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Entry into Force of the CTBT: All Roads Lead to Washington A Report from the Fifth Article XIV Conference
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Instability in Georgia: A New Proliferation Threat?
Iraq's WMD Scientists in the Crossfire
Islamist Terrorist Threat in the Tri-Border Region
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Kazakhstan's Proposal to Initiate Commercial Imports of Radioactive Waste
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The Mitutoyo Case: Will Japan Learn from its Mistakes or Repeat Them?
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Weapons of Mass Destruction in Central Asia
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Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East
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Issue Brief
redline

Kazakhstan’s Proposal to Initiate Commercial Imports of Radioactive Waste
Margarita Sevcik, Program Coordinator/Research Associate
NIS Nonproliferation Program
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
Monterey Institute of International Studies
January 2003

Issue Introduction

The proposal to turn Kazakhstan into a commercial importer of radioactive waste has been on the nation’s agenda since the summer of 2001. It is believed that such imports would generate significant profits and allow the country to solve the problem of its own accumulated radioactive waste. The ongoing debates focus on the import, storage, and subsequent disposal of low- and medium-level radioactive waste on the republic’s territory—debates that have revealed the divisive and controversial nature of this issue. Opposition comes from the country’s environmental organizations, general population, and a group of Mazhlis (lower house of Kazakhstan’s Parliament) deputies who have recently announced their intention to block such imports. The radioactive waste import proposal is supported by representatives of the country’s nuclear industry, officials and scientists of the National Nuclear Center, and members of the government at the ministerial level. A draft bill to amend the existing legislative base on the use of atomic energy and environmental protection that would allow imports of radioactive waste has been submitted to the country’s Parliament for further consideration.


Kazakhstani Facilities Map: Click here to enlarge the map.

Issue Brief

The proposal to import radioactive waste to Kazakhstan emerged from the report “On the Radioecological Situation on the Territory of Kazakhstan” delivered by Mukthar Dzhakishev, President of the National Atomic Company Kazatomprom, to the Parliament on June 18, 2001. In his report, Mr. Dzhakishev drew parliamentarians’ attention to the huge amounts of radioactive waste accumulated on the territory of Kazakhstan as a result of 40 years of Soviet nuclear testing, waste produced by research and commercial reactors, and the operation of industrial sectors including uranium and non-uranium mining. According to the official data, Kazakhstan has about 237.2 million metric tons of radioactive waste, with a total radioactivity level of 15.5 million curie (Ci). The report estimates that approximately $1.1 billion would be needed to re-cultivate contaminated territories, dispose of all radioactive waste, and enhance Kazakhstan’s overall radiation safety. Since only about $1 million was allocated from the federal budget for these purposes in 2001, it is clear that the country will need to find external sources of funding to cope with the problem of its radioactive waste.

This report provided the impetus for the proposal to allow the commercial import of radioactive waste to be buried along with Kazakhstan’s own waste. This initiative was backed by several Mazhlis deputies who lobbied for amendments to existing Kazakhstani legislation to allow the import of foreign radioactive waste for subsequent disposal. Proponents of this plan believe that, by allowing imports of radioactive waste, Kazakhstan will earn the funds necessary to deal with its own enormous quantities of waste. Furthermore, they argue that Kazakhstan has the resources, expertise, and technologies necessary for radioactive waste management.

Critics of the initiative point to concerns about the safety and security of the radioactive materials to be brought to Kazakhstan, and the transparency in the distribution of profits earned from such imports. Certain details of the proposal are especially contentious.

Types of Radioactive Waste to be Imported to Kazakhstan

The question of the types of radioactive waste to be imported to Kazakhstan is among the most controversial issues because of the vague definitions of radioactive waste categories. Although there are five categories of waste proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), many nations have developed their own classification systems. Kazakhstani experts who favor the disposal of foreign radioactive waste in their country propose the import of low- and medium-level radioactive waste. They claim that this waste will not include nuclear spent fuel that contains plutonium. British experts, however, argue that medium- (or intermediate-) level waste could contain plutonium that has a half-life of 24,000 years and, thus, require special treatment. This lack of international standards for the classification of radioactive waste raises concern among project’s opponents that some importers could send plutonium to Kazakhstan categorized as medium-level waste.

Economic Viability of the Proposal

It is anticipated that Kazakhstan could earn from $30 to $40 billion over a 30-year period by allowing commercial imports of radioactive waste. Potential clients include countries with small territories and nations with a heightened sense of awareness and sensitivity toward radioactivity. Such countries could be charged approximately $4,800 to dispose of each barrel of waste. This will bring Kazakhstan a profit of $3,900 per barrel. Another advantage of the project is that depositories built for these purposes would contain only 1% foreign radioactive waste and 99% domestic waste; the extra radioactivity would hardly register, but the profits would be enormous. However, there is a certain degree of skepticism and doubt directed towards the ambitions and the estimates provided by proposal initiators. For instance, some experts argue that Kazakhstan needs to build a reprocessing facility and depositories for its own radioactive waste before accepting foreign waste. There is also a need for a developed and reliable infrastructure in the geographic region where waste will be buried. Only after the completion of these preparatory measures should possible profits and gains be calculated.

Location of the Radioactive Waste Depositories

It has been suggested that radioactive waste may be deposited in the exhausted open-cast uranium mines of the Open Joint Stock Company Kaskor located in Mangistau Province in western Kazakhstan. This site is about 30 km from the city of Aktau, a sea port on the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstani experts believe that this location is most suitable for the burial of low- and medium-level radioactive waste, which they plan to bury in trenches dug in a deep clay layer. The suggested site is a semi-desert region whose dry climate would prevent the migration of radionuclides. There is a network of railroads and highways that lead to the site. This site, however, is found inadequate by critics who consider the possibility that imported radioactive waste may contain plutonium. They refer to IAEA standards that require long-lived waste, such as plutonium, be deposited in deep, stable rock formations. The plan to use former uranium mines near Aktau for radioactive waste disposal was also met with strong opposition from the population of the nearby area. Some residents threatened to resort to such radical measures as laying themselves across the railroad tracks or disassembling the railway to stop trains from delivering dangerous cargoes to their region.

Moral Issues

Opposition to the import of radioactive waste to Kazakhstan has been voiced by environmental groups and other nongovernmental organizations. They claim that this proposal is immoral, since it further burdens a nation whose people and ecology have already suffered greatly from the effects of 40 years of Soviet nuclear testing. They say that it will lead to the continued deterioration of the country’s environment. These groups argue that the Kazakhstani government has done very little to improve the lives of people who live in ecologically devastated areas, and they believe that the import of radioactive waste is simply another money-making venture that will not benefit the country’s population. Advocates of the proposal, however, maintain that the conclusions of certain environmental groups are morally tainted, since their real motivation is to attract grants from foreign organizations interested in blocking such a project. Nevertheless, a number of polls have demonstrated that the majority of the population of Kazakhstan is against the commercial import of radioactive waste.

Conclusion

It was reported recently that a draft bill allowing the import of low- and medium-level radioactive waste has been submitted to the country’s Parliament. According to the Minister of Environmental Protection, neither the Parliament nor the government has yet arrived at a unanimous opinion on the issue. However, Kazakhstani officials have held talks with the IAEA about their plans to bring foreign waste to their country. IAEA spokesperson Mark Gwozdecky was quoted by The Guardian newspaper as saying the agency is prepared to play an advisory role in the execution of this plan, if asked. The Kazakhstani side has made assurances that all measures in the execution of this plan will be carried out in full compliance with IAEA standards and regulations. Proponents of turning Kazakhstan into a commercial importer of the radioactive waste are optimistic and expect that their initiative will receive official support. In this case, Kazakhstan will become the first and only nation in the world willing to accept foreign radioactive waste for disposal on its territory.

Relevant Resources

Articles and Reports

Muktar Dzhakishev, On the Radioecological Situation on the Territory of Kazakhstan.

Classification of Radioactive Waste: A Safety Guide. A Publication in the Radwass Programme. Safety Series No. 111-G-1.1, IAEA, 1994.

Paul Brown, “Kazakhstan Reveals Solution to its Nuclear Waste Crisis: Import More,” The Guardian, November 21, 2001.

Ken Bragg, and Ferruccio Gera, “Safety Issues in the Disposal of Solid Radioactive Waste; Assessing Approaches,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2000.

John Cooper et al., “What Waste Is “Radioactive”? Defining the Scope of the Regulatory System,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 3, March 2000.

Government Documents

The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Use of Atomic Energy.

Websites

NIS Nuclear Profiles Database: Kazakhstan.

Radwaste.org

Appeal to the Parliament and the Prime Minister.

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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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