Ashton Carter, Michael May, and William Perry, The Washington Quarterly Autumn 2007
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Ever since the United States lost its monopoly on nuclear weapons in 1949, the possibility of a nuclear attack on U.S. soil has been regarded as the gravest of all imaginable threats to U.S. national security. Today, nonstate terrorist actors such as al Qaeda have pledged to carry out an “AmericanHiroshima” of a significantly greater magnitude than the attacks perpetrated against the United States on September 11, 2001.

Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, The Bulletin Online, October 23, 2007
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In a casual, often-irreverent tone, journalist William Langewiesche walked readers of the December 2006 issue of The Atlantic through the possibilities and hurdles associated with procuring the required material for a nuclear weapon, transporting it to a safe place, and assembling the bomb. With no ambitions to provide solutions to these questions, his article was a pretext to draw attention to the successes and failures of U.S. assistance to Russia and other former Soviet states in protecting fissile material, safeguarding borders, identifying trafficking routes, and exposing the involvement of local criminal groups.

Interviewed by Miles A. Pomper and Peter Crail, Arms Control Association, November 2007
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Since January 2006, Slovakian Ambassador Peter Burian has chaired a UN committee charged with examining the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540. Unanimously adopted in April 2004, Resolution 1540 requires all states to implement a variety of domestic measures to prevent nonstate actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related materials.

Graham Allison, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs
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Nuclear security expert Graham Allison gives a sobering assessment on why a nuclear attack on U.S. soil is inevitable unless we take immediate, well-concerted measures.

Martin C. Libicki, Peter Chalk, Melanie Sisson , RAND, March 2007
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Al Qaeda, the jihadist network personified by Osama bin laden, seeks a restored caliphate free of Western influence. It uses terror as its means. But how does terrorism serve the ends of al Qaeda? Understanding its strategic logic might suggest what U.S. targets it may seek to strike and why.

George Bunn, Arms Control Association, January 2007
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For a long time, how nuclear facilities were protected from terrorists and thieves has been largely the prerogative of the facilities themselves or individual governments.[1] But the September 11 terrorist attacks and statements by Osama bin Laden have raised new concerns about preventing terrorists from stealing or attacking nuclear material that is often not well protected. As a result, new international standards have been adopted, calling on states to provide stronger protection for nuclear material.

Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, December 2006
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Led by the United States and Russia, 13 countries recently promulgated eight general principles for averting and responding to nuclear terrorism. The group will meet in February to discuss further actions. The principles emerged from the inaugural Oct. 30-31 meeting in Rabat, Morocco, of the voluntary Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin announced the initiative in July on the eve of the Group of Eight (G-8) summit in St. Petersburg.

Charles Meade and Roger C. Molander, RAND, August 2006
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A quickly growing concern about terrorism is that a devastating attack would send social and economic aftershocks cascading through multiple sectors long after the initial strike was over. While much analysis has been done on the possible short-term effects of an attack of this magnitude, no work has investigated longer-term implication. Exploratory efforts to do so are needed.

Director General, IAEA, August 16, 2006
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The responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with each individual State. International legal instruments provide a strategic framework and a common platform for States to work together to enhance their collective nuclear security. A new international nuclear security framework is emerging based on obligations contained in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the relevant Security Council resolutions and the non-binding Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Sources and its Supplementary Guidance. The obligations in safeguards agreements are part of this framework.

Charles D. Ferguson, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2006
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A nuclear attack by terrorists against the United States has the potential to make the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, look like a historical footnote. In addition to the immediate horrific devastation, such an attack could cost trillions of dollars in damages, potentially sparking a global economic depression. Although, during the 2004 presidential campaign, President George W. Bush and Democratic challenger Senator John F. Kerry agreed that terrorists armed with nuclear weapons worried them more than any other national security threat, the U.S. government has yet to elevate nuclear terrorism prevention to the highest priority. Despite several U.S. and international programs to secure nuclear weapons and the materials to make them, major gaps in policy remain. This report makes clear what is needed to reduce the possibility of nuclear terrorism. It identifies where efforts have fallen short in securing and eliminating nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials, and it offers realistic recommendations to plug these gaps in the U.S. and international response. The result is a clear primer on a critical subject and a set of practical proposals that policymakers would be wise to consider carefully.

Henry Sokolski The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, January 2006
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By focusing as much as we do on the worst but most unlikely threats of rouge states, such as Iran and North Korea, possibly handing off their nuclear assets to terrorists, the US and many  of its key friends have distorted their anti nuclear terrorism policies.

Alexander Glaser and Frank N. von Hippel, Arms Control Today, January/February 2006
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The greatest opportunity for would be terrorists or countries seeking a quick bomb or two are poorly secured sites that contain significant quantities of HEU. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is the material of choice for terrorists or for states that seek to proliferate clandestinely without testing their weapons. The authors survey the issue and formulate a list of recommendations on how to lower the risk of diversion or theft of HEU.