Issue Brief

To Comply or Not to Comply:
Outline of the UN Inspections Mechanism in Iraq
Victor Mizin, Senior Research Associate
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
Monterey Institute of International Studies
March 2003

Issue Introduction

Twelve years after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent U.S.-led Desert Storm operation, the United Nations continues to persevere in the process of disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through inspections and monitoring. Victor Mizin, Senior Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and former UNSCOM inspector, argues that inspections have been and will continue to be unsuccessful due to an organized system of concealment, sanctioned by the highest level of Iraqi leadership.

UNSCOM Inspector Collects Samples

Issue Brief

The UN inspections and monitoring mechanism in Iraq was recently reinforced in November 2002 by the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1441 (SCR 1441). Prior to SCR 1441, the United Nations Security Council set forth the scope of WMD inspections in SCR 687 (1990), which specified cease fire plans and detailed Iraq’s obligations to destroy all chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and all missiles with a range in excess of 150 kilometers.[1] Iraqi non-compliance with SCR 687 included an extensive and officially sanctioned network of deception, denial, and, at times, physical disruption of the inspection process, which led to subsequent UN resolutions.[2] Additionally, the Iraqi final, full, and complete disclosures (FFCD) of WMD capabilities repeatedly fell short of what inspections actually found and what transpired according to defector reports and other intelligence sources.[3] Questions remain regarding nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile systems that are still unaccounted for or that lack any official Iraqi documentation certifying their destruction.[4] Current inspections, developed under a drastically different international political environment, intend to provide Iraq with a final opportunity to fulfill its responsibilities and obligations imposed by the international community through current and previous Security Council resolutions.

SCR 1441 is the 17th Security Council resolution regarding the disarmament of Iraq. SCR 1441 allows the reintroduction of weapons inspectors into Iraq under its new inspection agency (UNMOVIC established by SCR 1284).[5] Verification requirements under SCR 1441 are basically similar to those stipulated by SCR 687 with a few exceptions. The new resolution requires the Iraqis to allow anyone with knowledge of WMD programs to be interviewed by inspectors in private or outside of the country, if needed.[6] UNMOVIC inspectors wield new high-tech equipment, such as a gamma-spectroscopy monitor, known as the Ranger, which can detect radiation on the ground or a device called Alex, which can pick out metals used for nuclear purposes or a special “sniffer” that can detect the presence of chemical or biological agents in the air on site without sending samples to the laboratory.[7] Although this presents a step forward in the efficiency of inspections, the effectiveness of these technologies has yet to be proven. Finally, and most importantly, SCR 1441 represents “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council” and repeats a warning of “serious consequences” if Baghdad refuses to disarm.[8]

SCR 1441 returns to previous requirements imposed on Iraq under resolutions SCR 707 (http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/
resolution707.htm)
and SCR 715
(http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/
resolution715.htm). This stringent approach was eroded by the conclusion of the “special arrangement” between Iraq and the United Nations. The United Nations was anxious to give Baghdad some incentives to comply by conceding to narrow the scope of the UN’s mandate by inhibiting inspections of “sensitive sites--presidential palaces and premises related to national sovereignty” and requiring inspectors to give 24 hours’ notice prior to inspections. SCR 707 recognizes Iraq’s material breach of resolution 687. A number of serious violations occurred, including failure to provide full, final, and complete disclosure of all aspects of its WMD and missile programs at the start of UNSCOM’s inspections in 1991.[9] SCR 715 outlines the plans for monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance, as well as the use of intrusive “no-notice inspections.”[10]

UNSCOM Inspector Searches Iraqi Documents

As is the case with previous resolutions, SCR 1441 reproduces the same ambiguous language regarding what constitutes a “material breach.” This ambiguity regarding possible responses to non-compliance has resulted from a political rift in the Security Council that some say has given Saddam the possibility for maneuvering and procrastination.[11] There is a tug-of-war between the supporters of continued inspections, such as France, Germany, and Russia, and the United States, which strives to set deadlines, which, if not met, would automatically call for military action to disarm Iraq. This situation unavoidably dilutes the power of the resolution and has an effect similar to that which the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding had on the inspection process under UNSCOM’s tenure.[12]

When they left Iraq in December 1998, UNSCOM inspectors were unable to fully document Iraq’s WMD programs.[13] There are many indications that Baghdad has continued to develop its proscribed WMD arsenals. Recently, the Iraqis were apprehended importing illicit components that some allege could be used in WMD programs.[14] Many of these cases were interpreted differently due to the divisions in the general political approaches among the UN Security Council and the expert community. For example, the purchase of aluminum tubes is believed to be a sign that Iraq is attempting to reconstitute its nuclear program, although the Iraqis assert the tubes were acquired for the manufacture of the airframes permitted missiles’ airframes.[15] In addition, UNSCOM left with many unanswered questions about Iraq’s biological weapons programs, including anthrax, botulinum, and growth media that could be used to produce these agents.[16] Also, there are reports that Iraq has failed to account for many of its chemical weapons referred to by Hans Blix in his UN Security Council report on February, 14, 2003.[17] So far, inspections have not produced any significant results, not due to the flaws in the design of the inspection process, but because of Iraq’s refusal to fully comply with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. At the same time, Baghdad is trying to create the image that it is fully cooperating with UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Iraq has consented to Hans Blix’s demand to destroy its newest al-Samoud-2 missile, the tests of which have demonstrated the actual range exceeds the permitted 150 km by more than 20%. However, there is little reason to believe that new inspections will help answer any of the previous questions, given the Iraqi regime’s history of non-compliance and concealment attempts. To promote the disarmament process, inspections should be backed up by credible threats of force (as in the idea of “coercive inspections” proposed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace http://www.ceip.org/files/publications/iraq/
mathews.htm), which Saddam might subsequently try to undermine using the aforementioned divergence within the UN Security Council and the current criticism of the U.S. administration’s unilateralist approach to the Iraqi crisis.

There are no signs that Iraq has dismantled its concealment mechanism, which has been used to avoid Security Council-imposed obligations over the past twelve years. This period of time allowed Iraq to fine-tune the means of deception by surveying and studying the inspectors and the inspection process.[18] It is an organized and comprehensive system sanctioned by the highest level of Iraqi leadership and implemented by the Iraqi National Inspections Directorate, Iraqi secret services, specifically the Special Security Organization, and its Special Republican Guard.[19] The Iraqi goal is to bog down the inspections process while providing, from time to time, insignificant pieces of evidence to demonstrate its cooperation, so that it will be able to retain its WMD capabilities and related assets, and finally to have sanctions lifted by the Security Council, which will be forced to do so in the absence of any major discovery by UNMOVIC. According to Dr. John Yurechko of the Defense Intelligence Agency, “It’s a highly centralized effort. The program encompasses intelligence and security services, the Special Republican Guard, the military-industrial commission, and the ministry of information.”[20] Concealing weapons facilities in residential areas, mosques, hospitals, or underground facilities and presenting fraudulent declarations in violation of Security Council resolutions represent normal Iraqi behavior during inspections.[21]

It is important to remember that verification is merely a tool to arms control and disarmament; verification cannot succeed without cooperation.[22] Inspectors are not “scavengers” or “detectives” and thus it is almost impossible for them to roam a country the size of California in search of buried pieces of evidence. Inspections will fail and 12 years of Iraqi deception and denial will conclude in international military action to remove the current Iraqi leadership and destroy its WMD.[23] In his February 5, 2003 speech to the United Nations Security Council, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell declared: “Should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing--at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond?” he asked rhetorically. He continued, “The United States will not and cannot run that risk to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option. Not in a post-September 11 world.”[24]

Table I
(A Chronology of Inspection Process)

Table II
(Unresolved Questions Regarding Iraq’s WMD and Missile Capabilities)

Sources:
[1] United Nations Security Council Resolution 687. Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting, on April 3, 1991. Also, for an outline of key Security Council Resolutions see, “UN Resolutions on Iraq,” BBC Website, September 9, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2246037.stm.
[2] For more on Iraq’s history of concealment efforts, see Scott Ritter, Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem -- Once and For All (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), p. 118.
[3] For additional information see Jonathan B. Tucker, “Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment: Lessons From the U.N. Experience in Iraq,” The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer (1996).
[4] For more on this topic, see United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,” October 2002, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm;
The British Government, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government,” September 2002, http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/page271.asp.
[5] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1284, December 17, 1999, http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm; see also “UNMOVIC: Basic Facts,” http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/main.htm.
[6] See these two articles for more information regarding interviews: Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Iraq Claims ‘Super Cooperation’ with UN,” Washington Post Website, January 27, 2003; William Safire, “Inspect the Brains,” New York Times, December 16, 2002.
[7] Massimo Calabresi and Mark Thompson, “Inspections: Can They Work This Time?” Time Magazine Online, September 25, 2002, http://www.time.com/time/magazine.
[8] United Nations, “Resolution 1441 (2002),” UN Document S/RES/1441 (2002), November 8, 2002, p. 3.
[9] United Nations Security Council Resolution 707, August 15, 1991, http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm.
[10] United Nations Security Council Resolution 715, October 11, 1991, http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm.
[11] See more about the debate in David E. Sanger and Julia Preston, “Bush is Expected to Say Iraq Failed to Meet U.N. Terms,” New York Times Website, 18 December 2002; “Iraq I: Washington, London Set Their U.N. Strategy: Dare a Veto,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, February 21, 2003, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2003/2/21/4p.html.
[12] For more on the Memorandum of Understanding, see Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Republic of Iraq, February 27, 1998, http://www.un.org/Depts/unsocm/s98-166.htm.
[13] For more information, see UNSCOM’s Comprehensive Review, “Iraq: Ongoing Monitoring and Verification,” 1999, http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/index.htm.
[14] For more information see, David E. Kaplan, “Shopping Spree: Iraq’s Pursuit of Weaponry, Including Nuclear Technology, Knows no Bounds or Boundaries,” U.S. News & World Report, October 14, 2002.
[15] For more information regarding Iraq’s unresolved nuclear questions, see Steer, Ian, “Iraqi Declarations Fail to Answer UN’s Questions,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1, 2003, http://jir.janes.com/search97/vs.vts?action=View&VdkVgwKey=
/content1/janesdata/mags.
[16] For more on this issue, see United States Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,” October 2002, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm;
The British Government, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government,” September 2002, http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/page271.asp.
[17] The United Nations Security Council, “Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei Deliver Presentation to the U.N. Security Council,” February 14, 2003; Transcript: Federal Document Clearing House, Washington, D.C.
[18] For more information, see “Deception Activities,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/deception.htm.
[19] For more information on Iraqi concealment efforts, see Scott Ritter, Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem -- Once and For All (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999); James Hackett, “Cat-and-Mouse Game in Iraq.” Washington Times Website, February 6, 2003, http://www.washtimes.com/; Peter Spiegel, “Powell Reveals ‘Disturbing Pattern’ of Deception,” Financial Times, February 6, 2003; Ben Arnoldy and David S. Hauck, “The Inspections Maze,” Christian Science Monitor Website, November 7, 2002, http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1107/p12s01-wogi.htm;
United States Department of Defense, News Transcript Website, “DoD Briefing on Iraqi Denial and Deception,” John Yurechko, presenter, October 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/cgbin/dlprint.cgi?http...efenselink.mil/
news/Oct2002/t10082002_t1008dia.html; The United States Department of State, International Information Programs,
David Kay, presenter, “Detecting Cheating on Non-Proliferation Regimes: Lessons From the Iraqi Experience,” (presented at the Fifth Annual International Conference on Controlling Arms, Norfolk, June 1996).
[20] United States Department of Defense, “Briefing on Iraqi Denial and Deception,” Dr. John Yurechko, presenter, Defense Intelligence Agency, October 8, 2002, p. 1.
[21] For more on this topic, see Charles Clover and Mark Huband, “Full Evidence on Iraq Arms Only After War,” Financial Times, January 27, 2003; see also Philip Sherwell and David Wastell, “Saddam Hiding the Weapons in Mosques,” The World Tribune, November 19, 2002, http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/front_3.html.
[22] For more information on the subject of verification, see William C. Potter, ed., Verification and Arms Control (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1985).
[23] For an interesting perspective of the possible outcomes of war, see Michael Barletta, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, “The Coming U.S. War with Iraq: WMD Stakes and Scenarios,” February 10, 2003, http://www.cns.miis.edu/.
[24] Remarks to the United Nations Security Council by United States Secretary of State Colin Powell, New York, February 5, 2003, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm.

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Relevant Resources

Reports

		Michael Barletta, “Disarming Iraq by Force: WMD Stakes and Scenarios,” http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030307.htm March 6, 2003.
		Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Iraq: What Next?” http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/Iraq/ webfinalv2.pdf January 2003.
		Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Iraq: A New Approach” http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Iraq.Report.pdf August 2002.
		IISS, “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment,” http://www.iiss.org/news-more.php?itemID=88 September 2002.
		Wahlberg, Leitenberg, Zanders, “Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment: Lessons from the UN Experience in Iraq,” SIPRI, http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/research/ cbw-yb20009b.pdf.

Official Documents

		UNMOVIC Working Document, “Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes,” http://nti.org/db/profiles/iraq/fulltext/ unmovic_jan6.pdf March 6, 2003.
		Colin Powell, “Remarks to the UN Security Council,” http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/ 17300.htm, February 5, 2003.
		Colin Powell, “Remarks to the UN Security Council,” http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/ 18458.htm, March 7, 2003.
		Colin Powell, “Iraq: Still Failing to Disarm,” http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/ 18307.htm March 5, 2003.
		UNSCOM’s “Comprehensive Review,” January 1999 http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/ index.htm.
		Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government http://www.ukonline.gov.uk/featurenews/ iraqdossier.pdf.
		CIA, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/ Iraq_Oct_2002.htm October 2002.

Websites

		Iraq Watch http://www.iraqwatch.org/.
		Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Iraq Inspections Database http://www.cns.miis.edu/Iraq-Inspections/.
		Federation of American Scientists, Iraqi Missile Guide http://fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/missile/ index.html.

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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