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Issue Brief
Akaki Dvali, Research Assistant
Center for
Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
Monterey Institute of International Studies
August
2003
UN Peacekeepers on roadside in Gali, Georgia
(Nov. 2002)
The former Soviet republic of Georgiahas seen numerous wars and conflicts since the fall of the Soviet Union. Like all the former Soviet republics, Georgia inherited numerous political, economic, and social problems. After gaining independence in 1991, Georgia has experienced several internal armed conflicts, severe political and economic crises and a high crime level. Stability returned for the most part in 1995, but Georgia's central government still faces serious challenges from unstable breakaway regions and some poorly governed parts of the country.
This issue brief covers the three main sources of instability in Georgia: the Pankisi Gorge, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.
Issue Brief
Georgia is a former Soviet republic and is located in the Caucasus region, which has seen numerous wars and conflicts since the fall of the Soviet Union. Like all the former Soviet republics, Georgia inherited numerous political, economic, and social problems. Its transition from a totalitarian system to a democracy with a free market economy has been a painful process. After it gained independence in 1991, Georgia went through several internal armed conflicts (including a civil war) and consequently its territorial integrity was compromised. Abkhazia and South Ossetia separated from Georgia and became autonomous republics, outside the jurisdiction of the Georgian government. In addition, in the early 1990s Georgia suffered severe political and economic crises and a high crime level, which further complicated the country’s transition. Since 1995, stability and the rule of law have been established in most of Georgia. However, unstable breakaway regions and some poorly governed parts of the country still pose serious challenges to the central government. Tensions in neighboring areas, such as Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh, also have a negative influence on the development process in Georgia.
This issue brief covers the three main sources of instability in Georgia: the Pankisi Gorge, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. These regions have recently come under scrutiny for possibly contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Pankisi Gorge became a focus of international attention after international criminal groups, terrorist organizations, and Islamist militants began to use it as a base of operations for illegal activities, reportedly including chemical weapons production and proliferation. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, although not alleged to be hosting international terrorists, could attract proliferators who might find safe havens for their illegal business in these unstable areas.
Pankisi Gorge Crisis
Pankisi Gorge is located in mountainous northeastern Georgia. The gorge is mainly populated by Kists (closely related to the Vainakh ethnic family, which also unites Chechens and Ingush) and ethnic Georgians. The gorge is 3 kilometers wide and 30 kilometers long and has only one paved road, though there are numerous small paths connecting the gorge with neighboring regions. To the north, the gorge is bordered by Chechnya. Control of the border is extremely difficult due to the severe terrain. This border area runs along the Caucasus Mountains, where there are numerous paths poorly controlled by both the Georgian and Russian sides. Cross-border movements of individuals and criminal groups are common. Due to the gorge’s geographic location and unstable weather conditions, it has always been difficult to control on-going illegal activities, even during the Soviet era. Since 1999, Pankisi Gorge has been home to 7,000 Chechen refugees, who crossed the border after the second Chechen war started in 1999. This influx of refugees further complicated the task of Georgian law enforcement agencies, since distinguishing refugees from Chechen rebels or other terrorists is extremely difficult. Criminal activities have increased in the past four years, with drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and kidnapping the most frequently committed crimes.
While the Pankisi Gorge became known to the international community at the end of the 1990s for its criminal element and reportedly for sheltering Chechen fighters, it attracted further attention after Russian allegations that al-Qai’da terrorists and possibly Usama bin Laden were operating from the area. On a number of occasions, Russian officials, including the ministers of foreign affairs and defense, accused the Georgian government of sheltering Chechen terrorists and Arab mercenaries within the Pankisi Gorge. The Georgian government was concerned that Russia might use these allegations to justify a military intervention in the gorge. Although supposedly acquiescing to U.S. pressure not to intervene militarily in Pankisi, Russia has deployed bombers on numerous occasions, violating Georgian airspace and either bombing the area or dropping landmines.
The Georgian government at first dismissed Moscow’s claims regarding the presence of terrorists and Chechen fighters in Pankisi. However, in the fall of 2001, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze acknowledged the possibility that Chechen commander Ruslan Gelayev could have been hiding in the region. This acknowledgement was followed by a statement from Georgian Security Minister Valeriy Khaburdzania pointing out that an unspecified number of Jordanian and Saudi citizens allegedly planning an attack in Russia had been apprehended in the Pankisi Gorge. In the meantime, U.S. intelligence also acknowledged that Arab militants and other fighters from Afghanistan had been seen in the Pankisi Gorge.[1] According to Philip Remler, then acting U.S. ambassador in Georgia, al-Qai’da and Taliban fighters had scattered across the Caucasus, and some of them were hiding in the Pankisi Gorge and were in contact with Al-Khattab, an Arab terrorist with connections to Usama bin Laden.[2]
Those allegations became the basis for Russian officials requesting a large-scale counter-terrorist operation in the Pankisi Gorge with the participation of Russian troops. Due to Russian-Georgian tensions, the Georgian government excluded any possibility of conducting a joint military operation with Russian forces. However, Georgia accepted a deal from the U.S. government, which offered assistance to the Georgian military to conduct a counter-terrorist operation in the region. According to George Baramidze, then head of the Georgian parliamentary defense committee, Georgia would not object to Western troops helping to settle the problems in Pankisi.[2] The U.S.-Georgian deal concerned Russia, which considered the entrance of U.S. military instructors tantamount to the United States developing a military presence in the Caucasus—a declared Russian sphere of interest. However, the U.S. assistance program, known as the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), officially launched on May 27, 2002, did not stipulate direct U.S. military intervention in the Pankisi Gorge; rather, it was designed to provide equipment and training to four Georgian specialized battalions, one company-sized team, and 200 staff officers at a cost of $64 million, funded by the U.S. Department of Defense.[3] As Georgian Foreign Minister Irakli Menagharishvili announced, the implementation of this program would increase the efficiency of the Georgian armed forces and would be a guarantee of peace and stability in the whole Caucasus region. At the opening ceremony of the program, U.S. Ambassador to Georgia Richard Miles stated that together with the global war on terrorism, the United States hopes to promote Georgian freedom and stability.[4]
In the fall of 2002, Georgian law enforcement agencies backed by U.S.-trained troops launched a comprehensive security operation to rid the Pankisi Gorge of criminals and terrorists. Despite Russia’s skepticism that Georgian armed forces could achieve success in the gorge without Russian involvement, Georgian officials say that security and stability have significantly improved since the security operation.
Masked Georgian soldiers participate in an
anti-crime operation in Pankisi Gorge (Aug. 2002)
However, the security operation did not put an end to allegations. In early 2003, for the first time in the Pankisi crisis, new allegations were made regarding possible WMD production within the gorge. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, during his speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy on February 8, 2003, announced that the Pankisi Gorge was a well-known destination for the training and instruction of international “chemical terrorists” and that makeshift laboratories had been built in the region for the production of ricin, a poisonous toxin derived from the castor bean plant. Ivanov claimed that alleged chemical terrorists recently arrested in Britain and France had been trained in the Pankisi Gorge.[5] Ivanov’s allegations could be based on the Georgian government’s prior acknowledgement that Georgian Security Ministry operatives had discovered the components of ricin in the Pankisi Gorge.[6] However, the Georgian government dismissed the Russian allegations by claiming that no material evidence had been found to suggest that ricin or other lethal substances had ever been manufactured in Pankisi. Georgian Deputy Security Minister Irakli Alasania reported that during the security operation in the region, no ricin production laboratories were discovered.[7] Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze pointed out that some Pankisi-based militants might have been chemical experts, but no such individuals remained in the region after the security operation.[5] According to Otar Kvesitadze, director of the Georgian Institute of Biochemistry and Biotechnology, if makeshift laboratories were in operation in the Pankisi Gorge, they would have the capability to produce only crude ricin with low lethality, which would require other purification procedures outside the gorge.[8]
It is also worth mentioning that while addressing the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell too linked international terrorists with the Pankisi Gorge. While talking about the Iraqi regime’s ties with suspected terrorist Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, who reportedly had links with al-Qai’da and Usama bin Laden, Powell noted that al-Zarqawi and his associates, among them two Islamic militants arrested in France, had been active in the Pankisi Gorge and Chechnya and were planning gas attacks against Russia.[5]
Although the allegations about terrorists and chemical weapons production have not been confirmed, the fact that criminals and international terrorists have made use of the lawless gorge is unquestioned, and raises concerns that the region could be used by terrorists for illegal activities in the future. The Georgian government argues that order has been restored in the Pankisi region since implementation of the security operation, and the gorge is under the full control of Georgian law enforcement. However, due to its geographic location and the instability in neighboring Chechnya, the Pankisi Gorge remains vulnerable to the threat of future criminal and/or terrorist activities.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, unlike Pankisi, are fully outside the jurisdiction and control of the Georgian government. During the Soviet era, both regions enjoyed autonomous status within the Soviet Republic of Georgia. However, their status was a point of controversy, as Georgia considered the territories to be indigenous Georgian lands. Officially, Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain within the territorial borders of Georgia today, though after bloody armed conflicts in the early 1990s, both regions achieved de facto independence. Separatist leaders in the breakaway regions formed governments and declared independence, though neither has been recognized by the international community. Although separatist leaders have established most government institutions, the authorities have been incapable of controlling criminal trends in their territories, mainly a result of devastated economies and ineffective law enforcement. Since the end of armed conflicts in Abkhazia (1992-93) and South Ossetia (1990-93), the official status of these regions has been unclear. This factor is a major contributor to the unstable environment in Georgia.
South Ossetia is completely surrounded by Georgia on the south, east and west, and by the Caucasus Mountains on the north. The so-called Rokskiy tunnel, which links the breakaway region with the Russian province of North Ossetia through the Caucasus Mountains, has been South Ossetia’s lifeline since the 1992-93 conflict, though in recent years, economic ties between the breakaway region and the rest of Georgia have increased. Smuggling in and out of the region (in both the Russian and Georgian directions) is the basic form of criminal activity in South Ossetia. Extremely high levels of corruption among border guards, customs and law enforcement officials in the whole region, including the Russian province of North Ossetia and Georgia, create an environment conducive to illegal enterprises and organizations. Many smuggled goods find their way to the Georgian market, basically coming from Russia through South Ossetia.
Although there have been no allegations that South Ossetian territory has been used for the smuggling of fissile material or other WMD components, instability and the criminal environment could attract WMD proliferators to use the region as a base for criminal activities. South Ossetia did not inherit any research or production facilities for WMD from the Soviet Union, and is not home to radioactive waste or other hazardous substances. This fact reduces proliferation concerns. However, the existing criminal environment, the direct link to Russia through the Rokskiy tunnel, the extensive practice of smuggling, and high corruption levels in the region could attract proliferators to use this territory for illegal business.
Clear evidence of Abkhazia’s involvement in WMD proliferation is also not available, though Abkhazian’s self-proclaimed authorities have frequently been accused by the Georgian government of facilitating the proliferation of fissile material and other hazardous substances. During the Soviet period, the Abkhazian capital Sukhumi housed the I. Vekua Institute of Physics and Technology (SIPT), which conducted research on plasma physics, controlled fusion reactions in a tokamak, ion accelerator physics, semiconductors, and thermal emission physics. In 1993, after the conflict in Abkhazia ended, 200 scientists fled from Sukhumi to Tbilisi (the Georgian capital) and re-established SIPT at the site of the Georgian Academy of Sciences. However, SIPT in Sukhumi remains functioning. Despite Sukhumi’s extensive involvement in past nuclear research activities, the former research facilities are not safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and no credible information is available about the fate of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or other materials reportedly housed in Sukhumi facilities in the past. According to unconfirmed information from Georgian scientists, SIPT once housed an isotope production reactor and fissile material (approximately 2 kg of HEU), which disappeared during the conflict. Its whereabouts is still unknown. According to Georgian allegations, some of the 244 types of radioactive materials, including enriched uranium, stored at SIPT might have been sold to terrorists or Iraq. Abkhazian authorities have denied the allegations. In 1996, individuals were apprehended in Belarus possessing HEU that Georgian and Russian scientists believed originated from Sukhumi.[9] This fact raises the credibility of reports that proliferators could gain access to the HEU or other hazardous materials once stored in Sukhumi facilities.
Conclusion
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, WMD proliferation to terrorists has become a major international concern. Countries where there is no authority capable of preventing terrorist groups from using parts of their territory as bases for illegal activities have attracted particular attention. The three unstable Georgian regions represent such areas where terrorist or criminal organizations may feel safe to pursue operations. In addition, the Caucasus region might be attractive to terrorist organizations due to its remoteness and geographic location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. The problem of instability in these regions is made worse by high levels of corruption in the Caucasus. According to unconfirmed reports from Georgian nongovernmental organizations, criminal gangs in Pankisi Gorge (and in other places) have operated in conjunction with corrupt politicians and law enforcement officials.
One way of reducing the threat of terrorism and WMD proliferation in the region would be to return the Pankisi Gorge to the control of the central government and to officially define the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The official status of the two breakaway regions remains unclear 10 years after the end of conflicts. Due to historic ties with Georgia and significant numbers of ethnic Georgians in both regions, the independence of either Abkhazia or South Ossetia, or their integration into Russian Federation, is not likely to happen in the current environment.[10] A possible solution to the uncertainty might be for the international community to work with Georgia and the regions to formulate a mutually acceptable status—whether it be federal, confederal, or other type of autonomous governance—within the borders of Georgia.
[1] Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Georgia:
Situation in Pankisi Gorge Raises Tension, Speculation,” Radio Free Europe Radio
Liberty Website,
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/02/
20022002075707.asp.
[2] Artyom Vernidoub, “Bin
Laden and U.S. Troops Welcome in Georgia,” Gazeta.ru online edition,
http://www.gazeta.ru/2002/02/19/BinLadenandU.shtml.
[3] Kathleen T. Rhem,
“American Troops Training, Equipping Georgian Military,” American Forces
Information Service, U.S. Department of Defense Website,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/
n05302002_200205304.html.
[4] “Train-and-Equip
Launched,” Civil Georgia Online Magazine,
http://www.civil.ge/.
[5] Jean-Christophe Peuch,
“Russia: Moscow Levels Fresh Terrorism-Related Charges Against Georgia,” Radio
Free Europe Radio Liberty Website,
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/
2003/02/11022003161829.asp.
[6] “Gruziya nachala davat
priznatelnyye pokazaniya,” Gosudarstva SNG v zerkale Rossiyskoy pressy, January
17, 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.ru.
[7] “Ministr oborony RF –
podderzhka boyevikov osushchestvlyayetsya v osnovnom iz Gruzii i Azerbaidzhana,”
Praym-Nyus, February 8, 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.ru.
[8] “Britanskiy sud
rassmotrit delo v otnoshenii chetvertykh podozrevayemykh v proizvodstve
ritsina,” Russkiy kurer, January 17, 2003; in Integrum Techno,
http://www.integrum.ru.
[9] William Potter, “Less
Well-Known Cases of Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Diversion in the Former Soviet
Union,” CNS Nuclear and Missile Database, NTI Website,
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/nuccases.htm.
[10] According to the
last Soviet census of 1989, the population of Abkhazia totalled about 537,000,
of whom 45.7% were Georgians, 17.8% Abkhazians, and the rest Armenians,
Russians, and Greeks. However, since the end of the war, about 250,000 people,
mostly ethnic Georgians, have fled Abkhazia to other parts of Georgia. In South
Ossetia prior to conflict, the population totaled 100,000, of whom 66.2% were
Ossetes and 29% Georgians. Due to the conflict, a large number of ethic
Georgians were also displaced from South Ossetia to other parts of the country.
Relevant Resources
Related Articles
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“Pankisi Crisis,” Civil Georgia Online Magazine, http://www.civil.ge/pankisi_about.shtml. |
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Daan van der Schriek, “Pankisi’s Role in European Terror Plot Remains Unclear,”
EurasiaNet,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/ |
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Sergei Blagov, “Military Issues Block Russia-Georgia
Détente,”
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/ |
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Christopher Waters, “Pankisi Tension and International
Law,”
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Jaba Devdariani, “Georgian Security Operation Proceeds in the Pankisi Gorge,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/ articles/eav090302a.shtml. |
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Jaba Devdariani, “Fresh UN Resolution on Abkhazia Fails to Generate Optimism,” http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/ articles/eav020702.shtml. |
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Jeffrey Silverman, “Corruption in South Ossetia
Complicates American Mission in Georgia,” |
Websites
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Georgia Train and Equip Program, U.S. Embassy, Tbilisi. |
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Official Documents
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U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism,”
April 30, 2003,
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/ |
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Selected Reports of the Secretary General (1994-2003),
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomig/ |
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been
independently verified by NTI or its directors,
officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.
