Overview
	Technical Background
	The Threat
	Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials
Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling   Second Line of Defense   Export Control & Border Security   International Counterproliferation   WMD Proliferation Prevention   International Interdiction Efforts
	Stabilizing Employment for Nuclear Personnel
	Monitoring Stockpiles
	Ending Further Production
	Reducing Stockpiles

 

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Previous Publications
	Funding for U.S. Efforts to Improve Controls Over Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise Overseas: Recent Developments and Trends February2007 Readthe Full Report (1.5M PDF)
	Securing the Bomb 2006 The latest report in our series, from May 2006, finds that even though the gap between the threat of nuclear terrorism and the response has narrowed in recent years, there remains an unacceptable danger that terrorists might succeed in their quest to get and use a nuclear bomb, turning a modern city into a smoking ruin. Offering concrete steps to confront that danger, the report calls for world leaders to launch a fast-paced global coalition against nuclear terrorism focused on locking down all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide as rapidly as possible. Read the Executive Summary (379K PDF) or the Full Report (1.7M PDF)
	Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives Our May 2005 report finds that while the United States and other countries laid important foundations for an accelerated effort to prevent nuclear terrorism in the last year, sustained presidential leadership will be needed to win the race to lock down the world’s nuclear stockpiles before terrorists and thieves can get to them. Read the Executive Summary (281 K) or the Full Report (1.9M PDF)
	Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action Building on the previous years' reports, this 2004 NTI-commissioned report grades current efforts and recommends new actions to more effectively prevent nuclear terrorism. It finds that programs to reduce this danger are making progress, but there remains a potentially deadly gap between the urgency of the threat and the scope and pace of efforts to address it. Download the Full Report (1.2 M PDF) Выписки из доклада по-русски (423K PDF)
	Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan 2003 report published by Harvard and NTI measures the progress made in keeping nuclear weapons and materials out of terrorist hands, and outlines a comprehensive plan to reduce the danger. Download the Full Report (2.7M PDF)
	Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action 2002 report co-published by Harvard and NTI outlines seven urgent steps to reduce the threat of stolen nuclear weapons or materials falling into the hands of terrorists or hostile states. Read the Full Report (516K PDF)

Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling

International Efforts to Combat Smuggling in Nuclear Weapons and Materials

Status

Proliferation Security Initiative

In a speech in Krakow, Poland, on May 31, 2003, President Bush announced a new international effort to improve and enhance countries' abilities to interdict suspected land, sea, and air shipments of WMD and related materials.[1]  Through this Proliferation Security Initiative, the United States, along with France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and Poland, will work to make use of all their legal authorities to cooperate in discovering and stopping shipments of nuclear and other WMD, and related materials.[2]  (U.S. officials ultimately hope to have all 19 NATO members participate,[3] along with other key countries along potential proliferation routes, such as China.)  Because of the "increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or circumvent existing nonproliferation norms, and to profit from such trade," states a White House fact sheet, the Proliferation Security Initiative is an effort to "establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern."[4]  Certainly, North Korea is at the top of the list of states of proliferation concern, but the framework is broad enough to allow for improved cooperation in interdiction operations around the globe.[5]  While this initiative may offer some opportunity to stop shipments of nuclear materials if they are sent in a large and observable ship or airplane, the amount of material needed for a bomb could also fit in a suitcase or carry-on bag—so the contribution of this initiative to preventing nuclear smuggling (as opposed to stopping shipments of long-range missiles or other large pieces of equipment) should not be overstated.

After several meetings in summer 2003 (led by John Bolton, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, indicating the priority of the effort in the U.S. government) the participating countries agreed in Paris in early September 2003 on a set of principles to which the countries would adhere.  These principles include: streamlining procedures for exchanging sensitive information of suspected proliferation activity; maximizing coordination in interdiction efforts; working to strengthen both national legal authorities and, where appropriate, international treaties and frameworks; and, taking a number of specific actions to interdict suspected WMD and related cargoes. 

In particular, the countries agreed to make every effort, using existing legal authorities, to board and search any ship or aircraft that is “reasonably suspected” of carrying proliferation-sensitive cargo to a state of proliferation concern, when the suspect vessels or aircraft are either flying the flag of a participating country or in water and air space over which a participating country has jurisdiction.[6]  Undersecretary Bolton also stated after the first meeting of countries in Madrid in June 2003 that countries had the right to intercept and board ships flying without a flag or those flying a flag of convenience if the country of that flag gave its permission.[7]  While not every member of the coalition accepted the full extent of his interpretation, it is clear that the countries participating in the initiative want to embolden their enforcement agencies to act under existing laws and international treaties—doing everything they can within those laws to stop proliferation into and out of countries of concern.[8] 

Plans to carry out joint military and law enforcement exercises to train for future interdiction operations as part of the initiative have drawn media attention, especially because of the perception that the initiative is largely focused on North Korea.  The first such exercise, Pacific Protector, was carried out in mid-September 2003 near Australia, with U.S., Australian, Japanese, and French military and law enforcement personnel participating.  In the scenario, a suspected Japanese freighter is stopped, boarded, and inspected on the high seas by Japanese Coast Guard officials working with French, U.S., and Australian counterparts.[9]

The initiative was in part inspired by an incident in December 2002 in which Spain, acting on a tip from the United States, intercepted a North Korean freighter in the Arabian Sea containing Scud missiles bound for Yemen.  Lacking any justification under international law for holding the freighter, Spain and the United States then reluctantly allowed the freighter to continue on to Yemen.  Ironically, though the incident was one of the motivating factors behind the Proliferation Security Initiative, as presently conceived the outcome of the freighter incident would not have changed had the initiative been in operation at the time, because the freighter was on the open seas and was not explicitly violating any international treaty.[10]

Efforts Led by the International Atomic Energy Agency

Owing mostly to constraints on the funding and personnel resources, the efforts of the IAEA are fairly humble in scope.  The IAEA focuses on collecting information provided by its member states into a database about illicit trafficking, providing some training to member states on methods to combat nuclear smuggling, collaborating with other interested international organizations, and performing research to assess available detection methodologies and technologies.  The IAEA’s activities in this area have expanded significantly under the Action Plan against nuclear terrorism developed in the  wake of the September 11 attacks; IAEA teams, for example, have been visiting a number of countries to perform overall assessments of their needs for assistance in controlling nuclear smuggling.[11]

IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB).  The IAEA has been tracking reports of illicit trafficking since 1992.  In 1995, the IAEA created a formal Illicit Trafficking Database to collect information from participating countries in a uniform, detailed fashion, and then to disseminate that collected information to member states.[12]  The purpose of the database is not to interdict smuggling per se, but to enhance the level of knowledge about how many incidents of illicit trafficking are detected each year and to search for trends in smuggling activities.  The database contains information on incidents involving both nuclear material and radioactive sources.  The IAEA counts a total of 73 states as participants in the database program, while others also submit on an ad hoc basis.  As of August 2003, the IAEA had collected information on over 476 cases of trafficking, with 46 confirmed reports coming since August 2002 (most of these incidents involve radioactive, not fissionable, material, and none of the fissionable material was a quantity sufficient for a nuclear device).[13]  The IAEA has designed and distributed to participating countries software to fill in the database, and other efforts to further understand and corroborate incidents have been expanded.[14]  The United States has donated an expert to the IAEA headquarters to support the database.[15]  A review meeting of national points of contact to the database is planned for October 2003, to discuss ways to improve the ITDB, its software, and especially its ability to track non-fissionable radioactive sources.[16]

IAEA Training for Law Enforcement and Customs Officials.  Though not nearly as extensive as U.S. bilateral training and cooperation efforts, the IAEA, in coordination with the World Customs Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), and the European Commission, does provide training to law enforcement officials in member states on the detection and response to illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.  The IAEA has developed a three-pronged strategy for providing training to other countries:  "a) regional awareness seminars to combat illicit trafficking, b) regional focused training on methodologies and practices to detect radioactive materials in illicit trafficking, and c) specific training in using detection equipment provided as support."[17]  In support of this strategy, the IAEA has developed standardized curricula for training in each of these different categories.  In November 2002, the IAEA organized a workshop in the Philippines for law enforcement and customs officials along with commercial operators to train them on ways to combat illicit nuclear trafficking, while a tentative work plan for similar efforts in Africa was created in 2002.  Meanwhile, in February 2003, a regional course on preventing and responding to terrorist nuclear acts, including efforts to interdict trafficking, was held in Romania; a similar regional course will be held in December 2003 in South America.[18] 

International Interagency Coordination.  The IAEA also works with the World Customs Organization (WCO), the Universal Postal Union, Interpol, and EUROPOL to share information and to improve national capacities to control the flow of nuclear and radioactive materials, although resources for carrying out such operations are limited, as the IAEA Director General notes in a report for the 2003 General Conference.  On sign of such collaboration was the provision in 2003 of the unrestricted information in the Illicit Trafficking Database to Interpol, EUROPOL, and the WCO. [19]

IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP).  The IAEA created in 2002 a Coordinated Research Project (CRP) to oversee research and development on the "detection capabilities and field performance of hand-held and portable radionuclide measurement devices."[20]  The CRP is building on an earlier detection assessment program carried out jointly with the Austrian and Hungarian governments to understand the functional requirements for radiation monitoring equipment.  That assessment found that improvements were needed in the methodology and technology many countries used to detect nuclear and radioactive materials at border crossings.[21]  After a meeting in March 2003, the CRP expects by the end of 2003 to provide member states with a set of specific minimum technical specifications for equipment monitoring for radioactive materials moving across borders.[22]

Other International Efforts

Nuclear Forensics Science.  Concerns about nuclear smuggling have led to the development of a new field referred to as nuclear forensics.  Experts at numerous laboratories around the world, including the U.S. national laboratories, are working to develop procedures and knowledge about how to determine the nature of material seized in an illicit trafficking attempt, as well as how to gain insight into the intended use and the origin of that material.  The IAEA has been working with scientists and laboratories to help improve and accelerate development of this knowledge.

As one useful example of work being contributed internationally in the area of nuclear forensics, the European Commission Joint Research Center's Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) has been focusing for several years on working to maintain and develop investigative techniques into the nature, source, and even possible transit route of seized materials, to develop crime scene procedures with law enforcement organizations, including Interpol and the World Customs Organization, and to develop a database on commercial nuclear materials to aid the identification of seized material.[23]  The Institute has been able to identify the source of seized materials in a number of cases, including alpha-contaminated stainless steel that had originated at a reactor at Obninsk, Russia.  The ITU coordinates its research closely with the IAEA, having worked with the IAEA to develop a model action plan for dealing with seized nuclear material and hosting a number of conferences, including one in October 2002.[24]  In February 2002, the IAEA also hosted a meeting on improving provision to IAEA member states of forensics support for seized nuclear material.[25]

G-8 Cooperation to Counter Nuclear Trafficking.  At the 1996 Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, the Group of Eight nations collectively announced a "Programme for Preventing and Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material," [26] which included commitments to:

• "regularly share and promptly disseminate, in accordance with the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, information on nuclear theft and smuggling incidents;"

• "exchange information on significant incidents in this area…"

• "foster enhanced cooperation and coordination among our national intelligence, customs, and law enforcement agencies and cooperation with those other concerned countries in order to ensure prompt investigation and successful prosecution in cases of illicit nuclear trafficking;"

• "support efforts to define training requirements pertaining to detection of concealed nuclear material, radiation protection, safe handling and transportation of nuclear material and radiation protection, for law enforcement agencies (customs, police) in accordance with their respective tasks and closely coordinate relevant training activities in this area;"

• "support the exchange of scientific information and data to permit the identification of the origin, history, and route of seized illicit nuclear material;"

On the whole, progress on these initiatives was limited.  The G-8's Nonproliferation Experts Group (NPEG) established the system of "points of contact" to serve as a permanent means of communication for exchanging information on significant trafficking incidents and on related matters, [27] laboratories in a variety of countries participated in joint efforts on nuclear forensics (including conferences and "round robin" examination of particular items of nuclear material),[28] and the number of countries participating in the program was expanded to several dozen, well beyond the original G-8.

Then, at the June 2002 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, the G-8 leaders announced a G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.[29]  In that announcement, the G-8 leaders called on the world to join them in committing to six principles, one of which was:

"Develop and maintain effective border controls, law enforcement efforts and international cooperation to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in such items, for example through installation of detection systems, training of customs and law enforcement personnel and cooperation in tracking these items; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient expertise or resources to strengthen their capacity to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in these items."[30]

Programs in this area would be eligible for funding from the $20 billion over 10 years the G-8 statement pledged for nonproliferation and arms reduction efforts.  The G-8 have established a group of senior officials to coordinate implementation of this new global partnership, and are beginning to flesh out what specific initiatives related to illicit trafficking would be undertaken under this new partnership—but so far, despite the Global Partnership’s name, all of the funded initiatives that have been announced have been within the former Soviet Union, and whether projects will be expanded to other countries around the world remains in some doubt.[31]  As of September 2003, of the 11 members of the Proliferation Security Initiative, six (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan) are members of the G-8 Global Partnership, and statements coming from the group have emphasized the initiative's consistency with the G-8 principles.[32]

 

Budget

Expenditures for the Proliferation Security Initiative will be made by individual states participating in the initiative, and budget figures are not yet available.  As noted above, no specific financial pledges focused on nuclear smuggling have yet been announced as part of the G-8 Global Partnership.

The IAEA is reliant on contributions from member states, and does not have extensive resources to devote to the problem of nuclear smuggling.[33]  For instance, according to the most recent IAEA budget for 2004, the agency plans to spend: $1,270,000 to provide training and technical support to member states on detecting and responding to illicit nuclear trafficking; $769,000 for assessing available methodologies and technologies to detect nuclear and other radioactive material; and $544,000 for the development of guidelines and procedures for countries to use in trying to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials.[34]

Key Issues and Recommendations

Integrating the Proliferation Security Initiative with Other Efforts.  The Proliferation Security Initiative has become a highly visible aspect of U.S. efforts to halt proliferation of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons (getting much more press attention in summer 2003 than programs to secure and control the former Soviet nuclear stockpile).  It has potential to greatly enhance the ability of participant countries to cut off proliferation into and out of areas of concern.  But it is by no means the only interaction between the United States and other countries trying to interdict smuggling of materials related to weapons of mass destruction.  A great deal of work is already being done in other programs to improve countries’ own capacity to interdict such smuggling.

• Recommendation: The United States should invite every country that is receiving or has received export control and border security assistance to adhere to the principles of the Proliferation Security Initiative.  These programs have worked to build the capacity of countries to stop proliferation.  Tying that improved capacity more closely with both U.S. and other PSI participant capabilities would reinforce the training provided and provide a more integrated capability to stop trafficking related to weapons of mass destruction.  If many countries agree to participate, it could expand the reach of the Proliferation Security Initiative, potentially bringing important transshipment countries into the operation.  Additionally, the United States has provided export control equipment, training, and software to several countries that, if integrated into the Proliferation Security Initiative, could feed useful data points into that effort.

Funding From Other Donor States.  Currently a huge fraction of all the funds being spent worldwide for helping states improve their ability to detect and interdict nuclear smuggling is coming from the United States—almost certainly over 90 percent of the total.  Yet nuclear smuggling poses a threat to the entire international community, not just the United States.

• Recommendation: Leading nuclear states, especially the participants in the G-8 Global Partnership, should substantially increase the funding they contribute (both through bilateral arrangements with recipient states and through the IAEA) to programs to interdict nuclear smuggling.  Mechanisms to coordinate such international efforts should be strengthened.

Finding the Niche for the IAEA in Anti-Smuggling Efforts.  The tiny resources provided to the IAEA for addressing nuclear smuggling have constrained its ability to contribute to solving the problem.  With more resources, the IAEA could play a crucial expanded role in carrying out and coordinating international efforts, complementing the United States' own programs.  The IAEA could be looked to for filling in inevitable gaps in U.S. efforts, especially in working with countries that may be willing to deal with the IAEA but not with the United States.  More resources would also allow the IAEA to expand its offerings of seminars and conferences that bring together law enforcement and customs officers from various countries to share ideas and learn new techniques, and its efforts in coordinating international R&D on nuclear smuggling detection technology.

• Recommendation:  U.S. anti-smuggling program officials should work closely with the IAEA to find an IAEA role that can most effectively complement other efforts, and ensuring that all participants share and understand a common set of goals and objectives.  U.S. officials should also work with the IAEA to create an unclassified database concerning what equipment and training has been provided where, to avoid duplication of efforts, as well as unclassified assessments of the smuggling threat posed in each country, to the extent those are available. 

• Recommendation:  Member states, including the United States, should increase their voluntary contributions to the IAEA's efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.

G-8 Cooperation on Illicit Trafficking.  The model set by G-8 cooperation on combating illicit trafficking following the 1996 Moscow is not one that particularly warrants emulation following the 2002 declaration at the G-8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada.  To be successful in the global war on terrorism, law enforcement and customs officials throughout the G-8 must be able to coordinate effectively on stopping all manner of illicit flows though their countries, be they terrorists, illicit drugs, laundered money, or materials for weapons of mass destruction.

• Recommendation:  Law enforcement, intelligence, customs, and border control officials from the G-8 should ensure that exchanges of information on trafficking in nuclear materials and on technology uses are part of the other exchanges of information that are fostered in working to combat terrorism globally.  The Proliferation Security Initiative will serve as an important mechanism of cooperation among many of the G-8 countries.  But away from this high-profile political effort, law enforcement, customs, and border control offices in the G-8 countries should continue to explore ways in which their organizations can share useful information.

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