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Introduction Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling
 Car passing through U.S.-funded nuclear detector, Russia. |
While the first and most critical line of defense in controlling nuclear warheads and materials is to prevent them from being stolen in the first place, a multi-layered defense is needed, to deal with those cases in which the first line fails and nuclear material is stolen. Theft and smuggling of weapons-usable nuclear material is not a hypothetical concern, but an ongoing reality: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented 18 cases, confirmed by the states involved, of seizures of stolen plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) over the past decade.[1] |
Police, intelligence, customs, and border control measures to catch nuclear thieves and interdict nuclear smuggling represent the critical second line of defense. The United States and other countries have launched a wide range of programs, described in this section, designed to strengthen these back-up defenses. But the challenge of building a substantial barrier to nuclear smuggling could hardly be more daunting. Once stolen, the material could be anywhere, and it is very difficult to detect, especially if shielding is used to limit radiation emissions. Relatively little material is required: as little as four kilograms of plutonium – about the size of a soda can – or three times that amount of HEU can potentially be enough for a bomb.[2] Borders over which smugglers might travel stretch for thousands of miles, and millions of trucks, trains, ships, and airplanes in which nuclear material might be hidden cross international boundaries at legitimate border crossings every year. Officials tasked by their countries with guarding those borders are often poorly paid, geographically isolated, and susceptible to corruption.
Indeed, one need look no further than the vast, intractable international illegal drug trade to quickly understand the challenge of stopping smuggling of nuclear material once it is has been stolen. The United States is able to stop at best maybe 20 to 25 percent of the hundreds of tons of South American cocaine being smuggled annually over its borders.[3] It is sometimes said that the easiest way to bring nuclear material into the United States would be to hide it in a bale of marijuana. The world is becoming ever more interconnected, and national borders are ever more porous. Every nation's border is vulnerable to various types of illicit movement, be it drugs, terrorists, or the material needed to unleash nuclear terror.
Despite the challenge, U.S. and other international programs are making genuine progress in helping states better control nuclear materials crossing their borders. The Departments of Defense, State, and Energy have each on their own institutional expertise and resources to address the problem of nuclear smuggling. These programs have done important work, but viewed collectively, U.S. efforts also face significant difficulties because of the lack of clear, agreed-upon goals for these efforts; the absence of a clear, agreed-upon strategic plan for achieving those goals; and the lack of appropriate coordination among the various programs. The response to nuclear smuggling has evolved piecemeal over the years, and what is clearly missing as a result is an overarching strategic vision of what this assistance is truly intended to achieve and how that can best be accomplished.
In the summer of 2002, the National Security Council (NSC) staff organized the various appropriate agencies to develop an overall government-wide strategic plan for interdicting all manner of smuggling related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[4] However, by fall 2002, it appears that neither the government-wide strategic plan for smuggling interdiction assistance nor a specific proposal governing roles and responsibilities of various agencies involved in providing nuclear material detection equipment had been completed.[5]
This section provides information on the key aspects of the U.S. effort to improve the ability of other countries to combat nuclear smuggling, as well as information about international efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Group of Eight (G-8) industrial nations to address the problem of nuclear smuggling. Each page provides a detailed description of the program, the budget supporting it, the key issues the program faces along with recommendations for addressing those issues, and links to other information useful for learning more about the initiative. The programs discussed in this section are:
 |
The Department of Energy (DOE) Second Line of Defense program, which works to install radiation detection equipment to detect nuclear material passing through key ports and border crossings in Russia and other Newly Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union, train officials on the use of that equipment, and link that equipment to a communications system |
|
The Department of State Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program, which funds equipment, training, and legal and regulatory assistance (provided by its own program officials and by U.S. partner agencies such as the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Coast Guard) to control illicit trafficking in nuclear and other WMD and related material in and around the NIS, as well as in several other regions of the world; |
|
Department of Defense (DOD) International Counterproliferation, in which DOD collaborates with the U.S. Customs Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to provide equipment and training to customs and law enforcement counterparts in the NIS and in Southern and Eastern Europe; |
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The proposed, but not yet initiated, DOD Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation Prevention program, which would expand beyond the International Counterproliferation program to focus on collaborating with internal and border security forces in key NIS states, especially those of Central Asia, to improve their ability to interdict smuggling not just at ports and customs checkpoints but along the whole length of these countries' land, air, and sea borders; and, |
|
IAEA and other international efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, including through educating officials on the problem, improving scientific capacity to detect nuclear material and to determine where it came from, and fostering cooperation among those nations trying to interdict nuclear smuggling. |
Links
| Key Resources | |
|
Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John P. Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, March 2003). |
| This new report, as part of comprehensive review of U.S. actions, assesses the U.S. budgets for programs aimed at interdicting the smuggling of materials once they are stolen (Download 538K PDF), examines how much has been accomplished on this goal thus far (Download 847K PDF), and makes recommendations for next steps (Download 418K PDF). | |
|
Scott Parrish, Senior Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, "Issues & Analysis: Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS," Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library, March 2002. |
| Useful page
in the Issues & Analysis section of the Research
Library providing a succinct description of the threat
and policy options in dealing with the problem of nuclear
smuggling. |
|
|
U.S. General Accounting
Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Assistance
Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning, Washington,
D.C.: General Accounting Office, GAO-02-426, May 2002.
Download 4.8M PDF. |
| Essential reading for anyone interested in what the U.S. government is doing to interdict smuggling of nuclear material overseas. The report was prompted by congressional concerns that there was too much overlap and too little coordination among these government programs. The report highlights the lack of coordination and strategic planning in detail, and also outlines instances in which equipment provided to combat nuclear smuggling was not working, was not used, or was not capable enough to accomplish the mission effectively. | |
|
United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, " Hearing to receive testimony on the report of the General Accounting Office on nuclear nonproliferation and efforts to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling," Washington, D.C., July 30, 2002. |
| Page from which one can read the submitted testimony of officials from the General Accounting Office, the State and Energy Departments, and the U.S. Customs Service who were called to testify on the state of U.S. efforts to interdict nuclear smuggling. The testimony provides a useful overview of each agency's activity in this area. | |
|
Rensselaer Lee, "Nuclear Smuggling From the Former Soviet Union: Threats And Responses", Foreign Policy Research Institute: A Catalyst for Ideas, April 27, 2001. |
| Examines both the supply side and the demand side of the illicit market for nuclear materials. The article suggests applying lessons from other supply-side reduction efforts such as illicit drug interdiction, and to consider what the author calls a "more dynamic" approach focusing on the demand for illicit nuclear materials. | |
|
Matthew Bunn, "Nuclear
Smuggling Interdiction," in The Next Wave: Urgently
Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace and Harvard Project on Managing the Atom, April
2000), pp. 39-41. Download 659K PDF |
|
Matthew Bunn, "Nuclear
Smuggling," in The Next Wave: Urgently Needed
New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace and Harvard Project on Managing the Atom, April
2000), pp. 88-90. Download 88K PDF |
| Excerpts from 2000 report describing the actions that were being carried out at the time to end nuclear smuggling in the former Soviet Union, and discussing the urgently needed next steps to combat nuclear smuggling. | |
|
Scott Parrish and Tamara
Robinson, "Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls
and Combat Illicit Trafficking and Brain Drain,"
Nonproliferation Review, Volume 7, Number
1, Spring 2000. Download 409K PDF |
| Article from series in the Spring 2000 issue of The Nonproliferation Review that reviewed programs trying to combat nuclear and other WMD smuggling, among other things. | |
|
Emily Ewell, “NIS Nuclear
Smuggling Since 1995: A Lull in Significant Cases?”
Nonproliferation Review, Volume 5, Number
3, Spring-Summer 1998. Download 47K PDF |
| An article examining possible explanations for reduced levels in reports of weapons-grade material between 1995 and 1997, including both optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. | |
| FOOTNOTES | |
| [1] | International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), "Facts & Figures: The IAEA's Database on Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials" (press release, Vienna, Austria, October 8, 2002). |
| [2] | These are the amounts for a reasonably well-designed implosion bomb. A simpler gun-type bomb can only be made with HEU, not plutonium, and requires some 50 kilograms of material. See Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren, and Anthony Wier, Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action (Cambridge, MA: Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 2002). |
| [3] | Rensselaer Lee, "Nuclear Smuggling and International Terrorism: Issues and Options for U.S. Policy," CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL31539, August 17, 2002. |
| [4] | Ambassador Norman Wulf, Special Representative to the President for Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, Testimony before U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, July 30, 2002. |
| [5] | United States Senate, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, "On nuclear nonproliferation and efforts to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling," July 30, 2002, text from Federal Information Systems Corporation Federal News Service. Available on: LexisNexis™ Congressional (Online Service). Bethesda, MD: Congressional Information Service; interviews by author with U.S. Government officials, June-September 2002. |
Written by Matthew Bunn.
Last updated by Anthony Wier on August 1, 2006.
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