Media Advisory, Arms Control Association, October 2007
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Arms Control Association (ACA) experts called the Oct. 3 agreement in the six-party talks for disabling North Korea’s core nuclear facilities a “another positive step leading North Korea in the right direction—toward denuclearization.” ACA is a non-partisan, independent organization working in support of effective arms control policies.

Arms Control Association, October 2007
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After four days of negotiations and several additional days of deliberations, six countries on Oct. 3 reached agreement on a number of additional actions to advance a September 2005 joint statement and a Feb. 13 initial agreement. They “agreed to push forward the Six-Party talks process” whose goal is “the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a useful manner.”

Peter Crail, Arms Control Association, October 2007
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Since news reports surfaced regarding the Sept. 6 incursions of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) into Syrian airspace, numerous theories have emerged regarding the intent and results of the reported raid. The most serious and most questionable allegation is that the purpose of the IAF flights is related to North Korean assistance for a Syrian nuclear weapons program. Damascus has called claims of nuclear cooperation with North Korea “fabricated and groundless accounts that have no value whatsoever,” and Pyongyang has dismissed them as “preposterous misinformation.”

Peter Crail, Arms Control Association, September 2007
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In July, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that North Korea has shut down five facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon associated with Pyongyang’s plutonium-based nuclear weapons program. The shutdown was the primary step in the first phase of a Feb. 13 agreement intended to lead to North Korea’s denuclearization. The six-party talks are now focused on discussing the implementation of the second phase of that agreement.

Joel S. Wit, The Washington Quarterly, Spring, 2007
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The 2006 stalemate at the six-party talks, coming after North Korea’s missile tests and its first nuclear detonation, was a sign that U.S. policy was failing. Hamstrung by bureaucratic bickering, unable to build a cohesive multilateral coalition in support of its efforts, and unwilling to engage in serious negotiations with Pyongyang, Washington faced the real prospect of a North Korea armed with a small but growing nuclear deterrent. The Bush administration said that it would never accept a nuclear North Korea, but because of its policies, it seemed to have no choice.

Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, March, 2007
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In January, China for the first time used a weapon to destroy one of its satellites. Beijing says its feat was not hostile, but it polluted space with a huge amount of potentially harmful debris and sparked debate over China’s professed desire to prevent a space arms race. China Jan. 11 demolished an aging weather satellite, the Feng Yun-1C, orbiting Earth at an altitude of approximately 850 kilometers. The satellite disintegrated when struck by a projectile carried into space by a ballistic missile launched from the Xichang space launch facility in southwestern China.

Press Release, Arms Control Association, February 13, 2007
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Arms Control Association (ACA) experts called the multilateral agreement reached earlier today with North Korea a "long overdue and essential first step toward reducing the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program."

Donald G. Gross, CSIS, January 15, 2007
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North Korea made good on its long-time threat to conduct a nuclear test when it exploded a small nuclear device of less than a kiloton on Oct. 9. The test generated political shock waves and led to comprehensive sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council Oct. 14. Under tremendous pressure from the international community and China, in particular, North Korea announced Oct. 31 it would return to the Six-Party Talks.

Paul Kerr, Arms Control Association, December, 2006
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Several weeks after North Korea’s early October announcement that it had successfully tested a nuclear device, new information is emerging about the test and Pyongyang’s plutonium-based nuclear weapons program. Still, much uncertainty remains about the status and scope of that program and a suspected North Korean uranium-enrichment program.

Nuclear Weapons Archive October 25, 2006
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An overview of North Korea's Nuclear program from its inception through the resent nuclear test. The article then provides and in-depth look at the nuclear test itself.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in collaboration with the Henry L. Stimson Center, October 12, 2006  
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A discussion prompted by the apparent North Korea nuclear test entitled “Next steps on North Korea: Options Beyond Sanctions” with Randy Schriver, a founding partner of Armitage International LLC and a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and Alan D. Romberg, Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center. Carnegie Senior Associate Michael Swaine moderated the discussion.

Marcus Noland, Asian Policy Number 2, July 2006
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This essay analyzes the economic implications that a North Korean nuclear test would have on Northeast Asia. Main Argument - A North Korean nuclear test would likely have a negative, though non-catastrophic, economic impact on the region.

Bruce W. Bennett, RAND, 2006  
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At the request of Republic of Korea (ROK) Assemblyman Jin-Ha Hwang, a member of the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee, this analysis was performed of the ROK Defense Reform Plan (DRP). It examines the overall nature of the DRP, identifies major risks in the plan, and discusses how those risks can be managed. It concludes that the DRP is a good approach to potential ROK security dilemmas, but the plan faces major risks, especially in meeting potential ROK security requirements. The DRP could be strengthened by adding concepts for managing its major risks. This paper discusses the background of the DRP and the manpower problem it needs to address. It then presents the author’s estimates of the force changes that would occur and how those forces appear to fit the force requirements the ROK will likely face in the coming years. It examines the budget requested for the DRP and whether it will cover the necessary costs, addresses the effects that the DRP could have on ROK military morale and how the United States may view the DRP, and concludes by recommending steps the ROK could take to manage the key risks identified throughout this analysis.

Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen May/June 2006  
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China continues to modernize its nuclear forces, though its recent developments are less dramatic than many analyses have suggested. There continues to be a number of substantial unknowns about the composition of China's future forces, including if and how it will respond to the U.S. deployment of a ballistic missile defense system.

David Albright and Paul Brennan, Institute for Science and International Security, June 26, 2006
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This report is the latest in a series by ISIS examining North Korea’s existing plutonium production activity and providing our assessment of its current stocks of separated plutonium. This type of plutonium is weapons useable and provides an indication of the size of North Korea’s nuclear weapons arsenal.

Bong-Geun Jun, Arms Control Today, January/February 2006
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After 25 months and on-and-off negotiations, the six party talks finally produced a milestone joint statement on September 19, stipulating goals and principles leading to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Yet, as the failure of a subsequent November round to achieve significant progress makes clear, this is only the beginning of another long journey full of surprises and uncertainties. 

Alex Bollfrass, Arms Control Association, September 2007
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On his state visit to Libya, French President Nicolas Sarkozy signed a memorandum of understanding on nuclear energy cooperation with long-time Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi. The July 25 memorandum clears the way for French access to Libyan uranium and outlines an agreement on the eventual construction of a nuclear desalination plant to provide drinking water to the littoral desert country.

Paul Rodgers, Global Security, June 29, 2006 
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The determination of Britain's political elite to maintain the country as a nuclear-weapons state is rooted in a half-century of military planning to which the possibility of tactical and first use of nuclear weapons is central.

Editorial Essay by Rebecca Johnson, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 82, Spring 2006 
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Does Britain need to invest some £20-25 billion in a new generation of nuclear weapons? Those advocating a nuclear follow-on to Trident gave as their main argument that the future was "unknowable", that unexpected military threats could emerge, and that nuclear weapons were needed as Britain's "insurance policy". In effect, they are saying that there is no need for nuclear weapons now, but one day there might be.

Rebecca Johnson, Arms Control Association, April 2006 
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The British government is expected to decide on the fate of its nuclear weapons program sometime before 2010. Britain's current Trident system is expected to cease to be operational by the early 2020's, and therefore would require an extension of the service life or an entire new system altogether. The author surveys the ongoing debate as to the direction the British government is likely to take, while commenting on the prospects for  a path towards a non-nuclear defense policy.

Malcolm Dando, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, January 2006 
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It is well known that a number of states have pursued programs intended to develop agents with specific effects on the nervous system of a quite different order from traditional (irritant) riot control agents. For example the United States weaponized BZ in the 1960's and Iraq was reported to have a psychoactive agent, Agent 15, in the 1990's. Furthermore an agent (or agents) of this type were used were used to break the Moscow theatre hostage crisis in late 2001. The intention here is to concentrate  on the program carried out in the United Kingdom during the 1960's, since much of the recent documentation has recently become available.   

Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association, November 2007
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Nearly two months after Israel’s Sept. 6, 2007 raid on a facility in Northern Syria, there is suggestive but ultimately inconclusive evidence that it may have been a small reactor still under construction. Opponents of the six-party process toward the verifiable denuclearization of North Korea are suggesting that possible North Korean involvement may provide reason for a shift in policy regarding the six-party talks and the implementation of the steps outlined in the October 3 joint statement.

Daryl G. Kimball and Peter Crail, Arms Control Association, November 2007
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International efforts to persuade Iran to restrain its nuclear program have fallen short, leaving Tehran to continue expanding its nuclear program, particularly its uranium enrichment activities. Later this month, the permanent five members of the Security Council plus Germany will consider an additional sanctions resolution to persuade Iran to suspend its nuclear efforts. For analyses, recommendations, and background information on Iran’s nuclear program, please visit the following resources from the independent Arms Control Association (ACA).

Alex Bollfrass, Arms Control Association, July/August 2007
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Vowing to take sole responsibility for destroying its chemical weapons, Libya has annulled its contract with the United States. The Libyan government cancelled the agreement, effective June 14, because of dissatisfaction with its provisions on liability, financing, and facility ownership.

Paul Kerr, Arms Control Association, March, 2007
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Iran has continued to advance its nuclear program in defiance of a December 2006 UN Security Council resolution, according to a Feb. 22 report from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei. The agency’s Board of Governors is to discuss the report at its next meeting, which begins March 5.

Paul Kerr, Arms Control Association, March, 2007
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Senior officials from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany agreed Feb. 26 in London to draft a new council resolution that could impose additional nonmilitary sanctions on Iran. Discussions were preliminary, however, and the six countries did not lay out a specific course of action.

Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, March, 2007
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The Department of State recently informed Congress that Israeli use of U.S.-origin cluster munitions in Lebanon last summer might have broken U.S. export rules. Washington has yet to announce if it will take any action against its close ally, but some lawmakers are proposing new U.S. cluster munitions export and use policies.

Sergej Mahnovski, Kamiljon T. Akramov, Theodore W. Karasik, RAND, January 19, 2007
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This report assesses the economic dimensions of security in post-Soviet Central Asia and considers their implications for the role of the United States. The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States led to the realization among policymakers that instability, failed and failing states, and economic and political underdevelopment present security concerns not just to the states that suffer directly from these problems but to the global community as a whole.

Paul Kerr, Arms Control Association, January 19, 2007
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The UN Security Council Dec. 23 responded to Iran’s continued failure to comply with its demands by raising the stakes, unanimously approving a new resolution limiting Tehran’s ability to obtain materials that could aid its nuclear and missile programs. So far, Tehran has indicated that it will not bow to Security Council demands, although Iranian officials maintain they are willing to negotiate about their controversial gas centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment program.

Paul Kerr, Arms Control Association, December, 2006
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Iran continues to advance its nuclear programs even as diplomatic efforts to contain it continue, according to a Nov. 14 report from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei to the agency’s Board of Governors. ElBaradei also reported that investigators have not been able to make progress in their investigation of Tehran’s nuclear activities for months, although Iran promised some renewed cooperation with the agency in late November.

Paul Kerr, Arms Control Assosiation, November, 2006
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Following a late and inconclusive round of diplomacy between officials from the European Union and their Iranian counterparts, new efforts to try to restrain Iran’s nuclear program are underway in the UN Security Council. The Security Council’s five permanent members met Oct. 26 to discuss a draft resolution. The new resolution would impose punitive measures on Iran for its failure to comply with Resolution 1696, passed in July, which calls on Iran to take several steps, including suspending work on its uranium-enrichment program.

Sanam Vakil, Washington Quarterly, Autumn, 2006
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Iran has searched for and found partners willing to accept its nefarious activities and willing to deal with it on a quid pro quo basis. Iran's carefully cultivated relationships with China, Russia, and India are providing it with the economic and political coverage that it could never obtain from the West.

Center for Strategic and international Studies, September 19, 2006
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Iran's actions in the last year have unsettled many around the world, provoking an active and rich debate as to how nations should best respond. Embedded in this debate are widely divergent assumptions, assessments, and conclusions about Iranian intentions and Iranian actions. To add clarity and intellectual rigor to this debate, CSIS has prepared a list of issues — "20 questions" — intended to highlight these points of divergence.

Dr. Farhang Jahanpour, Oxford Research Group, July 2006
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In the third of a series of occasional ORG briefing papers from key international commentators and experts, Farhang Jahanpour explores the rhetoric of aggression developing between Iran and the USA and Israel, and asks if war is really inevitable?

Ronald Bruce St John, Program of International Security, March 2006
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Bruce St John’s paper examines the current state of US-Libyan relations giving due credit to the vast improvement that has occurred while also noting remaining obstacles. To overcome these, he offers a set of suggestions on how the normalization process may be completed to mutual benefit.

James E. Doyle and Sara Kutchesfahani, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2006
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This paper explores Iran's logic in its nuclear ambitions. It also argues that a rapprochement between the Iranians and the Americans is possible, with a change of policy from both sides. Furthermore, this paper explains how an opportunity exists for the European Union to play an effective role as a catalyst in normalizing U.S.-Iran relations. 

Charles D. Ferguson and Ray Takeyh, Arms Control Association, March 2006
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The authors discuss the urgency for a new approach to the Iranian nuclear deadlock. The approach treats Iran's perception of its security as a significant contributor to the impasse and suggests ways in which to overcome these concerns. 

Paul Rogers, Oxford Research Group, February 2006
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This briefing paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the likely nature of U.S. or Israeli military action that would be intended to disable Iran's nuclear capabilities. It outlines both the immediate consequences in terms of loss of human life, facilities and infrastructure, and also the likely Iranian responses, which would be extensive.   

Wade Boese , Arms Control Association, November 2007
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Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, July/August 2007
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Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 7 proposal to share radar data on missiles with the United States might be an earnest offer, a cynical ploy to undercut U.S. plans to base anti-missile systems in Europe, or both. Regardless, U.S. leaders say they will continue their current missile defense approach despite strong Russian opposition.

Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, June 2007
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President Vladimir Putin and other top Russian leaders recently ratcheted up warnings that Moscow might freeze or end participation in a treaty limiting conventional weapons in Europe if some long-running disputes with NATO are not soon resolved.

Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, March, 2007
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A U.S. bid to base anti-missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic is provoking strong reactions from Russia, including hints that it might abrogate a two-decade-old treaty restricting Russian missile holdings. Moscow has consistently opposed Washington’s proposal to base long-range ballistic missile interceptors in Europe since it first became public in 2004. (See ACT, July/August 2004.) But January revelations that Washington has approached Prague and Warsaw to start formal negotiations over deployment options have reinvigorated the Kremlin’s denunciations.

Joseph Ferguson, CSIS, January 15, 2007
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In a relatively quiet quarter for U.S.-Russia relations, the issues topping the bilateral agenda were trade, nuclear proliferation, and energy security. That nuclear proliferation and energy security were at the top of the list should come as no surprise. The big news was the announcement that the U.S. government had agreed in principle to Russia’s long-awaited accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin met twice during the quarter, a few days apart in Moscow and Hanoi. At their meetings the discussions centered on WTO, Iran, and North Korea. A surprise announcement by the Japanese foreign minister concerning the dispute over the Northern Territories caused a few ruffles in both Moscow and Tokyo, but the Japanese-Russian relationship returned again to its stagnant state by the end of the quarter.

Kenneth N. Luongo, Derek Averre, J. Raphael Della Ratta, Maurizio Martellini, Spring 2006
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In April 2005, RANSAC and LNCV held a meeting titled Advancing. International Cooperation on Bio-Initiatives in Russia and the CIS in Rome, Italy. The event was the second in a series of meetings on how to further cooperation between these governments and NGO's to prevent biological terrorism by promoting biosecurity, biosafety, and the involvement of commercial entities in key biological institutes.

Miles A. Pomper, Arms Control Today, November 2006  
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Russian officials are eager to work with the United States both to increase their share of the U.S. civil nuclear market and promote the worldwide growth of nuclear power. But to do so, they will first need to address nonproliferation and economic concerns voiced by U.S. officials and lawmakers.

By Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen March/April 2006  
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Russia continues to transition from its Cold War nuclear stockpile, further reducing its total nuclear forces in 2005 but also announcing plans for new weapon systems and upgrades of existing ones. The Russian government appears to be attempting to reassert its nuclear strength after years of decline in order to underscore its status as a powerful nation. To this end, President Vladimir Putin said Russia has reinstated large-scale military exercises, and military officials made several statements about the role of Russia's nuclear posture.

Daryl G. Kimball & Fred McGoldrick, Arms Control Association, August 3, 2007
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After months of contentious negotiations, the U.S. and Indian officials have concluded -- and released the text of -- a formal agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. The proposed agreement (also known as a "Section 123" agreement) would give India assurances of supply and advance consent to carry out sensitive nuclear activities that are unprecedented. These U.S. concessions compromise long-standing U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policies and give India, a country that has refused to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), preferential treatment that the United States has not even given to states that have assumed all the obligations and responsibilities of the NPT.

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This paper challenges the the notion that India has an impeccable nonproliferation record.  The authors claim to have uncovered a well developed, active and secret Indian program to outfit its uranium enrichment program and circumvent other countries' export control efforts. The paper concludes that Indian procurement methods for its nuclear program leak sensitive nuclear technology.