This file is no longer being updated. For information on
developments in the nuclear power industry, please see the
Ukraine: General Nuclear
Power Developments section.
(To see the criteria Profiles uses to select materials
for inclusion in the Power Reactors files, click
here.) 6/5/2000: WESTINGHOUSE TO SUPPLY
FUEL TO SOUTH UKRAINE NPP As a result of the agreement to implement
the Ukraine Nuclear Fuel Qualification Project, South Ukraine NPP is to
receive the first batch of six Westinghouse test assemblies in 2003 and
a reload set of 42 assemblies in 2005. South Ukraine NPP will be the first
Ukrainian NPP to receive Westinghouse fuel. For more details see
the 6/5/2000 entry in
the Fuel Cycle Developments section.
{Entered 6/5/2000 MJ}
4/1/2000: SOUTH UKRAINE
NPP TO RECEIVE FRESH FUEL FROM TVEL, SOURCE OF LOAN FOR PURCHASE UNCLEAR Minister of Fuel and Energy
Serhiy Tulub stated on 1 April 2000 that thanks to a loan from Prominvestbank,
South Ukraine NPP will be loaded with new fuel. Tulub also said that increasing
cash collections from energy consumers had become a main priority of the
Ministry.[1] An initial installment of $23 million was transferred
from Prominvestbank to
Enerhoatom
and has been paid to the Russian company TVEL.
Under the agreement, TVEL will provide fuel on the condition that payments
are made in cash and that thirty-five percent of the total cost will be
paid up front.[2] However, a 25 April 2000 Interfax report gave a different
account, stating that the payment became possible after the Krivorozhstal
steel works signed a futures contract for electricity supplies with Enerhoatom.
Enerhoatom then opened a line of credit at Oshchadbank and paid TVEL.
Interfax also reported that TVEL granted Enerhoatom a 28% discount for
the first half of the year.[3] For more information on nuclear fuel
imports, see the
Fuel Cycle
Developments section.
Sources: [1] UNIAN, 1 April 2000; in "Ukrainian
Nuclear Plant Receives Loan for Fuel Purchase," FBIS Document CEP20000401000067. [2] Natalia Kozlova, ITAR-TASS, 10
April 2000; in ""Russia Begins Deliveries of Nuclear Fuel to Ukraine,"
FBIS Document AFP20000409000223. [3] "Russia DeliversNuclear Fuel to
South Ukrainian Nuclear Plant," Interfax, 25 April 2000. {Entered 4/27/2000
GD}
12/27/99: CABLE SEVERED
IN THEFT ATTEMPT, CAUSES SHUT-DOWN OF UNIT 1 On 27 December 1999, a South Ukraine NPP worker cut
a power cable in an attempt to steal it, causing Unit 1 to shut down.
Official statements indicate that the safety system functioned properly
during the incident.[1] No further details were given about the theft
or the perpetrator. As a result of the incident, Enerhoatom stated that
heightened security measures would be undertaken at NPPs throughout Ukraine.[2]
Sources: [1] "Popytka krazhi silovogo kabelya
privela k otklyucheniyu energobloka na Yuzhno-Ukrainskoy AES," Interfax,
28 December 1999. [2] "Na Ukraine namerevayutsya povysit
nadezhnost okhrany AES," Interfax, 29 December 1999. {Entered 5/18/2000
GD}
12/1/99: CONFLICTING REPORTS ON BREAK-IN ATTEMPT
AT SOUTH UKRAINE NPP On 1 December 1999, Interfax reported that a drunken
individual attempted to enter the South Ukraine NPP through the guard station.
The guards discovered that he was carrying a gun, which was registered
through his employer. While subduing him, the gun went off, shooting the
individual in the left foot. He was taken to the hospital. An investigation
of the incident is under way.[1] Segodnya reported that a man attempted
to drive his car through a security barrier at the South Ukraine NPP on
the evening of 1 December. The man, who sustained an injury to his
foot, was arrested before any incident occurred. His motivations
were unknown.[2] [Both reports appear to be referring to the same incident,
although this cannot be confirmed.
Sources: [1] "Pri popytke proniknoveniya na
Yuzhno-Ukrainskuyu AES ranen narushitel," Interfax, 1 December 1999. {entered
12/3/99 CC} [2] "Na Yuzhno-Ukrainskuyu AES rvalsya
'nochnoy gost'," Segodnya online edition,
http://today.viaduk.net, 2 December 1999.] {Entered 2/15/2000 GD}
10/16/98: UNIT 2 UNABLE TO OPERATE DUE TO DEBT
TO CZECH SUPPLIER The operation of Unit 2 at the South Ukrainian NPP
has been deferred due to the facility's debt to Skoda,
a Czech supplier of control and protection equipment for the unit, UNIAN
reported on 16 October 1998.
[UNIAN, 16 October 1998; in Nuclear
Generating Set Idle Due To Debts, FBIS-SOV-98-289] {Entered 12/1/99 SK} 9/27/97: UNIT 3 CLOSED FOR PREVENTIVE
MAINTENANCE, REFUELING The Ukrainian Ministry of Environmental
Protection and Nuclear Safety disclosed that Unit 3 at the South Ukraine
NPP was shut down for scheduled maintenance sometime between Friday night,
26 September 1997 and the following morning. Over an 80-day repair period,
the reactor will undergo pre-winter refueling. The cost of fuel from Russia
for Unit 3 is approximately $19 million.[1] Officials from Energoatom,
the concern that manages the plant, have said that the first and second
units are in perfect working order. As of 28 September 1997, the background
radiation surrounding the facility was 16 microroentogens per hour, a level
within allowable limits.[2]
Sources: [1] UNIAN, 27 September 1997, in "Ukraine:
Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant Reactor Halted For Repairs," FBIS-SOV-97-270. [2] Interfax, 30 September 1997, in
"Ukraine: Third Unit of Ukrainian Nuclear Plant Down for Maintenance,"
FBIS-SOV-97-273.{Entered 10/13/97 AjP}
7/22/97: UNIT 1 PLANNED MAINTENANCE
COMPLETED Workers restarted Unit 1 at the South
Ukraine NPP at its lowest operational capacity after the successful completion
of operational tests following a scheduled refueling, technical evaluation
of the pipelines, and replacement of reactor room instruments.
[Interfax, 22 July 1997; in "Ukraine:
Repairs Completed on South Ukrainian Nuclear Generator," FBIS-SOV-97-203.]{Entered
11/10/97 AjP} 7/18/97-7/19/97: TESTS CONDUCTED
ON UNIT 3 Workers lowered output for Unit 3 at
the South Ukraine NPP from full capacity to 400 MW in order to check the
reactor control and safety systems. Tests took place from 10:25 P.M. on
18 July 1997 to 6:30 A.M. on 19 July 1997.
[Interfax, 22 July 1997, in "Ukraine:
Repairs Completed on South Ukrainian Nuclear Generator," FBIS-SOV-97-203.]{Entered
11/10/97 AjP} 6/3/97: UNIT 3 POWER REDUCED According to the Information Center
of the Ukrainian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety's
Nuclear Control Administration, the capacity of Unit 3 was reduced on 3
June 1997 at 10:35 P.M. in order to examine a flaw in the turbine equipment
that had previously hindered operation at full capacity.
[UNIAN, 4 June 1997; in "Ukraine:
Turbine Fault Reduces Nuclear Power Station Capacity," FBIS-SOV-97-155.]{Entered
11/10/97 AjP} 2/5/97: WATER LEAK SHUTS DOWN UNIT
2 The Information Center of the Ukrainian
Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety's Nuclear Control
Administration disclosed that Unit 2 at the South Ukraine NPP was taken
off line unexpectedly after 100 metric tons of non-radioactive hot water
leaked into the basement areas of the reactor. The leak resulted from a
damaged pipeline used to heat the town of Konstyantynivka's water.
[UNIAN, 5 February 1997, in "Ukraine:
Water Leak Causes Shutdown of Reactor at South Ukraine AES," FBIS-SOV-97-007.]{Entered
11/10/97 AjP} 12/24/96: EMERGENCY SHUTDOWNS AT SOUTH UKRAINE NPP Several emergency shutdowns occurred at the South Ukraine
NPP during December 1996. According to Ukrainian nuclear officials, on
24 December 1996, South Ukraine's Unit 1 was shut down in the second incident
in 24 hours after Unit 5 was shut down on 23 December 1996. Both shutdowns
took place during planned tests of the reactors' safety systems. Ukrainian
news agencies also reported the automatic shutdown of Unit 2, which occurred
on 5 December 1996 due to the failure of the reactor's safety instrument
for detecting short circuits. None of the incidents resulted in radiation
emissions.
Sources: [1] "Ukraine Shuts Down Nuke Reactor," The Washington
Post, 24 December 1996. [2] Oleg Varfolomeyev, "Nuclear Reactor Shut Down in Southern
Ukraine,"OMRI Daily Digest, 5 December 1996. {Entered 12/30/96
GN}
11/1/96: PRIME MINISTER TO CONSIDER DISMISSING PLANT MANAGER During a meeting of Ukrainian nuclear power plant directors
and chief engineers, Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavel Lazarenko said that
after reviewing the explanation for a transformer malfunction at the South
Ukrainian NPP, he would consider dismissing either Director General of
the plant, Volodymyr Fuks, or the directors of company which manufactured
the equipment. The meeting was convened in part to emphasize the increased
responsibility that Lazarenko will be placing on the nuclear power plant
directors for the performance of each plant.
[Interfax, 1 November 1996; in "Premier Says Government To
End 'Squandering' Of Electricity," FBIS-SOV-96-213, 1 November 1996.]
10/30/96: SMALL RISE IN RADIOACTIVE EMISSIONS AT UNIT
3, PLANNED SHUTDOWN OF UNIT 3 A temporary increase in radioactive emissions from Unit 3
was registered at the South Ukraine NPP. The unit's instruments recorded
a rise of up to 32 Ci in 24 hours whereas the normal radioactivity level
ranges from 5 to 10 Ci per 24 hours. However, according to the Ministry
of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety, the increase in radioactivity
posed no danger, because power-generating units of this type (capacity
-1000 MW) are allowed to produce radioactive emissions of up to 500 Ci
per 24 hours. A Ministry spokesman said that the increase in radioactivity
was caused by removing the reactor cover of Unit 3 prior to planned repairs.
On 27 October 1996, Unit 3 was shut down for repairs and maintenance, which
were expected to last 37 days.
[UNIAN, 30 October 1996; in "Rise in Radioactive Emissions
at Nuclear Plant," FBIS-SOV-96-211, 30 October 1996.] {Entered 12/2/96
GN}
10/9/96: UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES ISSUE LICENSE TO SOUTH
UKRAINE NPP TO SELL ELECTRICITY The Ukrainian government issued a license to the South Ukraine
nuclear plant allowing it to sell electricity and conduct other business
activities. The plant will sell electricity at rates established by the
Ukrainian State Committee for the Use of Nuclear Energy (Derzhkomatom).
According to UNIAN, other Ukrainian plants will be granted similar licenses.
[UNIAN, 9 October 1996; in BBC Monitoring Service, 18 October
1996.] {Entered 12/4/96 GN}
9/4/96: MINOR ACCIDENT OCCURS AT SOUTH UKRAINE NPP A minor accident, caused by a breakdown in the purification
system of a turbine condenser, occurred at Unit 1. According to the Ministry
of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety, due to the breakdown, the
nuclear plant's management had to apply for permission to decrease the
Unit 1's power generation down to 80 percent of its operational capacity.
The Ministry also said that no radiation leaks inside or outside the plant
were found.
[Intelnews, 5 September 1996; in "Accident Occurs at Pivdenno-Ukrayinsk
Nuclear Plant 4 Sep," 5 September 1996.]
6/9/96: IGNITION OF HYDROGEN AT UNIT: INES-3 Unit 3 was shut down for 5 hours when a reference sample
of hydrogen taken at the secondary circuit of the cooling system ignited.
The incident was rated "zero" at the INES scale. No change in the level
of radiation was noted.
[Interfax, 10 June 1996.] {Entered 8/96 GN}
5/21/96:OFFICIALS DENY EXPLOSION AT UNIT 3 Unit 3 was reopened after repairs of the cooling system of
an electric generator and checks of control and safety systems. Authorities
at the plant denied reports that on 20 May 1996 there had been an explosion
at the plant leading to a dispersal of radioactive material across Mykolaiyv
and beyond.
[ITAR-TASS, 21 May 1996; in BBC Monitoring Service, 24 May
1996.]
5/1/96: SEISMIC DATA ON THE SOUTH UKRAINE NPP REGION COLLECTED
AND ANALYZED Ukrainian scientists have discovered that the main seismic
threat to the South Ukraine nuclear power plant originates in the Vrancea
zone. It was found that in the region of South Ukraine NPP, episodes of
seismic intensity around level 6 have occurred three times in the past
200 years and the area affected by level 6 and 7 earthquakes is in fact
larger then depicted in the previous seismic map, which does not include
the area around the South Ukraine NPP. The scientists have collected and
processed all available information on the effects of 13 strong earthquakes
in the territory of Ukraine (especially in the Vrancea zone) since 1790
using a unique scientific method. This method includes an application of
the MSK-64 scale and the modified MMSK-84 scale. As a result of the scientific
study, a summarized map of isoseismic lines was compiled and a report based
on the findings of the study was sent to the director of the South Ukraine
NPP.
[V. A. Korolev, O. N. Safronov, "Summary," Geofizicheskiy
Zhurnal, May 1996, No 3, pp. 73-75; in "Analysis of Macroseismic Data
of Strong Earthquakes in the Vrancea Zone in the Territory of Ukraine,"
in FBIS-UST-96-030, 1 May 1996.] {Entered 11/10/96 GN}
2/12/96: FAULT IN AN OIL PUMP AT UNIT 2 Unit 2 was unexpectedly shutdown due to a fault in an oil
pump in one of the main reactor circulation pumps. A sudden surge in power
demand resulted and Ukraine was cut off from the Russian power grid. The
Deputy Minister for Energy, Vasyl Yevtukhov, reported that the frequency
in the Ukrainian grid dropped to 49.11 hertz. At 49.1 hertz, Ukraine's
NPPs are at risk of severe damage if they are kept in operation.
["Nuclear Power Plants Pushed To Compensate For Cut From
Power Grid," Post-Soviet Nuclear Defense Monitor, 12 March 1996,
pp. 7-8.]
1/18/96:CONSUMER DEBT TOTALING $54 MILLION The debt is contributing to a lack of funds for completion
of repair work at the South Ukraine nuclear power plant.
[Chrystyna Lapychak, "Ukraine's Nuclear Authority Strapped
For Cash,"OMRI Daily Digest, 18 January 1996.]
1/3/96:RADIOACTIVE VAPOR WAS RELEASED AT UNIT
3; INES 1 Unit 3 was shut down when radioactive vapor was released
into the reactor's airtight shell. Reportedly, the radiation did not pose
a threat to personnel and scored a one on the INES scale. A spokesman,
Oleksandr Nepomnyshchiy, reported that the reactor would be brought on-line
on 10 January 1996.
[AP, 8 January 1996.]
12/1/95:UNIT 1 CAPACITY REDUCED FOR REPAIR WORK Unit 1 had its capacity reduced by 20 percent for repair
work. Repairs were scheduled to be completed within 24 hours.
Sources: [1] BBC Monitoring Service, 8 December 1995; in "Nuclear
Safety," IAEA DAILY PRESS REVIEW, 8 December 1995. [2] "Ukraine: Capacity Of Two Nuclear Generating Units Reduced
In Ukraine," BBC Monitoring Service, 8 December 1995.
12/95:RADIOACTIVE LIQUID LEAK IS CLASSIFIED AS
A 1 ON INES It was reported that radioactive liquid leaked from a pipe
onto the ground, contaminating a 30 square-foot area. The leak was not
discovered until early January 1996 and was classified as a 1 on the INES.
[Source Book: Soviet Designed Nuclear Power Plants in
Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic,
Hungary and Bulgaria, 1996, p. 132.]
10/95:UNIT 2 IS DOWN Unit 2 was down for refueling and/or maintenance for at least
part of October 1995.
["Ukraine," Nucleonics Week, 9 November 1995, p. 15.]
8/10/95: TECHNICAL FAILURE AT UNIT 1; INES 0 Unit 1 shut off automatically due to a technical failure
during a routine check by plant personnel, according to a representative
of the Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy (SCUAE). The source said
that no radiation leakage occurred and the radiation background remained
unchanged. The reactor was restarted 14 August 1995 and is working at nominal
capacity, according to the SCUAE. The incident rated a zero on the INES.
Sources: [1] "Reactor at Nuclear Plant Fails: NO Leakage," ITAR-TASS,
11 August 1995. [2] "Nikolayev Plant's First Power Unit Resumes Operation,"
Interfax, 15 August 1995.
8/95:PLANT HAS NO FUEL FOR WINTER The Director of the South Ukraine plant, Volodymyr Fuks,
reported that the plant had no fuel for 1996. Fuks also reported that the
plant lost 4 engineers, 6 production managers, and numerous other skilled
workers in 1994.
[Source Book: Soviet Designed Nuclear Power Plants in
Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic,
Hungary and Bulgaria, 1996, p. 132.]
7/95:UNIT 2 HAS NO FUEL STOCK FOR WINTER Reportedly, Unit 2 does not have a full fuel stock to last
through the winter. Also, 20 percent of valves and 70 percent of other
components are in need of replacement, according to the Committee for the
Use of Atomic Energy.
[Peter Coryn, "Ukraine Taking Emergency Measures to Ease
Nuclear Plants' Money Woes," Nucleonics Week, 27 July 1995, p. 15.]
6/10/95: LEAK IN THE GENERATOR GASKET OF UNIT 3 A minor leak in the generator gasket of Unit 3 prompted the
unit to be shut down only hours before it was scheduled to be taken off-line
for routine repairs. There was no release of radiation.
[Chrystyna Lapychak, "Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant Shut
Down After Minor Leak," OMRI Daily Digest, vol. 1, no. 3, 12 June 1995.]
6/9/95:TRANSFER OF SPENT FUEL IS UNDERTAKEN BY
KRASNOYARSK-26 For the first in three years, the transfer of spent fuel
from this plant, which was approved by Minatom, was undertaken by Krasnoyarsk-26
storage facility personnel in Russia.
Sources: [1] Vitaliy Pyrh, "Nuclear Voyage To Ukraine," Rabochaya
Tribuna, 9 June 1995, p. 2. [2] "Special Trip For Nuclear Fuel," Krasnoyatsky Rabochiy,
25 May 1995, p. 1.
5/95:FICHTNER IS INDEPENDENT PROCUREMENT AGENT
FOR SOUTH UKRAINE PLANT Fichtner has been named the independent procurement agent
for the South Ukraine plant. 10 million ECU worth of items will be procured
through this German company.
["EC Procures Procurer," Nuclear Engineering International,
May 1995, p. 51.]
3/95:PROGRAMS ON SYSTEM FOR EARLY EMERGENCY PROGNOSIS
AND RESPONSE CENTERS The first step in the System for early Emergency Prognosis
and Response Centers (SEPRC) was completed in mid-March when South Ukraine
Unit 3 was hooked up to the Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy (SCUAE)
by a remote monitoring system. The SEPRC supports normal safe operations,
prevents emergencies through early detection of abnormalities, and manages
emergency and post accident activities. The SEPRC is a three-level system:
the low level consists of on-line diagnostic systems at the individual
reactor units, the middle level consists of Crisis Centers at the nuclear
power plants, and the Upper Level consists of an Emergency Response Center
at the SCUAE. The program is also designed to work closely with international
organizations. The SEPRC is planned for implementation using US funds made
available within the scope of the Lisbon Protocol. The system will be operational
in all Ukrainian reactors by 1999.
[Yu. Tsoglin, I. Klimenko, and V. Borisenko; "Ukraine Early
Warning," Nuclear International, May 1995, p. 31.]
2/18/95: DESIGN FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND MC&A SYSTEMS A design for a physical protection system for the South Ukraine
plant was scheduled to be prepared by this time. In addition, an MC&A
system was scheduled to be designed by March 1995.
[DOE Public Information, Office of Nonproliferation and National
Security, 27 January 1995.]
2/18/95:UNIT 1 RESUMES OPERATIONS AFTER REPAIRS Unit 1 resumed operations after repairs were completed on
its circulating pump. The unit had been shut down on 17 February 1995 after
the pump failed and the level of vacuum in the condenser decreased.
[Viktor Demidenko and Mikhail Melnik, ITAR-TASS, 18 February
1995; in "South Ukrainian Nuclear Plant Reactor Resumes Operation," FBIS-SOV-95-034,
18 February 1995.]
1/31/95:IAEA MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS As a result of its observations, an IAEA Mission has recommended
that the appropriate governing bodies in Ukraine ensure that the flow of
funds to the nuclear power plants is not disrupted and that the "brain
drain" of experienced personnel is halted. The IAEA presented its preliminary
findings to Derzhkomatom on 31 January 1995 and noted that over the past
five years, the frequency of stoppages had declined and that the radioactive
levels had not exceeded the established limits. There were 178 incidents
and only 98 were deemed by the IAEA to be important. The IAEA's conclusion
was that the South Ukraine plant has a "fairly efficient system for preventing
incidents." It reported that safety at unit 1 had declined while safety
at Unit 3 had improved.
Sources: [1] UNIAN, 31 January 1995; in "IAEA Recommends Safety Improvements
at Nuclear Plant," FBIS-SOV-95-021, 31 January 1995. [2] Source Book: Soviet Designed Nuclear Power Plants
in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, the Czech Republic, the Slovak
Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria, 1996, p. 132.
1/17/95: IAEA DELEGATION EVALUATES ABILITY TO COPE WITH
ACCIDENTS An IAEA delegation began evaluating the staff's and management's
ability to cope with accidents and "technical mishaps." The mission is
supposed to last ten days.
[Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service, 17 January 1995; in FBIS-SOV-95-011,
17 January 1995.]
1/13/95: FOUR NUCLEAR REACTORS IN NIKOLAEV LIE IDLE The manager of the Chornomorsky Naval yard in Nykolayiv,
Ihor Ovdiyenko, contacted the management of the South Ukraine plant in
an effort to find a use for four 400-MWe nuclear reactors that were originally
to be put to use on the Ulyanovsk aircraft carrier. The construction of
this carrier was halted in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
[UKRINFORM, 13 January 1995; in "Future of Scrapped Ship
Reactors Still Unresolved," FBIS-SOV-95-015, 13 January 1995.]
12/15/94: MPC&A ASSESSMENT REPORTS FOR SOUTH UKRAINE
PLANT DOE officials drafted MPC&A assessment reports for the
South Ukraine plant. Tags, seals, metal detectors, and Special Nuclear
Material (SNM) monitors are being procured for installation at this site.
[DOE Public Information, Office of Nonproliferation and National
Security, 27 January 1995.]
11/1/94: INCIDENT IN PIPELINE IN UNIT 2 TURBINE SECTION;
INES 0 Unit 2 was shut down to rectify a problem in one of the pipelines
in the turbine section of the unit. This incident rated a zero on the INES.
[Moscow Mayak Radio Network, 1 November 1994; in " 'Zero
Rated' Incident Occurs at Power Station," FBIS-SOV-94-212, 1 November 1994.]
10/24/94: ACCIDENT IN DNIPROPETRIVSK Two trains carrying fresh fuel for the South Ukraine nuclear
power station collided at Dnipropetrivsk. The State Committee for the Use
of Atomic Energy (Derzhkomatom) reported that the fuel was not damaged
and arrived at the South Ukraine station on 26 October 1994. Officials
have stated that this incident demonstrated a carelessness in Ukrainian
handling of nuclear material as well as a confusion as to which organization
has jurisdiction over the transportation of nuclear fuel in Ukraine. Derzhkomatom
has responsibility for nuclear plant operation and the production of nuclear
fuel, which should include the transit of such material. Apparently, the
accident occurred in a location that was not on the scheduled route.
[Alex Brall, "Rail Cars Carrying Fresh Fuel Collide in Ukraine,
Cause Unknown," Nuclear Fuel, 7 November 1994.]
8-9/94:SURVEY AT SOUTH UKRAINE PLANT Under the auspices of the US Nunn-Lugar CTR assistance program,
a material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) survey was conducted
from 29 August to 9 September 1994 at the South Ukraine plant.
[DOE Public Information, Office of Nonproliferation and National
Security, 27 January 1995.]
Last updated 5 October 2000 This file is no longer being updated. For information on
developments in the nuclear power industry, please see the
Ukraine: General Nuclear
Power Developments section.
This file is no longer being updated. For information on
developments in the nuclear power industry, please see the
