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Nuclear Trafficking in Focus: NTI Resources (2007)
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International Export Control Observer
Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material (IAEA, 2008)
Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the
Security Risks (CNS, 2003)
Organized Crime, Terrorism and Nuclear Trafficking (CCC, 2007)

 

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Latest Nuclear Trafficking Statistics Released
Abstract Number: 20050370
Headline: Latest Nuclear Trafficking Statistics Released
Date: 27 September 2005
Bibliography:  
Author:  
Orig. Src.: IAEA
Case:  
Material: Weapons-Grade Nuclear, Nuclear, and Radioactive Materials

Abstract:
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a report on the latest statistics in its Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) on 27 September 2005. The report shows that countries reported 121 incidents to the IAEA in 2004 of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. In addition, the report indicates that one incident reported to the IAEA since 2003 involved weapons-grade nuclear material —highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. This incident took place in 26 June 2003 when an individual was arrested in Sadahlo, Georgia, while attempting to illegally transport 170 grams of HEU across the border. [This incident had not previously been identified by media or government sources as involving HEU. The incident involved was probably that reported in abstract 20030530, which was reported to involve uranium of unspecified enrichment seized from a suspect trying to cross the Georgian-Armenian border in June 2003.] The report states that there was a substantial increase in the number of incidents reported by states to the IAEA during the two-year 2003-2004 period compared with previous years. The report claims that improved reporting may in part account for the increase [suggesting that actual smuggling may not be increasing]. The majority of the incidents that occurred in these two years, the report says, “showed no evidence of criminal activity” such as theft, illegal possession, or illegal transfer or transaction. [This appears to imply that the majority of cases involve improper disposal, or inadvertent theft of radioactive material by individuals seeking to steal other materials or metals.]

The report also explains trends in ITDB data in the 12-year period 1993-2004. In these 12 years, the report shows 18 confirmed incidents of trafficking in nuclear weapons-grade material. Although most of the 18 incidents involved very small quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material, a few incidents involved kilogram quantities, the report explains. In some of these incidents, the report says that the materials seized by authorities were “allegedly a sample of larger quantities available for illegal sale or at risk of theft.” All ITDB data for the 12-year period shows that more than two dozen incidents involved trace amounts of plutonium sources.

Over the 1993-2004 period, the report states that 220 incidents involved nuclear materials. Of the confirmed nuclear material cases, the report says that the majority involve low-grade nuclear materials, most often reactor fuel pellets, natural uranium, depleted uranium, and thorium. The quantities of nuclear materials in these incidents have been too small to be significant in constructing a nuclear explosive device, the report explains. Nevertheless, the report claims that the incidents show gaps in the control and security of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the report says that the majority of confirmed incidents involving nuclear materials in the twelve-year period involved criminal activity. Some incidents, the report suggests, may indicate “a perceived demand for nuclear materials on the black market.” The report goes on to claim that when there was information available on the motives for the illegal trafficking of nuclear materials, profit-seeking appeared to be the principal motive.

The report shows that countries reported to the IAEA 424 incidents involving radioactive materials, most often in the form of radioactive sources, in the 1993-2004 period. The report indicated that the control and security of the use, storage, and disposal of radioactive sources used in medical, industrial, and other applications are much less strict than for nuclear materials. The report suggests that radioactive sources could be used to fabricate a radiological dispersal device, or “dirty bomb.” In addition, the report argues that human health and the environment may be put at risk by uncontrolled or improperly handled radioactive sources. As an example, the report suggests that the melting of illegally discarded or improperly disposed-of radioactive sources at scrap metal recycling plants may damage the environment or the economy in the surrounding area. Most radioactive-material incidents involved radioisotopes and portable radioactive sources used in industry, the report says. Fifty radioactive-material incidents involved radioactive sources that are radioactive enough to be dangerous if used maliciously, the report claims. Furthermore, the report states that the overwhelming majority of the incidents involving dangerous sources were reported over the last six years.


The Center for Nonproliferation Studies has not verified the accuracy or veracity of this report or the facts presented therein.  For more information on the material in this database please contact Dr. Scott Parrish at sparrish@miis.edu.

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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