Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control
The AQ Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export Controls
Brazil's Nuclear Ambitions, Past and Present
The Bush Proposals: A Global Strategy for Combating the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Technology or a Sanctioned Nuclear Cartel?
Bush-Putin Summit, November 2001
на русском (In Russian)
China Enters the Nuclear Suppliers Group: Positive Steps in the Global Campaign against Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
на русском (In Russian)
Congressional Oversight of U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Cooperative Threat Reduction and Pakistan
The Costs of U.S. Nuclear Weapons
DOE's Domestic Nuclear Security Initiatives
Egypt and Saudi Arabia's Policies toward Iran's Nuclear Program
The Emerging Arab Response to Iran's Unabated Nuclear Program
Entry into Force of the CTBT: All Roads Lead to Washington A Report from the Fifth Article XIV Conference
Going Beyond the Stir: The Strategic Realities of China's No-First-Use Policy
IAEA Board Deplores Iran's Failure to Come into Full Compliance: Is Patience with Iran Running Out?
IAEA Board Welcomes EU-Iran Agreement: Is Iran Providing Assurances or Merely Providing Amusement?
Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS
на русском(In Russian)
Implications of Proposed India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Indo-Pakistani Military Standoff: Why It Isn't Over Yet
The International Uranium Enrichment Center at Angarsk: A Step Towards Assured Fuel Supply?
Iran and the IAEA: A Troubling Past with a Hopeful Future?
Is Syria a Candidate for Nuclear Proliferation?
Japan and Kazakhstan: Nuclear Energy Cooperation
Japan's Evolving Security Policies: Along Came North Korea's Threats
The New IAEA Resolution: A Milestone in the Iran-IAEA Saga
North Korea's Nuclear Test and its Aftermath: Coping with the Fallout
North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program and the Six-party Talks
Nuclear Conflict in the 21st Century: Reviewing the Chinese Nuclear Threat
Nuclear Posture Review
на русском(In Russian)
Nuclear Proliferation and South Asia: Recent Trends
Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement
на русском(In Russian)
Nuclear Trafficking Hoaxes: A Short History of Scams Involving Red Mercury and Osmium-187
A Pause in the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement
Practical Steps for Improving U.S. Nonproliferation Leadership
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives: An Alternative Paradigm for Arms Control
на русском(In Russian)
Plutonium Disposition
на русском(In Russian)
Radiological Materials in Russia
на русском(In Russian)
Reykjavik Summit: The Legacy and a Lesson for the Future
Risks of Plutonium Programs
The Role of Security Assurances: Is Any Progress Possible?
Russian Spent Nuclear Fuel
на русском(In Russian)
Russia's Nuclear Doctrine
на русском(In Russian)
The Second NPT PrepCom for the 2005 Review Conference: Prospects for Progress
Seven Years After the Nuclear Tests: Appraising South Asia's Nuclear Realities
The Six-Party Talks and President Obama's North Korea Policy
Sixty Years After the Nuclear Devastation, Japan's Role in the NPT
START Process and Russian Strategic Force Modernization
Submarine Dismantlement Assistance
Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW)
на русском(In Russian) 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Germany: Time for Withdrawal?
Taiwan and Nonproliferation
The Treaty of Moscow
на русском(In Russian)
Understanding Obama and Jerusalem
UN Disarmament Committee Forecasts Troubled Nonproliferation Future
UN General Assembly Tackles Nonproliferation and Disarmament After Disappointing Summit
U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation
на русском(In Russian)
Venezuela's Search for Nuclear Power — or Nuclear Prestige
Vying for Influence: Saudi Arabia’s Reaction to Iran’s Advancing Nuclear Program
Will Saudi Arabia Acquire Nuclear Weapons?


Biological Weapons
The Anti-plague System in the Newly Independent States, 1992 and Onwards: Assessing Proliferation Risks and Potential for Enhanced Public Health in Central Asia and the Caucasus
Assessing the Threat of Mass-Casualty Bioterrorism
на русском(In Russian)
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
на русском(In Russian)
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Compliance Protocol
на русском(In Russian)
Developments in the Biosciences: Do Recent Scientific and Technological Advances Lower the Threshold for the Proliferation of Biological Weapons?
на русском(In Russian)
The Fifth Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)
на русском(In Russian)
International Assistance for Anti-plague Facilities in the Former Soviet Union to Prevent Proliferation of Biological Weapons
на русском(In Russian)
Is the Avian Influenza Virus a Suitable Agent for a Biological Weapon?
Lessons from Select Public Health Events Having Relevance to Bioterrorism Preparedness
на русском(In Russian)
The Next Generation of Sensor Technology for the BioWatch Program
Security and Public Health: How and Why do Public Health Emergencies Affect the Security of a Country?


Chemical Weapons
Dusty Agents and the Iraqi Chemical Weapons Arsenal
на русском(In Russian)
First Review Conference of the CWC: Coming of Age
Global CW Assistance
Industrial Chemicals as Weapons: Chlorine
The Risks and Challenges of a Cruise Missile Tipping Point
The Seventh Conference of State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
на русском(In Russian)
The United States and the CTBT: Renewed Hope or Politics as Usual?
Vinalon, the DPRK, and Chemical Weapons Precursors
на русском(In Russian)
What to Expect at the Eighth Conference of State Parties to the CWC


Missiles, Missile Defenses, and Delivery Vehicles
A Look at National Missile Defense and the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System
Addressing the Spread of Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs)
Examining China's Debate on Military Space Programs: Was the ASAT Test Really a Surprise?
Future Space Security
на русском(In Russian)
Japan's Space Law Revision: the Next Step Toward Re-Militarization?
Radiological and Nuclear Detection Devices
Russia's Approach to the U.S. Missile Defense Program
на русском(In Russian)
Space Security and Bush Administration Policy: Results of the First Term
Taiwan's Response to China's Missile Buildup
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and Northeast Asian Security
на русском(In Russian)
Unmanned Air Vehicles as Terror Weapons: Real or Imagined?


General Nonproliferation Topics
The Chechen Resistance and Radiological Terrorism
China's White Paper on Nonproliferation: Export Controls Hit the Big Time
Department of Homeland Security: Goals and Challenges
на русском(In Russian)
DP World and U.S. Port Security
The European Union and the Arms Ban on China
G8 10 Plus 10 Over 10
на русском(In Russian)
The Global Partnership 2004
Global Submarine Proliferation: Emerging Trends and Problems
Instability in Georgia: A New Proliferation Threat?
Iraq's WMD Scientists in the Crossfire
Islamist Terrorist Threat in the Tri-Border Region
на русском(In Russian)
Kazakhstan's Proposal to Initiate Commercial Imports of Radioactive Waste
на русском(In Russian)
The Mitutoyo Case: Will Japan Learn from its Mistakes or Repeat Them?
Nonproliferation Assistance to the Former Soviet Union
на русском(In Russian)
North Korea's 11th Supreme People's Assembly Elections
Nuclear Watch—Pakistan: The Sorry Affairs of the Islamic Republic
Radiological Materials in Russia
на русском(In Russian)
To Comply or Not to Comply: Outline of the UN Inspections Mechanism in Iraq
на русском(In Russian)
Unlocking the Impasse: Who Holds the Key to the Conference on Disarmament
Was Libyan WMD Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation?
Weapons of Mass Destruction in Central Asia
на русском(In Russian)
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East
на русском(In Russian)
Will Emerging Challenges Change Japanese Security Policy?

Issue Brief
redline

What to Expect at the Eighth Conference of State
Parties to the CWC

Holly M. Dragoo, International Organizations and Nonproliferation
Program (IONP) Intern at the OPCW
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
Monterey Institute of International Studies
October 2003

Issue Introduction

The Eighth Conference of State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) will be held October 20-24, 2003 in The Hague, the Netherlands. Several important issues will dominate the Conference agenda this year. Discussions on how to best implement national legislation obligations, requests to extend chemical weapon destruction deadlines, and approval of the 2004 draft budget are expected to be the primary concerns. Most of these issues were addressed at the First Review Conference (April 28-May 9, 2003) and at the 34th Session of the Executive Council (September 23-26, 2003), but were left for further discussion and approval at the Conference of State Parties.

Source: OPCW
Source: OPCW Website

Issue Brief

The Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force in April 1997, simultaneously creating the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), based in The Hague. The OPCW was designed to verify adherence to the tenets of the Convention, advise State Parties on legal aspects of the CWC, monitor verification and compliance with the CWC, and also foster scientific cooperation and technical assistance among State Parties. The Conference of State Parties is the primary policymaking organ of the Organisation, intended to provide an arena for practical concerns to be aired and resolved.

National Legislation Issues (Article VII)

The obligation to create national implementation laws (Article VII) is fundamental to the effectiveness of the treaty, as it ensures global coordination of State policies and procedures as they relate to the transfer of chemicals, administration of chemical weapon facilities and stockpiles, and chemical industry research and development. Despite OPCW efforts, only 47 percent of State Parties have fulfilled this obligation. Without such legislation in national governments, the CWC is difficult to enforce and confidence in the Convention is undermined. Having been discussed at the previous four Executive Council sessions, this issue is sure to be a subject for discussion at the Conference—in the form of a request for increased support from the OPCW in the form of training for the National Authorities, sponsored legal workshops, and provision of model legislation to States in need.

Demilitarization Deadlines

Under Article IV of the CWC, all states must destroy their chemical stockpiles and convert production facilities by the tenth year after accession to the CWC. Given the size and continued deterioration of various facilities and armaments, the task is progressing at a slower pace than had been anticipated. While the CWC allows State Parties to request up to a five-year deadline extension, States are reluctant to grant extensions without benchmark verification tools and confidence-instilling measures.

Earlier this year, the United States made the long anticipated request for an extension of its deadline for 45 percent of its chemical weapons stockpile destruction, shifting the date from April 2004 to 2007. This request comes fairly close to the original deadline, despite public acknowledgement (although not at the OPCW) of the impending difficulties of destruction for over two years. Citing “unresolved political and operational issues that forced shutdown or postponed start-up dates,” in a statement dated September 3, 2003, the United States is now facing difficulties, albeit on a different scale, akin to the Russian Federation. Environmental regulations, plant safety matters, escalating destruction costs, and communities located near facilities voicing their concerns have all been alluded to as reasons for this postponement request.

The request by the Russian Federation for an extension of its two intermediate destruction deadlines (of 20 and 45 percent of stockpiles) has been up for consideration since the 27th session of the Executive Council (2001), but has met with no success. It will be interesting to see the effects of the U.S. request in the General Debate of the Conference, as the United States and its allies have been the primary objectors to allowing the deadline extensions for Russia. However, Russia is expected to stand in support of the U.S. extension request in empathy of the difficulties facing safe armament destruction.

To date, the Russian Federation has destroyed only 1.25 percent of its Category 1 chemical weapons (weapons with the most deadly agents), while the United States has destroyed over 25 percent of its stockpile.

Budget 2004

Always a flash point at the Conference of State Parties, the 2004 draft budget will also be up for debate. Every year, the budget is allowed an increase in funding to adjust for inflation, sunk costs, and tenured positions. The Conference is often hard pressed to reach consensus on increases in real terms, as the emphasis shifts from the question of “how much do we increase it?” to “where will it all be allocated?” Last year’s quibble over whether to give more money to verification costs or to cooperation and assistance programs held up agreement on the Conference conclusions for some time. This year, however, plans for both a real increase in the budget and for cuts in the budget will be proposed in the event that a similar slow-down should occur. There seems to be no feeling as to what route or what amounts will be deemed acceptable and adopted by the Conference.

Universality

The accession of 12 states since the 2002 Conference has brought the total States Parties to the CWC to 157, the latest being Kyrgyzstan, which has highlighted universality as a continued goal of the CWC. It would seem logical to expect a discussion on how best to engage the provisional Iraqi government in acceding to the CWC, given the events of the past year. However, the chances of this are slight due to expected changes in the Iraqi governing council and priority status given to other agenda items at the Conference. Other States not party to the CWC, such as North Korea, Egypt, Libya, and Syria, have not yet signed the treaty and many Signatory States have not yet ratified, such as Israel. This will likely be raised by many States as an issue of concern, but not as a top priority.

Other Issues

Remnants of the controversial April 2002 dismissal of the former Director-General Mr. Jose M. Bustani still linger in the air as the legal ramifications continue to unfold. The recent judgement in favour of Mr. Bustani’s claim at the International Labour Organization (ILO) cited “extremely vague” justification given by the OPCW, declared the removal of the Director-General illegal, allocated an assessment of damages, and denied the possibility of future appeals. Funding for recompense will be difficult to negotiate given an already tight budget. How the Conference will respond to this judgement as recourse for appeal is not clear.

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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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