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Last Updated January 17, 2002

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Israel (from "A New Challenge After The Cold War: Proliferation Of Weapons of Mass Destruction)
Headline:Israel (from "A New Challenge After The Cold War: Proliferation Of Weapons of Mass Destruction)
Date:5 March 1993
Bibliography:Proliferation Issues, 5 March 1993, p. 24
Orig. Src.:Report by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Moscow, 199

Abstract:
Israel will neither confirm nor deny the possession of nuclear weapons and is not party to any international agreements on the control of nuclear exports. Israel has three facilities for the production of weapons-grade plutonium. An unsafeguarded heavy-water reactor (with a 75-150 MW capacity) and an irradiated fuel reprocessing plant, both built with the French assistance, are "mainly used for the production of weapons-grade nuclear material." They are capable of producing between 5 and 10 weapons a year. Israel also announced the construction of a 250 MW heavy water reactor in 1984; this reactor could produce over 50kg of plutonium per year. Israel has been accused of the theft and secret acquisition of nuclear materials from the US, France, UK, and Germany. The Israeli government has acknowledged its illicit removal of cryotrons [krytrons] from the US in the early 1980s. In 1986, it was discovered that over 100kg of enriched uranium had disappeared from a US plant; the material is believed to have gone to Israel. It is estimated that Israel has uranium stocks sufficient to last 200 years, and that it possesses 100-200 nuclear weapons. In 1974, Israel patented a laser uranium enrichment method, and in 1978 "they devised an even more economical method for separating uranium isotopes based on the difference in their magnetic properties." Israel may also have studied aerodynamic enrichment.

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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