LOCATION: Ulugbek,
approximately 30km northeast
of Tashkent
[US Department of Energy, Russia/NIS
Nuclear Material Security Task Force, Improving Nuclear Materials
Security at the Institute of Nuclear Physics--Tashkent, Uzbekistan(Washington, DC, June 1997), US Department of Energy Office of
Nonproliferation and National Security, Material Protection, Control and
Accounting Program Web Site, http://www.nn.doe.gov/mpca/text/t-broch/t-uzb/t-uzb.htm.] {Updated 6/9/98 AM,
2/26/01 KB} SUBORDINATION: Academy
of Sciences of Uzbekistan{Updated
2/26/01 KB} ADMINISTRATION: Director: Bekhzad Sadykovich
Yuldashev[1]
Deputy Director: Aleksandr Kist Deputy Director: Sherboy Makhkamov[2] Head, Reactor Physical Protection System
Department: Akhror Rakhmanov[1] Head, International Relations Department: Anvar Avezov[3]
Sources: [1] US Department of Energy, Russia/NIS
Nuclear Material Security Task Force, Improving Nuclear Materials
Security at the Institute of Nuclear Physics--Tashkent, Uzbekistan
(Washington, DC, June 1997), US Department of Energy Material Protection,
Control and Accounting Program Web Site, http://www.nn.doe.gov/mpca/text/t-broch/t-uzb/t-uzb.htm. {Updated 6/9/98 AM} [2] "The Institute of Nuclear Physics
of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences," Cooperative Monitoring Center
Web Site, http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/Central/InstituteNucPhysics.htm. [3] CNS Staff Trip to Tashkent, Uzbekistan,
February 1997.{Updated
2/26/01 KB} BACKGROUND: The Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) was founded
in 1956 as part of the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan.[1] The
VVR-SM
reactor began operating in September 1959, at a capacity of 2MW.[2] INP is often described as the largest
facility of its kind in Central Asia and aims to become the primary nuclear
research and isotope production facility for the region. INP has a
staff of 220 people.[3]
Sources: [1] US Department of Energy, Russia/NIS
Nuclear Material Security Task Force, Improving Nuclear Materials
Security at the Institute of Nuclear Physics--Tashkent, Uzbekistan
(Washington, DC, June 1997), US Department of Energy Material Protection,
Control and Accounting Program Web Site, http://www.nn.doe.gov/mpca/text/t-broch/t-uzb/t-uzb.htm. [2] A. Rakhmanov et. al., "A Neutronic Feasibility Study for LEU
Conversion of the WWR-SM Research Reactor in Uzbekistan," Paper
presented at the 1998 International RERTR Meeting, 18-23 October 1998, Sao
Paulo, Brazil; on Argonne National Lab Technology Development Division Web
Site, p. 2. http://www.td.anl.gov/.../ARakhmanov.pdf. [3] L.E. Romesburg, Institute of
Nuclear Physics, Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Washington, DC, June 1997),
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Web Site, http://www.nn.doe.gov/.../nibs051.htm.{Entered 2/26/01 KB} ACTIVITIES: The VVR-SM reactor is designed to
carry out experiments in the field of nuclear physics and nuclear
engineering, neutron activation analysis, solid state physics, and isotope
production.[1] During the Soviet era, the reactor was also used
for military scientific experiments.[2] In addition to the
VVR-SM
reactor, the institute includes two cyclotrons, a gamma source facility, a
neutron generator, and a radiochemical complex. The
facility engages in commercial production of radioactive isotopes, labeled
compounds and isotope sources, super-pure metals, measurement and control
instruments, and air and water purification filters.[3]
The staff covers most of its operational expenses by selling commercial
production to the US, Germany, India, NIS, and other countries. As of
1996, the government provided only 27% of the institute's budget.[4] The
Institute conducts cooperative research under 22 programs with international
research centers, including the European Center for Nuclear Research
(CERN), Fermi National
Accelerator Laboratory, and research centers in Germany, France, Sweden,
Italy, Japan, Belgium, Poland, and other countries.[5]
Sources: [1] A. Rakhmanov et. al., "A Neutronic Feasibility Study for LEU
Conversion of the WWR-SM Research Reactor in Uzbekistan," Paper
presented at the 1998 International RERTR Meeting, 18-23 October 1998, Sao
Paulo, Brazil; on Argonne National Lab Technology Development Division Web
Site, http://www.td.anl.gov/.../ARakhmanov.pdf. [2] NISNP
discussion with Uzbekistani nuclear physicist, 2 June 1995. [3] "The Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Uzbekistan Academy of
Sciences," Cooperative Monitoring Center Web Site, http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/Central/InstituteNucPhysics.htm. [4] Emily Ewell, "Trip Report - Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Ukraine," May 1996.{Updated
6/9/98 AM} [5] "Institute of Nuclear
Physics," Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan Web
Site, http://www.uzsci.net/physmat/inf/index_in.html.
{Updated 2/26/01 KB} STRUCTURE: The Institute of Nuclear Physics is made up of 26
scientific divisions and two enterprises, Tezlatgich and Radiopreparat,
which produce and export isotopes. ["Institute of Nuclear
Physics," Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences Web Site, http://www.uzsci.net/physmat/inf/index_in.html.]{Entered
3/12/01 KB} MPC&A: Following a June 1995 inspection visit by
IAEA officials, Australia and Sweden agreed to provide assistance in the
areas of material control and accounting, while the United Kingdom and the
United States agreed to provide physical protection upgrades. Work on
physical protection upgrades began in September 1995 and was completed in
August 1996.
To improve physical protection at INP,
four main systems were installed: delay barriers, entry control systems, an
alarm assessment system, and an enhanced communications system. A 10
meter-wide clear zone was established around the reactor complex. Windows at
the ground level were permanently covered with security grills. At the lobby
entrance in the main building, a grilled door was installed to control
entry. Main doors to the lobby entrance, reactor control room, and the
reactor building were equipped with magnetic card readers and keypads,
magnetic door locks, balanced magnetic switches, and request-to-exit
switches. The fresh fuel storage vault was reconfigured as a
room-within-a-room, which requires two authorized personnel to be present
with lock codes to open the magnetically locked door. At all critical areas
within the facility, interior intrusion detection sensors were installed.
Hand-held and walk-through special nuclear material (SNM) and metal
detectors were installed in the main building entrance to detect
unauthorized movement of radioactive materials.
In addition to sensor
systems, video cameras and a video display system were installed. INP was
provided with a Central Alarm Station (CAS) to monitor general area
surveillance inputs. Several security modifications have been designed to
reinforce the CAS against attempts at forced entry. CAS displays indicate
the status of all sensors. To improve MC&A, a fresh fuel measurement
system was provided. In addition, a personal computer-based material
accounting system and accounting software have been installed at INP. Tamper
indication devices (TID) were provided to prevent unauthorized access to
storage containers. Wax seals were replaced with E-type seals.
Sources: [1] US Department of Energy, Russia/NIS
Nuclear Material Security Task Force, Improving Nuclear Materials
Security at the Institute of Nuclear Physics--Tashkent, Uzbekistan
(Washington, DC, June 1997), US Department of Energy Material Protection,
Control and Accounting Program Web Site, http://www.nn.doe.gov/mpca/text/t-broch/t-uzb/t-uzb.htm.
{Updated 6/9/98 AM} [2] L.E. Romesburg, Institute of
Nuclear Physics, Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Washington, DC, June 1997),
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Web Site, http://www.nn.doe.gov/.../nibs051.htm.{Updated
2/26/01 KB} REACTORS: One
TYPE: VVR-SM, tank
POWER: 10MW
The VVR-SM reactor operated at 2MW from criticality in
September 1959 until 1971. Since modernization, which took place in 1971-1979, the
reactor has operated at 10MW.
[A. Rakhmanov et. al., "A Neutronic Feasibility Study for LEU
Conversion of the WWR-SM Research Reactor in Uzbekistan," Paper
presented at the 1998 International RERTR Meeting, 18-23 October 1998, Sao
Paulo, Brazil; on Argonne National Lab Technology Development Division Web
Site, http://www.td.anl.gov/.../ARakhmanov.pdf.]{Updated 2/26/01 KB} FUEL: The normal core loading is 5.5kg of 36%
HEU.[1] Small stocks of 36% HEU, purchased from the Novosibirsk
Chemical Concentrate Plant, are stored on site.[2]
From 1959 to 1971 the reactor used pin-type fuel elements enriched to 10%. From 1971 to 1979, the reactor was modernized
under a project developed by the Kurchatov
Institute. From 1979 to August
1998, the reactor used IRT-2M type fuel assemblies with 90% HEU-based fuel.
The reactor was converted to use 36% HEU under the Russian
Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, a process
lasting from August 1998 to February 1999. The last of the 90% HEU
fuel was
loaded into the reactor core in August 1998. Tests to further reduce
the enrichment to 19.7% HEU were scheduled to take place in October 2000.[3]
For more information on the conversion see the
developments entry below for September 1998.
Sources: [1] International Atomic Energy
Agency, IAEA Research Reactor Database, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb. [2] NISNP discussions with Uzbekistani nuclear physicist, 2
February 1999, UZB990202.{updated 4/6/99 SDP} [3] E. P. Ryazantsev, et. al., "Testing
of the IRT-4M Type FA with LEU UO2-Al Fuel in WWR-CM Reactor,"
Paper presented at the 1998 International RERTR Meeting, 18-23 October 1998,
Sao Paulo, Brazil; on Argonne National Lab Technology Development Division
Web Site, http://www.td.anl.gov/.../PDF/Egor00.pdf{Updated
2/26/01, 5/8/2001 KB} SPENT FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE: Spent fuel is stored in two on-site cooling ponds.[1]
According to the IAEA research reactor database, the
storage area has a capacity of 252 assemblies and holds 237.[2] The
Institute has been accumulating
spent fuel since 1993.[1]
Sources: [1] Emily Ewell, "Trip Report - Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Ukraine," May 1996. [2] "Research Reactor Database,"
International Atomic Energy Agency Web Site, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb.{Updated
2/26/01 KB}
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR PHYSICS DEVELOPMENTS:
3/31/2003: CARGO SEIZED AT AIRPORT
Kazakhstani authorities seized a cargo arriving in Almaty on 31 March 2003, after
finding that it was emitting higher than normal radiation. The cargo was
on a Uzbekistan Airways flight from Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The firm
Radiopreparat (at the Institute of Nuclear Physics in
Ulugbek, Uzbekistan) had manufactured the radioactive material, which was
intended only for medical uses. The recipient of the cargo was Izotop, a
private Kazakhstani firm that supplies radioactive sources for industrial and
medical purposes. Authorities found that the cargo was emitting 100
microroentgen/hr at a distance of one meter and placed it in a warehouse under
guard and video surveillance. There are no details indicating that the
shipment was illegal or that the radioactive materials were improperly labeled
or shielded. [Igor Cherepanov, "V aeroportu Alma-Aty zaderzhan gruz s povyshennym radiatsionnym fonom,"
ITAR-TASS,
1 April 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.ru.]
{Entered 12/12/2003 CC}
1/16/2003:
TRANSFER OF SPENT FUEL TO RUSSIA DELAYED; RUSSIA AFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR
REPATRIATION
Under a March 2002 agreement between Uzbekistan,
Russia
and the United States, spent fuel from the INP reactor is to be transferred to
Russia for technical storage and processing. US officials had hoped that the transfer would
take place by the end of 2002, but as of January 2003, the material has yet to
be removed.[1] In an article published in Vremya novostey on16 January
2003, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev reaffirmed his support for the
repatriation. He was quoted as saying, "this [spent fuel from Uzbekistan]
is our fuel and we have to take it."[2]
Sources:
[1] Bryan Bender, "International Response: Moscow to Speed Up HEU Removal
at Soviet-Era Research Reactors," Global Security Newswire,
http://nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2003/1/3/5p.html, 3 January 2003.
[2]"Ministerstvo
po atomnoy energii rassmatrivayet vopros o dostavke v Rossiyu otrabotannogo
yadernogo topliva s issledovatelskogo reaktora v Uzbekistane," Vremya
novostey, No.
6 (681), 16 January 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.ru.]
{Entered 1/16/2003 AD}
3/12/2002: SPENT FUEL TO BE
SENT TO RUSSIA On 12 March 2002, US Secretary of Energy Spencer
Abraham and Uzbekistani Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdulaziz Komilov
signed an agreement under which spent fuel from the INP reactor will be repatriated to Russia.[1]
According to a report in Vremya MN, 250 spent fuel assemblies weighing
a total of 70kg have
accumulated at the reactor site.[2] Under the agreement, the United States will pay
all transportation
costs, estimated at about $4 million, and Uzbekistan, with the assistance of
the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, will convert the reactor to
use low-enriched uranium.[1,3] Sources: [1] "U.S. and Uzbekistan Cooperate on
Nonproliferation: Agreement Protects Nuclear Materials and Technologies," US Department of Energy Press Release,
12 March 2002, DOE
Web Site,
http://www.energy.gov/HQPress/releases02/marpr/pr02040_v.htm. [2] "Vremya politiki i ekonomiki.
Uzbekistan," Vremya MN, No. 017, 31 January 2002, p. 3.{Updated
03/29/2002 YP} [3] ITAR-TASS, 12 March 2002; in "US
to pay for transportation of Uzkek enriched uranium to Russia," FBIS
Document CEP200020313000036.{Entered
03/22/2002 YP}
9/98: VVR-SM REACTOR CONVERTED TO
USE 36 PERCENT ENRICHED FUEL In September 1998, a team from the Kurchatov
Institute in Moscow arrived at the Institute of Nuclear Physics in
Tashkent to convert the VVR-SM reactor to use lower-enriched fuel.
Previously, the reactor had used 90 percent enriched fuel, but after the
conversion, it will use 36 percent enriched fuel. For a transitional period,
the core will be loaded with a mixture of 90 percent and 36 percent fuel.
As of February 1999, the reactor was running on such a mix of fuel, but the
last of the institute's supply of 90 percent enriched fuel had been loaded
into the reactor core in August 1998, meaning that the reactor will probably
begin running solely on 36 percent fuel in the near future. According to Dr.
Bekhzhad Yuldashev, the director of the Institute of Nuclear Physics, the
institute decided to convert the reactor to run on lower-enriched fuel in
order to conform with current tendencies in the international community. Dr.
Yuldashev said the conversion required some adjustments to the reactor, but
no major structural changes. He added that no outside financial assistance
had been received for the conversion. The institute plans to convert the
reactor again in the future to use 20 percent enriched fuel, although Dr.
Yuldashev did not specify a date for this change. The institute now has a
small stock of 36 percent enriched fuel on site, which it purchases from the
Novosibirsk
Chemical Concentrates Plant.
[NISNP discussions with NISNP nuclear physicist, 2 February
1999, UZB990202.]{entered 4/6/99 SDP}
10/1/96: DOE COMPLETED UPGRADING OF VVR-SM REACTOR
FACILITIES The US Department of Energy (DOE) announced that it has
completed MPC&A upgrades at the reactor facilities operated by the
Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Uzbekistani Academy of Sciences. US
Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary commented that the upgrades "will
significantly reduce the risk of theft of bomb-grade materials at the
facilities." DOE's Sandia, Los Alamos, and Argonne National
Laboratories participated in developing the safeguards. The United Kingdom
has also contributed to improving the Uzbekistani facilities.
["DOE Secures Nuclear Material in Belarus and
Uzbekistan, Reduces Risk of Nuclear Proliferation," DOE Press Release,
1 October 1996, http://www.doe.gov/.../pr96147.html.]
5/96: PHYSICAL PROTECTION IMPROVEMENTS AT THE VVR-SM
REACTOR According to the Tashkent Institute of Nuclear Physics and
Uzbekistan's Gosgortekhnadzor, all physical protection improvements at the
VVR-SM reactor in Ulugbek should be completed by September 1996. The work is
mostly conducted under the US Department of Energy's
Government-to-Government program. US assistance has been swiftly implemented
in Uzbekistan--construction work started in 2/96, after talks on US physical
protection assistance took place in 9/95. In addition, the United Kingdom is
providing some communications equipment for the reactor's security guards.
No international assistance has been earmarked for the second reactor at the
Uzbekistani Radioelectrical Technical Plant, according to Gosgortekhnadzor.
[Emily Ewell, "Trip Report - Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan,
Ukraine," May 1996.]
3/96: SANDIA WORKS WITH THE INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR
PHYSICS ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION A joint project between Sandia National Laboratories and
the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent is working to increase physical
protection and technical support at the reactor site in order to comply with
IAEA safeguards. In FY 1995, the project made recommendations on the
development of safeguards and in FY 1996 the recommendations are to be
enacted.
[Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Protection and Surveillance of
Nuclear Materials in the Former Soviet Union: Hearings Before the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
20 March 1996, pp. 27-28.]
8/95: INSTITUTE OF PHYSICS BUYS FUEL FROM
GEORGIA In August 1995, the Institute of Physics
in Georgia sold 17 IRT-3M type assemblies to the Institute
of Nuclear Physics in Uzbekistan.[1] The fuel assemblies, containing
approximately 5kg of HEU, were sold to Uzbekistan for $20,000.[2,3] Sources: [1] Z. K. Saralidze, et. al., Considerations
on Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel at the Research Nuclear Reactor of the
Institute of Physics of the Georgian Academy of Sciences (Obninsk,
Russia: March 1997), p. 4. [2] Interfax, 12 January 1997; in "Foreign Ministry
Makes A Statement On Nuclear Reactor," FBIS-SOV-97-008. [3] Michael R. Gordon, "Russia
Thwarting U.S. Bid To Secure A Nuclear Cache," New York Times, 5
January 1997, pp. A1, A4.{Updated 5/8/2001 KB}
6/95: MPC&A NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED No changes have been made in the system of MPC&A at
the Tashkent reactor since the Soviet period. One Uzbekistani official
acknowledged that MPC&A needed to be improved, and added that Uzbekistan
had asked the IAEA and donor countries for help in this sphere.
[NISNP interview with officials at the Uzbekistani State
Committee for Safety and Supervision in Mining and Industry, June
1995.]
