 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
Issue Brief
Dr. Nikolai Sokov, Senior Research Associate
CNS NIS Nonproliferation Program
May 2002
Issue
Introduction Issue
Brief Relevant
Resources
Issue Brief
Definition:
Tactical (nonstrategic) nuclear weapons (TNWs) typically refer to
short-range weapons; within the U.S.-Soviet (Russian) context, this means
land-based missiles with a range of less than 500 km (about 300 miles) and air-
and sea-launched weapons with a range of less than 600 km (about 400 miles).
However, these definitions are not universally accepted: France classifies all
its currently deployed nuclear weapons as strategic; China also classifies many
weapons as strategic that in the U.S.-Russian context would be considered
tactical.
Diagram of over the shoulder delivery of tactical
nuclear weapon
Worldwide TNW Arsenals:
TNWs constitute a large percentage of the arsenals of the nuclear weapon
states: 30-40% of the American and Russian arsenals, nearly 100% of the Chinese
and French arsenals, and all of the Israeli, Indian, and Pakistani arsenals;
Great Britain no longer has short-range nuclear weapons. TNWs are also the
category of weapons about which the least is known. The table below contains
unofficial estimates of the numbers of deployed TNWs:
|
Country |
Deployed TNWs |
|
Russia |
~3,000-4,000 |
|
The United States |
~1,670-3,300 (approximately 150 of which are in Europe) |
|
China |
~400 |
|
Israel |
~200 |
|
France |
60-80 |
|
India |
~60 |
|
Pakistan |
15-48 |
|
Great Britain |
0 |
Sources:
Center for Defense Information
and
Natural Resources Defense Council.
Davy Crockett bazooka-type
missile with W54 nuclear warhead
Arms Control Regime:
TNWs are the least-regulated category of nuclear weapons covered in arms
control agreements. They are only subject to an informal regime created by
unilateral, parallel declarations made by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in
the fall of 1991. Prompted by mounting concern about the security of nuclear
weapons in the Soviet Union, George Bush announced on September 17, 1991 that
the United States would eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of
ground-launched TNWs and would remove all nuclear weapons from surface ships and
attack submarines. While the Soviet government would have preferred a formal,
negotiated action on TNWs, it accepted the U.S. approach as an opportunity to
achieve its long-standing objective of reducing the number of U.S. TNWs in
Europe. Mikhail Gorbachev responded on October 5, 1991, largely repeating the
measures outlined by George Bush. Namely, the Soviet Union promised to remove
all categories of nuclear weapons from deployment to “central storage
facilities,” while maintaining the deployment of one-half of its air-based
weapons; between one-third and one-half of the weapons removed from deployment
were scheduled for elimination. In January 1992, the Gorbachev statement was
confirmed and slightly expanded by Boris Yeltsin in the name of Russia.
Reductions (both removal to central storage and elimination) have been
measured in thousands of warheads and represent the single largest reduction of
nuclear warheads, surpassing all other agreements between the United States and
the Soviet Union/Russia. Both countries have completed the regime’s stated
withdrawals from deployment, and the United States has also completed the
elimination of warheads. In Russia, the target date for elimination of warheads
was the year 2000, and in 1999, Russia reported the job as completed for some
categories and “almost” completed for the rest. In 2002, however, Russia moved
the completion date to 2004, citing lack of funding for warhead elimination.
In the absence of a formal a treaty, the United States and Russia do not
exchange information about stockpiles and cannot verify the process of
implementation. From time to time, they have updated each other on the progress
within the framework of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (established in
1997), but these exchanges specify only the share of weapons eliminated
rather than hard numbers. The informal nature of the 1991 regime has resulted in
considerable uncertainty with regard to implementation, as well as considerable
disparity in numbers.
The Dangers Associated with TNWs:
In some respects, TNWs are more dangerous than strategic weapons. Their small
size and the absence of electronic locks or Permissive Action Links (PALs) on
older versions contribute to their vulnerability to theft and unauthorized use.
In addition, the modes of the basing and employment of TNWs also pose major
problems:
- Historically, TNWs were intended for the use in battlefield and
theatre-level operations in conjunction with conventional forces.
These missions encourage their forward-basing and can make the
decision to use TNWs psychologically and operationally easier.
- Military thinking argues for the pre-delegation of launch
authority to lower-level commanders, especially once hostilities
commence, because of an orientation toward the employment of TNWs in
conjunction with conventional forces and a concern about their
survivability. This might result in diminished control over TNWs by
the political leadership.
- Low-yield TNWs are sometimes seen as less destructive and thus
more usable than other classes of nuclear weapons. This might
increase the probability of limited use of nuclear weapons and is
the reason for increasingly vocal demands in the United States and
Russia for the creation of low-yield nuclear weapons.
Thus, the very existence of TNWs in national arsenals increases the risk of
proliferation and reduces the nuclear threshold, making the nuclear balance less
stable. If the two leading nuclear powers appear to consider TNWs essential and
“usable,” others may well emulate this example.
The Role of TNWs in the post-Cold War World:
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union relied heavily on
nuclear weapons for all types of missions. With the end of the Cold War,
military and political relevance of TNWs declined, resulting, among other
developments, in the 1991-92 informal U.S.-Russian regime. Toward the end of the
1990s, however, attention toward TNW began to increase again.
In Russia, TNWs acquired greater significance because of the deterioration of
Russia’s conventional forces and its growing reliance on nuclear arms as a “poor
man’s” counter to the “revolution in military affairs” and technological
breakthroughs in costly, advanced conventional arms by the United States. This
trend was observable as early as 1996, when some Russian officials began to make
threats about withdrawing from the 1991 TNW regime in response to NATO’s planned
expansion. Reliance on nuclear weapons increased even further following the war
in Kosovo in 1999. The current military doctrine, which was adopted in early
2000 following that war, provides for limited use of nuclear weapons for the
purpose of “de-escalation” of (i.e., avoiding defeat in) a conventional
conflict. Reliance on nuclear weapons, including their tactical variety,
decreased in the context of improved relations between the United States and
Russia in 2001 and 2002.
For its part, the United States continues to maintain a small stock of TNWs
in Europe. These weapons, of uncertain military value in post-Cold War Europe,
are regarded in Washington as still useful for the political purpose of
confirming U.S. commitment to its European allies. TNWs are also promoted by
some in Washington as a useful deterrent against possible chemical and
biological threats from “rogue” states.
A string of calls to consider the use of TNWs in Afghanistan following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States focused attention
on proposals, many of which had been publicized years earlier, to develop new,
low-yield nuclear weapons for a limited range of military contingencies--in
particular, to destroy deeply buried, hardened bunkers (caves, in the case of
Afghanistan). During a briefing on the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review on January 9,
2002, Assistant Secretary of Defense J. D. Crouch told that “no recommendations”
had been made in the report with regard to development of a new type of nuclear
weapons, adding, “We are trying to look at a number of initiatives,” one of
which “would be to modify an existing weapon to give it greater capability
against deep or hard targets.”
The Road Ahead:
The new perception of the usability of nuclear weapons in both Russia and the
United States, albeit for different reasons, could create a dangerous precedent
for other countries, leading them to believe that nuclear weapons could provide
tangible political and military benefits and increasing propensity to acquire
nuclear capability. For that reason, it seems highly desirable to strengthen the
informal 1991-92 U.S.-Russian regime on TNWs.
In the last several years, a number of states, belonging primarily to the New Agenda Coalition, have tried to push the two nuclear powers toward action in the area of TNWs. After several years of discussion within the context of the Preparatory Committees for the NPT Review Conference, the 2000 Conference adopted, as part of the final document, a Program of Action (Next Steps) on Nuclear Disarmament. The 2002 Preparatory Committee for the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference reinforced that message, but practical action by nuclear weapon states still seems far away.
Issue
Introduction
Issue
Brief
Relevant
Resources
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been
independently verified by NTI or its directors,
officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.
