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here.)
3/20/2001: ENERHOATOM PLANS CONSTRUCTION OF KHMELNYTSKYY NPP UNITS 3 AND 4
BY 2010-2014 Enerhoatom
Executive Director of Production Viktor
Stovbun stated on 20 March 2001 that current plans anticipate completion of
Khmelnytskyy NPP Units 3 and 4 by 2010-2014. According to Stovbun, decisions
regarding the further construction of Units 3 and 4 will be made after the completion of
Khmelnytskyy Unit 2 and Rivne Unit 4.[1] On 29 January 2001, Khmelnytskyy NPP
Director Volodymyr Sofiyuk had said that construction
work on Units 3 and 4 had been halted indefinitely, as
the reactor type had not yet been chosen and there were no specific plans
for completion.[2] Henadiy Sazonov,
Enerhoatom project director, said in December 2000 that Russian VVER-1000
reactors would not be chosen for Units 3 and 4, and the model
would be determined through an international tender.[3]
However, Stovbun's remarks on 20 March 2001 suggested that Russian VVER-1000 reactors
or their more modern variants might be chosen, because construction work
already completed on the units is suited for a Russian reactor type.[1]
Sources: [1] "Tretiy i chetvertyy energobloki
Khmelnitskoy AES mogut byt dostroyeny v 2010-2014 gg.," Interfax, 20
March 2001. [2] "Ukraina ne vedet dostroyku blokov
Khmelnitskoy AES - direktor stantsii," Interfax, 29 January 2001. [3] "No VVERs for Khmelnitsky 3 and
4," Nuclear Engineering International, December 2000. {Entered
5/25/01 RG}
1/15/2001: ENERHOATOM AND KUCHMA EMPHASIZE
NECESSITY OF COMPLETING NEW POWER UNITS AT KHMELNYTSKYY AND RIVNE NPPS On 15 January 2001, Enerhoatom
announced that completion of the power units under construction at the
Khmelnytskyy and Rivne NPPs is necessary due to the limited supply of fossil fuel for regional electrical power plants and the high cost of importing
fuel. Enerhoatom said that the regional power plants are obsolete and
past the end of their service lives, and the decision to complete the power units is both
economically and environmentally justified.[1]
Ukrainian
President Kuchma similarly emphasized the need to complete the
Khmelnytskyy and Rivne NPP power units during a meeting with
Chornobyl
NPP leadership on 20 February 2001. Kuchma said that Ukraine must
complete the power units even if the EBRD fails to provide the funding that was
promised by a Memorandum signed with
the G-7 in 1995. His statement came after the EBRD informed
Ukrainian officials that the bank directors were reconsidering renewal of their
funding program to Ukraine. Kuchma expressed his dissatisfaction with
international finance organizations, saying that they have continually
attached new conditions to their aid to Ukraine and show a lack of desire to
fund the construction of the power units.[2]
Sources: [1] "Dostroyka blokov ukrainskikh
AES - yedinstvennoye ekonomicheski i ekologicheski opravdannoye resheniye,
schitayut v 'Energoatome'," Interfax, 15 January 2001. [2] "Prezident Ukrainy
vyskazyvayetsya za dostroyku Khmelnitskoy i Rovenskoy AES," Interfax, 20
February 2001. {Entered 5/30/01 RG}
8/20/2000:
UKRAINE PLANS TO FINISH BUILDING ADDITIONAL NPP POWER UNITS WITHOUT WESTERN
AID As reported by Interfax on 20 August 2000, Ukrainian
Deputy Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko announced that Ukraine can independently finish building
Unit 2 of the Khmelnytskyy
NPP and Unit 4 of the Rivne NPP due to
increases in energy revenues.[1,2] The estimated $700-800 million cost of constructing the two new
units will be financed by increased electricity tariffs, collecting energy
debts owed to Enerhoatom by construction firms and equipment suppliers, as well as
Russian credits in the form of equipment and the first nuclear fuel load for the reactor. ITAR-TASS reported that
Enerhoatom intends to use Russian and Ukrainian equipment to
complete the construction of the power units. However, automated control
systems for the reactors may be purchased from Western firms.[3] The
additional Rivne and Khmelnytsky units would compensate for the final
shut-down of the Chornobyl NPP.[4]
Sources: [1]
"Ukraina sposobna samostoyatelno dostroit atomnyye energobloki-
vitse-premier,"
Interfax, No.1, 20 Aug 2000. [2]
"Ukrainian Energy Market to Finance Construction of Nuclear Power Plant
Units," Interfax, No. 3, 20 July 2000. [3] ITAR-TASS, 21 Aug 2000; in "Ukraine: Nuclear Plants to Use Domestic, Foreign
Components," FBIS Document CEP20000821000189. [4]
Interfax, 6 June 2000; in "Russia: Deputy Minister Regrets Decision to Close Chernobyl,"
FBIS Document CEP20000606000139.{Entered 9/14/2000 RG}
5/16/2000: UKRAINE MAY HOLD NEW TENDER FOR
RIVNE AND KHMELNYTSKYY NPP CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS Yulia Tymoshenko,
Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, told Interfax on 16 May 2000 that the
government may hold a new tender for the Rivne and Khmelnytskyy NPP construction
projects if the present contractor [not named in report] does not lower
its price. The original tender was for the amount of $1.4 billion,
however the contractor then presented a figure of $2 billion to complete
the work. Tymoshenko said that if the contractor does not lower its price
to the original figure, Ukraine can legally hold a new tender for the contract.
["Ukraine may call new tender to complete
nuclear reactors," Interfax, 16 May 2000, Vol. V, Issue 89; in FBIS
Document CEP20000516000182.] {Entered 5/17/2000 GD}
3/25/2000: ATTEMPT MADE TO STEAL NUCLEAR
FUEL AT KHMELNYTSKYY NPP The UT-1 television news presented a story on 25
March 2000 concerning the uncovering of "a group of dealers" attempting
to steal nuclear fuel from the Khmelnytskyy NPP and smuggle it out of the
country. Members of the group have been arrested. UT-1 reported
that the fuel was to be sold for $500,000 per container in Moldova.
No details were given about the group. UT-1 also reported that six
criminal charges had been filed against several Khmelnytskyy NPP managers
for illegal barter operations resulting in the theft of 800,000 hryvnyas
(about $146,000 as of 25 March 2000). According to the report, law
enforcement agencies now control all transactions at the plant. (Other reports
of attempted theft of nuclear materials from nuclear power plants may be found
in the NIS Nuclear
Trafficking Database.)
[UT-1 Television, 25 March 2000; in
"Ukraine: Fuel Theft at Nuclear Plant Thwarted," FBIS Document CEP20000326000081.]
{Entered 3/31/2000 GD}
2/7/2000: KHMELNYTSKYY-2 CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
STOLEN, SALE THWARTED On 7 February 2000, Volodymyr Vezdenetskyy, deputy
head of the investigative directorate of the Khmelnytskyy Oblast branch
of the Internal Affairs Ministry, told journalists that his directorate
was investigating the theft of six 495kg pipe covers, used in the reactor's
emergency cooling system. The perpetrators were discovered when they
tried to sell two of the covers, which cost more than 52,000 hryvnyas apiece
(over $9000 as of 8 February 2000), to a scrap metal dealer for 1600 hryvnyas
(about $283 as of 8 February 2000). Vezdenetskyy said that the thieves
were probably foremen involved in the construction of Unit 2. Due
to the weight of the items in question, a crane operator and a truck driver
were also necessary.
[Mikhail Vasilevskiy, "Neveroyatnaya
krazha na Khmelnitskoy AES," Den online edition, http://www.day.kiev.ua,
8 February 2000.]{Entered 3/30/2000 CC}
1/12/2000:
TWO FORMER KHMELNYTSKYY NPP MANAGERS SOUGHT FOR CRIMINAL WRONGDOING Ukrainian authorities are searching for former Khmelnytskyy
NPP director Viktor Sapronov and a former deputy director, Mr. Teplov.
Sapronov is sought in connection with transferring almost $20,000 in plant
funds to his dentist. In addition, Sapronov is accused of transferring
almost 1 million hyrvnyas (about $181,000 as of 12 January 2000) to a pension
fund. Sapronov disappeared after learning of the charges against
him.[1,2] Deputy Director Teplov is being sought on charges that he was
involved in suspicious transactions between the NPP and commercial structures.[2]
Sources: [1] "Uslugi stomatologa oboshlis direktoru
AES v $20 tysyach," Segodnya online edition, http://today.viaduk.net,14
December 1999. [2] Andriy Sek, "Draconian methods
in the year of the dragon? How shall we fight corruption and organized
crime," Ukrayina Moloda, 12 January 2000; in "Scale of Ukraine Corruption,
Tasks Seen," FBIS Document FTS20000125000958. {Entered 3/23/2000 GD}
9/29/99: EBRD DEFERS DECISION
ON FINANCING KHMELNYTSKYY-2 AND RIVNE-4 As Ukraine moves to complete Khmelnytskyy's Unit
2 and Rivne's Unit 4, which are scheduled to be put into operation after
the closure of the Chornobyl NPP, prospects of receiving Western loans
for the project are uncertain.[1,2] In 1995, the G-7 countries promised
to allocate $800-900 million to complete the two reactors.[1,3] The European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) tentatively agreed in early
1999 to advance a $190 million loan for the reactors' completion.[4] However,
the EBRD is postponing its final decision, insisting that prior to receiving
the loan, Ukraine must meet international nuclear safety requirements,
reduce barter payments for electricity,[5] privatize regional energy firms,[5,6]
indicate a date for shutting down the Chornobyl NPP, and separate assets
belonging to the Chornobyl NPP from Enerhoatom.[7] The EBRD's decision
is further contingent upon the positions of the individual European governments
that would grant the loan. While Germany, for example, has refused to allocate
any funds until it carefully reviews the results of the German-Ukrainian
negotiations,[8,9] France and Finland have been supportive of assistance.[10,11]
The total financial package for completion of the reactors is estimated
at $1.75 billion, of which the EBRD would cover 10 percent, the Financial
Times wrote on 29 September 1999.[6]
Sources: [1] "EBRD Chernobyl Proposals Rejected,"
Nuclear
Engineering International, June 1999, p.8. [2] "Kuchma: G7 Will Stand By Pledge
To Finance Nuclear Facilities," Interfax, 29 April 1999. [3] Igor Kudrik, "EBRD Indecisive,
Russia Cautious," Bellona web site, www.bellona.no/e/russia/990215.htm,
15 February 1999. [4] Tony Wesolowsky, "Ukraine: EBRD
Plans To Fund Controversial Nuclear Reactors," Radio Free Europe,www.rferl.org/newsline/1999/02/170299.html,
29 January 1999. [5] "EBRD Stalls on N Industry Loans,"
Ukrainian
Weekly, 25 April 1999, p. 2. [6] Financial Times, 29 September
1999, p. 3; in "Condition on Ukraine Loan," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe. [7] UNIAN, 30 April 1999; in "Talks
With European Bank on Future of Chernobyl Plant Continue," Lexis-Nexis
Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe. [8] Interfax, 17 June 1999; in "Ukrainian
Officials Discuss Debt Issues With IMF Head," FBIS Document FTS19990618000043. [9] Intelnews,16 July 1999;
in "Germany Withholding Financing of Ukrainian," FBIS Document FTS19990716000577. [10] "Frantsiya podderzhit v YeBRR
proyekt dostroyki reaktorov na 2-kh ukrainskykh AES, Interfax, 23
April 1999. [11] "EU Must Help Ukraine in Building
Nuclear Reactors - Finnish PM," Interfax, 23 July 1999. {Entered
10/11/99 SK} 9/9/99: RUSSIA WILL ASSIST UKRAINE IN CONSTRUCTION
OF KHMELNYTSKYY-6 AND RIVNE-4 Russia has earmarked $60-70 million
in its 2000 budget to aid in the completion of Unit 4 of the Rivne NPP
and Unit 6 of the Khmenlnytskyy NPP.[1] This aid will come in the form
of equipment and nuclear fuel for the two nuclear reactors.[1,2]
Sources: [1] Intelnews, 9 September 1999;
in "Russia to Fund Ukrainian Nuclear Reactor Construction," FBIS Document
FTS19990910000130. [2] "Russia Ready to Fill Ukraine's
Nuclear Energy Gap," Jamestown Monitor, 23 July 1999. {Entered 10/7/99
SK}
7/9/99: GERMANY PREFERS NON-NUCLEAR ENERGY OPTIONS
TO COMPLETION OF KHMELNYTSKYY-2 AND RIVNE-4 Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and German Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder met on 9 July 1999 to discuss completion of Khmelnytskyy's
Unit 2 and and Rivne's Unit 4.[1] Germany has been trying to persuade the
Ukrainian government to consider non-nuclear energy alternatives to compensate
for energy losses after the Chornobyl NPP is decommissioned.[2] The German
authorities would prefer to provide Ukraine with modern fossil-fuel or
gas-fired facilities, rather then funding construction of Khmelnytskyy's
Unit 2 and Rivne's Unit 4, which are 80 percent complete.[1,2] The Ukrainian
government, nevertheless, insists on finishing the nuclear reactors, pointing
out that the non-nuclear option would cost $842 million more than the $1.1
billion needed to complete the construction of the two nuclear reactors.[1]
If the Western countries do not provide Ukraine with financial help, Ukraine
will finish the construction of the two reactors with Russian help or by
itself.[1,3] In this case, the reactors would be completed without any
of the safety upgrades envisioned by the EBRD. Nevertheless, it seems likely
that the Schroeder cabinet will eventually approve German aid for the reactors,
since former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl committed his country to assist
Ukraine in constructing the reactors.[1]
Sources: [1] Mark Hibbs, "Ukraine Rejects German
Offer to Replace K2/R4 With Gas, Coal," Nucleonics Week, 15 July
1999, pp.6-7. [2] Ukrayinske Radio Second Program,
8 April 1999; in "Germany Will Not Fund New Nuclear Plants in Ukraine,"
FBIS Document FTS19990408001857. [3]"EBRD Chernobyl Proposals Rejected,"
Nuclear
Engineering International, June 1999, p.8. {Entered 10/14/99 SK} 5/11/99: ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS OPPOSE CONSTRUCTION
OF KHMELNYTSKYY-2 AND RIVNE-4 Environmental and anti-nuclear groups oppose construction
of Khmelnytskyy's Unit 2 and Rivne's Unit 4, UNIAN reported on 11 May 1999.
The Ukrainian environmental organization Zelenyy Svit (Green World) says
that the project violates the law on finishing construction of the reactors
and safety principles. Zelenyy Svit further pointed out that the reactors
did not pass the state environmental assessment examination.[1] European
environmental groups also pronounced the project economically and environmentally
unsound. They urged the EBRD not to finance the construction and to consider
alternative energy sources. According to Charles Frank, EBRD's first vice
president, the Khmelnytskyy and Rivne reactors have more advanced designs
than the Chornobyl reactor and have been upgraded to Western safety standards.
Sources: [1] UNIAN, 11 May 1999; in "Environmentalists
Oppose Two New Reactors," FBIS Document FTS19990514000752. [2] Gill Tudor, "EBRD Defends Kiev's
Controversial Plans for Nuclear Power Projects," New Europe, 26
April-2 May 1999, p. 22. {Entered 10/14/99 SK}
9/19/98: YELTSIN PLEDGES $180 MILLION FOR COMPLETION
OF KHMELNYTSKYY-2 AND RIVNE-4 In an informal meeting between Ukrainian and Russian
Presidents Leonid Kuchma and Boris Yeltsin in Moscow Oblast on 19 September
1998, Yeltsin promised to allocate $180 million in the 1999 budget for
completion of Khmelnytskyy's Unit 2 and Rivne's Unit 4.[1,2] According
to President Kuchma, the $180 million will come in the form of technology
and fresh nuclear fuel. Kuchma further stated that Ukraine and Russia will
cooperate in completing the construction of the two reactors regardless
of the final decision of the EBRD on financing the
project. According to Yuriy Bespalko, press secretary of Minatom,
no concrete figures were named, nor more contracts signed, at the Yeltsin-Kuchma
meeting.[3]
Sources: [1] Interfax, 19 September 1998; in
"Yeltsin, Kuchma Agree to Set up Joint 'Anticrisis Group'," Lexis-Nexis
Academic Universe, web.lexis-nexis.com/universe. [2] Viktor Lugovik and Viktor Yadukha,
"Rossiya zaplatit za ukrainskiye reaktory," Segodnya, online edition,
www.ipres.ru,
13 October 1998. [3] "Kuchma rasskazyvayet skazki,"
Anti-atom
Press, No. 182, 2 October 1998. {Entered 10/29/99 SK}
6/30/97: KHMELNYTSKYY-1 POWER
SUPPLY DISRUPTED A defect in an auxiliary transformer
on a 330 kV transmission cable interrupted power to Unit 1 during the reactor's
planned maintenance. For 90 minutes on 30 June 1997 the reactor was
without power, according to the Information Center of the Ministry of Environmental
Protection and Nuclear Safety. Emergency sources of power, including
three diesel generators to supply electricity to the reactor's safety control
system and accident prevention equipment, came on line during the outage.
In less than an hour, workers restored power to Khmelnytskyy-1 by attaching
another cable.
[UNIAN, 1 July 1997; in "Ukraine: Fault
Disrupts Power Supply to Khmelnitskiy Nuclear Plant," FBIS-SOV-97-182.]{Entered
11/24/97 AjP}
5/5/97: KHMELNYTSKYY-1 CLOSED FOR
PLANNED MAINTENANCE Unit 1 at the Khmelnytskyy NPP was
shut down on 5 May 1997 for scheduled repairs, according to Derzhkomatom.
The 73-day maintenance period will include spent fuel removal, fuel casing
examinations, and safety system cooling duct restoration. Radiation levels
remained stable during the shutdown.
["Ukrainian Nuclear Station Stops Unit
for Routine Maintenance Works," RIA-Novosti Hotline, 5 May 1997.]{Entered
10/24/97 AjP} 2/18/97: FRANCE AND UKRAINE TRY
TO ATTRACT FUNDING FOR NEW REACTORS At a press conference on 18 February
1997, Electricite de France (EdF) Director Jean-Pierre Baret stated that
twenty French nuclear power engineering experts and Ukraine's Energoatom
are working to form a group to develop proposals designed to attract Western
investment for the completion of Khmelnytskyy-2 and Rivne-4. EdF serves
as a consultant to Derzhkomatom. At the press conference, Derzhkomatom
Deputy Chairman Anatoliy Chernov also announced that Ukraine will seek
tenders by 2000 for selecting a new type of reactor for NPPs in Ukraine.
Chernov noted that France has "a good chance of winning this tender."
[Intelnews, 21 February 1997; in "Ukraine:
State Firm, French Experts To Cooperate on Nuclear Units," FBIS-SOV-97-035,
21 February 1997.]{Entered 8/1/97 MK}
12/9/96: KHMELNYTSKYY-1 SHUT DOWN
DUE TO FALLING PRESSURE At 7:15 p.m. local time on 9 December
1996, Unit 1 at the Khmelnytskyy NPP underwent emergency closure after
pressure fell in the unit's first circuit. The decrease of
Khmelnytskyy-1 pressure resulted from a power fluctuation in the turbogenerator
brought on by a flaw in the turbine regulating system, according to a power
plant spokesman. Power generation is expected to resume on 10 December
1996. No fluctuations in background radiation at the plant occurred,
and the event measured zero on the International Nuclear Event Scale.
[Interfax, 10 December 1996; in "Ukraine:
Falling Pressure Forces Closedown of Nuclear Power Unit," FBIS-SOV-96-239.]{Entered
10/24/97 AjP}
10/12/96: KHMELNYTSKYY-1 UNDERGOES
EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN: INES-0 According to the Ukrainian Ministry
of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety, Unit 1 at the Khmelnytskyy
NPP, which had been operating at full capacity, was shut down due to a
fault in an auxiliary pipeline in the reactor. The malfunction resulted
in a radioactive water leak, which remained within the containment vessel
of the reactor. ITAR-TASS reported that the temporary shutdown resulted
from a leak in an air-valve flange on the generator. The leakage did not
increase levels of radiation at or around the plant and was given a preliminary
rating of zero on the International Scale of Nuclear Events (INES). According
to Ukrainian sources, Unit 1 was restarted following necessary repair work
on 10/15/96.
[UNIAN, 10/14/96; in BBC Monitoring
Service, "Ukraine: Fault Closes Reactor at Khmelnitskiy Nuclear Plant,"
10/18/96.] {Entered 12/31/96 GN}
7/26/96: TWO NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS KILL
WORKER AND LEAK RADIATION: INES 3 Two nuclear accidents at Unit 1, which
has been undergoing scheduled large-scale repairs since 7/20/96, killed
an employee and released radiation into Unit 1's interior halls. The first
accident took place during testing before Unit 1's scheduled restart when
a steam pipe burst, killing a worker. The second accident occurred several
hours later when radioactive water from the circuit leaked into the nitrogen
storage area after plant workers failed to conduct a safety check. According
to plant management, radioactive contamination was limited to an inside
area and was rapidly eliminated. Both accidents were rated level 3 on the
INES seven-point scale for nuclear accidents.
Sources: [1] Chrystyna Lapychak, "Two Accidents
at Ukrainian Nuclear Plant Kill Worker, Release Radiation," Omri Daily
Digest, 7/26/96. [2] Natalya Kondratyuk, Russian Public
Television (Moscow), 7/26/96; in " 'Staff' Blamed for Khmelnitskaya Nuclear
Accident," FBIS-SOV-96-146, 7/26/96. {Entered 10/25/96 GN}
5/30/96:BRITISH GOVERNMENT
AID According to the Minister of Environment
and Nuclear Safety Yuriy Kostenko, the British government has provided
$80,000 to buy equipment for a training facility (see entry 9/95 below)
under construction in Khmelnytskyy.
[EXECUTIVE NEWS SERVICE, 5/30/96, No.
278]
4/20/96:EBRD WILL PROVIDE
$975 MILLION TO COMPLETE KHMELNYTSKYY AND RIVNE NPPs The European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) reportedly has been influenced by the G-7 to take
the lead in raising at least$975 million (650 million pounds) to complete
the Khmelnytskyy and Rivne NPPs.
[Mary Brasier, "West Faces Soaring
Cost Of Chornobyl," Daily Telegraph, 4/20/96, p. 17.]
4/14/96:UKRAINE APPEALS
TO EBRD FOR MORE MONEY FOR EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR SECTOR The EBRD is considering granting $1
billion to Ukraine to complete the Khmelnytskyy and Rivne reactors. Petro
Hermanchuk, the Ukrainian Finance Minster, appealed to the EBRD board to
lend even more money to Ukraine for this expansion of the nuclear sector.
[Peter Rutland, "Ukraine Pleas For
More Cash For Chornobyl," Omri Daily Digest, 4/15/96.]
3/96: TRAINING CENTER AND COMPUTER
MODELS AT KHMELNYTSKYY According to the US Department of Energy
(DOE), plant analyzers and computer models have been developed for the
nuclear power plant simulators at Khmelnytskyy. A training center has also
been set up there.
[Working Document to the Scientific
and Technological Options Assessment Panel of the European Parliament,
"Nuclear Safeguards and Nuclear Safety in the East," November 1996, p.
45.] {Entered 10/17/97 JP}
2/18/96:UNIT 1 WILL COMPENSATE
FOR ENERGY LOST AT ZAPORIZHZHYA UNIT 2 Khmelnytskyy Unit 1 was brought on
line following completion of repairs. According to the Minister of Energy,
Oleksiy Sheberstov, this unit was to compensate for energy lost at Zaporizhzhya
Unit 2, which is not working at normal capacity due to a lack of fuel.
["Nuclear Power Plants Pushed To Compensate
For Cut From Power Grid," Post Soviet Nuclear and Defense Monitor,
3/12/96, pp. 7-8.]
2/15/96:ELECTRICITE DE FRANCE WILL
HELP TO COMPLETE KHMELNYTSKYY AND RIVNE The cost of completing Khmelnytskyy
Unit 2 and Rivne Unit 4 has been estimated to be around $1 billion by Electricite
de France. Khmelnytskyy Unit 2 was 85.5% completed when construction was
stopped. With significant safety upgrades through collaboration with Western
firms, the new timeline would have it on line by 2000.
[Ann MacLachlan, "EBRD Studying Request
To Fund Completion Of Ukrainian Reactors," Nucleonics Weeks, 2/15/96,
pp. 1-2.]
2/12/96: EBRD WILL PARTICIPATE IN
FINAL STAGES OF KHMELNYTSKYY AND RIVNE CONSTRUCTION The EBRD reportedly was considering
participation in the final stages of construction of Khmelnytskyy Unit
2 and Rivne Unit 4. It planned to give Ukraine financial estimates of these
projects before the nuclear safety summit in Moscow in 4/96.
["EBRD Into New Reactors," Eastern
Economist, 1/12/96, p. 4.]
1/31/96:ANONYMOUS CALL THREATENS
TERRORIST ATTACK AT KHMELNYTSKYY NPP The Khmelnytskyy NPP received an anonymous
call warning of an imminent terrorist attack on the plant, according to
the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety.
["Ukraine: Nuclear Power Plant Put
On Terrorist Alert," UNIAN, 1/31/96.]
1/21/96:SHORT CIRCUIT AT
UNIT 1 Unit 1 was shut down due to a short
circuit. It was brought back on-line and reconnected to the grid on 2/19/96
following repairs.
[Interfax, 2/19/96; in "Russia: No
1 Unit At Khmelnytskyy Nuclear Plant Back In Operation," BBC Monitoring
Service, 2/23/96.]
1/11/96: PLANT MANAGERS SAY THAT
RADIATION LEAK WAS NO THREAT A failure in the plant's gas purification
system resulted in a radiation leak into the atmosphere. The daily curie
rate was 30.5 instead of the normal 5. The plant managers reported that
the
leak did not pose a threat to people in the area.
["AES Radiation Leak," Eastern Economist,
1/15/96, p. 18.]
12/19/95: UNIT 1 INCIDENT - 0 ON
INES Unit 1 was cut off from the network
due to hydrogen leaking from a crack in a pipe leading to the cooling unit.
The combustion of this hydrogen was stopped 10 minutes after the unit was
taken off-line. REUTER reported that the reactor was taken off the electricity
grid but was not shut down completely. The reactor was brought back on-line
six hours later. This incident was rated a zero on the INES scale. There
were no breaches of radiation limits or safety conditions at and around
the station.
Sources: [1] "Znovy Zaymannya Na AES. Tsyoho
Razy Vodnyu," Holos Ukrainy, 12/21/95, p. 1. [2] "Accident At Khmelnytskyy Nuclear
Power Station," ITAR-TASS, 12/19/95. [3] "Small Fire Halts Ukraine Nuclear
Power Output," Reuter, 12/20/95.
12/95:UNIT 2 WILL BE BROUGHT
ON LINE IN TWO AND A HALF YEARS Unit 2, which is 85% complete, can
potentially be brought on line in two and a half years. Electricite de
France (EdF) has presented plans for the upgrading and completion of this
unit. EdF will work as a consultant as the unit is completed.
["Data Features: World Nuclear Generating
Capacity 1993/94," 12/95, p. 45.]
10/2/95:UNIT 1 IS BROUGHT
BACK ON LINE Unit 1 was brought back on line. It
had been switched off on 9/30/95 due to a leaking component of the hydrogen
cooling system.
["Ukraine: Khmelnytskyy Nuclear Power
Plant Back To Full Capacity," BBC Monitoring Service; in Reuter Insurance
Briefing.]
9/95:TRAINING CENTER IS
ESTABLISHED AT KHMELNYTSKYY A training center with a simulator,
financed by the United States, is being established at Khmelnytskyy . A
contract to supply the simulator was signed with S3 Technologies at the
end of 1994. As part of a wider program to improve training and plant safety,
Ukraine has a policy (but not a law) to provide simulators for each nuclear
sight. Support for computer safety assessment techniques comes from the
United States, Germany, France, and Canada.
Sources: [1] Janet Wood, "The Simulator Explosion,"
Nuclear
Engineering International, 9/95, p. 50. [2] "Ukraine," by Nikolai Kurilchik
and Alexei Breus, Nuclear Europe Worldscan, 7-8/95, p. 77.
9/30/95:UNIAN REPORT According to the UNIAN news agency,
Unit 1 was taken off line due to a fault in the power generator. On 9/26/95
a high-voltage line had disconnected and power at Unit 1 dropped to 760
Mw. There was no change in background radiation.
["Ukraine: Emergency Stoppage At Ukraine's
Khmelnytskyy Nuclear Power Plant," BBC Monitoring Service, 10/9/95, p.
20.]
8/7/95:INCIDENT AT KHMELNYTSKYY
UNIT 1 PROMPTS SHUTDOWN There was an emergency shut-down at
Unit 1. According to the information center at the NPP, the shutdown was
triggered by a rise in water level and the failure of level sensors in
Steam Generator 1. The incident radiation was reported to be unchanged
and the established limits of safe operation were not transcended. The
turbogenerator of the first reactor was reactivated on 8/8/95. Level sensors
in the steam generator reacted to a false signal that the level was lowering,
according to the plant's press office. An investigation into what triggered
the false alarm is under way.
Sources: [1] "Otklyuchen Turbogenerator Pervogo
Energobloka Khmelnytskoy AES," Segodnya, 8/22/95, p. 1. [2] "Emergency shutdown of Khmelnytskyy
Nuclear Power Station," ITAR-TASS, 8/8/95/. [3] "In Ukraine", Post Soviet Nuclear
and Defense Monitor, 9/1/95, p. 15. [4] "Nuclear Power Plant Reactivated,"
Interfax, 8/8/95.
7/15/95:LEAKAGE OF OIL FROM
TRANSFORMER A generating set (unspecified) was
stopped due to leakage of oil from the set's transformer. The background
radiation is within normal levels. An investigation into the causes of
the accident is underway.
["Khmelnytskyy Nuclear Plant Stopped
Due to Leakage," UNIAN, 7/15/95.]
1/16/95: CIRCULATING PUMPS WERE
DISCONNECTED FROM THE MAIN SYSTEM AT UNIT 1 The emergency shut down system was
activated at Unit 1. Three main circulating pumps were disconnected from
the main system due to a failure of the power supply of the transducers.
Serhiy Nazarenko, an official with the State Committee for Atomic Energy
Use, stated that there was no increase in radiation levels in the area
and the cause of the accident was being investigated. The reactor was to
be shut down in the near future for repairs and regular maintenance of
the control and safety mechanisms.
["Reactor at Khmelnytskyy Nuclear Plant
Shut Down After Mishap," OMRI Daily Digest, Vol. 1, No. 12, 1/17/95.]
1/12/95:THE MOST COST-EFFICIENT
WAY TO ADD GENERATING CAPACITY IS TO COMPLETE KHMELNYTSKYY Westinghouse and its three partners
(Italian firms Ansaldo and Fiat, and the Ukrainian Kyivatomenergoproekt)
have come to the conclusion that the completion of Units 2, 3, and 4 at
Khmelnytskyy , with the necessary Western safety upgrades, would be the
most cost-efficient way to add to Ukraine's electricity generating capacity.
Unit 2 is 85 percent complete, Unit 3 is 50 percent complete, and construction
of Unit 4 has just begun. Westinghouse refuses to publicize the actual
costs involved, stating that the price is a matter of controversy in Ukraine
currently.
[Ann MacLachlan, "Upgrading, Finishing
Three PWRs At Khmelnytskyy Is Cheapest Choice," Nucleonics Week,
1/12/95, pp. 13-14.]
12/12/94: NUCLEAR POWER TRAINING
FACILITY WILL BE BUILT AT KHMELNYTSKYY The United States has provided Ukraine
with an $8.5 million grant to build a nuclear power training facility at
Khmelnytskyy ; this is under the auspices of a 1992 agreement to transfer
US experience to Ukraine. A full-scale computer based training facility
will be built complete with simulators to complement an educational program.
The training will concentrate on five areas: reactor control, turbine control,
refueling operation, and instrumentation and control. Seven more specialties
will be added later.
["Nuclear Training Boost for Ukraine,"
Nucnet,
No. 590-591, 12/12/94.]
7/19/94:TWO INCIDENTS IN
THREE DAYS AT UNIT 1 Due to a problem with the pipeline
system, the output capacity of Unit 1 was reduced drastically. Following
a reduction in energy load on the reactor, operators were able to solve
the problem and restore output capacity to a normal level on the same day.
Officials noted that accident safety norms were followed during and after
the incident. Two days later, another incident occurred, involving a shutoff
signal for Unit 1; this signal was given erroneously, however, during tests
at the station. This problem was solved during the following two days.[1,2]
Sources: [1] "Nuke Plant Malfunction Causes Scare,"
Intelnews, 7/94. [2] Krymskaya Pravda, 7/26/94, p. 2; in
"Incident At Khmelnytskyy AES Reported," FBIS-SOV-94-147, 8/1/94, p. 44.
3/8-19/93: SIX SAFETY PROBLEMS AT
KHMELNYTSKYY An IAEA Mission identified six major
safety problems at the Khmelnytskyy NPP: fouling of heat exchangers in
the emergency core cooling system, secondary circuit chemistry problems,
diesel generator failures, degradation of safety functions owing to circuit
breaker failures, deficiencies in maintenance procedures and acceptance
criteria after maintenance, and common cause failures owing to deficiencies
in instrumentation and control and electrical equipment.
[Source Book: Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants in
Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic,
Hungary, and Bulgaria, 1996, pp. 148-49.]
Page last updated 4 June 2002 This file is no longer being updated. For information on
developments in the nuclear power industry, please see the
Ukraine: General Nuclear
Power Developments section.
This file is no longer being updated. For information on
developments in the nuclear power industry, please see the
Ukraine: General Nuclear
Power Developments section.
