Abstract:
According to this article, the quantity of weapons of mass destruction materials smuggled into Turkey from former Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus has increased in recent years. The article attributes this increase to the 'rising demand by rogue states for such materials,' and their increasing availability on the market owing to 'worsening economic conditions in Russia and the former Soviet republics.' The author of the article argues that a survey of recent cases indicates that 'many traffickers of WMD materials view Turkey as a marketplace where they hope to meet their clients.' The article says the first smuggling case in Turkey involving WMD material from the former Soviet Union took place in March 1993, when 6.5kg of enriched uranium (enrichment level unspecified), was seized in Kars province in eastern Turkey. The uranium reportedly came from Tashkent, Uzbekistan, via Chechnya, Georgia, and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Oblast of Azerbaijan before entering Turkey. In October 1993, the article reports, Turkish authorities seized 2.5 kilograms of U-238, and arrested four Turkish businessmen and four Iranians. In this case, the uranium, reportedly destined for Iran, had been flown into Turkey from Germany on a private plane. In July 1994, Turkish authorities arrested seven Turkish citizens and confiscated 12kg of uranium, which reportedly came from Azerbaijan. According to this article, the uranium in was later determined to be 'weapons grade,' but other sources have reported only that it was uranium, without mentioning the enrichment level . In February 1996, a Turkish citizen was arrested in Switzerland while trying to sell a sample of highly-enriched uranium. This arrest subsequently led to the seizure by Turkish authorities of 1.128kg of uranium, which turned out to be LEU used in nuclear power plant fuel. The article also notes the March 1997 arrest of three Turkish citizens for trying to sell osmium. The article claims that osmium is 'used with plutonium as coating for nuclear missile warheads.' However, osmium is not a controlled material under US law or NSG guidelines, and according to the US Defense Special Weapons Agency, 'cannot be used in the production of nuclear weapons.' It is frequently offered for sale by con artists, who claim that it has properties similar to the mythical 'red mercury.' The article says that 1998 produced the largest number of nuclear smuggling cases in Turkey. In July 1998, Turkish police arrested six suspects, including an Iranian, who had 13 cylinders with markings indicating that they contained uranium, although the suspects said they contained only snake venom. According to this article, in September 1998, Turkish police arrested nine suspects and confiscated 4.5kg of unprocessed uranium and 6g of plutonium. However, in October 1998, the head of the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority denied that any plutonium had been involved in this case. The article contends that there is no reason to expect the number of WMD smuggling cases in Turkey to decline in 1999. It claims that Iran has now replaced Iraq 'as the leading buyer of WMD technology in the Middle East.' While Iranian officials have travelled as far as South Africa to acquire nuclear technology, the article argues, the overland route via Turkey remains the shortest potential smuggling route from Europe to Iran. The Turkish National Police Force leads efforts in Turkey to combat nuclear smuggling. Cooperation with European law enforcement agencies is satisfactory, according to Turkish police officials, but they are dissatisifed with the level of cooperation with their colleagues in the former Soviet Union. Turkey has proposed the formation of a Black Sea Police Organization (Blackseapol) to remedy this situation.
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