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Ukraine: Nuclear Weapons: Other Nuclear Weapon-Related Developments
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Ukraine: Other Nuclear Weapon-Related Developments

8/9/2002: RUSSIAN WARSHIP CHECKED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS
NTV reported on 9 August 2002 that the Russian warship Samum, which was transferred from the Baltic Fleet to the Black Sea Fleet, was inspected by Ukrainian naval officers, including Ukrainian Navy Commander Admiral Mykhaylo Yezhel, for nuclear weapons upon its arrival in Sevastopol. Ukrainian officers were accompanied by Russia's Chief of the Naval Main Staff Admiral Vladimir Kravchenko, according to whom the instructions on conducting the inspection were issued at the presidential level of both countries. Ukrainian officers inspected the ship's missile tubes, and found them empty.[1] Samum is a Project 1239 Sivuch missile corvette, a 1,260t warship whose main armament is eight 3M80 Moskit [NATO designation SS-N-22 'Sunburn'] anti-ship missiles, which are capable of carrying nuclear payloads.[2] [CNS note: Russian warships have not carried tactical nuclear weapons since 1992 as a result of the 1991 Bush-Gorbachev tactical nuclear weapon initiatives.]
Sources:
[1] NTV Television, 9 August 2002; in "Russia: Samum missile hovercraft deployed to Black Sea carries no nuclear weapons," FBIS Document CEP20020809000289.
[2] A.S. Pavlov, Voyennyye korabli SSSR i Rossii 1945-1995 (Yakutsk, 1994), p. 100. {Entered 10/23/2002 MJ}


2/12/2001: JOINT ICBM PRODUCTION NOT ON UKRAINE-RUSSIA SUMMIT AGENDA
On 12 February 2001 Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma signed a joint statement in Dnipropetrovsk (the location of the Pivdenne Design Bureau and Pivdenmash, which formerly designed and produced ICBMs) on expanding the two countries' aerospace cooperation. The joint statement addressed, among other issues, cooperation on producing space launch vehicles and transport aircraft.[1] According to Pivdenmash General Director Yuriy Alekseyev, the issue of resuming ICBM production in Ukraine was not on the agenda due to Ukraine's non-nuclear status and to technical difficulties. At the same time, Alekseyev stated that Pivdenmash specialists have been helping Russia maintain its R-36M-series [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] and RT-23UTTKh [NATO designation SS-24 'Scalpel'] ICBMs.[2] Alekseyev's remarks echoed earlier statements made by the US Ambassador to Ukraine, Carlos Pascual. Commenting on the upcoming meeting between Putin and Kuchma, Pascual stated that it would be impossible for Ukraine to cooperate with Russia on ICBM production without contravening the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pascual also met with the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary, Evhen Marchuk, who denied the possibility of cooperation with Russia in this field.[3] 
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 12 February 2001; in "Russia, Ukraine to expand cooperation in aerospace field," FBIS Document CEP20010212000161.
[2] Mikhail Melnik, ITAR-TASS, 12 February 2001; in "Russia: Putin tour of Yuzhmash said to have no bearing on US missile defense system," FBIS Document CEP20010210000025.
[3] "Posol SShA na Ukraine schitayet nevozmozhnym sotrudnichestvo Kieva i Moskvy v proizvodstve mezhkontinentalnykh ballisticheskikh raket," Interfax, 3 February 2001. {Entered 5/7/2001 MJ}

 
11/13/2000: KUCHMA SAYS UKRAINE WILL NEVER BECOME A NUCLEAR STATE
In a discussion with students at Kiev State University's International Relations Institute on 13 November 2000, President Kuchma stated that Ukraine will never become a nuclear state.  He added that Ukraine's decision not to pursue nuclear status was for economic rather than political reasons.  Nuclear weapons require infrastructure and economic resources that Ukraine does not possess.  Furthermore, the expertise and technology to build nuclear weapons is from Russia, not Ukraine.  Kuchma explained that for these reasons Ukraine was compelled to forego nuclear weapons. 
[UNIAN, "Ukraina nikogda ne budet yadernym gosudarstvom - Prezident," No. 46, 13-19 November 2000.] {Entered 2/14/01 RG}
 
3/15-16/2000: ELEVEN SU-24 BOMBERS DELIVERED TO CRIMEA, SECOND GROUP MAY FOLLOW
At a meeting in Kyiv held on 15 and 16 March between Oleksandr Byelov, the deputy secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, and Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, the Ukrainian-Russian commission in charge of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) presence in Ukraine agreed to several proposals which may clear the way for the delivery to Crimea of 11 Su-24 fighter-bombers [NATO name 'Fencer-D'], the second such group to be sent to Ukraine.[1,2,3]  Since 19 January 2000, 11 Su-24 bombers,  meant to replace older Su-17s [NATO name 'Fitter'], have been delivered to the Gvardeyskoye airbase near Sevastopol.[3,4]  Although the Su-24 is capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), lieutenant-general Valeriy Yurin, commander of the BSF air force, stated that all equipment pertaining to TNWs had been removed from the aircraft and that the alterations were inspected by Ukrainian experts before the aircraft left Russia.[5] A fourth session of the commission will meet in Moscow in the final quarter of 2000.[3]
Sources:
[1] Serhiy Zhurets, "Friendship one on one.  Moscow and Kiev continue the negotiation battles around the Russian Fleet," Den, 16 March 2000, pp.1,3; in "Ukraine: Black Sea Fleet issue viewed," FBIS Document CEP20000320000254.
[2] Raisa Stetsyura, ITAR-TASS, 16 March 2000; in "Ukraine allows transfer of Russian bombers to Crimea," FBIS Document CEP200003316000220.
[3] Olha Tanasiychuk, "A Meeting on the Roadstead," Kievskiye vedomosti, 22 March 2000; in "Ukraine, Russia Praise Fleet Talks," FBIS Document CEP20000323000133.
[4] ITAR-TASS, 19 January 2000; in "New Sukhoi Jets Fly to Russian Naval Base in Crimea," FBIS Document FTS20000119001822.
[5] ITAR-TASS, 18 January 2000; in "Nuclear Equipment Removed from Russian Aircraft," FBIS Document FTS20000118001777.  {Entered 3/31/2000 GD}
 
10/1/99: UKRAINE OPPOSES PRESENCE OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR-CAPABLE BOMBERS IN CRIMEA
Ukrainian government officials are concerned that allowing Su-24M [NATO name 'Fencer-D'] fighter-bombers, capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons, in the Russian Black Sea Fleet may jeopardize its non-nuclear status. Russia wants to replace Su-17s [NATO name 'Fitter'] at the Russian Gvardeyskoye Air Base near Simferopol with 22 Su-24Ms.[1,2,3] Russia had planned to begin the transfer of Su-24Ms from the Anapa naval base in Krasnodar Kray to the Crimean peninsula on 1 October 1999, at a rate of one plane per day.[2] Ukrainian military officials demand the right to inspect the bombers for the presence of equipment that would allow the use of nuclear weapons.[1,3] Ukrainian generals are reportedly convinced that the Black Sea Fleet had tactical nuclear weapons in its arsenal until 1991, and that the fleet continues to drill in the use of such weapons.[2]  Ukrainian government officials call for an international agreement that would address fleet and air unit verification issues.[3,4] Such an agreement exists for Russian conventional weapons present in the Crimea.[3] Russian officials have argued that Russia should be allowed to deploy the bombers without delay, saying that the bombers have been stripped of the equipment used to carry and launch nuclear weapons. Aleksandr Pikayev, a military analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center, pointed out that inspections of military units stationed abroad runs counter to international practice and therefore should not be required of Russia.[1] The bomber dispute is not the first incident involving inspections of Russia's Black Sea Fleet equipment. In May 1999, Russia compelled Ukraine to rescind Government Decree No. 863, which subjected Russian servicemen's baggage, weapons, and hardware to inspections, a common international practice.[3]
Sources:
[1] Simon Saradzhyan, "Ukraine Stalls Su-24M Aircraft for Black Sea Fleet," Defense News, 18 October 1999, p. 32.
[2] Viktor Yadukha, Segodnya, 30 September 1999, p. 2; in WPS Defense and Security, 4 October 1999; in "Leonid Kuchma Gives Wings to the Black Sea Fleet," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, web.lexis-nexis.com/universe.
[3] Serhiy Chornous, "'Sukhoys' With Nuclear Overtones," Ukrayina Moloda, 14 October 1999, p. 3; in "Bomber Transfer Seen Threat to Non-Nuclear Status," FBIS Document CEP19991019000015.
[4] UNIAN, 8 October 1999; in "Udovenko Opposes Russian Bombers in Crimea," FBIS Document FTS19991008001385. {Entered 11/18/99 SK}
 
9/4/99: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE VITRENKO PROMISES TO RESTORE UKRAINE'S NUCLEAR STATUS
Left wing presidential candidate Nataliya Vitrenko announced that if she wins the 1999 presidential elections, she will renounce Ukraine's non-nuclear weapon state status, and create a strategic partnership with Russia and Belarus as a defense against NATO.
["V sluchaye pobedy na prezidentskikh vyborakh N. Vitrenko planiruyet vosstanovit yadernyy status Ukrainy," UNIAN, 30 August - 5 September 1999, No. 35.] {Entered 9/10/99 SK}


3/24/99: UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT CALLS FOR NON-NUCLEAR STATUS REVISION
Reacting to NATO's air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada adopted a resolution, the fourth clause of which states "The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall submit to the Supreme Council a draft law on cancelling the decisions and renouncing Ukraine's obligations concerning its non-nuclear status."[1] Over 66 percent of the deputies approved the resolution.[2] In response, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma stated that Ukraine is not able to independently maintain nuclear weapons. He stressed that this was the key factor influencing the decision to give up its nuclear weapons and that it is impossible to "turn back."[3] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk responded to this development by stating that Ukraine has to observe international agreements on its non-nuclear status.[4] According to Tarasyuk and Kuchma's press secretary, the deputies' decision was emotional.[2,4] Ukraine's non-nuclear status is codified in Ukraine's constitution[5] and is further re-affirmed in the declaration "On the State Sovereignty of Ukraine" adopted in 1990. Since then, Ukraine has re-confirmed its status as a non-nuclear weapon state in numerous documents.[2]
Sources:
[1] "Zayavleniye press-sluzhby Verkhovnoy rady Ukrainy," Estonskoye Agentstvo Novostey ETA, 25 March 1999; in Natsionalnaya sluzhba novostey, http://nel.nns.ru.
[2] "V Kieve zatoskovali o yadernoy bombe," Vremya MN, http://www.mosinfo.ru:8080/.../0325-2.html, 25 March 1999.
[3] UNIAN, 29 March 1999; in "Ukraine Cannot Maintain Nuclear Weapons "Independently" - Kuchma," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe.
[4] UNIAN, 25 March 1999; in "Tarasyuk: Ukraine Must Adhere To Non-Nuclear Status," FBIS Document FTS19990330000936.
[5] "Parlament prinyal resheniye ob otmene bezyadernogo statusa," Ekonomicheskoye obozreniye Logos Press, 29 March 1999; Natsionalnaya sluzhba novostey, http://nel.nns.ru. {Entered 4/1/99 SK}
 
 1/20/99: UKRAINE PLANS TO CREATE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
A threat reduction agency modelled after the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency is scheduled to open in Ukraine in March 1999.
[Greg Seigle, "Ukraine Aims to Mirror US Threat Reduction," Jane's Defence Weekly, 20 January 1999, p. 6.] {Entered 9/27/99 SK}
 
3/98: UKRAINIAN OFFICIAL CLAIMS RUSSIA WILL EQUIP BLACK SEA FLEET WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Serhey Terekhin, a Verkhovna Rada deputy and chairman of the "Reforms and Order" party's economic council, claimed at a press conference that there is a possibility that Russia will deploy tactical nuclear weapons on its ships based in the Crimea. Terekhin, who based his allegation on secret documents, claimed that the deployment would occur in the next few months.[1, 2, 3, 4, 7] According to Terekhin, the Russian General Staff sent a secret directive to Viktor Kravchenko, commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, instructing him to "carry out a range of preparatory measures for the...Fleet's acceptance of so-called special products."[1] Terekhin, who is convinced that these 'special products' are nuclear warheads, went on to claim that the devices would be sent from a Novorossiysk storage facility to the Russian fleet's ships based in Sevastopol. The 'special products' would be deployed on the missile cruisers Admiral Holovko and Moskva, by means of loading nuclear charges on Bazalt (NATO designation SS-N-12 "Sandbox") ship-launched cruise missile systems.[1, 2, 4] Terekhin based his allegations on several other secret documents as well, including a study commissioned by the Russian Defense Council, entitled "The Place and Role of Modern Tactical Weapons Systems in Resolving the Russian Federation Armed Forces' Strategic Tasks."[1, 4] According to Terekhin, the report concludes that "strengthening the strike capability of the fleet forces based in the Black Sea-Mediterranean Sea region by means of nuclear missile systems of an operational-tactical class corresponds to the task of deterrence."[4] In addition, Terekhin had access to the classified text of the Program of Economic Cooperation of Russia and Ukraine for 1998-2007, which he claimed supported his allegation. In the final version of the agreement, a previously included section on environmental security at Black Sea Fleet bases had been removed. Terekhin believes that the section disappeared due to guidelines reportedly set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which state that territories where nuclear arms are located are declared to be environmentally hazardous. In Terekhin's view, Ukrainian leaders "know about Russia's nuclear plans."[1, 2, 4] Responding to these allegations, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Tarasov denied that "tactical nuclear missiles may be deployed aboard ships of the Black Sea Fleet stationed in the Crimean Peninsula." Tarasov stated that Russia "strictly adheres to the agreements reached by the Russian and Ukrainian Presidents with regard to Ukraine's nuclear-free status."[5, 7] The commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, Vladimir Kuroyedov, also denied that the fleet is armed with nuclear weapons, but said that both the Ukrainian and Russian Black Sea Fleets are equipped with ships, aircraft, and delivery systems which can handle nuclear weapons if required. While "the delivery capabilities exist," Kuroyedov added that "these navies are not facing such tasks at the moment."[6]
Sources:
[1] Viktor Lugovik and Viktor Yadukha, "Rossiya gotova razmestit v Sevastople yadernoye oruzhiye," Segodnya, 28 March 1998, p. 3.
[2] Unian, 25 March 1998; in "Ukrainian Official Says Russia to Deploy Warheads in Crimea," FBIS-TAC-98-084.
[3] RIA-Novosti Hotline, 26 March 1998, Issue 058.
[4] Anatoliy Skychko, "This is Just What We Need--Russian Nuclear Warheads," Vseukrainskiye vedomosti, 26 March 1998, p. 7; in "Nuclear Plans Threat to Russia," FBIS-SOV-98-100, 10 April 1998.
[5] RIA (Interfax), 31 March 1998; in "Russia Denies Arming of Black Sea Fleet With Nuclear Arms," FBIS-SOV-98-090.
[6] Interfax, 9 April 1998; in "Russian Navy Official: No Nuclear Arms in Black Sea Fleet," FBIS-UMA-98-099.
[7] Press-tsentr MID Rossii, "Zapis brifinga direktora departamenta informatsii i pechati MID RF G. P. Tarasova," 31 March 1998. {Entered 4/20/98 SP}
 
4/7/97: DEPUTY CLAIMS UKRAINE IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING ITS OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The chairman of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada Defense and National Security Commission, Volodymyr Mukhin, stated that "the scientific and industrial potential of Ukraine will allow for the production of our own nuclear weapons."  Mukhin emphasized that the removal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia had been a mistake, and expressed doubts regarding whether the US would pay $700 million dollars promised in compensation for Ukraine's nuclear weapons.
["Ukraina sposobna sozdat svoye yadernoye oruzhiye," Delovoy mir, 3 April 1997, p. 2.] {Entered 3/2/98 SP}
 
4/19/96: UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT AT G-7 NUCLEAR SUMMIT
4/19/96-4/20/96 a summit on nuclear safety took place in Moscow with the participation of the G-7 leaders and the Russian and Ukrainian presidents. President Kuchma called on the participants in the summit to cooperate under the auspices of the International Scientific-Research Center for the study the effects of the persistent radiation on flora and fauna in the unique conditions of the Chornobyl zone.
["Yaderna bezpeka i ne tilky" under the rubric "Moskovsky samit velykoi simky," Politika i chas, 6/96, pp. 82-83.]
 
1/96: TWENTY TU-22M3 BOMBERS WILL BE DEPLOYED IN POLTAVA
In the last week of January 1996 four TU-22M3 (NATO designation: Tu-26 Backfire) missile-carrying bombers arrived in Poltava. The bombers were transferred to Ukraine as part of the process of dividing the Black Sea Fleet. Colonel Vasyl Kukulenko, deputy commander of a bomber division, told a SOTSIUM correspondent that 20 aircraft of this class will comprise a regiment to be deployed in Poltava.
[Vitaliy Tsebriy, "We Have Strategic Bombers, But Their Strategic Task Remains a Military Secret," Kyivskiye vedomosti, 1/31/96, in "Ukraine: National Affairs," FBIS-SOV-96-023, 1/31/96]
 
11/20/95: RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN DEFENSE MINISTERS AGREED TO JOINTLY FINANCE A BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
Ukrainian and Russian Defense Ministers, Pavel Grachev and Valeriy Shmarov, agreed on a plan to jointly finance a ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) using a former Soviet radar in Ukraine. (This radar is undoubtedly the missile warning radar based at Mukhacheve.) The two sides disagreed on an air defense system for other Soviet states.)
["In Russia," Post-Soviet Nuclear and Defense Monitor, 11/30/95, p. 11.]
 
1/18/94: UKRAINE IS CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY GUARANTEES AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Anatoliy Plyushko, Ukrainian Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, and Dai Bingo, PRC Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed a declaration that addressed Ukraine's concern for security guarantees and financial assistance for eliminating nuclear weapons on its territory.
[Kyiv Radio Ukraine World Service, 1/18/94; in "Ukraine, PRC Envoys Discuss Nuclear Disarmament," FBIS-SOV-94-014, 1/21/94, p. 41.]
 
1/14/94: UNITED STATES WILL BUY 500 TONS OF HEU REMOVED FROM RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN WARHEADS
The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov signed an $11.9 billion deal in which the United States will buy 500 tons of HEU removed from Russian and Ukrainian warheads. Russia will blend down the HEU into LEU prior to delivery in the United States, where it will be used to fuel nuclear reactors. Each year for the next five years, the United States will purchase ten tons of uranium. After that, the United States will buy 30 tons of HEU (equivalent to 930 tons of LEU) per year.
["US Signs Contract For Purchase Of Enriched Uranium From Former Soviet Stockpile," USCEA Infowire, 1/14/94.]
 
10/6/93: RUSSIAN MFA BLAMES UKRAINE FOR DISRUPTING SERVICING AND STORAGE SCHEDULE FOR NUCLEAR WARHEADS
Georgiy Karasin, the Director of the Information and Press Department at the Russian Federation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, blamed Ukraine for the disruptions to the servicing and storage schedule for the nuclear warheads.[1] In the case of the storage facility at Pervomaysk, Karasin stated that six to eight times the allowable number of warheads are being stored together.[1] Karasin advocated that all the warheads that have been taken off-line should be transported to Russia immediately.[1] A Ukrainian representative stated that, according to the commission that Russia sent to Ukraine to assess the situation, there was no cause for alarm.[1] He added that any disruptions to the servicing schedule were caused by the Russian Ministry of Defense.[1] Another report cited the Russian commission as stating that the situation in the storage facility was intolerable and that an emergency situation could occur; the commission was comprised of experts from Minatom, the Ministry of Defense, and the State Committee for Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and the Elimination of Natural Disasters.[2]
[1] Ihor Zabilyk, Holos Ukrainy, 10/7/93, p. 5; in "Defense Official: `No Grounds for Alarm' Over Nuclear Storage Sites," JPRS-TND-93-034, 10/27/93, p. 39.
[2] Valeriy Ivanov, Komsomolskaya pravda, 10/7/93, p. 1, in JPRS-TND-93-034, 10/27/93, p. 40.
 
9/93: RUSSIA ANNULS MASSANDRA SUMMIT’S PROTOCOL
Russia reportedly annulled a protocol signed by Ukraine and Russia at the Massandra Summit, which stated that all nuclear weapons of the Strategic Nuclear Forces stationed in Ukraine would be withdrawn to Russia not more than 24 months after Ukraine has ratified the START I Treaty.[1] Russia claimed that Ukraine added an amendment stating that only those warheads removed from the launchers to be destroyed under the START I Treaty are included in this latest agreement; this excludes the SS-24 ICBMs.[2] Ukraine maintains that the amendment was added before the protocol was signed.[2]
[1] Pavel Shinkarenko, "The Truth About Nuclear Weapons. Russia Denounced Protocol On The Withdrawal Of All Nuclear Warheads From Ukraine," Rossiyskiye vesti, 9/22/93, p. 1.
[2] "Russia Annuls Protocol On Nuclear Weapons," RFE/RL NEWS BRIEFS, 9/20/93, p. 8.
 
7/26/93: UKRAINE MIGHT JOIN NPT AS TRANSITIONAL COUNTRY
Ukrainian Defense Minister Kostyantyn Morozov hinted that Ukraine might join the NPT as a transitional country that inherited nuclear weapons but will eliminate them.
[John Lepingwell, "Russia, Ukraine, and Nuclear Weapons Supplementary Chronology," RFE/RL RESEARCH REPORT, 1/28/94, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 23.]
 
7/2/93: ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE UKRAINIAN TERRITORY BELONG TO UKRAINE
Ukrainian Parliament passed a new defense doctrine that stated that all nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory belong to Ukraine. It also declared that Ukraine is committed to becoming a non-nuclear state in the future.
[John Lepingwell, "Ukraine's Position Hardens Despite Some Positive Signs," Arms Control Today, 9/93, p. 25.]
 
6/3/93: PRIME-MINISTER KUCHMA DEMANDS COMPENSATION FOR DISARMAMENT
Prime Minister Kuchma is said to support demanding compensation for disarmament while temporarily declaring Ukraine a nuclear state.
[John Lepingwell, "Ukraine, Russia, and Nuclear Weapons Supplementary Chronology," RFE/RL RESEARCH REPORT, 1/28/94, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 22.]
 
5/9/93: UNITED STATES WILL ADD TO $175 MILLION ALREADY OFFERED FOR DISARMAMENT
US Ambassador-at-Large Strobe Talbott arrived in Kyiv to discuss a new American policy toward Ukrainian disarmament that would emphasize cooperation rather than pressure. Talbott insinuated that, upon START I ratification, the United States would add to the roughly $175 million already offered in assistance for disarmament.
[Nucleaer Fuel, 1/17/93, pp. 16-17.]
 
4/10/93: DISMANTLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS MORE EXPENSIVE THAN MAINTAINING THEM
Yuriy Kostenko stated that studies show it would be more expensive to dismantle the nuclear weapons than to maintain them.
[John Lepingwell, "Ukraine, Russia, and Nuclear Weapons Supplementary Chronology," RFE/RL RESEARCH REPORT, 1/28/94, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 21.]
 
4/93: NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL REMAIN ON UKRAINIAN SOIL
Defense Minister Kostiantyn Morozov announced that the 43rd Strategic Missile Forces Army will pledge allegiance to Ukraine. Morozov also stressed that, regardless of the decision to be made by the Supreme Rada, the nuclear weapons in Ukraine would remain on the nation's soil for years to come.
["Ekho" Radio Program, 4/10/93, in Russia and CIS Today, 4/13/93, p. 28.]
 
3/25/93: UKRAINE’S INTENTION TO BECOME A NON-NUCLEAR STATE WILL NOT BE ALTERED BY EVENTS IN RUSSIA
It was reported that Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko said that the current political crisis in Russia had undermined support in Ukraine for eliminating nuclear weapons on its territory.[1] Although the government remains committed to approving the NPT, he indicated that there was growing parliamentary opposition to the treaty.[1] The following day, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said that Ukraine's intention to become a non-nuclear state could not be altered by events in Russia.[2]
[1] Washington Post, 3/25/93, "Ukraine is Loath to Yield Nuclear Arms."
[2] "Kravchuk Says Ukraine's Nuclear Status Unchanged," Reuters, 3/25/93.
 
3/93: IT IS NOT OBLIGATORY FOR UKRAINE TO BE A NON-NUCLEAR STATE
Bohdan M. Horyn, Deputy Chairman of the Rada's Foreign Affairs Committee and the Military Affairs Committee said that Ukraine "has the right to decide to be a nuclear or a non-nuclear State" and that commitments to become non-nuclear "were voiced as intentions, not obligations."
[Steven Erlanger, "Ukraine And Arms Accords: Kyiv Reluctant To Say, `I Do," New York Times, 3/31/93.]
 
2/11/93: UKRAINE WILL CUT NUCLEAR ARSENAL IN PROPORTION TO RUSSIAN CUTS
It was reported that Vyacheslav Chornovil, chairman of the Ukrainian Rukh (Movement) Party, said that Ukraine should cut its nuclear arsenal in proportion to the cuts made by Russia and the United States.
[Kyivskiye vedomosti, 2/11/93, p. 3.]
 
2/6/93: GREEN PARTY IS THE ONLY ORGANIZATION SUPPORTING DISARMAMENT
INTERFAX reported that the only political organization in Ukraine to support total nuclear disarmament is the `Green' party.
[Kyivskiye vedomosti, 2/11/93, p. 3.]
 
1/30/93: OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CEDED TO CIS JOINT STRATEGIC FORCES COMMAND
Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk stated that the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory belong to Ukraine, but operational control over them has been ceded to the CIS Joint Strategic Forces Command.
[Rossiyskiye vesti, 4/14/93, p. 7. For a discussion of the technical barriers to Ukrainian control over the nuclear weapons on its territory see Virginia Foran, "Ukraine's Creeping Nuclear Possession," NNN BULLETIN, 5/30/93.]
 
11/5/92: UKRAINE IS SEEKING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR GIVING UP NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Yukhnovskyi reportedly said his country should seek compensation from the world's nuclear powers for giving up warheads containing fissile material. His view was echoed by Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma who stated that Ukraine had the right to expect more financial assistance from the West in exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons.
["Ukraine To Seek Compensation For Nuclear Warheads," Reuters, 11/5/92.]
 
11/92: UKRAINE WILL BECOME NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE BUT NOT BY SELLING NUCLEAR WARHEADS
According to First Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Yukhnovsky, Ukraine will try to become a nuclear-weapon-free zone by selling off its nuclear weapons to the highest bidder. However, one week later Ukrainian Defense Minister Kostyantyn Morozov stressed to a visiting NATO delegation that Ukraine does not intend to sell nuclear warheads to anyone.
[China Radio International (Beijing), 11/11/92, in "Ukraine's Willingness To Sell Nukes Noted," JPRS-TND-92-044, 11/24/92, p. 4; and ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 11/17/92, in "Ukraine Stresses No Sale Of Nuclear Weapons."JPRS-TND-92-044, 11/24/92, p. 27.]
 
12/29/91: LEADERS OF FOUR REPUBLICS AGREED TO JOINT CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR ARSENALS
The leaders of Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine issued the Almaty Declaration on Strategic Forces in which they agree to joint control over nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union.
[Kazakh fact sheet to the UN Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 6/95, p.1.]
 

Last updated 10 April 2003

Comments or questions? Contact Michael Jasinski at MIIS CNS: Michael.Jasinski@miis.edu

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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