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Spent HEU Fuel Repatriated from Uzbekistan to Russia
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| Abstract Number: |
20060090 |
| Headline: |
Secret Mission to Remove Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel from
Uzbekistan Successfully Completed |
| Date: |
20 April 2006 |
| Bibliography: |
National Nuclear Security
Administration website,
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov |
| Author: |
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| Orig. Src.:
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| Case:
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| Material: |
Nuclear fuel |
Abstract:
According to a press release issued by the U.S. National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), 63 kg of spent fuel were repatriated from Uzbekistan
to Russia in four secret shipments between January and April 2006. The transfer
of the HEU spent fuel, most of which was enriched to 90 %, was carried out as a part of the
Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (GTRI), a US-led program to assist the identification, securing,
removal, and disposition of dangerous nuclear and radioactive materials.
According to Rosatom press secretary Sergey Novikov,
as part of the operation, 252 irradiated fuel assemblies were removed from the
WWR-SM research reactor at the
Institute of Nuclear Physics and taken to
Mayak
reprocessing facility for temporary storage and reprocessing. [1] The NNSA
press release stated that the spent fuel was vulnerable to theft because it had
been cooling for a long time and
did not emit an immediate lethal dose of radiation.
The United States,
Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
participated in the operation.
Source:[1] "Rossiya vernet Uzbekistanu ego radioaktivnyye otkhody [Russia
Will Return Uzbekistan Its Radioactive Waste]," Izvestiya.Ru: Novostnaya lenta,
21 April, 2006, in Integrum
Techno
database, www.integrum.ru. {Entered 9/6/07 GM}
The
Center for Nonproliferation Studies has not verified the accuracy or veracity
of this report or the facts presented therein. For more information
on the material in this database please contact Dr. Scott Parrish at sparrish@miis.edu.
 This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.
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