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Issue Brief
Kenley Butler, Research Associate
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
Monterey Institute of International Studies
December
2002
Issue Introduction
At the June 2002 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, Group of Eight (G8)
leaders issued a
statement in which they agreed to commit up to $20 billion over 10
years to help Russia and other nations destroy their stockpiles of
weapons of mass destruction. Under terms of the “G8 Global Partnership
against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,”
informally known as “10 plus 10 over 10,” the United States will provide
up to half of this sum; Canada, the European Union, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and possibly others will
contribute a matching amount.
G8 leaders adopted a set of
six principles that outline broad goals for the initiative and
nine guidelines
for new projects. Under the guidelines, the Global Partnership will
initiate new bilateral and multilateral projects and enhance existing
ones, such as those under the long-standing U.S. Nunn-Lugar or
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The G8
will establish a senior-level mechanism to coordinate Global Partnership
activities, including monitoring progress and considering priorities.
Russian President Putin agreed to provide contributing states the same
privileges it accords the United States, namely access to sites, tax
exemptions, and liability protection.
Months after the Summit,
however, there is concern over the slow progress in collecting funding
commitments from countries and still no coordinating mechanism or clear
plan for moving forward. The G8 leaders agreed to review progress of the
initiative at the June 2003 G8 summit in France.
G8 Family Photo
Issue Brief
Under the G8 “Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material
of Mass Destruction” (informally known as “10 + 10 over 10”), G8 leaders agreed
to raise up to $20 billion for projects pertaining to disarmament,
nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and nuclear safety over the next 10 years.
The United States intends to provide half of the total funding.
The
Global Partnership came out of a desire to prevent terrorists from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction. In their official
statement, G8 leaders committed themselves to “prevent terrorists, or those
that harbor them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological,
and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment, and
technology.”
Specifically, the G8 adopted—and invited other countries to also adopt—six
principles. In summary, these are to: (1) promote multilateral treaties that
help prevent the spread of weapons, materials, and know-how; (2) account for and
secure these items; (3) promote physical protection of facilities; (4) help
detect, deter, and interdict illicit trafficking; (5) promote national export
and transshipment controls; and (6) manage and dispose of nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons materials.
President Putin agreed to grant
contributor countries the same rights it currently grants U.S. programs. The G8
leaders, including Russian President Putin, agreed to
nine guidelines, which outline elements that must be present in each Global
Partnership agreement. Among other things, the guidelines state that recipient
countries must provide donor countries with access to sites, liability
protection, and exemption from duties and taxes.
Building on
Cooperative Threat Reduction
The G8 Global Partnership is intended to build on and expand programs
such as those under the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. Since 1992,
the United States has allocated $7 billion for CTR programs in Russia and other
former Soviet states. These programs have focused on the following:
- reducing numbers of strategic missiles, bombers, silos, and submarines
- ending weapons-grade plutonium production
- reducing excess weapons-grade plutonium
- upgrading storage and transport security for nuclear warheads
- upgrading storage security for fissile material
- reducing nuclear weapons infrastructure
- destroying chemical weapons
- eliminating chemical weapons production capability
- securing biological pathogens
- providing peaceful employment for former weapons scientists
- enhancing export controls and border security
- improving safety of civil nuclear reactors
During that same
period, G7 members contributed less than $1 billion for
such programs. The United States has pressed allies to
provide support for nonproliferation issues in the
former Soviet Union since Nunn-Lugar was launched in
1992.[1] The Global Partnership attempts to leverage
funds that the United States is already committing into
a much larger sum.
How the Program Will Work
Although the guidelines adopted by the G8 leaders at Kananaskis indicate
the G8 will work in partnership, bilaterally, and
multilaterally, U.S. officials have indicated that
members will fund and implement projects of their
choosing on a bilateral basis under
government-to-government agreements with recipient
countries. According to U.S. officials, there is no
intention of establishing a Global Partnership
multilateral implementation mechanism or common fund.[1]
The G8 Senior Officials will act as the coordinating
mechanism to address priorities and identify program
gaps to prevent duplication and overlap. U.S. officials
hope to have a reporting mechanism in place by the end
of calendar year 2002 for countries to report exactly
which programs are involved.[1] The mechanism will need
to be flexible enough to take into account the various
budgeting procedures and fiscal years of participating
countries.
Priorities for G8 Projects in
Russia
In its June 2002 statement, the G8
specifically listed its top priorities as the following:
- destruction of chemical weapons
- disposition of fissile materials
- employment of former weapon scientists
- dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines
The Russian Federation identified chemical weapons destruction and general-purpose submarine dismantlement as program priorities. Some nations expressed interest in assisting with the security of nuclear material and the physical protection of strategic nuclear warheads [5]. The Nordic nations, should they join the Partnership, might have an interest in continuing current programs to avert environmental damage that might be caused by rusting nuclear submarines in the Arctic. The strengths and interests of the participating countries will be complimentary; the United States, for example, does not have a legal mandate to engage in environmental projects, while others have considerable experience in this area.
Because of its long history of involvement in CTR programs in the former Soviet Union, the United States will likely have a significant role in shaping Partnership priorities.[2] The United States has provided information on its programs and has identified projects where substantial resources are needed from other countries. Though there is not yet an official list of projects the United States considers top priority, a list compiled by Senator Lugar (R-Indiana) includes the following projects:
- destruction of Russia’s estimated 2 million rounds of chemical weapons
- securing Russia’s biological pathogens
- eliminating and securely storing tactical nuclear weapons
- engaging more former Soviet weapons scientists in peaceful pursuits
- providing enhanced security systems and training to the remaining 60 percent of Russian nuclear facilities that have not received any to date
- securing Russia’s radioactive sources, such as radioactive generators that are spread throughout the former Soviet Union
- shutdown of plutonium-producing reactors in Russia
- plutonium disposition
- dismantlement of nonstrategic nuclear submarines
- reactor safety.[3]
Funding
According to the guidelines adopted at Kananaskis, funds disbursed or
released after the June 2002 announcement will be
included in the total committed resources.
The Bush administration’s FY2003 request for nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union is approximately $1 billion. President Bush has indicated that the United States will maintain this level of effort for a ten-year period. As of October 2002, about $15 billion of the $20 billion total had been committed (see Funding table below). In his October 9, 2002 testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton indicated that some countries have not yet publicly announced pledges.
Funding for 10 plus 10 over 10 as of October 2002
|
United States |
$10 billion |
|
Canada |
$650 million |
|
United Kingdom |
$750 million |
|
Germany |
$1.5 billion |
|
European Commission |
$1 billion |
|
Japan |
$200 million |
|
Italy |
$400 million |
|
France |
|
|
Russia |
|
|
Total |
$15 billion |
Source: Kenneth N. Luongo, “Perspectives on the G-8
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Testimony
by Kenneth N. Luongo to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 9, 2002,
RANSAC Website,
http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/whatsnew/
100902_sfrc_testimony.html.
Debt Swap for Nonproliferation
The June 2002 statement by G8 leaders specified that “a range of
financing options, including the option of bilateral
debt for program exchanges, will be available to
countries that contribute to this Global Partnership.” A
portion of Russia’s debt to participating countries
would be forgiven. In exchange, Russia would deposit
funds in Russian currency into an account dedicated to
carrying out specified nonproliferation activities.[4]
On September 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law
the State Department Authorization bill that includes
debt swap for nonproliferation provisions. Through the
swaps, the U.S. Treasury Department will restructure up
to $300 million in FY02 and FY03 of Russia’s Soviet-era
debt to the United States.
While the United States intends to pursue debt swap as a means of financing nonproliferation projects in Russia, other G8 members are less supportive of the option. Italy and France have reportedly expressed an interest in debt swap; Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan have not taken a stand; and Germany has reportedly committed new money to avoid debt swap initiatives altogether. There is concern in Russia that debt swap initiatives could spur inflation or hurt the country’s international credit rating, though no official Russian pronouncement on whether Russia would be willing to engage in such initiatives has been made.[5]
Progress to Date
As of November 2002, experts have raised questions about the
seriousness of the pledges and noted that progress to date has been minimal.
Even on the U.S. side, G8 efforts have been moving slowly. As recently as
October 31, 2002, Stephen Younger, director of the U.S. Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, which oversees many of the CTR activities, had yet to be
asked to play a role in coordinating the U.S. G8 effort.[6]
G8 Senior Officials met September 26-27, 2002 in Ottawa to discuss implementation of 10 plus 10 over 10, including the establishment of interagency coordination mechanisms within countries, identification of potential projects, and the budgeting of resources.[1] Another meeting is planned before the end of calendar year 2002. In 2003 the G8 will be lead by France, whose president promises that “all necessary impetus will be given to put this program to work.”[7] Progress on the Global Partnership will be reviewed at the June 2003 G8 summit in France.
Conclusion
Many issues remain unresolved, including the following:
- funding: G8 members need to agree on how much each country will commit and when.
- priorities and coordination: The G8 needs to clarify what role the Senior Officials, the coordinating mechanism for the Initiative, will play in identifying priorities and coordinating member projects.
- Russia’s commitment: Elected officials from G8 countries need to know that Russian financial commitment and support is adequate for assistance programs to move forward. Russia will need to put in place a new umbrella agreement with participating nations that provides liability protection for proposed projects in Russia, transparency into Russian WMD programs so countries can gauge progress, and exemptions from duties and taxes, among others.
- expansion of Partnership: The G8 needs to create a plan whereby non-G8 members can participate in the initiative.
- U.S. commitment: The U.S. commitment to contribute approximately $1 billion per year for ten years should be ensured so that the yearly allocation occurs in spite of changes in the administration or possible efforts by some to link U.S. funding to perceived Russian performance on arms control and nonproliferation commitments. Undersecretary Bolton recently stated that Russian assistance to Iran’s and others nuclear and missile programs has “already adversely affected important bilateral efforts and, unless resolved, could pose a threat to new initiatives, including the Global Partnership.”[1]
The June 2002 establishment of the Global Partnership was a step in the right direction. The Partnership will only be successful, however, if G8 and elected leaders are able to successfully and quickly resolve these unresolved issues and turn commitments into action.
Sources:
[1] Testimony of John R. Bolton, Undersecretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Hearing on Reducing Nuclear Threat from Russia,
October 9, 2002, U.S. State Department Website,
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/14243pf.htm.
[2] Richard Lugar, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Reducing
Nuclear Threat from Russia, October 9, 2002.
[3] Richard G. Lugar,
“The Next Steps in U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” Arms Control Today,
December 2002, Arms Control Association Website,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/
2002_12/lugar_dec02.asp.
[4] “Implementing a Debt Reduction-For-Nonproliferation Program with Russia:
Re-directing Debt Repayment to Fund Crucial Non-Proliferation
Priorities,” The Justice Project Website,
http://www.justice.policy.net/proactive/ newsroom/release.vtml?
id=28201.
[5] Testimony of Kenneth N. Luongo, Executive Director of the
Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Hearing on Reducing Nuclear Threat from Russia,
October 9, 2002, RANSAC Website,
http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/
whatsnew/100902_sfrc_testimony.html.
[6] Bryan Bender, “U.S. Response: Abraham Outlines 10 Principles for
Nuclear, Radiological Security,” Global Security Newswire, November 15,
2002, Nuclear Threat Initiative Website,
http://nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2002/11/15/5p.html.
[7] Statement by President Chirac, August 29, 2002,
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actual/declarations/
bulletins/20020830.html#Chapitre1.
Relevant Resources
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Remarks by Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chairman, and summaries of panels at conference in London, January 20, 2003. |
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Remarks by Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chairman, Nuclear Threat Initiative, at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace International Nonproliferation Conference, November 14, 2002, CEIP Website. |
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Remarks by Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace International Nonproliferation Conference, November 14, 2002, CEIP Website. |
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Testimony of John R. Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Reducing Nuclear Threat from Russia, October 9, 2002, U.S. State Department Website. |
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Testimony of Kenneth N. Luongo, Executive Director of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Reducing Nuclear Threat from Russia, October 9, 2002, RANSAC Website. |
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Statement of Rep. Ellen O. Tauscher on Debt-for-Nonproliferation before the House International Relations Committee, July 25, 2002, Justice Project Website. |
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Einhorn, Flournoy, Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership, CSIS Website, January 2003. |
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Richard G. Lugar, “The Next Steps in U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” Arms Control Today, December 2002, Arms Control Association Website. |
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CNS, “Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf Provides Details on G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” CNS Website. |
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Chuen, Jasinski, Meyer, “The 10 plus 10 over 10 Initiative: A Promising Start, But Little Substance So Far,” CNS Website. |
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“Implementing a Debt Reduction-For-Nonproliferation Program with Russia: Re-directing Debt Repayment to Fund Crucial Non-Proliferation Priorities,” The Justice Project Website. |
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The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Statement, Principles, and Guidelines, Kananaski Summit, G8 Website. |
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U.S. Department of State, G-8 Committing up to $20 Billion to Destroy Weapons of Mass Destruction, June 27, 2002. |
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U.S. White House, Fact Sheet: G-8 Summit—Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. |
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This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been
independently verified by NTI or its directors,
officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.
