]

 

The Ukrainian Proposal for a CEENWFZ.

However, the Ukrainian delegation to the 1995 NPTREC, led by its Permanent Representative to the U.N., Anatoli Zlenko, expressed support for the Belarussian proposal and the two states began discussing a cooperative initiative. More recently, in May 1996, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said in official capacity, "Ukraine is speaking out for the territory of the countries supporting the Central European initiative to be free of nuclear weapons."[4]

Kuchma’s official statement kicked off a summer-long press, on the part of Kiev, to build consensus around the need for a NWFZ in Central Europe. Vladimir Chumak of the Ukrainian President’s Institute for Strategic Studies outlined in a 7/96 Yaderny Kontrol article four reasons why his country considered the time ripe for the establishment of a CEE NWFZ:

 

• Both NATO and Russia are concerned primarily with regional conflicts, not superpower ones. Accordingly, the understanding has emerged that it would be more stable not to have nuclear weapons in Europe at all.

• NATO Member-States, especially the United States, are uncomfortable with the eagerness of some states in Eastern Europe to deploy nuclear weapons on their sovereign territory.

• The Central European states, which ardently desire security assurances, will not receive them outside the context of a CEE NWFZ, in regard of the current geostrategic situation.

• From a military perspective, since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from CEE in 1994, there are no longer any targets for tactical nuclear weapons.[5]

 

With the go-ahead from Kuchma, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko became the spokesman for Kiev’s CEENWFZ initiative. Kiev has consistently explained its interest in creating a CEENWFZ as two-fold: both "to build confidence and improve stability in the region," and to prevent the possible deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of new NATO Member-States.[6,7,8] Of these two reasons, however, the second was more compelling, as Udovenko in July 1996 named possible nuclear deployment the chief problem in the expansion of NATO.[8,9,10,11] Kiev’s call for a CEENWFZ was typically coupled with statements pointing out that Ukraine had voluntarily relinquished the tactical and strategic nuclear weapons left on its territory by the breakup of the Soviet Union. [12,13]

 

 

Ukraine’s Efforts at Consensus-Building for a CEENWFZ.

In the process of building consensus for a CEENWFZ, however, Ukraine has had to balance carefully its objectives between establishing closer ties with NATO and remaining on friendly terms with Russia. [11,14,15]

 

In working with NATO, Kiev repeatedly over the summer of 1996 pitched the idea for a CEE NWFZ as the "foundation for the creation of the new structural elements of a Euro-Atlantic security system."[16] To promote the NWFZ, Ukraine sought a "special partnership" with NATO within the framework of the 16 plus 1 formula, a form of cooperation designed to go beyond the Partnership for Peace program.[8,17] In early 8/96, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Udovenko sent letters to the foreign ministers of NATO Member-States to jump-start the 16 plus 1 process and to give "the Ukrainian initiative a concrete shape."[13,18,19]

 

While testing the CEE NWFZ idea with NATO Member-States, Udovenko continued developing cooperative relations with Moscow. He said, "We are consistently pursuing a foreign political course based on the comprehensive development of relations between Ukraine and Russia….The priority in our policy is relations with Russia based on friendship, mutual understanding, mutual benefit, respect for each other, and noninterference with internal matters."[20,19]

 

A third course pursued by Kiev in stirring interest for a CEE NWFZ was communication with intergovernmental organizations, specifically the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). At the 41st session of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, in 1996, Kuchma discussed the possibility of Ukraine’s integration into the WEU and reiterated the need for new European and Transatlantic security structures.[15] Later in 7/96, the OSCE passed a proposal "On a general and all-embracing security model for the 21st century Europe." The proposal, inter alia, took into account two suggestions, put forward by Ukrainian Chairman of the Supreme Council Oleksandr Moroz; namely, "a provision that no country has the right to consolidate its security at the expense of other states" and a second provision supporting the process of creating a NWFZ in Europe.[21,22,23] Little progress regarding the zone has emerged from Ukraine’s cultivation of these ties.

 

While most of Kiev’s tactics in consensus building for a CEE NWFZ, which originated from the Ukrainian Offices of the President and Foreign Ministry, have proven balanced and diplomatic, more direct and vocal dissatisfaction has recently been evidenced in the Ukrainian legislature. Chairman of the Committee on questions of defense of states security of the Ukrainian High Council, Vladimir Mukhin said, in 11/96, if nuclear weapons are to be deployed on the territory of other European states, then the Ukrainian parliament would have the "full right to raise the issue of redeploying its tactical nuclear weapons" which have been removed to Russia.[24]

 

NATO’S Response to Ukraine’s Endeavor to Create a CEE NWFZ.

Responding to the Ukrainian proposal for a CEE NWFZ, Assistant US Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said in 7/96 that NATO leadership sees no need to place additional nuclear weapons in Europe.[25] However, at that time, regarding its position on a CEE NWFZ, NATO remained quiet.

 

On 8/29/96, General George Joulwan, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), visited Kiev and met with Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk. After the meeting, Joulwan reportedly said that NATO’s military leadership had examined and supported the Ukrainian proposal for a CEE NWFZ.[26] The optimism of this meeting, though, contrasted with official statements from European governments.

 

Shortly after this bilateral meeting, another source reported that the Ukrainian initiative for a CEE NWFZ had not received serious attention in the West.[3] According to this source, French President Jacque Chirac and the British Foreign Office only expressed mild interest in the idea. The United States and the leaders of most European countries were silent on the issue, and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl spoke out against it.[3] Moreover, in response to the letters sent by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry regarding the zone, the foreign ministries of the United States, France and Germany expressed ambivalence, neither supporting nor rejecting the idea.[27] Finally, in 11/96, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana sent an official letter to Udovenko reaffirming that NATO does not intend to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of new Member-States, but rejecting the idea of a CEENWFZ. It said simply, "NATO cannot uphold the Ukrainian idea of creating the zone."[28]

 

While the NATO letter signaled an end to discussions of a CEENWFZ for the time being, obviating the possible deployment of nuclear weapons on new NATO states remains a significant matter for Kiev. In a speech to students at the Ukrainian Diplomatic Academy, although Udovenko did not mention a potential CEENWFZ, he did stress the need to "step up work to put forward an initiative to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons in the region [of Central and Eastern Europe]."[29]

Sources:
[1] David Fischer, Towards 1995: The Prospects for Ending the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, UNIDIR, 1993, pp. 171-72.
[2] Holly Tomasik (MIIS), "A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Central and Eastern Europe," Report for Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8/7/96, pp. 3-4.
[3] Vladimir Orlov, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Aone in Central and Eastern Europe: Proposals and their Future," Paper presented at Non-Proliferation Workshop in Kiev sponsored by the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (MIIS), 9/26-27/96, p. 12. Also available at: <info@pircenter.org>.
[4] Interfax-Ukraine, 5/29/96.
[5] Vladimir Chumak, "A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe: Possibilities and Expectation," Yaderny Kontrol, 7/96, p. 13.
[6] Interfax-Ukraine, 6/4/96; "Udovenko Urges Nuclear-Free Zone in Eastern, Central Europe," FBIS-TAC-96-008, 4/6/96.
[7] "Ukraina Vystupayet za zaklyucheniye soglasheniya o cozdanii v tsentral’noy i vostochnoy evrope zony, svobodnoy ot yadernogo oruzhiya," INTERFAX-UKRAINE, 6/22/96.
[8] INTERFAX-UKRAINE, 8/6/96; "Ukraine: Kiev Insists on Making Potential NATO Members Nuclear-Free," FBIS-SOV-96-153, 8/6/96.
[9] Interfax-Ukraine, 7/5/96; "Minister Urges Support for E. Europe Nonnuclear Zone," FBIS-TAC-96-008, 7/5/96.
[10] "Russia, Ukraine Hail Warm Relations," EXECUTIVE NEWS SERVICE, 8/2/96.
[11] KIEV UNIAN, 9/16/96; "Ukraine: Moroz Favors Nuclear-Free Zone to Counterbalance NATO," FBIS-SOV-96/181, 9/16/96.
[12] Kiev UT-1 Television Network, 7/8/96; "Ukraine: Kuchma Against Siting Nuclear Arms in New NATO States," FBIS-TAC-96-008, 7/8/96.
[13] KIEV UNIAN, 8/1/96; "Ukraine: Udovenko Tables Nuke-Free Proposals in Moscow," FBIS-SOV-96-150, 8/1/96.
[14] Tetyana Silina, "Proposing Nuclear-Free Zones Is Not Ukraine’s Business," KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI, 7/20/96; "Military Expert on NATO, Military Doctrine," FBIS-SV-96-145, 7/20/96.
[15] Lesya Mishchenko, "Both Stars and Fate -- In the Name of Ukraine," DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA, 6/22/96, PP. 1-2; "Ukraine: Udovenko Interviewed on NATO, Bosnia, Russian Election,"FBIS-SOV-96-126, 6/22/96.
[16] Serhiy Zhurets, "Minister of Defense of Ukraine Valeriy Shmarov: ‘The Stance of Our Nation Was Highly Regarded in Brussels,’" NARODNA ARMIYA, 6/19/96; "Ukraine: Shmarov on Ukraine’s Position Vis-a-Vis NATO, Partnership," FBIS-UMA-96-150-S, 6/19/96.
[17] Aleksandr Potemkin, MOSCOW ITAR-TASS, 6/26/96; "Ukraine: Kuchma Denies Ukraine Seeking Associated NATO Membership," FBIS-SOV-96-125, 6/26/96.
[18] KIEV INTELNEWS, 8/1/96; "Ukraine: Udovenko begins Two-Day Moscow Talks," FBIS-SOV-96-150, 8/2/96.
[19] MOSCOW MAYAK RADIO NETWORK, 8/2/96; "Russia: Primakov, Ukrainian Counterpart Upbeat on Talks," FBIS-SOV-96/151, 8/2/96.
[20] NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 7/2/96; "Ukraine: Foreign Minister on Ties With Russia, NATO Cooperation," FBIS-SOV-96-151, 7/2/96.
[21] KIEV UNIAN, 7/8/96; "Ukraine: Kiev’s Proposals on European Security in OSCE Resolution," FBIS-SOV-96-132, 7/8/96.
[22] KIEV UNIAN, 7/8/96; "Ukraine: Stockholm: Moroz Addresses OSCE Forum," FBIS-SOV-96-132, 7/8/96.
[23] KIEV UKRINFORM, 7/10/96; "Ukraine: Moroz Presents Stance on Security Issues to OSCE Assembly," FBIS-SOV-96-133, 7/10/96.
[24] GOLOS UKRAINY (Kiev), 10/17/96, p. 3; "Ukraina ne isklyuchayet vozmozhnoct’ otkaza ot statusa bez"yadernogo gosudarstva," Oborona I Bezopactnoct’, 11/1/96.
[25] MOSCOW INTERFAX, 7/18/96; "Ukraine: Talbott Supports Ukraine’s Involvement in European Security," FBIS-SOV-96-140, 7/18/96.
[26] KIEV UNIAR, 8/29/96; "Ukraine: SACEUR Says Ukraine ‘Has Moved Closer to NATO,’" FBIS-SOV-96-170, 8/29/96.
[27] KIEV UNIAN, 10/4/96; "Ukraine: Kiev To Concentrate Efforts for Nuclear-Free Zone in Europe," FBIS-SOV-96-195, 10/4/96.
[28] Rostyslav Khotyn, "The End of the Zone. It Would Not Harm Kiev To Forget about One of Its Diplomatic Initiatives," ZERKALO NEDELI, 11/16-22/96, p.2; "Ukraine: Nuclear-Free Zone Concept Said ‘Doomed to Failure,’" FBIS-SOV-96-228, 11/22/96.
[29] KIEV UNIAN, 12/14/96; "Ukraine: Foreign Minister Outlines Policy Goals," FBIS-SOV-96-242, 12/14/96.

 

---

NIS Profiles
 What's New | Search | Overviews | Maps | Tables | Glossary

---

Comments or questions? Contact Michael Jasinski at MIIS CNS: Michael.Jasinski@miis.edu

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

HOME  |  CONTACT US  |  SITE MAP