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Issue Brief
Elena Sokova, Research Associate
CNS NIS Nonproliferation Program
June 2002
Issue
Introduction Issue
Brief Relevant
Resources
Issue Brief
The Plutonium Surplus
Throughout the Cold War, the United
States and the Soviet Union produced about 90 and 120-165 metric tons of
weapons-grade plutonium, respectively.[1] Nuclear arms reduction efforts
in the late 1980s and 1990s slated thousands of nuclear weapons in the
United States and Russia for dismantling and elimination. These nuclear
weapon reductions, with their indisputable benefits for global security,
also meant that the two countries no longer needed large stocks of
weapons materials for their arsenals and that existing stocks would
increase even further as nuclear materials were removed from warheads.
In 1995, the United States announced that it possessed more than 50 metric tons of plutonium in excess of national security needs; in 1997, Russia followed suit and declared 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium surplus to its defense program. Both countries pledged to take steps to ensure that this material would never again be used for weapons or fall into the wrong hands.
Dismantling a Nuclear Weapon
Why Dispose of Plutonium?
Producing
fissile materials
is the major obstacle to the manufacturing of nuclear weapons by
proliferant states and terrorists. The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) estimates that only 8 kilograms of plutonium is sufficient
to make a bomb with a yield equal to that of the device used on
Nagasaki. Thus, elimination of surpluses of military plutonium would
greatly reduce the risk that it could be stolen or diverted to illegal
nuclear programs, and also ensures that neither the United States nor
Russia will reincorporate it into warheads in the future. In addition,
disposition of plutonium would reduce storage costs of plutonium, which
are very high over the long term.
Plutonium Disposition Options
Unlike weapons-grade uranium,
which can be rendered unusable for nuclear weapons by blending it with
lower-grade uranium (a blend that can then be used as fuel in nuclear
power plants), plutonium cannot be blended with other materials or
diluted to make it unusable in weapons. However, steps can be taken to
greatly complicate the use of plutonium for nuclear arms. Spent nuclear
fuel for commercial power reactors, for example, contains roughly 1%
plutonium, but it is bound up with highly radioactive material, thus,
creating a high-radiation barrier. In addition, the process of
separating plutonium and uranium from spent fuel is technically
difficult and expensive. Consequently, plutonium in spent fuel is
considered to have relatively modest proliferation risk. For the
disposition of weapons-grade plutonium, specialists have sought to
devise methods based on these properties of spent fuel to make
weapons-grade plutonium inaccessible for weapons use, a goal commonly
known as the “spent fuel standard.” (For details, see
Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium
by the National Academy of Sciences.)
During the early 1990s, U.S. and Russian technical and government committees considered several plutonium disposition options. In the end, two options were identified as meeting the two states’ nonproliferation objectives: (1) irradiating plutonium as nuclear power reactor fuel; and (2) immobilizing it with high-level radioactive waste in an inert matrix (such as glass or ceramic), and then disposing of the material in a geologic repository, where other nuclear wastes will also be stored.
The irradiation option involves the production of special fuel consisting of both plutonium and uranium oxides, which is called mixed-oxide, or MOX, fuel. Russia considers plutonium a valuable energy source and insists on using its surplus plutonium as fuel rather than immobilizing it. Moreover, because irradiation of MOX in nuclear power plants transforms weapons-grade plutonium into lesser quality “reactor grade” plutonium (while immobilized plutonium remains weapons-grade), Russia insisted that the United States adopt the MOX option as well for the bulk of its surplus plutonium. Russia argued that if the United States merely immobilized its surplus plutonium, the United States might some day re-separate the weapons-grade material and reuse it for nuclear arms.
The MOX fuel will be burned in commercial nuclear power reactors in the United States and Russia, primarily in light water reactors. Russia also intends to use its fast neutron reactor for burning MOX fuel. The use of Canadian and European reactors for the Russian material is also being considered as one possible means for accelerating the disposition program.
Fissile Material Containers: The U.S., through
the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, provided
Russia with over 26,000 such containers that will be
used for transportation and storage of fissile
material from dismantled nuclear weapons.
U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement
On September
1, 2000, the United States and Russia signed the
Plutonium Disposition Agreement. According to the agreement, both
countries must dispose of at least 34 metric tons of weapons-grade
plutonium. The United States agreed to dispose of 25.5 metric tons as
MOX fuel and to immobilize 8.5 metric tons; the Russian Federation
agreed to dispose of all 34 tons as MOX fuel. Both countries agreed to
begin disposition by the end of 2007 at the rate of at least 2 metric
tons per year, although it now appears that the first disposition of
plutonium will be delayed for several years.
The agreement bans each party from separating plutonium from irradiated MOX fuel (“reprocessing”) until that party has disposed of all 34 metric tons of plutonium subject to the agreement. Any additional plutonium designated in the future by either country as excess to defense needs can be disposed of under the terms and conditions of the September 2000 agreement. Initial cost estimates were more than $1.7 billion for the Russian program and $4 billion for the U.S. program.
In addition, the parties will each have to take special precautions
to ensure the security of plutonium and MOX fuel processed under the
agreement against possible theft or diversion.
To ensure that
plutonium subject to disposition is irreversibly removed from use in
nuclear weapons, the September 2000 agreement specified the two sides
would implement monitoring and inspection activities. The agreement also
provides for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification once
appropriate agreements with the IAEA are concluded.
Implementation Issues
The plutonium disposition programs in
both countries are still in their early stages. Before implementation
begins, both countries need to put the appropriate infrastructures in
place. For the MOX fuel option, facilities for plutonium conversion, MOX
fuel fabrication, and storage must be constructed. In addition, existing
nuclear power reactors must be modified to burn MOX fuel. The
disposition of plutonium is an expensive undertaking. The projected
costs have already significantly increased since 2000: The Russian
program cost estimates have increased to at least $2 billion, while the
U.S. program costs, if both the immobilization and MOX fuel options were
employed, might reach $6 billion. Russia does not have the resources to
implement this program on its own. The United States and other leading
Western economic powers (G-8 countries) agreed to provide financial
support for the Russian part of the program.
Opponents of the MOX burning option assert that immobilization of plutonium is safer, faster, and cheaper. They also argue that channeling weapons-grade plutonium into the civilian nuclear fuel cycle would increase, rather than decrease, the risk of diversion of the material. In addition, burning MOX fuel in reactors would reduce—but not completely eliminate—military plutonium in the resulting spent fuel. Thus, after years of “cooling” the irradiated fuel elements, the two countries would have to decide what to do with the spent fuel, which would still contain plutonium, although at significantly lower level than fresh MOX fuel. The United States plans to dispose of its spent MOX fuel in a geologic repository, along with conventional spent fuel from nuclear power plants. Russia’s plans are uncertain, but it has reserved the right to reprocess its spent MOX fuel once all 34 metric tons of plutonium are irradiated—that is, to separate plutonium from the spent MOX fuel for reuse in “second generation” MOX fuel for nuclear power plants.
When the Bush administration came to office, it ordered a review of all nonproliferation programs with Russia, including the plutonium disposition program. The administration was doubtful about the feasibility and nonproliferation value of the plutonium disposition due to its high costs and implementation uncertainties. In the end, the National Security Council review, completed in December 2001, recommended to continue the program but emphasized the need for the current plutonium disposition program to be less costly and more efficient.
In January 2002, the United States announced the decision to cancel the immobilization option and concentrate exclusively on the MOX fuel track. The Department of Energy (DOE) reported that canceling the immobilization option would save the United States $2 billion in total program costs and accelerate closure of former nuclear weapons complex sites. The DOE has also initiated the authorization process to construct a MOX fuel plant at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The transportation of plutonium to South Carolina faces strong resistance from the local communities and the governor of that state.
The total cost of the U.S. surplus plutonium disposition through the MOX option is anticipated to be about $3.8 billion over 20 years. The FY2002 appropriation for the U.S. fissile material disposition program is $241.4 million, of which approximately three-quarters (about $181 million) is designated for plutonium disposition. The Bush administration is seeking roughly $230 million for the U.S. plutonium disposition program in FY2003.[2]
The U.S. Congress appropriations for the Russian plutonium disposition program were $61 million in FY2002; the FY2003 request is for $98 million, but $64 million of this would be drawn from the 1999 appropriations of $200 million set aside for this purpose in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of that year. An additional $200 million was pledged for the Russian plutonium disposition program by the United States. However, the Western European countries and Japan have been slow in committing significant amounts to the program. Total international pledges, including the U.S. commitment, amount to $600 million–well below the mark. The U.S. program, in turn, is contingent upon the parallel Russian effort moving forward. In the near term, with the future funding of the Russian program uncertain, some nonproliferation specialists have argued that the United States should not advance its plutonium disposition efforts. Others argue that without concrete progress in the United States, the Russian disposition program may never start in earnest. The Department of Energy has chosen to pursue planning and plant design activities, but does not intend to break ground for new plutonium disposition facilities until the Russian program is at a roughly comparable stage.
Inspection and monitoring procedures for plutonium disposition activities and associated IAEA verification measures are additional unresolved issues. Russia insists that only measurements that cannot disclose classified information about certain attributes of its weapons plutonium be employed. Although new technical approaches have been designed to meet this challenge, a number of issues in this area remain under negotiation.
Once each country disposes of 34 tons of plutonium as described in the September 2000 agreement, the United States will still have 16 tons of excess military plutonium in various waste and fuel forms, while Russia will retain at least 16 tons of weapons-grade plutonium that it has declared in excess of its defense program. Furthermore, when both countries start dismantling their nuclear arsenals under to the new nuclear arms reduction treaty signed at the May 2002 Bush-Putin summit, U.S. and Russian plutonium surpluses will grow even larger.
Meanwhile, a high-security fissile material storage facility that will store plutonium from the dismantled Russian warheads is nearing completion at the Mayak site in Ozersk, Chelyabinsk Oblast. The facility is being built with U.S. assistance under the Nunn-Lugar Program and will store up to 50 metric tons of plutonium removed from nuclear warheads. It is anticipated that a portion of the plutonium stored here will be gradually moved through the disposition process. Additional plutonium from the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons might also be transferred to this facility.
Sources
[1] David Albright, Frans Berkhout, William Walker,
Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities
and Policies (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1997), pp. 40,
58.
[2]
“Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation,”
Department of Energy’s FY 2003 Budget Request to Congress, <http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/03budget
/content/defnn/nuclnonp.pdf>.
Issue
Introduction Issue
Brief Relevant
Resources
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been
independently verified by NTI or its directors,
officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.
