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| Abstract Number: | 20070010 |
| Headline: | Government Accountability Office Reports Limited Progress Securing Radioactive Material |
| Date: | 13 March 2007 |
| Bibliography: | Government Accountability Office website, http://www.gao.gov/ |
| Author: | Gene Aloise, Director of Natural Resources and Environment |
| Orig. Src.: | "Nuclear Proliferation: Focusing on the Highest Priority Radiological Sources Could Improve DOE's Efforts to Secure Sources in Foreign Countries" |
| Case: | |
| Material: | |
Abstract:
GAO REPORT
On 13 March 2007, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report called, "Nuclear Proliferation: Focusing on the Highest Priority Radiological Sources Could Improve DOE's Efforts to Secure Sources in Foreign Countries." The report both acknowledges U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) accomplishments in this area and critiques the program.
For instance, the GAO recognizes that the DOE has improved the security more than 520 sites that contain radiological sources in more than 40 countries, including industrial, medical, and commercial facilities. The GAO report also comments on some noteworthy accomplishments, including the removal of cobalt-60 and cesium-137 sources from a poorly protected nuclear waste repository in Chechnya; the removal, in cooperation with DOE's international partners, of more than 30% of the radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) located in Russia; improved coordination with the Department of State and Nuclear Regulatory Commission to secure radiological sources worldwide; improved cooperation and coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and several key donor states to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund to avoid duplication of effort; the development of successful bilateral and multilateral partnerships to enhance physical protection of vulnerable radioactive material at various sites around the world; construction of storage facilities in Uzbekistan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Georgia in order to consolidate sources and strengthen their long-term protection; and, the installation of physical security upgrades at 21 sites containing radiological sources in Greece prior to the 2004 Olympics.[1]
Despite the acknowledgement of these accomplishments, the GAO also identified areas that it believes need to be further addressed by DOE. These areas for concern are: quality assurance/sustainability, coordination, and transportation. Regarding the issue of prioritization, for instance, the GAO stipulates that while DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites, many of the highest-risk sources remain unsecured. According to the GAO, more than 700 radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG) remain operational or abandoned across Russia, representing the largest unsecured quantity of radioactivity in the world. [CNS Note: the majority of these RTGs are located in the Russian arctic, and are relatively inaccessible. Current plans call for all but some three dozen RTGs to be removed by 2011.] Additionally, the GAO notes that only four of 20 waste storage facilities in Russia and Ukraine have been secured. According to the GAO, this "limited progress" is due in part to the 2003 decision made by the DOE to broaden the scope of the program beyond the former Soviet Union and expand the types of sites that required security upgrades to include hospitals and oncology clinics. The GAO notes that as of 30 September 2006, almost 70% of all sites secured under the DOE program were hospitals and oncology clinics. Meanwhile, the report says, major waste disposal sites remain protected by primitive fences alone, while more than 700 generators are vulnerable to terrorists. According to the IAEA, since 1993, of the 16 confirmed trafficking cases involving highly enriched uranium and plutonium, four of these occurred in the Newly Independent States (NIS). Another seven of these cases involved material suspected to be of Russian or NIS origin. [Please see the CNS Issue Brief on Illicit Trafficking in the NIS for a more detailed report].[1,3]
DOE RESPONSE
At a United States Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee meeting on 13 March 2007, DOE Assistant Deputy Administrator Andrew Bieniawski issued a statement in response to the GAO report. According to Bieniawski, while the DOE believes it has achieved a great deal of threat reduction in a short period of time, he agrees with the GAO that there remains an enormous amount of dangerous material left to secure or eliminate. However, regarding the areas of concern noted by the GAO, Bieniawski stated that the DOE already has in place substantial measures to address each of these areas.
Regarding the issue of prioritization, for example, Bieniawski made it a point to mention that DOE is now moving to secure more high-risk generators and waste sites in Russia, and that their budget request for next year represents a slight increase. Similarly, with regards to coordination and transportation, Bieniawski noted that DOE has been working in close cooperation with the IAEA in programs such as the successful Tripartite Initiative, which involves the IAEA and the government of the Russian Federation, to identify, locate, and secure sources which are no longer used or orphaned in the former Soviet republics, including the recovery of a large quantity of vulnerable radioactive sources from Chechnya in 2006. After recovery, says Bieniawski, the DOE worked bilaterally with the Russian government to ensure the security of the radioactive materials during transportation to final material disposition site.[2]
Sources:
[1] Gene Aloise, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: Focusing on the Highest
Priority Radiological Sources Could Improve DOE's Efforts to Secure Sources in
Foreign Countries," United States Government Accountability Office, 13 March
2007.[2] Statement of Andrew Bieniawski, Assistant Deputy Administrator,
Office of Global Threat Reduction, National Nuclear Security Administration,
U.S. Department of Energy before the United States Senate Homeland Security and
Government Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Oversight of the Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Colombia, 13 March 2007.
[3] "Illicit Trafficking and Other Unauthorized Activities involving Nuclear and
Radioactive Materials: Fact Sheet," International Atomic Energy Website,
http://www.iaea.org/, 1 January 2006 {Entered 04/26/07 SG}.
The Center for Nonproliferation Studies has not verified the accuracy or veracity of this report or the facts presented therein. For more information on the material in this database please contact Dr. Scott Parrish at sparrish@miis.edu.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007
by MIIS.
