Submarine Proliferation

South Korea Export Behavior
Capabilities | Import | Export
South Korean Submarines. Source: Korean Navy Website, http://www.navy.mil.kr. |
In 2003, South Korea and Indonesia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
on defense sector cooperation. Aside from upgrading Indonesian military
equipment, South Korea will also replace engines on Indonesia's Type 209/1300
submarines at its shipyards.[1] This MoU followed earlier talks on this subject,
including on the possible joint production of vessels.[2] More importantly, it
has also been reported that Indonesia is interested in acquiring two of South
Korea's Type 209/1200 Chang Bogo-class submarines.[3] However, such a sale would
require the consent of the German government, since the submarines were built
from a German design.
Judging by South Korea's continued domestic design endeavors and confidence in
its ability to construct submarines, as witnessed by building the entire class
of its new Type 214 vessels, South Korea is likely to succeed in developing an
indigenous design and construction capacity in the near future. This has been
confirmed by South Korean officials, who state that the next generation
submarine will be designed and constructed using domestic technology, including
torpedoes, countermeasure systems, sonar arrays, and even combat systems.[4] The
cost of such a pursuit can only be offset by significant submarine exports.
Therefore, South Korea is likely to become an independent exporter of
submarines. To this end, in 2002 South Korea hosted an underwater defense
technology conference for the first time, allowing potential partners to meet
representatives from the Korean defense industry.[5] South Korea is already
becoming an after-sales service provider, as witnessed by an Indonesian contract
concerning the overhaul of one of its Type 209 boats.[6]
Alternatively, cooperation between HDW and the ROKN may develop along the lines
of HDW's cooperation with the Turkish Naval Forces (TNF): used ROKN vessels may
be sold to train regional navies without a submarine arm, with the ROK providing
its local facilities and simulators, followed by the production of new boats at
a Korean yard from German-supplied kits. As HDW's cooperation with the TNF and a
Turkish shipyard has not met with success to date, a new alliance with the
seemingly more promising ROK may be on the horizon.
Restrictive German arms export guidelines theoretically bar sales to areas of tension. However, both former and current German government coalitions have supported submarine sales; there appears to have been little concern about the submarine sales to South Korea. Therefore, future sales in the region are also quite possible.
Korean Shipyards:
Daewoo:
Daewoo constructed nine
Chang Bogo (Type
209/1200)
vessels for the South Korean Navy.
Hyundai:
The shipyard is constructing Type 214 vessels for the South Korean Navy.
Sources:
[1] "DPR agrees on procurement of more Sukhoi aircraft," Kompas,
September 1, 2003; in "Indonesia: Navy Chief of Staff visits South Korea to sign
MoU for new Navy," FBIS Document SEP20030901000039.
[2] Yonhap, July 8, 2003; in "ROK's Yonhap: Korea, Indonesia open defense
talks," FBIS Document 20030708000050.
[3] "Indonesia to buy two South Korean submarines," Agence France Presse,
September 25, 2003; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[4] Interview with Dr. Taebo Shim, principal researcher of the Naval Systems
Development Center's (NSDC) Agency for Defense Development (ADD) by Hartmut
Manseck, Naval Forces, 2002, No. 6, pp. 91-92; in ProQuest Information
and Learning Company,
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb.
[5] Hartmut Manseck, "UDT 2002 Korea," Naval Forces, 2002, No. 6, pp.
106; in ProQuest Information and Learning Company,
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb.
[6] "Indonesia to buy two corvettes from the Netherlands," Agence France Presse,
January 8, 2004; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
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material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
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