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Abstract Number:	20030630
Headline:	GAO Report: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening
Date:	May 2003
Bibliography:	United States General Accounting Office (GAO), www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-638
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Material:	Radioactive Isotopes

Abstract:
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) criticized US and international efforts to improve the security of sealed radioactive sources in a May 2003 report. The report said the efforts need better coordination and also increased funding.  According to the GAO, international efforts to improve control radioactive sources began in earnest in the wake of September 11th, as concerns were raised about possible terrorist use of radioactive materials to construct radiological dispersal devices, also called "dirty bombs".  Such bombs would combine conventional explosives with radioactive material, with the potential of causing not only physical damage to targeted sites but also widespread radiological contamination.  Most analysis indicates that the radioactive contamination caused by RDD use would not lead to many casualties, but would be extremely costly to clean up, and the psychological impact of such an attack could also be severe. The GAO study aimed to determine the number of sealed radioactive sources in use or reported lost or stolen throughout the world, the regulatory controls that are in place to protect them in various countries, and the effectiveness of assistance provided by the US Department of Energy (DOE) and other US federal agencies to strengthen controls over these materials.      

The forty-nine foreign governments that responded to the GAO survey reported having 7.8 million sealed radioactive sources in use.  Moreover, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) estimates that 2 million sealed sources are in use in the United States. The NRC also reported that about 250 sources are lost or stolen each year in the United States, most of which are recovered.  The survey results show that 612 sealed sources have been lost or stolen in the 49 other reporting states since 1995, of which 254 have not been recovered.  The majority of these lost or stolen sources, known as orphan sources, do not pose a significant security threat due to their low radioactivity or poor dispersability.  Some sealed sources, however, such as the radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) left after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the Republic of Georgia, contain large quantities of radioactive strontium that will continue to pose a threat for years to come. (For a discussion of these RTGs, see abstracts 20020200 and 20020510).

The GAO report found that regulatory controls over sealed sources are inadequate in many countries.  All 49 respondents to the survey reported having legislative or regulatory controls over sealed sources in place.  However, nuclear safety and security experts at the DOE, NRC, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission reported that these controls vary from country to country and are generally focused on safety and public health rather than protecting sources from theft or malicious use.  The IAEA estimates that 110 countries lack adequate controls over sealed sources and has established a program to help 88 of these countries enhance their regulatory infrastructures.  Less developed countries in particular lack sufficient regulatory control.  Representatives of some former Soviet states, for example, report the need for improvements in inventorying, consolidating and securing, and transporting sealed sources.  According to survey results, only 35 sealed sources have been reported lost or stolen in the former Soviet Union since 1995.  At the same time, Russia's nuclear regulatory agency, Gosatomnadzor, reported 51 sealed sources lost in 2002 and 245 in 2000.  In Georgia, 280 orphan sources have been recovered since the mid-1990s.

The problem of orphan sources is especially acute in the former Soviet Union due to the large number of highly radioactive sources that is in use and relatively high percentage of these that might be outside regulatory control or vulnerable to theft.  One of the most urgent problems is the more than 1,000 RTGs located throughout former Soviet States, predominantly in Russia.  These devices were built to provide electricity in remote locations to lighthouses, radio beacons and meteorological stations.  They contain from 40,000 to 150,000 curies of strontium-90.  Many of these may not be adequately protected.  Several of them have already been destroyed by people seeking to sell the metal casing that protects the generators' radioactive cores.  (For details see abstracts 20030290 and 20020030.)  Officials at the Russian National Technical Physics and Automation Research Institute, where the generators were designed, told the GAO that the devices have a service life of 10 to 15 years.  However, no repair or maintenance work has been performed on them since 1991, and the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) is considering extending their service life.  Another category of sealed radioactive source of concern is up to 1,000 seed irradiators distributed in Moldova, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan.  (For details see abstract 20020670.)  Each irradiator has an activity level over 1,000 curies of cesium-137 in powder form.   

In response to a Congressional requirement that the DOE address the threat of dirty bombs, the agency's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) organized the Radiological Threat Reduction (RTR) program under the Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation.  The program was allocated $37 million in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to initiate a program aimed at assisting countries in securing sealed radioactive sources.  It has focused on former Soviet states, particularly on Russia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Moldova.  The program is expected to receive an additional $22 million in supplemental funding for fiscal year 2003, including $5 million for work in Iraq.  In 2002, the DOE undertook numerous projects to secure sealed radioactive sources in the NIS.  In April of that year, work began to upgrade security at the Moscow branch of Radon, where 80% of Russia's institutional, industrial, and medical radioactive waste is stored.  (For more on Radon, see www.nti.org.)  Site assessments have also been completed at three other Radon sites, and security upgrades are to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2004.  Under the RTR program, security upgrades at research and irradiation facilities in Uzbekistan have also been completed. 

In June 2002, DOE announced two new initiatives. The first, the Trilateral Initiative, to be undertaken together with MINATOM and the IAEA, aims to inventory, locate, recover, store and dispose of sealed radioactive sources in former Soviet states. As part of this latter initiative, the parties will assess security at 19 Radon sites in former Soviet republics other than Russia. Officials from the DOE, IAEA and MINATOM have already completed a security assessment and upgrades at the Moldova Radon, and DOE and IAEA officials made a similar visit to Tajikistan in December 2002. The DOE plans to initiate projects in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the Baltics, and possibly Armenia, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan in fiscal year 2003.  In March 2003, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham announced plans to expand the Tripartite Initiative to include countries outside the former Soviet Union.  The DOE expects to begin work to secure high-risk sealed sources in Serbia and Indonesia this year.  The second DOE initiative is a bilateral effort to be conducted with MINATOM to secure sealed sources at facilities identified by the Russian ministry.  In July 2002, MINATOM provided the DOE with a list of priority projects including recovering RTGs and other orphan sources at 45 sites. The DOE says it will prioritize these projects according to the type and activity level of the radioactive sources concerned.  

The DOE also has a program managed by the NNSA's Office of International Nuclear Safety that aims to protect the health and safety of the public and people who work with sealed sources.  This program has contributed to efforts to recover sealed source in Georgia by providing technical support, software, personnel protection equipment and training.  The program has also provided training, equipment and other technical assistance to enhance the safety and security of sealed sources in Armenia.  As of September 2002, the DOE had spent about $333,000 on these activities. 

Though DOE is the leading US agency working to secure sealed radioactive sources, other agencies have contributed to this effort as well.  The Department of Defense's (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has spent $1.7 million on a project in Kazakhstan to inventory, secure and dispose of about 2,000 sealed sources, primarily cesium-137 and cobalt-60, from an out-of-service industrial facility.  The project began in 2001, before the DOE began working to secure sealed radioactive sources, and will be completed by the end of fiscal year 2003.  The DOD does not plan to undertake any further work to secure sealed sources. 

The State Department and NRC have also contributed to the securing of sealed radioactive sources.  State gave $1 million to the IAEA in 2002 for related projects.  Together with Sandia National Laboratory, the State Department has also initiated a study of the laws and procedures governing interstate transfers of sealed sources.  The study is focused specifically on the six countries that are the major exporters and importers of sealed sources, the volumes of trade in them, and whether exporters are required to verify that importing countries have sufficient controls in place to ensure the safety and security of sealed sources.  The NRC has spent $62,000 in Armenia to help strengthen controls on sealed sources.  This work will eventually include the setting up of a registry of sealed sources.  

DOE efforts have been criticized for being ill coordinated and for not consulting adequately with other US agencies or its counterparts in Russia.  In general, DOE's early efforts focused on short term goals, such as security upgrades, to the detriment of longer term goals such as the development of a comprehensive plan for addressing the issue of sealed radioactive sources.  For example, in May 2002 the director of the Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation halted development of such a plan so that the program could pursue more tangible results.  The director told the GAO that, while the early focus on securing sealed sources at Radon was positive, it hindered the DOE from setting priorities among other sites in Russia.  The DOE has recently been working on a draft plan for securing sealed sources.  The plan includes both short-term and long-term elements, such as consolidating and securing dangerous materials, continuing critical cooperative efforts such as the development of a code of conduct for radioactive sources with the IAEA, and helping other countries detect radioactive material smuggling through the Second Line of Defense program.  As part of this effort, DOE told the GAO that further planning and analysis is needed to 1) determine which countries present the greatest security risk and most urgently require assistance, 2) identify future funding requirements, and 3) develop performance measures to gauge program success. 

DOE has come under considerable criticism from officials at Gosatomnadzor, the agency that is responsible for regulating sealed sources in almost 8,000 facilities in Russia.  Apart from one meeting, DOE officials did not consult with the Russian agency when prioritizing sites for physical security upgrades.  Gosatomnadzor officials were surprised, for example, at the selection of Radon for a security upgrade, because the probability of sealed sources being stolen from there is relatively low in their view.  DOE officials told the GAO that they are now working more closely with Gosatomnadzor.   

IAEA officials have likewise criticized DOE's coordination of the Tripartite Initiative.  One official said that early efforts were ad-hoc and that a systematic approach is needed.  The official acknowledged that the initial effort of the Tripartite Initiative to identify and secure sealed sources in Moldova was a success.  However, he notes, the Tajikistan visit was much less successful, particularly because DOE's rigidity in scheduling the visit prevented MINATOM and IAEA representatives from attending.  DOE officials responded by saying the scheduling difficulties were due to country clearance restrictions for US government travel in Tajikistan and, moreover, that it is not necessary for each party to the Trilateral Initiative to send representatives on every visit.  This is due to the division of duties under the Initiative, which envisions Russia and the IAEA conducting initial visits to determine which sealed sources exist in a given country and their current level of vulnerability and the US later visiting the country to negotiate contracts to improve security at vulnerable sites.  The IAEA official emphasized that better coordination and planning are needed, particularly because the Tripartite Initiative will serve as a model for future efforts to secure sealed sources.  DOE officials agree that better coordination is needed and are working with MINATOM and the IAEA to finalize a "Terms of Reference" document that defines the objectives, scope, roles, operational framework, and procedures to be followed for implementing projects under the Initiative. 

The GAO found that the DOE also failed to fully coordinate its efforts with the Department of State or the NRC.  The report notes that both organizations have extensive experience in nuclear regulatory and safety-related issues in the former Soviet Union.  According to NRC and State Department officials, the DOE failed to adequately consult either organization adequately when developing its Radiological Threat Reduction program or when working with the IAEA and MINATOM to create the Tripartite Initiative.       

Perhaps the biggest criticism made by the GAO of DOE efforts to secure sealed radioactive sources is in regard to the proportion of spending that went to countries needing assistance.  As of January 31, 2003, the DOE had spent about $8.9 million on it Radiological Threat Reduction program.  The IAEA received $3 million of this total, and 93% of the remainder was spent in US national laboratories for labor, travel, equipment and overhead.  While nearly $5 million was spent on labor only in US laboratories, just over $400,000 was spent in the former Soviet Union.  The DOE cites three reasons for this apparent imbalance: 1) Significant start-up efforts were required to determine the potential threat posed by sealed sources, possible impact of dirty bombs, and to categorize and prioritize sealed sources in terms of security threat. 2) Unforeseen difficulties that arise when working in the FSU.  For example, work at Radon had to be stopped for several months in order to gain the approval of the Ministry of Construction. 3) DOE needed time to establish relationships with agencies responsible for regulating sealed sources.  DOE officials say spending in target countries will increase as efforts to consolidate and dispose of sealed sources get underway. The program director also said plans are being developed to secure sealed sources in other countries, and the DOE wants to be sure that it has a sound basis for selecting countries to assist.   

The GAO report concludes that, given its long history in securing nuclear material in the former Soviet Union, the DOE is well suited to the task of helping other countries secure their sealed sources.  However, the report offers three recommendations to the agency:
    1) Develop a comprehensive plan for helping other countries secure sealed sources that         includes:   
          a) a unified set of program goals and priorities and a plan for meeting these goals;
          b) program cost estimates;
          c) time frames for effectively spending funds;
          d) performance measures
          e) ways to sustain facility upgrades and equipment, with cost estimates;
          f) an exit strategy for each country.
    2) DOE should take the lead in efforts to help other countries secure their sealed sources, but should work with the Secretaries of State, Defense and Homeland Security, and the Chairman of the NRC in developing a plan of action.  The plan should also be coordinated with the IAEA to prevent duplication of efforts. 
     3) Increase program expenditures in countries requiring assistance.