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Issue Brief
Victor Mizin, Diplomat-in-Residence,
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
Monterey Institute of International Studies
July 2002
Issue Introduction
The U.S.-Russian summit held in Moscow and St. Petersburg on May 24-26, 2002
capped the process of rapprochement between the two states that began in earlier
summits in Ljubljana, Genoa, Crawford, and Shanghai, with both aspiring to leave
behind the logjams of the Cold War.
Several documents—some of them having, perhaps, more symbolic than practical
meaning--were signed on a set of issues ranging from arms control to cooperation
in economic, energy, and information technology areas. One of the documents, the
Joint Declaration, outlines the foundation of a new strategic relationship and
claims that the era in which both countries “saw each other as an enemy or
strategic threats has ended.” This document, proclaiming the two countries as
“partners” cooperating “to advance stability, security, and economic
integration,” stipulated for the first time in history that the United States
and Russia share the same basic ideology based on democratic values, human
rights, freedom of speech and the press, tolerance, supremacy of the rule of
law, as well as the same vision of global challenges.
This summit, in
effect, sealed the reversal of the Bush administration’s attitude toward Russia,
which tentatively began in the summer of 2001 and came to fruition in the
aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Moscow is now back on Washington’s
political radar as an ally--or at least a friendly power. The United States has
finally acknowledged Russia’s importance, not only because it possesses the
world’s second-largest nuclear arsenal, still ready to annihilate the United
States and NATO countries in minutes (always a reason for Western anxiety), but
also because of its remaining diplomatic clout in such parts of the world as
Europe, the Middle East, Central and South Asia, as well as its mineral, human,
and intellectual resources. This acknowledgment satisfies President Putin, who
employed a political gambit, trading a weak and rather “meaningless”--in terms
of traditional arms control punditry--“strategic arms reductions” treaty for
Moscow’s recognition by Washington as an important, albeit a junior, partner on
the global level. Politicking aside, the signing of this arms control agreement
has marked the beginning of a new phase in the arms reduction process, one which
could conceivably move beyond the Cold War-style of suspicious and careful
“bean-counting” of weapons arsenals to one of more general deliberations on
broad strategic issues of war and peace, international terrorism, and weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) proliferation dangers.
At the same time, with all
its “historical” importance in opening “a new chapter” in bilateral relations,
this summit did not, of course, completely extricate the two countries from
their lingering, mutual mistrust left over from the Cold War. It remains to be
seen whether a new turning point has actually been achieved or if the “entente
cordiale” will vanish during another crisis. There are further positive signs
demonstrating Washington’s recognition of Moscow’s potential role in fighting
global terrorism, reducing WMD proliferation, advancing peace-building efforts,
and promoting democracy and human liberties worldwide (not excluding Russia with
its Chechnya and freedom of press conundrums), as illustrated by the creation of
the NATO-Russia Council.
Issue Brief
The U.S.-Russian summit was held in Moscow and St. Petersburg on May 24-26,
2002, capping the process of rapprochement between the two states that began in
earlier summits in Ljubljana, Genoa, Crawford, and Shanghai, with both aspiring
to leave behind the logjams of the Cold War.
Several documents--having, perhaps, more symbolic than practical meaning--were signed on a set of issues ranging from arms control to cooperation in the economic, energy, and information technology areas. The most publicized event of the summit was the signing of the Treaty of Moscow. This document, which is to remain in force until December 31, 2012, was largely a result of compromise: the United States insisted that the two countries did not need a treaty at all, but agreed to insistent Russian proposals about concluding one. At the same time, the United States preserved what it wanted above all--freedom of choice on the fate of its decommissioned warheads, while Moscow gave up its earlier proposals on the guaranteed destruction of warheads. Russia got a legally bindding document confirming its status as the second largest nuclear power in the world and the attendant role of a state that should be paid attention to. The United States got Russia on the bandwagon as an ally and showed its European allies that the United States and Russia are engaged in policies related to WMD. By 2012, both countries are to reduce their strategic arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads from the current levels of 5,949 for the United States and 5,858 for Russia (or by approximately two-thirds in comparison with START I-permitted levels). Both sides are free to define the composition and structure of their offensive forces within the imposed ceilings.
Presidents Bush and Putin
sign the Moscow Treaty
As soon as the United States officially withdrew from the
ABM Treaty, Russia promptly announced termination of START
II.[1] According to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov,
Moscow still hopes “to continue negotiations on issues
surrounding the ABM Treaty,” thinking the balance between
offensive and defensive strategic armaments is still
important. Russians still hope to assuage their concerns of
the “reversibility” potential, which they think the United
States is getting through the Treaty of Moscow, in the
Bilateral Implementation Commission this document
established.
The treaty received negative treatment
in the Russian political and military communities, although
criticism was not as harsh as one might have expected.
Russian experts, estranged from diplomatic imperatives of
the Kremlin’s current policy, have claimed that it is better
to have “no treaty than a bad one.” Their main argument is
that the treaty does not lead to any actual cuts in the U.S.
nuclear arsenal, nor does it require the destruction of even
a single launcher or warhead. The United States will be
allowed to store the decommissioned warheads, which they
plan to keep on reserve for possible future contingencies.
On the other hand, Russia, under the pressure of economic
hardships, is to physically eliminate its aging strategic
systems that have been taken out of combat duty, as they
have no funds or storage sites to place them in reserve.
Actually, the terms of the treaty place an additional burden
on the United States, which is currently and actively
assisting Russia under the Nunn-Lugar program in dismantling
its strategic arsenal in order to prevent weapon theft or
fissile material diversion by rogue states or terrorists.
(This destruction is being administered in accordance with
START I and other arms control treaties, such as the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Chemical
Weapons Convention.) Now that more and more warheads are to
be decommissioned, Russia needs even more help with their
secure dismantlement.
Moscow also suggested that both countries destroy not just launchers, as
has been the case so far, but the warheads as well. The
ostensible purpose of this suggestion by the Russian General
Staff was to embarrass the American side with its
predictable rejection, to demonstrate Moscow’s far-reaching
allegiance to the noble cause of arms control, and, if the
opportunity arose, to catch a glimpse of the most secret
American facilities and devices. This was clearly very
risky. Had the Americans agreed, they would have gained
access to Russian nuclear storage facilities—a scenario the
Russian military would have loathed. The procedures for the
verification of warhead dismantlement, which are only
roughly worked out in theory, obviously demand a higher
level of trust and transparency than currently exists in
bilateral relations.
Putin’s tilt to the West and his
readiness to compromise on certain traditional Russian
points of concern in strategic affairs have caused some
ripples in Moscow’s military-political elite. Putin was
asked to seek more “payoffs” from Washington for Russia’s
role in combating terrorism. His acquiescence with a “bad”
arms control treaty was equated with Russian “geopolitical
suicide” in the wake of some highly publicized events--his
weak reaction to the rash U.S. pullout from the ABM Treaty,
the U.S. military deployments in Central Asia and Georgia,
as well as the closure of Kamran (Vietnam) and Lourdes
(Cuba) military bases–and was considered almost a betrayal
of national interests compared to Gorbachev’s “defeatist”
policies.
It is evident that the Russian leader has
the leverage to apply more pressure on his “recalcitrant”
generals, who could be forced to retire or stripped of their
pensions if they disagree with the new policies. But the
criticism is coming not only from the leftist or
ultra-nationalist or Russian generals still living mentally
in the Soviet Union and cherishing superpower ambitions in
the absence of available ammunition. Even the normally
pro-Western intellectuals and strategy experts have stopped
the litanies on the importance of assuring nuclear parity
with the United States. Balance presupposes two poles that
are supposed to be equal, but Russia has long ceased to
exist as a separate and even opposing center of gravity,
having entered into a strategic alliance with the United
States. For some states in the so-called Third World, the
threats of fundamentalist Islamic terrorism and irredentism
remain the main threats to Russian security, not the
American imperialism that continues to loom as “Enemy #1”
for many Russian strategists. The two countries should begin
genuine, unrestricted discussions on the parameters of the
future strategic relationship, moving beyond the historical
paradigms of mutually assured destruction and nuclear
deterrence.
Arms control in U.S.-Russian relations
has ceased to be a major policy avenue and the only channel
for dialogue. It is to be replaced by measures for greater
transparency in dealing with strategic weapons. The United
States could dramatically intensify its efforts to provide
safe and secure storage for Russian warheads, both strategic
and sub-strategic. But so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons
(TNW) were only cursorily touched on during the talks in
Russia. No one in the West knows how many of them are
deployed or stored. Experts estimate that there are about
3,500 Russian tactical warheads deployed and about 5,000 in
“reserve” or slated for destruction (generally figures vary
between 3,000 and 22,000). As Senators Richard Lugar and
Joseph Biden have proposed, the Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) program should be extended to further upgrade security
at nuclear storage facilities of all types, to help reduce
threats from TNW, as well as to dismantle more
nuclear-powered submarines. The bilateral consultations on
the practical, agreed-upon steps to complete the unilateral
cuts in TNW initiated by both countries in 1991-92 are to be
launched: first, likely focusing on the issues of
confidence-building and strategies for TNW use, moving to
verification issues, and finally addressing the topic of
further possible reductions. Certain signals that the two
states might start cautiously moving to adapt their
strategic thinking to today’s security environment are
corroborated by the Joint Declaration’s paragraphs on their
readiness to implement a number of steps aimed at
strengthening confidence and increasing cooperation in the
area of missile defense. This may mean that Moscow is
painstakingly shifting its stance on missile defense toward
accepting the inevitable steady progress of American
research and development on this program hitherto staunchly
criticized by the Russian military.
Another emerging
issue is nonproliferation. Russian cooperation with Iran in
the nuclear and--as the United States alleges--missile areas
remains a bone of contention that led to one of rare
difficult moments during the Moscow-St. Petersburg summit.
Russia staunchly denied any wrongdoing and pledged that its
cooperation with Iran is strictly within the limits of its
international obligations and in compliance with
international nonproliferation regimes. Putin pointed out,
wryly, that “the United States has taken on the obligation
of building a nuclear power station identical to the one in
Bushehr in North Korea.” At the same time, he has suggested
pushing Iran to allow international inspections of the
Russian-built nuclear reactor there.[2] Putin is quite
correct when he underscores that Russia’s cooperation with
Iran “as far as energy is concerned, focuses exclusively on
economic issues.”[3] Russia is getting billions of dollars
from its nuclear power plant deal and arms sales to Iran
(which, no doubt, remains geopolitically an important
friendly state on Russia’s southern borders). Sanctions and
admonitions will not solve this issue of Russian ties with
one of the most demonized states in the American inventory
of states in the “axis of evil.” One can only agree with the
conservative thinker Richard Perle, who suggests that this
problem can be solved in a “business-like manner,” and
suggested the following: “If you want to get this solved,
don’t send a diplomat. Send a banker to discuss it.”[4]
A U.S.-Russia working group was formed before the summit to
resolve the problem. It is difficult, however, to imagine
what Washington could actually propose to the cash-strapped
enterprises in the Russian military industrial complex,
short of buying out the most thriving of them. The same goes
for the stated readiness of Washington to actively engage
Russia in consultations on future missile defense systems.
It is still unclear what specifically this Russian
engagement could imply.
There is little doubt that
the summit in Russia has ushered Moscow and Washington into
a qualitatively new era in which both presidents are
challenged to achieve greater levels of cooperation by
moving beyond the uninventive, routine approaches of their
military and political expert communities and assuring a
major breakthrough into a brave new world where both states
are irreversible allies. There are obvious challenges to the
smooth development of a bilateral dialogue, including the
“final solution” of the Iranian conundrum by some sort of
“payoff” to Moscow, the partial or total pardon of Russia’s
international debts, and Russia’s acceptance of possible
U.S. military moves against Iraq. But, if these two leaders
succeed, their names will be included with the likes of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Peter the Great.
Sources:
[1] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website,
Statement of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the legal status of
START II, as it appeared on the
http://www.grani.ru,
May 8, 2002.
[2] Ron Hutcheson, “Putin Offers Inspectors in Iran,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 27, 2002.
[3]
“Putin
and Bush Sign N-Deal,”
CNN, May 24, 2002.
[4] “U.S. Sent Data to Russia on Iran,” Middle East
Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 198, May 29, 2002.
Relevant Resources
Official Documents and Reports
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The United States of America and the Russian Federation, Joint Declaration, May 24, 2002. |
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U.S. Department of State, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. |
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White House, Fact Sheet. |
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Arms Control Association, Treaties. |
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Nuclear Threat Initiative, Bibliography: Bilateral U.S.-Russian Treaties. |
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Federation of American Scientists, Strategic offensive Reductions Treaty. |
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Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, Strategic Arms Reductions. |
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Pavel Podvig, “For Russia, Little Loss, Little Gain,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November-December, 2001. |
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Dana Milbank, “Bush and Putin Sign Arms Pact,” Washington Post, May 25, 2002. |
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Vladimir Isachenkov, “Nunn and Lugar Look to Safeguard Weapons,” Moscow Times, May 28, 2002. |
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Joseph Biden, “Beyond the Moscow Treaty,” Washington Post, May 28, 2002, p. A17. |
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been
independently verified by NTI or its directors,
officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.
