Highlights

Trafficking Database annual summary tables are forthcoming.

Nuclear Trafficking in Focus: NTI Resources (2007)
Civilian HEU Reduction & Elimination database
Securing the Bomb 2007


 

Additional Resources on Nuclear Trafficking:

IAEA & Nuclear Security
Proceedings of 2007 IAEA Illicit Trafficking Conference in Edinburgh
CNS International Export Control Observer
Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material (IAEA, 2008)
The 2003 and 2006 HEU Seizures in Georgia (Sokova and Potter, CNS/IAEA, 2007)
Organized Crime, Terrorism and Nuclear Trafficking (Zaitseva, CCC, 2007)
Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks (Ferguson et al, CNS, 2003)
Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS: What's New? What's True?(Potter and Sokova, CNS, 2002)

 

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Abstract Number: 20050250
Headline: Georgia reports four new nuclear smuggling attempts
Date: 8 July 2005
Bibliography: Reuters
Author: Margarita Antidze
Orig. Src.:  
Case:  
Material: HEU

Abstract:

On 7 July 2005, the head of the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service of the Georgian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, Soso Kakushadze, told the Reuters news agency that in the past two years Georgian law enforcement and security services thwarted four attempts to smuggle highly enriched uranium (HEU) through Georgia.[1] According to the Associated Press version of Kakushadze’s revelations, the four HEU seizures took place in Georgia over the span of three to four years.[2] In particular, Kakushadze stated, “In all these cases, Georgian security officials prevented attempts to smuggle HEU through Georgia to other countries. The HEU had been brought to Georgia from abroad.”[1] However, Kakushadze provided no details on the enrichment level or the origin of the seized HEU.[1] In his comments to the Associated Press, however, Kakushadze mentioned that there were reasons to believe that some of the HEU came from South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia landlocked in the middle of the country and bordering on the Russian Federation.[2] Kakushadze added that none of the HEU was weapons grade, and that the seized HEU was not enriched highly enough even to be used as a core for a radiological dispersal device (RDD), one type of which is popularly known as a “dirty bomb.”[2] [Because HEU is weakly radioactive, the seized material could not fuel a potent RDD.]

IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky, commenting on Kakushadze’s statements, pointed out that Georgia had reported the last of the four incidents but declined to go into details. A diplomat close to the IAEA, however, said that the Georgian report submitted to the IAEA did not specify the enrichment level of the seized HEU.[2]  [The IAEA database of illicit trafficking incidents lists an April 19, 2000 seizure of 0.9 kg of HEU fuel pellets (30% U-235 enrichment) in Batumi, Georgia. The CNS illicit trafficking database also reports this HEU seizure (abstract 20000260), as well as some incidents involving low-enriched uranium in Georgia in the past four years (20010300 and 20010650). Most likely these are the same incidents as mentioned by Kakushadze. However, it is possible that Georgia indeed reported new cases to the IAEA recently.]

This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>

Sources:
[1] Margarita Antidze, “Georgia reports 4 new nuclear smuggling attempts,” Reuters, July 8, 2005.
[2] George Jahn, “U.N. Nuclear Agency Expands Treaty,” Associated Press; in
The Guardian online edition, July 9, 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-5128514,00.html>.


The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies has not verified the accuracy or veracity of this report or the facts presented therein. For more information on the material in this database please contact Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova.

 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008 by MIIS.

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