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Issue Brief
Akaki Dvali, Graduate Research Assistant
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
Monterey Institute of International Studies
March 2004
In the course of the last decade, concerns that Saudi Arabia would seek to acquire nuclear weapons have arisen periodically. These concerns have largely been driven by Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical situation, which some analysts suggest gives the country a number of strong incentives to develop its own nuclear arsenal. However, no solid evidence has yet appeared in open source material demonstrating that Saudi Arabia is seeking nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, these concerns merit reexamination in the wake of the recent revelations about the proliferation activities of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the former head of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. Khan sold or offered nuclear weapons technology to several Middle Eastern states, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. No direct evidence has emerged confirming that Khan made similar offers to Saudi Arabia, but longstanding suspicions of nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are cause for continued concern.
Saudi Arabia has several reasons to consider acquiring nuclear weapons: the current volatile security environment in the Middle East; its ambition to dominate the region; and the growing number of states (particularly Iran and Israel) with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the region. According to the British newspaper The Guardian, for example, Saudi Arabia worries about an alleged Iranian nuclear program and the absence of any international pressure on Israel (estimated to have up to 200 nuclear devices) to disarm.[1] Richard L. Russell, a research associate at Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, also mentions the insecurity and regional proliferation of WMD as a major motivation for Riyadh’s steps toward procuring a nuclear deterrent. Russell notes Saudi Arabia’s clandestine purchase of long-range CSS-2 ballistic missiles (capable of delivering nuclear weapons) from China in the 1980s as an indication of Saudi ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons.[2] Also, given the Saudi’s growing hostilities toward the United States and the evident deterioration of U.S.-Saudi security ties, particularly after the September 11 terrorist attacks, it is likely that the Saudi government would consider alternative security arrangements, including a nuclear option.
King Fahd with Crown Prince Abdullah receiving
Chinese President Jiang Zemin in 1999
In September 2003, an article in The Guardian alleged serious efforts on the
part of the Saudis to acquire nuclear weapons.[1] The Guardian referred to a
strategy paper, supposedly considered at the highest levels in Riyadh, that set
out three options for maintaining national security:
1. acquiring a nuclear capability as a deterrent;
2. maintaining or entering into an alliance with an existing nuclear power that
would offer protection; and
3. trying to reach a regional agreement for a nuclear-free Middle East.[1]
According to The Guardian article, the discussion of the strategy paper was triggered by the current instability in the Middle East, Riyadh’s estrangement from Washington, and the subsequent weakening of its reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.[1] However, the day after the article came out, the Saudi government forcefully denied all allegations put forward by the newspaper. The Saudi Embassy in Washington reacted to the reports, and called them “baseless and totally false.”[3] Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Prince Turki Bin-Muhammad also dismissed the allegations and noted that the Kingdom has always been known for its position in support of making the Middle East region free of weapons of mass destruction.[4] Initiatives to establish a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East have been discussed since 1974. Since that time, several resolutions have been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly urging countries to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and place all nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Saudi Arabia also joined the coalition of countries demanding a NWFZ in the Middle East, and in May 1999, Ambassador Fazvi A. Shobokshi, Saudi Arabia’s permanent representative to the United Nations, officially declared the Kingdom’s interest in efforts to eliminate WMD from the region. However, in his statement, Shobokshi raised concerns over Israel’s refusal to cooperate in these efforts, and stressed that Israel was the only country undermining initiatives for the establishment of the NWFZ in the Middle East. This statement indicates Saudi Arabia’s serious concerns about Israel’s nuclear capabilities.[5]
Although Saudi officials denied the allegations in The Guardian article about Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions, according to Simon Henderson, a London-based associate of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Guardian report had merit. Henderson claims that the report was based on comments at a meeting that was held during a three-day international symposium on “Saudi Arabia, Britain, and the Wider World” organized by the Oxford Center for Islamic Studies. The 29 invited participants at the symposium included the author of The Guardian report, three princes from the Saudi royal family, a Saudi government minister, and two members of the Saudi consultative council. According to Henderson, the Saudi participants discussed the information that formed the basis for The Guardian article on Saudi Arabia’s nuclear options, and the accuracy of The Guardian story was later confirmed by one of the meeting participants.[6]
King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz
The allegations that The Guardian put forward in September 2003 are not really new. Rumors about Riyadh’s possible nuclear ambitions have circulated on several other occasions over the past decade. However, they were not given much attention, possibly because of the absence of evidence of Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. According to Saudi defector Mohammed Khilevi, who was first secretary of the Saudi mission to the United Nations until July 1994, Riyadh has sought a bomb since 1975.[7] Khilevi produced documents in support of his charges that between 1985-1990, the Saudi government paid up to five billion dollars to Saddam Hussein to build a nuclear weapon. According to Khilevi, these payments were made on the condition that some of the bombs be transferred to a Saudi arsenal if the Iraqi project were successful.[8] Khilevi also claimed that Saudi Arabia had provided financial contributions to the Pakistani nuclear program, and had signed a secret agreement that obligated the Pakistani government to provide positive security assurances to Saudi Arabia.[8] Citing UN officials, The Guardian also mentions past rumors (dating back 20 years) that the Saudis wanted to pay Pakistan to do research and development on nuclear weapons.[1]
The recent revelations about the black market nuclear technology network led by Dr. A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, increase the probability that suspicions about Saudi nuclear arrangements are credible. In early February 2004, Khan publicly confessed that he had transferred nuclear technologies and know-how to several countries, including Iran, Libya, and North Korea.[9,10] Unconfirmed reports also mention that Khan developed some ties with Syria and Iraq; reportedly those countries rejected Khan’s offer as they mistrusted his intentions.[11] Although Khan stated that his motivation for nuclear proliferation was ideological, it is widely believed that Khan’s activities were motivated by profit.[9,12,13] Given these facts, it is reasonable to suspect that Khan developed ties with Riyadh, which would have been capable of paying for all kinds of nuclear-related services. However, to date, reports have only suggested but not confirmed that Saudi Arabia was among the countries that received Khan’s nuclear assistance.
Even before the revelations about Khan’s activities, concerns about Saudi-Pakistani nuclear cooperation persisted, largely due to strengthened cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In particular, the frequent high-level visits of Saudi and Pakistani officials during the last several years raised questions about the extent of Saudi-Pakistani cooperation in defense matters and possible clandestine nuclear cooperation between the two countries. For example, in May 1999, a Saudi Arabian defense team, headed by the Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz visited Pakistan’s highly restricted uranium enrichment and missile assembly factory, a visit that prompted a formal diplomatic complaint from the U.S. government. Reportedly, Prince Sultan was also briefed by Dr. A.Q. Khan.[1,8,14] Khan also visited Saudi Arabia in November 1999 to attend a symposium, “Information Sources on the Islamic World.” The following week, Dr. Saleh al-Athel, president of King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology, visited Pakistan to work out the details for cooperation in the fields of engineering, electronics, and computer science.[8] In 2003, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf paid a visit to Saudi Arabia, and Pakistani Prime Minister Mir Zafrallah Khan Jamali visited the Kingdom twice.[6] It is believed that the United States warned Pakistan several times not to provide nuclear assistance to Saudi Arabia.[6]
Concerns over possible Saudi-Pakistani nuclear cooperation intensified after the October 22-23, 2003 visit of Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz to Pakistan. In connection with this visit, the Washington Times reported that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia concluded a secret agreement on nuclear cooperation, which would provide the Saudis with nuclear-weapons technology in exchange for cheap oil.[14] However, the main allegation regarding this visit was made by Major-General Aharon Zeevi, a senior intelligence officer of the Israeli defense forces, who said that the Saudis had gone to Islamabad with the intention of buying Pakistani warheads, to be placed on Saudi land-based missiles.[15] These claims were vigorously denied by both the Saudi and Pakistani governments. Ahmad Khan, spokesman for the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, called the allegations a “figment of somebody’s imagination,” and part of a disinformation campaign against Pakistan. He added that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent is for defensive purposes only and is directed towards India.[16] Saudi Arabia has also denied Zeevi’s claim. According to Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, no military agreements were concluded between the two countries.[14]
Although events and allegations periodically raise international concerns about a possible Saudi nuclear weapons program, the lack of solid open-source evidence makes it difficult to draw decisive conclusions. However, the current geopolitical situation in the Middle East and some disclosed facts (such as Khan’s nuclear black market activities and the unexpected progress of Iran’s and Libya’s nuclear programs) fuel speculations about Riyadh’s possible nuclear arrangements and make certain allegations more credible.
Sources:
[1] Ewen MacAskill and Ian Traynor, “Saudis Consider Nuclear Bomb,” Guardian
Unlimited online edition, 18 September 2003,
www.guardian.co.uk.
[2] Richard L. Russell, “A Saudi Nuclear Option?” Survival, Vol. 42, No.
2 (Summer 2001), pp. 69-79.
[3] “No plans to acquire nukes: Saudis,” News.com.au online edition,
http://www.news.com.au/common/story_page/ 0,4057,7310684%255E1702,00.html.
[4] “Official Says Kingdom ‘Prepared’ to Answer IAEA Questions,” 22 September
2003; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.
[5] Statement by H.E. Amb. Fawzi A. Shobokshi, Permanent Representative of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations,
www.nuclearfiles.org/
hinonproliferationtreaty/99-npt-me-sarabia.html.
[6] Simon Henderson, “Towards a Saudi Nuclear Option: The Saudi Pakistani
Summit,” Columbia International Affairs Online Website,
www.ciaonet.org/pbei/winep/policy_2003/2003_793/.
[7] “Saudi Arabia country profile,” Federation of American Scientists Website,
http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/saudi_arabia.htm.
[8] “Saudi Arabia Special Weapons,” GlobalSecurity.org Website,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/saudi/index.html.
[9] Matthew Pennington, “Pakistan nuclear expert gave info to Iran, others,”
WCNC.com Website,
http://www.wcnc.com/sharedcontent/nationworld/
worldprint/020204ccjcintnuclear.766c3ac1.html.
[10] Owais Tohid, “Pakistani nuclear scientist confesses to sharing secrets,”
The Christian Science Monitor online edition, 2 February 2004,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0202/p07s02-wosc.html.
[11] Robert Windrem, “Pakistani nuclear ‘father’s’ offer to Saddam,” MSNBC News
online edition, 4 February 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4163638.
[12] “Khan’s illicit nuclear network said to span globe,” Planet ARK online
edition, 10 February 2004,
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/
23754/newsDate/10-Feb-2004/story.htm.
[13] “Founder of Pakistan’s nuclear programme admits leaking secrets,” MCN
International online edition, 2 February 2004,
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/
afp_asiapacific/view/69131/1/.html.
[14] Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in secret nuke pact,” The
Washington Times online edition, 22 October 2003,
www.washtimes.com/world/20031021-112804-8451r.htm.
[15] David R. Sands, “Israeli general says Saudis seek to buy Pakistani nukes,”
The Washington Times online edition, 23 October 2003,
www.washtimes.com/world/20031022-113729-8359r.htm.
[16] “Pakistan denies nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia,” Japan Economic
Newswire, 21 October 2003; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http://www.lexisnexis.com.
Relevant Resources
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Ewen MacAskill and Ian Traynor, “Saudis Consider Nuclear Bomb,”
Guardian Unlimited online edition, 18 September 2003,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/saudi/story/0% |
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“Saudi Arabia Special Weapons,” GlobalSecurity.org Website,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/ |
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Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in secret nuke pact,”
The Washington Times online edition, 22 October 2003,
http://www.washtimes.com/world/20031021- |
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Stephen Blank, “Saudi Arabia’s nuclear gambit,” AsiaTimes online
edition, 7 November 2003,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/ |
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Naef Bin Ahmed Al-Saud, “Underpinning Saudi National Security Strategy,”
Defense Technical Information Center Website,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/ |
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Gaurav Kampani, “Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan,” The Center for Nonproliferation Studies Website, http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm. |
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Michael A. Levi, “Would the Saudis Go Nuclear?” The Brookings
Institution Website,
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/ |
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been
independently verified by NTI or its directors,
officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.
