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Issue Brief
Stephanie Lieggi, East Asia Nonproliferation
Program
Mark Wuebbels, East Asia Nonproliferation Program
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
Monterey Institute of International Studies
December
2003
Issue Introduction
Since World War II, Japan has depended primarily on its security alliance with the United States to protect its borders. Tokyo’s relatively passive defense strategy echoed public distrust of the military and attachment to the ideals of the 1947 Peace Constitution, which prohibits the use of force to settle international disputes. Reliance on the United States for security eased the fears of other Asian countries about a possible revival of Japanese militarism and allowed Japan to concentrate on economic development. However, security challenges presented by North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, an increasingly powerful China, and the potential breakdown of the nuclear proliferation regime have caused the Japanese leaders and public to reassess the viability of Japan’s traditional security policies.
Prime Minister Koizumi favors strengthening
Japan’s
Self-Defense Forces
A new generation of Japanese politicians, taking an increasingly realist approach to defense policy, is gaining prominence in the Diet. The Koizumi government’s successful push for changes in the legislation governing the activities of the Japanese military reflects the influence of these “military realists.” More open debates about Japan’s security policy have taken place without stimulating major public protests. Even discussions about Japan’s possible development of nuclear weapons, until very recently a taboo subject, have become a controversial part of the Japanese security debate.
Sensitivity to U.S. pressure has historically influenced policymakers in Japan, and in the last decade, Washington has pressed Tokyo to play a more active role, both in its own defense and on the world stage. New agreements on military cooperation between the United States and Japan reinforced the need for increased Japanese military capabilities. After the September 11th terror attacks, the U.S. pressure enabled Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to push for a series of new legislation that increased Japan’s ability to join the U.S.-led “war on terror” and to send Japanese troops abroad.
In the past, Japanese policymakers have carefully balanced national security concerns against a strong public pacifist sentiment and the desire to avoid stoking regional fears of Japanese military expansion. As perceived security threats increase, the concerns of neighboring countries are likely to play a lesser role in Japan’s defense policy. However, a sharp break with the past is not a forgone conclusion. Public opinion and political support for pacifism, along with a decade-long recession, continue to constrain Japanese security policy and slow efforts to overhaul Japanese military doctrine. Regional security challenges are forcing a more open debate about security policy, but the outcome of this debate is still uncertain.
Issue Brief
The Evolution of Japan’s Security Policy
After Japan’s defeat in World War II, public opinion turned against its past militarism. As the only country to suffer nuclear attacks, Japan developed a strong “nuclear allergy” that impeded open discussions of security issues in general and nuclear weapons in particular. The post-war Japanese Constitution, drafted under the American occupation government, placed strict limits on Japanese military capabilities. Article 9 of the constitution bars Japan from threatening the use of force as a “means of settling international disputes” and from maintaining a “war potential.” Ironically, shortly after Japan adopted the constitution in 1947, Washington began to pressure Tokyo to reinterpret Article 9 in ways that would expand Japan’s ability to help defend itself against the Soviet Union and communist expansion in the region. Then Prime Minister Yoshida did not accept U.S. demands, arguing that Japan could not afford increased defense expenditures. Pro-military factions disagreed, viewing U.S. pressure as an opportunity to establish an autonomous and more independent Japanese defense capability.[1] A pragmatic policy known as the “Yoshida Doctrine” ultimately prevailed, which called for Japan to focus on economic development and rely primarily on the United States for defense.
Tensions between the conservative and liberal factions of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as well as between the LDP and opposition parties, over defense issues produced political incentives to avoid serious public discussions of security issues. This often led to ambiguous policies and avoidance of tough decisions on military issues. As the U.S. government slowly withdrew its occupying forces, Washington pressed Japan to take more responsibility for its own security and to play a broader regional security role. The 1954 Mutual Defense and Security Assistance Agreement and its 1960 revision defined the terms of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. This agreement and the resulting domestic legislation enabled Japan to establish the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954. The creation of the SDF encouraged military proponents to lobby for a stronger defense industry capable of supporting expanding military needs. However, re-establishment of military forces stoked fears of remilitarization and met with significant popular resistance. Liberal politicians argued that the Japanese government’s moves were in disharmony with Article 9.[2] Ultimately, a compromise was reached, which emphasized strengthening the economy with minimal spending on the military.[3]
The limits placed on the posture and structure of Japan’s military forces by international and domestic forces made the security alliance with the United States the centerpiece of Japanese security policy for the last 50 years. Leaders in Tokyo regarded the alliance as essential for Japan’s economic development and overall security. The U.S. “nuclear umbrella” protected Japan against potential adversaries, while assuring other regional players that Tokyo would not return to its militaristic past. However, these assurances came at the cost of Japanese autonomy in military and foreign affairs. Concerns about commitment on both sides complicated the alliance. In Washington, officials consistently complained that Japan was not playing an active enough role in assuring its own defense. In Tokyo, leaders feared that Japan’s security under the U.S. nuclear umbrella might be vulnerable to changes in U.S. foreign policy. President Nixon’s 1970 announcement of decreased U.S. force deployments in Asia led Japanese leaders to question whether they could rely on Washington to defend Japan against threats from the Soviet Union and China.
The end of the Cold War prompted discussion of Japan’s new responsibilities as a global economic power, but Japan continued to rely on the United States for security. The limitations of this approach came to a head prior to the 1991 Gulf War. The United States put pressure on Japan to contribute assistance to the UN-backed coalition forces. Conservative Japanese politicians, interested in carving out a more active Japanese foreign policy role with a possible military component, seized upon potential international criticism as a reason to interpret Article 9 in ways that would permit Japan to send troops as part of the UN coalition. The resulting outcry from the public and opposition parties ultimately forced the Japanese government to dismiss this idea, damaging Japan’s standing in the international community. Despite spending $11 billion dollars to assist in the Gulf War, Japan suffered significant international embarrassment for its reluctance to send troops, even in non-combat roles.[4] Japan’s reluctance to send troops in 1991 disappointed U.S. leaders, and led to increased pressure from Washington for proactive defense policies. A joint declaration on security and new defense cooperation guidelines, along with increased focus on joint development of missile defense, were in part reactions to these increased demands from Washington.
Another factor that affected Japan’s policies was the emergence of China as a potential competitor in the region. Beijing’s military modernization emerged as an increasingly distressing issue for Japanese military policymakers. While bilateral relations between Japan and China improved with increased economic interdependence, policymakers in both countries continue to view each other as potential challengers. Both nations’ militaries rank in the top ten in the world, and many fear that a conflict between these regional rivals is inevitable. Japanese defense reports, including annual Defense White Papers dating from the late 1990s, expressed concern about Beijing’s increased military spending, and missile and naval developments. Beijing, likewise, was highly suspicious of any strengthening of Japanese military capabilities, particularly moves to broaden the SDF’s mandate or increase participation in ballistic missile defense arrangements. Although the potential tension between Beijing and Tokyo has been sidelined by increased attention on North Korea, long-term defense planning for Japan will continue to monitor and react to the growth of Chinese power.
Nuclear Policy and Public Opinion
Over the last 50 years, Japan’s political debate has been particularly sensitive to the issue of nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, many political leaders balked at forswearing Japan’s nuclear option or limiting the U.S. military’s ability to place nuclear assets within Japanese border. However, the Japanese public and a large number of politicians’ antipathy for nuclear weapons made the issue a political liability for the more hawkish elements of Japan’s government. In reaction to public pressure, Prime Minister Sato (widely considered a hawk) declared in 1967 Japan’s Three Non-nuclear Principles, pledging not to possess, produce, nor permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. On the surface, the new policy was a victory for the predominantly anti-nuclear public. However, Sato later tempered the ban to not preclude future circumstances when nuclear weapons might be necessary, and remained ambiguous regarding whether the principles would apply to U.S. nuclear assets on Japanese soil or in Japanese waters.[5] In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a secret commission established by Sato’s government concluded that while Japan had the ability to go nuclear, taking this route would be unwise from both a strategic and economic standpoint.[6]
Since ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976, Japan has played a key role in supporting the NPT regime, and has been a leading force in other nonproliferation regimes. Any support for a nuclear option within the Japanese political scene remained marginalized and Japanese government consistently demonstrated its resistance to “going nuclear.” However, with an advanced nuclear energy program and improving satellite launch capabilities, Japan possesses the technical capability to produce basic nuclear weapons and missiles in a relatively short time. Despite Japan’s nonproliferation credentials and assurances that it will never seek nuclear weapons, jittery neighbors view this latent capacity as a potential threat.
Current Security Challenges and Defense Policies
Since the mid-1990s, Japanese defense planners have gradually strengthened Japan’s conventional military capabilities. While concerns about China’s military modernization have influenced Japanese military planning, North Korea’s activities represented a more immediate threat, particularly after Pyongyang test fired missiles over Japanese territory in 1993 and 1998. The passive nature of Japan’s defense policies began to alter as the extent of North Korea’s missile program and potential nuclear capabilities became evident. An exchange of fire between Japanese coast guard vessels and a North Korean spy ship in 1999 further raised concerns. During this period, Japanese military planners and politicians became more supportive of ballistic missile defenses, as well as showing increased interest in conventional offensive capabilities and force projection capabilities.
After North Korea’s admission in October 2002 of the existence of a covert uranium enrichment program, the security situation in East Asia steadily deteriorated. A series of belligerent moves by Pyongyang, including naval cruise missiles tests, increased anxiety in Tokyo. As the deadlock over North Korea dragged on, and the looming threat to Japan became clearer, the government of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pushed more aggressively to strengthen Japan’s military options. Tokyo recognized that if hostilities were to break out over North Korea, Japan would be a likely target of North Korean Nodong missiles. The SDF would not be capable of defending against these missiles, and would have to rely on United States for protection.[7] This vulnerability became a key argument for policymakers, who insisted that Japan’s defense forces needed more flexibility to fulfill their mandate. Prior to the North Korean crisis, public opinion was sensitive to such prominent discussion about strengthening the military. However, a poll taken in March 2003 showed that an estimated 80 percent of Japan’s population considered North Korea a threat.[8] This helps explain why the Koizumi government has seen so little public backlash against its efforts to build up Japan’s defense capabilities.
A significant issue affecting the Japanese public’s attitudes towards North Korea is the emotional controversy surrounding North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens.[9] In September 2002, the North Korean government admitted that its operatives had kidnapped numerous Japanese citizens to use as language teachers for North Korean intelligence agents. While this admission and permission for surviving captives to visit Japan were meant as good-will gestures by the DPRK, the abductee issue has instead played a major role in turning Japanese public opinion against the Kim Jong Il regime. Despite recent North Korean attempts to sideline the discussion about abductees, the government of Japan has continued to link the abductee question with the resolution of the nuclear issues.[10] During the recent Six Party Talks, Japan pressed for this item to be placed on the multilateral agenda, and the Koizumi government has insisted that this issue be resolved before normalization talks can progress with North Korea.
Tokyo’s policies, including participation in the Six Party Talks, have supported a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis. However, Japan, unlike China and South Korea, has also expressed a willingness to use sanctions and pressure against Pyongyang if necessary. Japan’s Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba has pressed for a tougher security policy regarding the North, and stated in February 2003 that Japan would be justified in carrying out a pre-emptive strike if attack from the DPRK seemed imminent.[11] Heightened anxiety about the North Korea threat has muted both public and political reaction to comments such as Ishiba’s, and points to the strengthening of voices within the political and defense establishment that argue for a security-conscious agenda that directly challenges previous passive policies.[12]
Tokyo’s reaction to the September 11th terror attacks in the United States and the conflict in Iraq were recent turning points for Japan’s security policies, and illustrate the extent to which U.S. pressure influences Japanese policymaking. After September 2001, Japan made bold efforts to assist the U.S. led war on terror, including the dispatching of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) into the Indian Ocean to assist with operations in Afghanistan. The split in the international community over Iraq put Japan’s usually robust support for multilateral institutions to the test. Japan has historically been a strong supporter of multilateral organizations, such as the UN Security Council (UNSG), UNMOVIC, and the IAEA. However, when controversy arose in the Security Council about the use of force in Iraq, Tokyo supported the Bush administration. Despite public opposition to the war in Iraq, the Koizumi government chose not to risk alienating the United States at a critical junction in the North Korean crisis. Tokyo also did not want to repeat the diplomatic disaster that befell Japan after the 1991 Gulf War. This time around, Japan gave the United States concrete assistance, including dispatching an Aegis destroyer to assist U.S.-led forces and the prime minister’s personal lobbying of UNSC members to support a second resolution authorizing use of force.[13] Despite domestic opposition to U.S. actions in Iraq, Koizumi’s approval ratings were not significantly hurt by his pro-war stance.[14]
Moving Towards Pro-Active Policies?
As security dynamics in East Asia evolve, Japanese defense planners and policymakers continue to re-examine Japan’s defense strategy. Tokyo’s reaction to these security dynamics—and how these reactions are perceived by Japan’s neighbors—could have an enduring effect on East Asian security. The transformation occurring in Japan’s defense thinking has also affected discussions on the once taboo subjects of offensive capabilities and nuclear weapons development. While the Japanese public (and the majority of politicians) still opposes moves toward offensive capabilities, especially nuclear capabilities, the fact that these conversations are occurring within the Japanese leadership is itself a radical change from the policy discussions of the last few decades.
Since the beginning of 2003, Koizumi’s government has used the shift in public sentiment to press for readjustments in Japan’s military policies. In June 2003, Koizumi pushed legislation through the Diet that widened the mandate of the SDF. The new legislation was the first since the drafting of the Japanese constitution in 1946 to detail specific measures to respond to actual or imminent attacks on Japan. Opposition parties claimed that the legislation was too ambiguous and potentially defied Japan’s pacifist constitution. However, support from the two largest parties allowed the motion to pass overwhelmingly.[15] This legislation was followed by Diet approval for sending of 1,000 troops to Iraq assist with reconstruction efforts. On the procurement side, the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) has requested funding to build or acquire a helicopter carrier, ballistic missile defenses, and air-refueling tankers.
As was true in the Cold War, Japan’s sense of security reflects the degree of confidence Tokyo has in the U.S. commitment to protect Japan. Therefore, faith in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or lack thereof, has a far-reaching influence on Japan’s evolving security doctrines. Increased U.S. force commitments in other parts of the world and plans for decreasing the number of troops stationed in East Asia have many defense analysts in Japan wondering—similar to the concerns expressed in 1970—whether the U.S. commitment to Japan’s security could be fading.[16] If this uncertainty spurs a push for self-reliance within the Japanese government, efforts to strengthen Japan’s military forces are likely to increase.
Potential proliferation of nuclear weapons has also influenced shifts in Japan’s attitude toward defense. Japan’s support of the nuclear nonproliferation regime is tied to the belief that the NPT has played a vital role in ensuring Japan’s national security. The existence of a credible, universally accepted treaty curtailed the development of nuclear weapons by nations that had the latent capacity to construct their own arsenals. With these nations dissuaded from developing nuclear weapons, Japan felt sufficiently secure to abide by the Three Non-nuclear Principles. However, with the nuclear nonproliferation regime in danger, some politicians in Japan are rethinking the logic of adhering to anti-nuclear pledges in the long-term.
Japan is poised to make decisions that will have long-term ramifications on its standing in the international community, as well on future security developments in the region. In the past Japan has made regional concerns about possible remilitarization an important factor in its security policies. However, as concerns over North Korea and China’s military development become more pressing, the opinions of other countries are likely to play less of a role. If pro-military factions are able to push their agenda through, Japan’s security policy could change significantly in coming years. Many Asian countries still distrust Japan’s intentions and suspect that current military constraints are superficial. This reflects a chronic fear in the region that Japan is more disposed to re-arming than it is willing to admit. Tokyo’s policies towards offensive capabilities would therefore have an immediate effect on the defense policies of neighboring countries. The result could be a regional arms race or other forms of insecurity and conflict.
Conclusion
As Japan looks towards the future, it sees increasing uncertainties about security in the Northeast Asia region. Implications of a nuclear North Korea, rising Chinese economic and military power, and questions about the future of the U.S.-Japan security alliance all create uncertainties about Japan’s future security policy. Although pacifist sentiments are still politically relevant, the Japanese public and politicians have begun to show a new willingness to discuss security challenges openly and to consider more active defense policies. Some security analysts have begun to stress that Japan may need to keep its nuclear options open in the event of negative long-term security developments. Japan is unlikely to develop nuclear weapons, but Tokyo will continue to gradually improve Japan’s military capabilities and ability to act with more autonomy from the United States. The limited public reaction to the Koizumi government’s recent defense moves suggests that Japanese security policies can be adjusted to meet future defense challenges. However, any changes are likely to occur slowly and cautiously, with anti-nuclear and pacifist principles continuing to exercise a restraining role.
Sources:
[1] Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan’s Search for
Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1983-84), p.
154.
[2] Raymond F. Wylie, “The U.S.-Japanese Security
Relationship,” in Paul Gordon Lauren and Raymond F. Wylie ed., Destinies
Shared: U.S.-Japanese Relations (Boulder: Westview Press 1989), p. 58.
[3] Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense
Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 10-11.
[4] In 1991, the current Japanese Foreign
Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi was posted to the Embassy in Washington, DC. Many
other top advisors to the Koizumi administration were also in key policy
positions during the first Gulf War. In an article posted on Japan Today
by Shigeru Abe, Kawaguchi recalls the feelings she had the day she read an
advertisement by the Kuwaiti government thanking the nations that contributed to
Kuwait’s liberation, with Japan notably missing from the list. As another
official continued, “We don’t want to go through with the same thing a second
time.” Shigeru Abe, “Gulf War ‘trauma’ haunts Japan,”
Japan Today, March 15, 2003,
http://www.japantoday.com.
[5]
Hans M. Kristensen, Japan Under the Nuclear Umbrella: U.S. Nuclear Weapons
and Nuclear War Planning in Japan During the Cold War, A Working Paper for
the Nautilus Institute, July 1999, pp. 17-19.
[6] Matake Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or
Coming Soon?” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2002, Vol. 26, Iss. 1.
Kamiya writes: “according to the advisory group, the financial burden of
nuclearization would be enormous, and public support for such a program was
unlikely.”
[7]
“Japan’s Diplomacy Being Called into Question; SDF Stands at Turning Point,”
Kyodo Clue II, April 30, 2003, in FBIS JPP20030502000022.
[8]
“Koizumi Approval Rating Stays Above 40% Despite Support for Iraq War,”
Sankei Shimbun (Internet Version), March 24, 2003 on FBIS
JPP20030324000020.
[9] Katsu Furukawa, “Japan’s View of the Korea
Crisis,” North Korea Special Collection, Center for Nonproliferation
Studies,
http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/korea/jpndprk.htm.
[10]
Matake Kamiya, “A Disillusioned Japan Confronts North Korea,”
Arms Control Today, May 2003,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_05/kamiya_may03.asp.
[11]
“Japan Warns Of First Strike,” Washington Post, February 14, 2003, p. 27.
[12] “True Intent of ‘Attack Enemy Base
Argument’ – Accelerating ‘Neo Defense Clique’ Type Argument,” Tokyo AERA,
April 14, 2003, in FBIS JPP20030415000079.
[13]
“Tokyo in Dilemma Over Aegis Ships,” Asahi Shimbun, March 29, 2003 on
FBIS JPP20030329000046; and “Japan Begins Full Efforts To Urge UNSC Nations To
Vote for Resolution on Iraq,” Kyodo Clue II, March 10, 2003 on FBIS
JPP20030317000129. According to the Asahi Shimbun report the Aegis
destroyer was meant to escort and protect Japanese ships supplying fuel to
vessels from the United States, the United Kingdom and other allied countries.
[14] According to a poll taken in March of 2003
by the Asahi Shimbun, 65 percent of the Japanese population did not
support U.S. actions in Iraq. See Brad Glosserman, “U.S. – Japan Relations: How
High is Up?” Comparative Connections, (A Quarterly E-Journal on East
Asian Bilateral Relations), Vol 5., No. 1 (First Quarter 2003), p. 18.
[15] Akio Mori, “Accord Paves Way for Enhanced
Security,” Yomiuri Shimbun (Internet English Edition), May 15, 2003
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp.
[16]
Howard W. French, “Japan Faces Burden: Its Own Defense,”
New York Times, July 21, 2003.
Relevant Resources
Websites
Articles and Reports
 |
Katsu Furukawa, “Japan’s View of the Korea Crisis,” Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, |
|
|
Matake Kamiya, “A Disillusioned Japan Confronts
North Korea,”
Arms Control Today, May 2003,
|
|
|
Japan Special Weapons Guide,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/ |
|
|
Yuri Kase, “The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s
Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report” The
Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2001,
http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol08/ |
|
|
Hans Kristensen, “Japan Under the US Nuclear
Umbrella,” The Nautilus Institute, July 1999
http://www.nautilus.org/nukepolicy/ |
Official Documents and Reports
|
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White Paper: Defense of Japan 2002 (Summary), http://www.jda.go.jp/e/pab/wp2002/. |
|
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Atomic Energy Basic Law,
http://www.jnc.go.jp/kaihatu/hukaku/english/ |
|
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Japan’s Disarmament Policy (MOFA),
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/ |
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been
independently verified by NTI or its directors,
officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.
