Abstract:
Note: Details about the Blaauw case are provided in the Africa Confidential article. ..... According to information released regarding the secret mid-1980s extortion trial of Johann Blaauw, a brigadier in the South African army, South Africa and _Israel_ participated in four clandestine nuclear deals in the mid-1970s. Blaauw was found not guilty of trying to extort mining concessions from Minister of Mines Fanie Botha in a trial in 1989 [1]. The first nuclear deal occurred in shortly after the Yom Kippur War in 1973 when "Benjamine," a member of the Israel Council for Scientific Liaison, asked Blaauw to acquire South African yellowcake which Israel could use for weapon-grade plutonium. ("Benjamine" is believed to be Benjamin Blumberg, the head of the Israeli Intelligence division Lish Ka l-Kishrei (Lakam) [2].) After discussions with Gen. Hendryk van den Bergh, head of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), South African Prime Minister John Vorster eventually agreed to sell 50 metric tons of yellowcake to Israel. The deal was handled by Minister of Mines Fanie Botha, who replaced Piet Koornhog [Koornhof] after Koornhog opposed the sale. Uranium Enrichment Corporation Chairman Ampie Roux was also aware of the deal.

During his testimony, Blaauw said that "a high degree of confidence was developing between the South African and Israeli governments which involved the exchange of military technology, joint aeronautic ventures, and the supply of 'know-how' by Israel to South Africa in regard to the manufacture of weaponry."

The second transfer of nuclear material included tritium. Van den Bergh asked Blaauw to procure 30 grams of tritium from Israel, which the trial record stated was "enough to manufacture 12 atomic bombs." Tritium is used to increase the power of nuclear weapons by creating fusion for thermonuclear bombs [2]. In a project with the code name "Teeblare" (or "Tea Leaves"), Israel delivered many small shipments of tritium to South Africa in capsules which contained 2.5 grams each. Blumberg and Information Ministry Secretary Eschel Rhoodie served as escorts on the flights [2]. The South African Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) has admitted to the IAEA that it did import tritium but has refused to name its sources.

Blaauw received $1 million from Israel as a "gift for what I had done for them" [1]. [Note: It is unclear whether the "gift" was provided as a reward for arranging the tritium deal, the yellowcake deal, or both.]

In reports to the IAEA, the AEA has also admitted to performing lithium-6 separation which results in the production of tritium [2]. A September 1993 IAEA document said that in the early 1980s South Africa was planning to construct a 150 MW reactor at Gouriqua, near Moussel Bay, that would be capable of producing tritium and plutonium indigenously [2]. The reactor was never built [2].

The third transaction involved the export of 50 metric tons of South African yellow cake to Israel. The fourth transaction involved the release of 500 metric tons of South African yellowcake that was already inexplicably located in Israel.

The details of each transaction are also recorded in the book, "Critical Mass" by William Burrows and Robert Windrem [1]. Despite these occurrences, South African President de Klerk stated in a speech to parliament in March 1993, "I wish to emphasize that at no time did South Africa acquire nuclear weapons technology or materials from another country, nor has it provided any to any other country, or cooperated with another country in this regard" [1]. When asked why South Africa was importing tritium from Israel, de Klerk responded, "Although tritium may be used in initiators of nuclear explosive devices, (although not in the devices produced by South Africa) it has many other commercial uses. South Africa has been active in the commercial exploitation of tritium for some time and has procured this material from various sources in the past" [1].

Some of the information about the Blaauw case was revealed in March 1993 and April 1993 by Des Blow of the Johannesburg City Press.

Supporting Sources:

[1] Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), February 1911-17/94, p. 2; in JPRS- TND-94-006, pp. 1-2, "De Klerk Not Telling 'Truth' About Nuclear Program." [2] Africa Confidential, 4 February 1994, pp. 1-3, "South Africa: a Nuclear Nightmare."