| Abstract Number: | 19990670 |
| Headline: | Neutron Weapon from Underground |
| Date: | 15 July 1999 |
| Bibliography: | Segodnya online edition, 15 July 1999, http://195.222.189.5/news/sg/index.html. |
| Author: | Neytronnoye oruzhiye iz pod poly [Neutron Weapon from Underground] |
| Orig. Src.: | Vadim Nesvizhskiy |
| Case: | |
| Material: | Radioactive Isotopes |
Abstract: Unlike californium-251, a weapons-grade fissile material with a bare sphere critical mass of 9kg, californium-252 is not weapons-usable. Californium-252, a strong emitter of neutron radiation, is used to start up nuclear reactors, but it can also be utilized to poison or murder because of its high penetrating capacity (three to 10 times more dangerous than gamma radiation).[1,5] Although Balan and Yefimovich handled the material carefully, reports indicated that it nevertheless emitted radiation 350 times higher than the maximum permissible level.[1] Californium-252, produced at the All-Russian Scientific and Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (SRIAR) in Dmitrovgrad, is usually stored on board the Imandra in 200-kg containers. The material is transferred onto the icebreaker in a bucket-sized container, which can be carried by one person. Once spent, the californium-252 is transferred from the icebreaker to the Atomflot storage facility.[5] Authorities sent the confiscated californium-252 to the V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute Scientific Production Association for evaluation.[1] The crime of stealing radioactive materials falls under Article 221, Part 2 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code and is punishable by five to 10 years in prison.[1,2,3,4] Since 1996, the United States and Russia, as part of the US Department of Energy's MPC&A Task Force program, have cooperated on upgrading physical protection of the icebreaker fleet's fresh fuel (HEU) stored on board the Imandra, the ship on which Yefimovich worked. (For more information on the upgrades, please see the US DOE MPC&A program reports from 1997 and 1998 in the full-text document section.) A source at the Murmansk Shipping Company stated that it has accounted for all the material aboard Imandra.[5] Although the theft from the Rossiya involved non-weapons-usable material, it nonetheless validates the insider theory, which posits that an employee working with the material, such as Balan, may be best positioned and more likely to divert that material. (For further information about the Imandra and the Rossiya please see the Russia: Naval Nuclear Reactors: Civilian-Use Naval Reactors section of the NIS Profiles database.) [1] Andrey Tsyganov, 'Moryaki torgovali izotopami s ledokola,' Kommersant, online edition, http://win.www.online.ru/rproducts/commersant-daily-month/15-Jul-99/13498698.DOC.rhtml, 15 July 1999. |
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The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies has not verified the accuracy or veracity of this report or the facts presented therein. For more information on the material in this database please contact Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova.
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