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Updated October 2008
Missile: Overview
Introduction
After suffering a humiliating defeat to the British in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands war in 1982, Argentina began an effort to produce a medium-range ballistic missile. The Air Force appointed a secret working group of scientists and technicians that would subsequently assess the feasibility of constructing a nuclear warhead for the missile. Though the group later concluded that the Air Force could not gain access to fissile material for a nuclear warhead and abandoned the effort, the missile project, which became known as the Condor II, continued.
Lacking the indigenous capability to fully develop a complete missile system, Argentina employed a large consortium of mostly European firms to work on the Condor project. At the height of the project in the early to mid-1980s, firms from West Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, and other countries worked on the project. In 1984, Iraq agreed to provide funding for the project in exchange for access to missile technology. Reports indicate that Saudi Arabia also provided between $1-2 billion in financing. Technical problems, loss of outside financing, and pressure from the United States ultimately forced Argentina to completely dismantle the project in the early 1990s.
History
Initially, Argentina pursued the Condor missile out of security concerns. In the late 1970s, Argentina was in the midst of a dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel islands and with Great Britain over the Falkland/Malvinas islands. Other factors such as political prestige and potential revenue from exports also motivated the missile program. Argentina's traditional rivalry with Brazil and that country's expanding space program added to its threat perception.
The Condor I missile program began around 1979 when the Argentine government contracted the German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB)[1] to develop a single-stage missile with a range of around 150 kilometers with a 400 kilogram warhead. The Swiss firm CONSEN and the Italian firm SNIA-BpD were also contracted to work on the project. Over the next few years European involvement in the program grew to include the Austrian firm Bolhen Industries, and the Swiss firms IFAT and Disentec AG. In 1983, program personnel conducted a static motor test of the Condor I.
After the defeat in the Falkland/Malivinas war in 1982, the concept of the Condor II—a missile capable of striking that island—became a very attractive proposition for Argentina, both for security and economic reasons. The Condor II was a much more sophisticated version of the Condor I. It was a two-stage solid-fueled missile that in its final design would have a more advanced guidance system than the Condor I. By 1984, the Argentine government had completed contracts with many of the same firms working on the Condor I to provide technology for the Condor II.
The latter part of 1983 saw the end of military rule and the return of a democratically elected president in Argentina. In early 1984, the Air Force, which had secretly controlled the Condor project, informed the newly elected president and several other high-level officials of the existence of the project. It was also in 1984 that the Middle East component of the Condor project began to take shape.
Iraq expressed interest in funding the Condor project, provided that the resulting product would have a range at least five times that of the Condor I's 150 km range (which would put Tehran and Tel Aviv in range). The Air Force calculated that the Condor I could be transformed into the second stage of a larger rocket with a liquid-fueled booster to extend the range, but accomplishing this would require technology that would attract the attention of the United States and Great Britain.[2] To avoid scrutiny, Iraq suggested using Egypt as a go-between to obscure its role in financing the project. Egypt would also gain access to Condor missiles and technology.
Iraq agreed to provide funding via Egypt for the Condor II program, in exchange for some portion of Argentine missile production and access to technology that would enhance its own missile production capability. Egypt and Iraq expected to receive around 200 missiles. Saudi Arabia, while appearing to be ambivalent about the project, secretly deposited $1 billion into Swiss banks for its support.[3] The Saudis were eager to support a missile that could be fired on Israel or "revivalists" in Iran. [4]
Throughout the 1980s, work continued on the Condor II missile system with an increasing number of foreign companies—including U.S. and British firms—supplying technology. A $200 million plant was constructed in the mid-1980s at Falda del Carmen outside the city of Cordoba.
In the mid- to late 1980s, the United States began to grow concerned about the Condor project. By this time, the solid fuel engines had been tested and some were shipped to Egypt. But the project would soon start to unravel. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) came into existence with France, Italy, and West Germany—all countries with firms participating in the Condor program—as members. In the fall of 1987, U.S. and British intelligence discovered that an Italian firm was supplying technology to the Condor project in violation of the MTCR. In 1988, an Egyptian-American scientist and former employee of the U.S. Jet Propulsion Laboratory was caught by U.S. Customs attempting to smuggle sophisticated missile components to Egypt for use in that countrie's end of the Condor project. [5] The United States subsequently increased pressure on Buenos Aires to dismantle the burgeoning Condor II project. [6]
Carlos Menem assumed the Argentine presidency in 1989. Shortly before taking power, Menem told the Argentine newspaper La Nación that Argentina did not have the political capacity or the international standing to sustain the Condor missile. He took office facing an economic crisis, with an inflation rate of 150% per month, and the country $4 billion in arrears in payments on its $64 billion foreign debt. Later in the year, Menem issued a joint declaration on missile technology with his Brazilian counterpart, Fernando Collor de Mello. The two presidents signed the Argentine-Brazilian Joint Declaration on Bilateral Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, thereby relaxing some of the tensions between two countries with regards to missile and space technology.
During a September 1989 visit to Washington that included a meeting with President George H. W. Bush, Menem was told unequivocally that Argentina risked losing U.S. credits and funding if it did not halt the Condor program. A year later, Menem would tell Bush that the Condor program had been completely deactivated, though behind the scenes in Argentina, a bitter debate ensued over whether to bow to U.S. pressure and dismantle the program—which many high-level officials and Air Force personnel opposed—or to risk isolation by continuing the project. [7]
In May 1991, the Argentine defense minister publicly announced the decision to dismantle or recycle all of the elements, parts, and components of the Condor II. The recycled elements would only be used for peaceful applications. The minister of defense also announced Argentina's decision to adhere to the MTCR and concluded by declaring that far from protecting Argentina's national security, the Condor made Argentina more vulnerable, increased instability in other parts of the world, and compromised the nation's prestige.
The Condor II missile program came to an end with no flight-test ever having been conducted. The missile still lacked an adequate guidance system—a problem due in large part to limited funding. These factors likely simplified the decision to terminate the program.
Over the next two years, employing Spain as an intermediary, the Condor program was physically dismantled in Argentina. U.S. officials and journalists were eventually invited to visit the once secret Falda del Carmen complex. In November 1993, Argentina became a member of the MTCR.
Current Status
Argentina currently has no ballistic missiles. However, several sources list the Alacran (English: Scorpion) short-range missile as being in service. [8] It is unclear whether this is the case or if it is an assumption based on the natural progression and development of this missile and the fact that several successful flight tests were apparently carried out. There are no open source reports of this missile officially entering service nor are there reports of the deactivation of this missile. Sources with inside knowledge of the Condor program interviewed by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies assert that published specifications of the Alacran are unrealistic and would have been beyond the indigenous production capacity of Argentina. The same sources also cast doubt on the viability of the Condor II missile had the program continued. These sources allege that many of the European contractors—especially MBB—were proceeding with the project using unrealistic designs and simply enjoying the substantial amounts of money the various parties were pouring into the project.
In 2007, Argentina set the goal of bringing the country into the space age by developing space vehicles and launch services. A project for a light-payload satellite launch vehicle for domestic use and commercial purposes, the Tronador, is being developed under civilian leadership, reportedly with no involvement from the military or the Defense Ministry. [9]
Sources:
[1] Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm is now DaimlerChrysler.
[2] Several sources list another missile in Argentina's inventory, the Alacran. It is generally reported to use Condor I technology and has the same range and payload of the Condor I. However, it is unclear if the missiles are the same. The Argentine Air Force envisioned the Condor I as the second stage of the Condor II missile. A knowledgeable source interviewed by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, however, says that this would have been impossible given the design of the Alacran/Condor I.
[3] Some sources indicate that the Saudis provided up to $2 billion to the project.
[4] William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 470.
[5] Ruth Marcus and David B. Ottaway, " Egyptian Officer Tied To Smuggling Effort; 5 Accused of Plot to Export Missile Material," Washington Post, 25 June 1988, p. A1, <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.
[6] Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Seeks to Curb Argentine Missile Project," The Washington Post, 19 September 1988, p. A6, <http://www.lexisnexis.com>.
[7]Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 185-199.
[8] Payload: 500 kg, max. range: 150 km "Features, Ballistic Missiles," Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17 Apr 1996, <http://www.janes.com>.
[9] Daniel Gallo, "Probaron en secreto un cohete argentino", La Nación, 5 August 2007, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar>.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2009 by MIIS.
