Parts of this report were prepared by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies in January 1998 under a grant from the United States Department of Energy's Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Energy or the United States Government.

Introduction
Export Control Legislation
Export Licensing Process
International/Bilateral Agreements
Other Agreements

INTRODUCTION

Uzbekistan has many laws and regulations designed to control exports and imports, but none of them have been written specifically to address nonproliferation-related export controls. Early legislation was clearly designed to regulate and protect domestic markets, with export licenses required for such items as cotton and carpets. Later regulations from 1994 and 1995 control military and nuclear items but contain very general lists.[1] On 27 November 2002, Uzbekistan's draft law on export controls was sent for review to the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan. Work on the bill was coordinated by the Agency for Foreign Trade and involved members of the Uzbekistani parliament, the Oliy Majlis. Upon approval by the Cabinet of Ministers, the bill will be submitted to parliament.[2]

There are a number of high-technology firms in Uzbekistan that produce potentially sensitive technologies: Tekhnolog RIA, which manufactures machine tools and metal cutting instruments; Start-Avia, which produces aircraft engines and parts; and Uzbekkosmos, which produces satellite launch technologies.[3] In addition, Uzbekistan has an extensive chemical industry based in the Fergana Valley, which primarily manufactures chemicals for use in agricultural pesticides. Lastly, there is extensive uranium mining and processing centered around the Navoi Mining and Metallurgy Complex (NMMC) as well as one nuclear research reactor near Tashkent.[4]

There are also a number of sites in Uzbekistan where sensitive, weapons-related activities previously took place. A genetics institute, which used to work on the development of biological agents to destroy enemy crops for the Soviet Ministry of Defense, is currently engaged in research to develop biological agents that could be used in the fight against opium and other illegal drug production.[5] The town of Nukus is the location of a chemical research institute that once served as the Soviet Union's second largest chemical weapons test site; according to a May 1999 implementing agreement signed by Uzbekistan and the United States, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program will provide $6 million for its dismantlement.[6,7] Vozrozhdeniya Island in the Aral Sea was the site of biological testing during the Soviet era. Finally, there was a widespread complex of heavy water production facilities in Uzbekistan that were shut down in 1985.[8]

Uzbekistani customs and border control posts have received vehicles and radiation detection equipment, including pagers, from the United States under a $3 million program to to improve Uzbekistan's border infrastructure.[9] In April 2000 the Chernayevka border post on the Kazakhstani border used US-supplied pagers to intercept radioactive material on a truck headed for Pakistan.[10] Incursions by anti-government militants from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in August and November 2000 led Uzbekistan to step up security along those borders.[11] The 1,621km border with Turkmenistan, however, was essentially unguarded as of 1997.[3]
Sources:
[1] NEC Team Accomplishments, Bureau of Export Administration NEC Cooperation Center Web Site, http://www.nectic.bxa.doc.gov/nec_frameset.html.
[2] NIS Representative Office Correspondence with Uzbekistani official; in "Uzbekistani Government Reviews Draft Export Control Law," NIS Export Control Observer, January 2003, CNS Web Site, http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon.
[3] Liam Anderson, “The Central Asian States,” Restraining the Spread of the Soviet Arsenal: NIS Nonproliferation Export Controls, Status Report, 1996.
[4] Interviews with Uzbekistani scientists and visits to nuclear research reactors, 1996 and 1997.
[5] Discussion with US Government official, February 1997.
[6] Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov, Khimicheskoye oruzhiye v Rossii: Istoriya, ekologiya, politika (Moscow: Center of Ecological Policy, 1994); in Federation of American Scientists Web Site, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/cbw/jptac008_194001.htm.
[7] "Nunn-Lugar to Clean up Major Soviet Chemical Weapons Site," press release from the office of Senator Richard G. Lugar, 28 May 1999, http://www.senate.gov/~lugar/990528.htm.
[8] Interview with Uzbekistani scientists, February 1997.
[9] "Fact Sheet: The United States Government Border Security Assistance Programs in Uzbekistan," US Embassy in Uzbekistan Web Site, http://www.usembassy.uz/news/00419a.htm.
[10] Remarks by US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright at Customs College, Tashkent, 19 April 2000, http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000419.html.
[11] "Uzbekistan: Neighbors Complain of Zealous Border Guarding," RFE/RL, http://www.rferl.org/.../F.RU.000121131443.html. {Updated 6/25/2001 KB; 3/13/2003 KB}

EXPORT CONTROL LEGISLATION

Decree No. 287 includes control lists.  The decree is the most recent iteration of a series of export control decrees, each of which has superceded the one preceding it.  However, the control lists for weapons and military items essentially have been repeated from one section to the next.[1]

Appendix Four: Contains the list of "specialized goods the export or import of which requires a license that has been issued by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MFER), with the explicit permission of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan."  This list includes:

• weapons and military technology;
• uranium, radioactive substances, and radioactive waste;
• instruments and equipment which use radioactive substances.

This list is similar to the list from March 1994, with some significant differences.  In order to receive an export license from the MFER for items on this list, an exporter now must have explicit permission from the Cabinet of Ministers. In addition, chemical pesticides have been removed from the list.

Appendix Six: Contains the list of "specialized goods (works and services), the export or import of which requires the permission of authorized organs of the Republic of Uzbekistan."  This list consists of a number of items, including:

• professional activities of citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Permission is given by the Ministry of Labor;
• export of the results of scientific-technical work, know-how, and inventions.  Permission is given by the State Committee for Science and Technology.

While not necessarily drafted specifically to prevent "brain drain," this list could be used as the legal basis by which to prevent the emigration of scientists with sensitive knowledge or the export of sensitive information.

Appendix 8: Contains the list of items that may not be transported across the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan.  The list includes

• arms, ammunition, and military equipment;
• aircraft, parts, instruments, and related equipment;
• materials and equipment that could be used in the preparation of arms, ammunition, and airplanes;
• explosives;
• strong poisons;
• and any items that are forbidden from import into Uzbekistan.

There is a note at the end of this appendix, which states that these items actually may transit through the territory of Uzbekistan, if explicit permission is given by the MFER and the Cabinet of Ministers.[2]

Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 558, On Improving Foreign Economic Activity and Reorganizing the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, 17 November 1994

This decree restructured and redirected the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MFER) essentially to be responsible for stimulating economic development by promoting exports from the Republic of Uzbekistan.  Appendix Two states all the various Divisions and Departments in the MFER.  There are a number of divisions which are responsible for such things as "analyzing the potential for foreign economic ties," "developing export potential," and "marketing."  The Division of Regulation of Foreign Economic Activity is most likely the division which issues export licenses.  However, the decree does not specify any division as responsible for export controls.[3]

Presidential Decree No. 837, On Measures to Secure Control of Hard Currency During Export-Import Operations, 20 April 1994.

This decree approves the procedures by which hard currency export-import operations are controlled by the Uzbek State.  It is not by design a nonproliferation export control measure, but it does contain the provision that all export contracts for licensed goods be registered at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MFER).[4]

Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 163, "On Measures to Regulate Foreign Trade Operations," 25 March 1994

This decree approves the procedures for setting quotas and issuing licenses for the export and import of goods, works, and services.  The decree includes a number of appendices with the customs codes for controlled items. Appendix 5 contains a list of specific goods, works, and services, which can be exported only with a license from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.  The list includes the following items:

• chemical pesticides;
• arms and military technology, and special products for their production;
• uranium and radioactive substances;
• instruments and equipment which use radioactive substances;
• radioactive waste and explosives.[5]

LICENSING PROCESS

Despite Uzbekistan's extensive chemical industry, the MFER does not in any way license or control the export of chemicals.  However, Uzbekistan does receive guarantees from the CIS countries to which it exports certain chemicals that they will not be used for military purposes.  Chemicals are exported primarily to other CIS countries, although some are exported to China.
[Interview with Ilyor Ganiyev, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, February 1997.]

INTERNATIONAL/BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

On 26 June 1992, Uzbekistan became a signatory to the Minsk Accord on CIS Export Control Coordination.[1]  In this agreement, the States-Parties agreed to create national export control systems, coordinate their efforts to control exports of materials used in the production of weapons of mass destruction, and create uniform control lists based on existing international export control regimes.[2]  As has been the case with many multilateral agreements between CIS countries, however, very little has been done to implement this early attempt to coordinate CIS export control policy.[3]  On 9 February 1993, Uzbekistan reached an agreement with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Tajikistan to cooperate in the control of exports of raw materials, equipment, technology, and services, which could be used in the creation of a weapon of mass destruction.[4]

Uzbekistan acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and has signed and ratified both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.[5]

For general information on international organizations and nonproliferation, please see the NIS International Organization and Treaty Tables and the 2000 Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes compiled by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Sources:
[1] Statement by the H. E. Ambassador Fatikh G. Teshabayev, Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21 April 1995.
[2] Minsk Accord on CIS Export Control Coordination, Russian-language version.
[3] Sergei Ryabikin, "Representatives of CIS States Discuss Export Control Over Products Used for the Creation of Mass Destruction Weapons," RIA Novosti Hotline, 29 October 1997.
[4] Minsk Accord on CIS Export Control Coordination, Russian-language version.
[5] Tariq Rauf, James Lamson, Shawna McCartney, and Sarah Meek, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, 1996-1997 Edition, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA.{Updated 6/25/2001 KB}

OTHER AGREEMENTS

The US-Uzbekistan Joint Commission convened for the first time from 26-27 February 1998 in Washington, DC.  The Commission is meant to provide the two governments with a structure for maintaining regular high-level contacts.  Chaired by Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the NIS Steven Sestanovich and by Uzbekistani Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov, the Commission is divided into four Committees: Political; Military; Trade, Investment, and Energy; and Economic Reform.[1]  In addition to its intent to halt the spread of chemical and biological weapons, the Political Committee's Nonproliferation Subcommittee reiterated its commitment to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the "cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime."   The subcommittee also recognized the importance of maintaining export controls to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and will promote US Department of Defense training initiatives, including those under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR).  In June 2001 the US Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted the first of four workshops for the Uzbekistani Ministry of the Interior and the National Security Service in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[3]  The Commission also promised immediate implementation of the participation of Uzbekistani scientists and research institutes in the programs of the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU).[4]
Sources: 
[1]  "US-Uzbekistan Joint Commission: Non-Proliferation," US Department of State, 27 February 1998, http://www.usia.gov/products/pdq/pdq.htm, 4 March 1998.                                                          
[2]  "Text: Statement on US-Uzbekistan Joint Commission," USIS Washington File, 27 February 1998. 
[3] Interfax, 21 June 2001; in "US instructs Interior Ministry staff in countering arms proliferation," FBIS Document CEP20010621000349.
[4] "US-Uzbekistan Joint Commission: Non-Proliferation," US Department of State, 27 February 1998, http://www.usia.gov/products/pdq/pdq.htm, 4 March 1998.{Updated 6/25/2001 KB}

On 27 December 1997 the Republic of Uzbekistan acceded to the STCU Agreement which assists weapons scientists and engineers from participating countries of the former Soviet Union to conduct research on peaceful activities.
["US-Uzbekistan Joint Commission: Non-Proliferation," US Department of State, 27 February 1998, http://www.usia.gov/products/pdq/pdq.htm, 4 March 1998.]

Page last updated 8 April 2003
For more recent updates, see the Uzbekistan: General Developments file.

Comments or questions? Contact Kenley Butler at MIIS CNS: Kenley.Butler@miis.edu