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Georgian Authorities Thwart Attempt to Transport Plutonium from
Azerbaijan to Georgia
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| Abstract Number: |
20070150 |
| Headline: |
Georgian Authorities Thwart Attempt to Transport Plutonium from Azerbaijan to
Georgia |
| Date: |
11
September 2007 |
| Bibliography:
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| Author: |
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| Orig. Src.:
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"Review of Incidents Involving Radioactive
Materials in the NIS," International Export Control Observer, Issue
11, June/July 2007 |
| Case:
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| Material:
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Plutonium; Waste/Scams/Contaminated Materials |
Abstract:
On 15 June 2007, the radiation portal monitor at the Red
Bridge port of entry on the Georgian-Azerbaijani border
registered higher than normal radiation from a Mercedes cargo
truck entering Georgia from Azerbaijan.[1,2,3] During the
subsequent inspection of the truck, which was loaded with
stainless steel scrap metal, Georgian border police officers
discovered a plutonium-beryllium source in a metal pipe.[1,2]
The border police notified the Special Operations Center of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia (MIA) and the
Ministry of Environment Protection and Natural Resources
(MEPNR) of the discovery.[1,3] The MIA and MEPNR
dispatched specialists to the scene, who confirmed that the
radiation level in the proximity of the radioactive pipe was
indeed elevated to 300 neutrons per second.[1,2,4,5] The MIA
and MEPNR jointly decided to return the cargo truck to
Azerbaijan and to inform the Azerbaijani authorities of the
incident.[2,3]
On 18 June 2007, the press service of the National Border
Police of Georgia (NBP) issued a press release providing
further details on the incident. According to the NBP press
release, the driver of the cargo truck was a Georgian citizen
and the documents accompanying the scrap metal shipment
were in order. The truck was carrying different types of scrap
metal, including metal pipes described as having been used for
logging oil wells, one of which emitted radiation.[2,3]
Editor’s Note: Plutonium-beryllium (Pu-Be) neutron sources,
or “neutron cannons,” as they are sometimes called, can
either use plutonium-239 or plutonium-238 because both of
these isotopes emit alpha particles which interact with beryllium to generate neutrons. Pu-Be sources used in oil
well-logging applications typically employ Pu-238, which is
not useful for nuclear weapons. However, several grams of
Pu-238 could fuel a potent “dirty bomb.” Pu-Be sources used
to produce neutrons for applications other than well-logging
tend to use a minuscule amount of Pu-239, the isotope useful
for nuclear weapons production, as the principal plutonium
isotope in a mixture containing small amounts of other
plutonium isotopes. A nuclear weapon would typically require
several kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium.
Soso Kakushadze, the head of the Nuclear and Radioactive
Safety Service at the MEPNR, told the Reuters news agency
that Georgia decided to return the cargo truck to Azerbaijan to
avoid the extra expenditures associated with the storage or
neutralization of the radioactive source.[4,6] However, NBP
head Badri Bitsadze provided another, rather unusual
explanation in an interview with the Tbilisi-based Imedi
television channel. Bitsadze stated that there was no
radioactive substance in the truck and that the radiation portal
monitor reacted to the elevated background radiation level in
the truck. “If this was indeed a case of illegal import of
radioactive substance, then a criminal case would have been
launched and there would have been an investigation,”
Bitsadze explained.[7] The MIA provided no details about the
truck’s owner or who was the intended recipient of the scrap
metal shipment.[4,5] When contacted, the Ministry of
Emergencies of Azerbaijan could not provide any additional
comments regarding this incident.[4] According to the
Azerbaijani online news agency Day.Az, the radioactive pipe
could have been included in the scrap metal shipment by
accident. The fact that the Azerbaijani border guards did not
intercept it can be explained by the absence of the radiation
control equipment on the Azerbaijani side of the border. [Editor’s Note: On
21 December 2005, the U.S. Department
of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
and the governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan signed
agreements to install radiation detection and integrated
communications equipment at multiple border crossings, airports, and seaports
throughout the two countries. This
agreement was part of the NNSA’s Second Line of Defense
Program. Once in place, as illustrated in this case, the special
equipment could prevent this type of undetected transport of
radioactive items.][4,5,8]
Sources: [1] “Predotvrashchena popytka vvoza plutoniya iz Azerbaidzhana v
Gruziyu” (An attempt to bring in plutonium from Azerbaijan to Georgia is
thwarted), Day.Az, 18 June 2007, http://www.day.az. [2] “Pogranichniki utochnili detali popytki vvoza v Gruziyu radioaktivnogo loma” (Border
guards clarified details of an attempt to smuggle radioactive scrap metal to
Georgia), Information-Analytical Web Portal Gruziya Online, 20 June 2007,
http://www.apsny.ge. [3] “Border Police Detects ‘Radioactive Scrap Metal’
at Azeri Border,” Civil Georgia, UNA-Georgia Online Magazine, 20 June
2007, http://www.civil.ge/eng. [4] “Radioaktivnyy gruz smog peresech
azerbaydzhanskuyu granitsu iz-za otsutstviya neobkhodimogo oborudovaniya
u pogranichnikov” (Radioactive cargo could cross the Azerbaijani border
because the border guards did not have the necessary equipment), Day.Az,
20 June 2007, http://www.day.az. [5] “Sluchay s perevozkoy plutoniya
cherez azerbaydzhanskuyu granitsu obyasnyaetsya otsutstiyem
spetsoborudovaniya” (The case with the transportation of plutonium across
the Azerbaijani border can be explained by the absence of special equipment),
Novosti-Gruziya News Agency, 20 June 2007,
http://www.newsgeorgia.ru. [6] Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Georgia Finds
Plutonium on Azeri Border, Sends Back,” Reuters, 20 June 2007,
http://www.reuters.com. [7] Vsevolod Yaguzhinskiy, “Gruziya
oprovergayet informatsiyu o vvoze radioaktivnykh veshchestv” (Georgia
denies information on import of radioactive substances), Novyy Region News
Agency, 21 June 2007, http://www.nr2.ru. [8] “U.S. Works with Georgia and Azerbaijan to Stop Nuclear and Radioactive Material Smuggling,”
21
December 2005, U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security
Administration website, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/newsreleases/2005/
PR_2005-12-21_NA-05-35.pdf. {Entered 09/11/07 AL}
The
Center for Nonproliferation Studies has not verified the accuracy or veracity
of this report or the facts presented therein. For more information
on the material in this database please contact Dr. Scott Parrish at sparrish@miis.edu.
 This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.
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