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Graham S Pearson and Malcolm R Dando, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, November 2005
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This paper is part of the "Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention" series and analyzes recent developments on the international scene regarding the BWC.

Malcolm R. Dando and James Revill, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, November 2005
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This Briefing Paper examines how the States Parties to the BWC could convert the agreement on the importance of awareness raising among scientists into effective action. The first section of the paper outlines some of the tools available to raise awareness. The second section uses a study of oaths in the medical community to expand on the value of an ethical code, in the form of an oath taken en masse at graduation ceremonies, in raising awareness. The third section identifies the key principles that could form the content of an oath and then proceeds to discuss elements that could contribute to the promulgation of an oath. Finally, the paper concludes with some suggestions concerning methods to encourage and ensure adoption. The central proposal put forward is that a Hippocratic style oath for life scientists could be an efficient and effective means of beginning to raise awareness of the dangers of dual-use research amongst the life science community and thus be a useful first step in an overall programme of code development and implementation.

Jenifer Mackby and Ola Dahlman, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), October 2005
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This issue brief introduces the reader to the many challenges
of combating bioterrorism--from the conversion of the former Soviet bioweapon complex to biodefense strategies. The authors argue that the Global Partnership’s work in the biological field is minimal, and that dedicated resources do not yet match the urgency of the threat.

Neil Davison, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, October 2005
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This report addresses the scientific and technological discoveries in the biological sciences that enabled the early interest in biological warfare to move from hurling infected corpses into enemy cities in ancient times, through use of small cultures of animal pathogens to sabotage enemy livestock in World War I, to the origins of organised military biological weapons (BW) programmes directed at humans, animals, and plants in the inter-war period. It builds on Dando’s 1999 paper: The Impact of the Development of Modern Biology and Medicine on the Evolution of Offensive Biological Warfare Programs in
the Twentieth Century. For the historical aspects of biological warfare programmes this report primarily draws from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute volume:
Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and
Use from the Middle Ages to 1945.

Iris Hunger, The Sunshine Project, September  2005
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This report presents an overview of data submitted by states parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in the course of the annual information exchange, the so called Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). For the first time, the content of all submissions from 1987 to 2003 is systematically analysed, summarised and herewith made publicly available.

Edited by Ingrid Fängmark and Lena Norlander, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC), August 2005
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Means to reduce proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is of high priority for the international community and a number of measures have been taken already. The more
complex threat picture after the end of the cold war era has accentuated the demand for measures to monitor the observance of the chemical and biological conventions, in particular for countries outside the treaties and also because the biological weapons convention lacks a verification regime. Simple criteria, indicators, to systematically gather information and track changes have previously been discussed as conceivable tools for this purpose. This report presents an analysis of suitable indicators of various strengths, representative for the different stages of the development of a state-funded offensive capability. It also contains a brief
assessment of indicators for non-state actors.

M.J. Zuckerman, Carnegie Corporation of New York, August 2005
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What physicists accomplished by unlocking the atom in the mid-20th century and engineers did by revolutionizing information at the end of that century, the life sciences are doing with molecular biology and genetics at the dawn of the 21st century. Each great advance in technology, it seems, produces uniquely challenging consequences. Today, biotechnology is yielding life-enhancing breakthroughs at a thrilling pace. Yet, an elite community of scientists attending to these advances is issuing stern warnings that these powerful new tools may also give rise to fiercely destructive forces. This life-giving science, they insist, must be secured from abuse. Thus far, those who might be expected to respond—authorities of government, private business or the academic community—have reacted sluggishly, if at all, foisting this security policy conundrum onto a very few in the science and policy communities who recognize the vast rewards and potential dangers inherent in today’s life sciences.

Alexander Kelle, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, July 2005
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The possibility that terrorist organisations will not only seek to acquire and deploy biological weapons (BW), but will do so successfully, has increasingly preoccupied politicians and military planers alike. Especially in the United States of America, beginning in the mid- 1990s, has been a clear trend to upgrade bioterrorism in relation to other threats to US national security. If one conceives national defenses against BW and multilateral BW arms control measures as two sides of a coin in the currency with which to counter the BW threat, there clearly has been a shift in US thinking and policy, calling into question the old equilibrium between defenses and arms control measures. Triggered by the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system in March 1995 and the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995, “the potential terrorist use of biological agents in the United States … has swept the national security sector of official Washington.” However, it will be argued in this briefing paper, that the “sweeping effects” of the emergence of bioterrorism as the number one threat to US security – a trend that has been boosted by the events of September 11 and the anthrax letters sent through the US postal system in the fall of 2001 – have not been limited to the national security sector, but have led to the securitization of the public health sector and the biomedical research infrastructure in the United States as well.

Lawrence M. Wein, Yifan Liu, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, July 2005
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We developed a mathematical model of a cows-to-consumers supply chain associated with a single milk-processing facility that is the victim of a deliberate release of botulinum toxin. Because centralized storage and processing lead to substantial dilution of the toxin, a minimum amount of toxin is required for the release to do damage. Irreducible uncertainties regarding the dose-response curve prevent us from quantifying the minimum effective release. However, if terrorists can obtain enough toxin, and this may well be possible, then rapid distribution and consumption result in several hundred thousand poisoned individuals if detection from early symptomatics is not timely. Timely and specific in-process testing has the potential to eliminate the threat of this scenario at a cost of less than 1 cent per gallon and should be pursued aggressively. Investigation of improving the toxin inactivation rate of heat pasteurization without sacrificing taste or nutrition is warranted. Besides raising a counter-terrorism policy issue--how milk might be better protected--the study reopened debate over how research publications can best guard against security risks while furthering the pursuit of knowledge. The National Academy of Sciences was set to publish the milk study in its journal "Proceedings" when the Department of Health and Human Services asked that the article be withheld, as it presented "a roadmap for terrorists."

Luciana L. Borio, Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, July 2005
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The U.S. government does not yet have the range of medical countermeasures needed to protect citizens from anthrax and other potential bioweapons. In the event of an anthrax attack, treatment interventions in addition to antibiotics would be needed so that very ill patients can be treated clean-up crews can be better protected, especially if an engineered strain is used. This article describes specific anthrax countermeasures that are in development, barriers to development, and potential mechanisms the government could use to accelerate the movement of these countermeasures through the pipeline. A key challenge will be to encourage the transition of promising leads from basic research to the product development stage, when they may qualify for BioShield funds.

Simon M. Whitby, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, May 2005
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In 2001, scientific and technological developments in the area of plant biology were identified as being of particular significance to the Convention and to future efforts to
strengthen the Convention against their hostile use. In a statement by the South African Delegation to the Fifth Review Conference of the 19 November 2001, Peter Goosen,
Chief Director: Peace and Security, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, reminded States Parties that in all of the work undertaken by States Parties related to the BWTC, the threat against plants was usually considered to be of a lower priority or importance than the threat against humans. This had occurred, Goosen pointed out, in spite of the widespread appreciation amongst States Parties that major elements of past biological weapons programmes since the 1920’s had been directed against crops and that numerous plant pathogens had been researched, developed and produced together with weapons as part of offensive BW programmes for the purpose of the widespread dissemination of anti-crop agents.

Caitriona McLeish and Paul Nightingale, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, May 2005
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Concerns about the proliferation of biological weapons and the threat posed by bioterrorism have assumed greater political prominence in recent years.1 In response, governments are actively attempting to frustrate the diffusion of technologies, relevant to the production of biological weapons, to regimes and non-state actors which might develop and use such weapons. Their most recent efforts have involved the introduction of a range of new national measures to control access to materials, knowledge and technologies. The States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) have at their annual meetings during the intersessional period between the Fifth Review Conference and the Sixth Review Conference been seeking to ‘discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action’ on some such national measures.

Alexander Kelle, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, May 2005
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Alexander Kelle outlines how the rise of bioterrorism as an existential threat has shifted the strategy in combating biowarfare from biological weapons (BW) arms control to biodefense measures emphasizing public health. Kelle’s paper specifically reviews the “changes in international public health discourse” and the resulting effects on the effort to control the proliferation of BW. The author argues that the enhanced participation of the international public health sector in combating biowarfare presents a unique opportunity to strengthen the BW prohibition regime.

Jean Pascal Zanders, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC), May 2005
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The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is presently the principal tool against biological warfare.1 As of December 2004, 153 states have ratified or acceded to the convention and another 16 have signed, but not ratified the convention. It encompasses a comprehensive prohibition of preparation for biological warfare. At the heart of the BTWC is Article I, which specifies that states parties cannot acquire or retain biological weapons (BW) under any circumstances. This prohibition is reinforced by the requirement in Article II to destroy or divert all BW to peaceful uses, and by the non-proliferation provision of Article III. By current standards the BTWC is nevertheless a weak treaty because it lacks verification and enforcement mechanisms. There have been some confirmed cases of material breaches and several other allegations of biological warfare and biological weapon (BW) programmes. These have increased the calls to equip the convention with instruments to verify it and enforce compliance. To date efforts to strengthen the BTWC by means of a supplementary legally-binding protocol have failed and the prospects that negotiation of a formal text could resume any time soon are bleak. 

Graham S. Pearson, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC), May 2005
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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) which entered into force in 1975 is the key multilateral instrument that totally prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or otherwise acquiring or retention of biological and toxin weapons. There are currently 152 States Parties and 16 Signatory States. This paper sets out the central role of the Convention and its prohibitions in preventing the development and acquisition of biological weapons. It then outlines the extended understandings that the States Parties to the BTWC have agreed at successive Review Conferences thereby reaffirming the prohibition norm and the comprehensiveness of the scope of the Convention. It examines the steps taken at these Review Conferences to address compliance concerns through a consultative procedure and the politically binding submission of annual confidence-building measures. 

Scott Spence, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, April 2005
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The First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), held in The Hague in May 2003, agreed in its report1 that two action plans should be developed and implemented to achieve universal adherence to the CWC and the treaty’s full and effective implementation at the national level. This Review Conference Paper examines how these action plans have been developed and implemented by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as it is recognized that the translation of the Review Conference requests into effective action requires commitment both by the OPCW Technical Secretariat and by its States Parties. This process is analysed as it could serve as a model for how the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 2006 might implement effective action on universality and on national implementation. It is concluded that the experience of the OPCW in implementing its action plans could inform similar plans to achieve universal adherence to the BTWC and the treaty’s full and effective implementation at the national level should the Sixth Review Conference decide to take such action. 

Jez Littlewood, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, March 2005
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Success is nearly always relative and so what could be regarded as successful in 2006 will to a large part depend on the perceptions about what is possible in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Sixth Review Conference in 2006 and how ambitious (or not) the States Parties are about interpreting and fulfilling the requirement in Article XII of the Convention to “review the operation of the Convention” at the Sixth Review Conference. Other factors will impinge on this: events between now and 2006; the outcome of the Meetings of Experts and the Annual Meetings in each year; the extent of any continued animosity between states parties over the failure of the negotiations to strengthen the BTWC through a legally binding instrument; whether or not one or more States Parties makes a proposal that will dominate proceedings to the expense of everything else (e.g. an amendment); the way in which the report1 of the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change with its recommendations on the BTWC is dealt with in the UN; how any recommendations from the WMD Commission (Blix Commission) relate to the biological and toxin weapons and to the BTWC; the plans and proposals States Parties put in place before the Review Conference convenes; and the ideas put forward by non-governmental organizations. Aspirations should not be set too low, but equally unrealistic expectations should be avoided. 

Nicholas A Sims, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, March 2005
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The BTWC's institutional deficit has been long remarked. Institutions are needed not for their own sake, or for organisational neatness, but for practical reasons. They are needed for the performance of functions on behalf of the BTWC's States Parties which are best performed collectively; for ensuring that the BTWC's condition as a treaty regime is more regularly monitored and promoted than quinquennial Review Conferences alone can ever hope to do; for keeping track of new scientific and technological developments which pose a threat to the treaty regime; and for solving problems as they arise. 

Graham S. Pearson and Nicholas A. Sims, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, February 2005
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At the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in Geneva on 6 to 10 December 2004, a number of States Parties in their statements looked forward to the Sixth Review Conference. During the informal session at which Non-Governmental Organizations were able to make statements to the Meeting of States Parties several likewise took the opportunity to look forward to the Sixth Review Conference and to propose outcomes for it to achieve. This Review Conference Paper is the first of a series of such papers which are intended to facilitate the preparation by the States Parties for a successful outcome to the Sixth Review Conference in 2006. This Paper provides an overview of the issues that need to be addressed by States Parties in their preparations for the Review Conference in 2006. It starts by recalling the outcome of the earlier Review Conferences from 1980 to 1996 and then considers what happened at the Fifth Review Conference and at the subsequent annual Meetings of the States Parties against the background of developments on the international scene over the past decade. 

Brian Rappert, Disarmament Forum, February 2005
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This article briefly traces current initiatives to formulate a BW-related code. It does so with a view to highlighting the diversity of proposed codes. Lessons from the analysis of professional codes more generally are referenced to suggest some of the problems and possibilities associated with the adoption of a BW code. Building on this, the outline of a “code matrix” is presented to suggest a range of possible activities that might be taken up under the name of a code. Finally, this article proposes content for a code of conduct and lays out the reasoning behind it. In doing so, the argument seeks to present ideas for discussions under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) work programme for 2005. 

Alexander Kelle, Disarmament Forum, February 2005
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A generally the intention of scientists doing cutting-edge research will generally be to better the human condition, such as through the development of new medicines. However, a considerable number of chemical compounds and micro-organisms have potential for harmful, as well as beneficial, effects. Many toxic chemicals, their precursors, as well as pathogens and processes involved in their production have perfectly legitimate civilian applications. At the same time the history of chemistry and biology provides ample examples of new discoveries in these areas being used for weapons’ purposes. Thus, the dual-use character of toxic chemicals and pathogenic micro-organisms is not just an abstract quality they possess. Rather, the different purposes to which these substances and organisms can be put have had profound implications on military thinking and—in the case of chemical weapons (CW)— the history of warfare. Any effort to control the use of toxic chemicals or pathogenic micro-organisms for offensive military purposes has to take into account the dual-use nature of many of these chemicals, organisms and related equipment and processes. 

Amy E. Smithson, The Washington Quarterly, January 2005
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Mankind’s most high-minded and obvious goals often turn out to be the most complicated to achieve. This axiom applies widely to issues ranging from safeguarding human rights to eliminating poverty and pollution. Another example would be establishing a total prohibition against turning germs into weapons to harm humans, animals, or plants. Mankind has suffered grievously enough from naturally occurring diseases—HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis being prime examples now ravaging the human population. Banning biological weaponry is both prudent and laudable. Putting that idea into practice, however, has been a nightmare.  

Bioterrorism Reporting Group, The New Defence Agenda (NDA), January 2005
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The Bioterrorism Reporting Group examined the common challenges for mutual threat identification in a wider European landscape and how such strategies will increase security for the US, Russia, the Newly Independent States and the EU. The meeting addressed key international programs and policies geared toward mutual threat reduction and countermeasures against biological terrorism. The Group highlighted successful partnership programs between the US, EU and Russia in this field. Assessments were given of current conversion programs for former Soviet Union laboratories and facilities as well as discussion of the need to further increase collaboration on counter-terror activities and non-proliferation initiatives.  

Leif Wellington Haase, The Century Foundation, January 2005
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After the anthrax attacks of fall 2001, Congress made the single largest investment in state and local public health capacities since World War II. But after spending almost $3 billion to date on public health preparedness, how much better prepared are we for a terrorist attack? In the final report of the Working Group on Bioterrorism Preparedness, a group of leading public health policy experts and practitioners conclude that the new federal funding has resulted in considerable improvements to the U.S. public health system, but that substantial vulnerabilities remain. The group found that without clearer definitions of what constitutes preparedness and standards for achieving it, the infusion of funds may not succeed in enabling the public health system to respond effectively to a future bioterrorist attack.  

The Sunshine Project, December 2004
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The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons, while permitting defensive research. Although biodefense research programs may be necessary for protection against biological warfare, there is often only a very fine line separating defensive and offensive activities, and offensive capabilities may be generated in the course of defensive work. Accordingly, there is an ongoing need for governments to exercise sound judgment and restraint in their biodefense programs and to guarantee full transparency in all aspects of biodefense research, so as to increase confidence between countries, avoid suspicions and uninformed allegations, and prevent a race for offensive capabilities under cover of defense. To increase transparency and to contribute to building confidence in this critical area of international arms control, the Sunshine Project has initiated a series of in-depth country studies to publish additional information on BW-related activities in a variety of countries. Reports have so far been published for the following countries: Germany, France, and Turkey.  

Michael Moodie, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute (CBACI), December 2004
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In the autumn of 2001, the anthrax attacks-by-mail drove the threat of biological weapons into the national consciousness. Because they occurred soon after the tragedy of September 11th, these attacks only reinforced the perception that terrorists could attack the United States using means and methods that were unconventional, random in impact, highly lethal, and potentially catastrophic. As a result, developing effective responses to the threats of bioterrorism is an integral feature of the nation’s commitments to securing the homeland. Between FY02 and FY04, the federal government increased spending on bioterrorism preparedness and response from just over $7.1 billion to $11.9 billion without a clearly articulated national strategy. Fighting Bioterrorism sets forth an action agenda for the second Bush administration and calls for an operational plan specifying critical next steps to address the bioterrorism challenge, determines the resources necessary, and ensures accountability. 

BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP), December 2004
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The BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP), an international non-governmental organization that works to strengthen the norm against using disease as a weapon, released the First Edition of its BioWeapons Report at the 2004 Meeting of States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in Geneva, Switzerland. The report aims to inform governments and the diplomatic community of the serious concerns regarding the growing possibility of the misuse of biology and biotechnology for hostile purposes.  

Matthew Meselson and Julian Robinson, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter 2004
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The United States is developing a costly bio-umbrella to protect its citizens against biothreats that do not now--and may never--exist. Any development, production, acquisition, or use of biological and chemical weapons is the result of decisions and actions of individual persons, whether they are government officials, commercial suppliers, weapons experts, or terrorists. The international conventions that prohibit these weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993, however, are directed primarily to the actions of states, and address the matter of individual responsibility to only a limited degree. What is needed is a new treaty, one that defines specific acts involving biological or chemical weapons as international crimes, like piracy or aircraft hijacking. The Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, with advice from an international group of legal authorities, began to develop a draft convention in 1996, continuing at workshops in 1997 and 1998.  

Susan Wright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2004
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The United States is developing a costly bio-umbrella to protect its citizens against biothreats that do not now--and may never--exist. On April 28, President George W. Bush unveiled an unclassified version of a secret presidential directive, "Biodefense for the 21st Century," indicating his administration's plans for defending Americans from terrorists intent on spreading dreaded diseases. The document, while light on detail, is heavy on goals: The country's air, water, and food will be closely monitored, as will its public health; huge quantities of vaccines and therapies will be stockpiled to be used in the event of a bioterrorist attack; and defenses against futuristic genetically modified pathogens will be developed. Moreover, the deadly organisms that are needed for research and development and the people who work with them will be tightly controlled in Andromeda Strain-type laboratories. Bush promises Americans a vast bio-umbrella intended to shield them from deadly bio-aggression in the same way that President Ronald Reagan promised that his Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") would shield them from nuclear missiles. A key component is even known as "BioShield." This is the vision of "biosecurity" that has seized Washington's imagination since 9/11.  

Trevor Findlay and Angela Woodward, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC), November 2004
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Unlike the treaties prohibiting nuclear and chemical weapons, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention does not provide for a permanent body for verification and compliance or to assist states parties to implement their obligations under the treaty. Efforts to establish an international verification organization for the treaty failed in 2001, when US opposition led to the collapse of negotiations on a verification protocol to the treaty, which would have established an Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons. The need for a dedicated BW verification body remains unsatisfied and should be the ultimate goal. Rapid advances in the biological sciences and the resultant greater opportunities for development of BW make verification of compliance with the BWC even more important than when the treaty was negotiated. In addition, thirty years after the treaty’s entry into force, surveys have shown that many states parties have not fulfilled all their legal requirements under the treaty, notably the adoption of national implementation measures. Many states require assistance to meet such obligations. In addition, all states, whether they are parties to the BWC or not, have derived additional obligations to prevent biological weapons proliferation, especially to non-state actors, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1540 of April 2004. No coordinated assistance is available to assist states to implement these obligations. This paper sets out a range of possible mechanisms that could be established or enhanced to fulfil the BW verification and implementation tasks that have been identified. Each mechanism may be established individually. Each is capable of working independently or in combination with others to contribute to a stronger BW regime. They need not be established simultaneously, but can be launched whenever the politics, diplomacy and resources permit. They may be combined in various ways in what we describe as a modular approach. Some are likely to attract ready support in the short term while others may be more controversial. The critical point is to pursue what is possible and add modules as they become feasible.  

Gary A. Ackerman and Kevin S. Moran, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC), November 2004
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The intense media and public interest surrounding the 2001 anthrax attacks had predictable effects. What was already a major security issue in the United States quickly achieved the status of a global threat as policymakers worldwide were galvanized to address the possibility of bioterrorism. Amidst the hype, bioterrorism simulations were run, research quickly funded and vaccine production commenced. One would assume that a thorough understanding of the threat underlies the difficult policy decisions associated with such preventive and response-related measures, which often involve resource limitations and tradeoffs between programs. Yet this has repeatedly been shown not to be the case. At every level – from the local to the national to the international – the approach to countering bioterrorism has often been partial, piecemeal and distorted by political or parochial institutional concerns. Previous Commission papers have dealt well with general, high-level issues surrounding biological weapons; here we focus on a specific subset of those issues – that relating to non-state actors and biological weapons – and look at the specific policy questions that arise in this context. This paper argues that an accurate and comprehensive assessment of the threat posed by bioterrorism is essential for policymakers working to identify and prioritize opportunities for reducing the global risk of such attacks. The first section of the document seeks to ground the discussion empirically by reviewing the specific nature of bioterrorism, highlighting recognizable trends in its modern history, and identifying key lessons and developments from the historical record that might signal how bioterrorism will likely manifest itself in the 21st century. The second section of the document begins by considering how threat assessment may be applied practically to bioterrorism, and broadly evaluating the current set of constraints and incentives for bioterrorism, according to this threat assessment framework. The paper concludes by identifying a number of specific “opportunities” policymakers have to reduce the threat of bioterrorism by strengthening the constraints and weakening the incentives identified earlier.  

Graham S. Pearson, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, November 2004
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The States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) agreed at the resumed Fifth Review Conference in November 2002 that the topic to be considered in the new process at which the States Parties would ‘discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action’ would in 2005 be: The content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. An earlier Bradford Briefing Paper no. 132 by Brain Rappert examined the potential contribution of professional codes such as codes of ethics, codes of conduct and codes of practice. This Briefing Paper considers what the aims are of such a code of conduct for the life sciences and how these aims might be achieved. It then examines a practical approach based on legislation and regulations in the UK. Finally, it concludes by considering how such a practical approach might be adopted internationally.  

Graham S. Pearson, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, November 2004
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In this Briefing Paper the opportunity is taken to consider how the world has changed over the past 25 years and how the perceptions of the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons have developed in order to identify the key priorities for strengthening the prohibition regimes for chemical and biological weapons in the second half of the first decade of the 21st century. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force in 1997 and has made the world a safer place. However, the first Review Conference in April 2003 failed to face up to the potential threat to the Convention posed by non-lethal or less-than-lethal agents. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention made progress and was almost at the point in 2001 on reaching agreement on a legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention when the United States at the eleventh hour withdrew its support and plunged that Convention into crisis. If the general purpose criteria in both Conventions are not maintained and reinforced, there are real dangers for peace and security. This Briefing Paper analyses the changing world and sets out priorities for international and national action to strengthen the prohibition regimes for chemical and biological weapons in the years ahead with particular attention being given to the forthcoming Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC in 2006.  

Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2004
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This report is a collaborative effort between the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a group of 14 U.S. biopharmaceutical industry experts. It outlines a plan for conducting trial inspections at U.S. biopharmaceutical facilities to test the feasibility of monitoring a global treaty outlawing biological weapons. The report debunks the conventional wisdom that says the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) is "unverifiable” due to the complex and dual-use nature of biological materials. The CSIS report offers an inspection model that enables inspectors to search for weapons activity while protecting proprietary data and minimizing the burden on legitimate facilities.  

The Sunshine Project, October 2004
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This report on the transparency and operation of Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBCs) is the result of an eight-month survey involving 390 committees across the United States. Historically, IBCs have the responsibility, at the institution level, to protect human health and the environment from the risks of biotechnology research. Now, the mandate of IBCs is expanding to include biological weapons research. The US does not have comprehensive laboratory safety law, thus, the IBCs operate under non-binding guidelines managed by the US National Institutes of Health. Because of the manifest public interest in ensuring the safety of biotechnology research, the guidelines contain provisions for public access to IBC records, including the minutes of IBC meetings. This survey requested meeting minutes from 390 IBCs and evaluated the response. 

Jonathan B. Tucker and Stacy M. Okutani, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC), October 2004
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A major challenge facing efforts to prevent the spread of biological weapons to “rogue” states and terrorist organizations is the dual-use nature of biotechnology: the fact that the same technical know-how and equipment involved in the peaceful development and production of vaccines and other commercial products can be diverted into offensive applications. This “dual-use dilemma” carries over into basic research in the life sciences. When microbiologists publish research papers that elucidate the process of infection, describe the molecular basis of pathogenesis, or explore the physiological action of toxins, they add to the existing body of knowledge and contribute to the development of medical therapies. Yet countries seeking biological weapons could utilize the same information to devise more deadly infectious agents and methods of delivery. At present, no multilateral organization oversees “contentious” research in the life sciences. Nevertheless, an international scientific committee with more limited scope—the oversight of research with live smallpox virus—currently exists under the auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO). Since its inception in 1999, this body, known as the WHO Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research (“variola” is the scientific name for smallpox) has monitored studies aimed at developing countermeasures against the deliberate use of smallpox as a military or terrorist weapon. Accordingly, the five-year track record of this committee provides an empirical basis for assessing the feasibility of a broader oversight mechanism to ensure the safety and defensive orientation of research with the most dangerous pathogens. 

Gary Cecchine, Michael A. Wermuth, Roger C. Molander, K. Scott McMahon, Jesse D. Malkin, Jennifer Brower, John D. Woodward and Donna F. Barbisch, RAND Corporation, October 2004
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Even before September 11, 2001, threat assessments suggested that the United States should prepare to respond to terrorist attacks inside its borders. This monograph examines the use of military medical assets to support civil authorities in the aftermath of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or conventional high explosives attack inside the United States. The authors focus on key questions, including under what circumstances military medical assets could be requested and what assets are likely to be requested.  

Lynne Gilfillan, Bradley T. Smith, Thomas V. Inglesby, Krishna Kodukula, Ari Schuler, Mark Lister, and Tara O’Toole, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, October 2004
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The purpose of this study was to gather and analyze the views of leaders from academia, government, and industry regarding the capacity of the U.S. to develop biodefense countermeasures and to elicit their recommendations on steps that would improve the nation’s capacities to succeed in these efforts. The anthrax attacks of 2001 hinted at the kind of illness and civil disruption a few letters laden with Bacillus anthracis spores could cause. The attacks also began to illustrate the grave impact that larger, more sophisticated bioattacks could have on the country. In the years since the attacks, the federal government has spent more than $14 billion on civilian biodefense, approximately $5 billion of which has been allocated for research on and development of drugs and vaccines to counter bioterror agents.1 This year, the BioShield Act (P.L. 108-276) was passed, with one of its major purposes being to provoke the development of the medical countermeasures (i.e., therapeutic drugs, vaccines, and diagnostic tests) necessary to cope with bioattacks that might befall the nation in the future. As significant as these steps are, a number of biodefense analysts and leaders from academia, government, and the pharmaceutical and biotech industries have concluded publicly and privately that the measures the U.S. government has taken to date, including the passage of the BioShield legislation, will not be enough to entice pharmaceutical industry leaders into this field and will not produce the countermeasures the nation needs for a truly effective biodefense. 

Julie Fischer, Henry L. Stimson Center, October 2004
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Following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax assaults, policymakers and the public found themselves confronted with the suddenly evident threat of biological terrorism and warnings of a sadly eroded public health infrastructure almost simultaneously. The US Congress and the Executive branch have responded with dramatically increased funding and a raft of laws, regulations, directives, and new programs for biological defense and security. Despite this evidence of current political will, the public health, bioscience, intelligence, law enforcement, and security communities still face many challenges in working together to develop a long-term, effective commitment to preventing the proliferation and use of biological weapons. These diverse communities must develop a shared vocabulary as well as a seamless strategy; their success will rely heavily on the integration of appropriate STH expertise at every level of biological security policy development and implementation. This report attempts to identify strategies for, and obstacles to, successfully completing this task.  

Anders Norqvist and Åke Sellström, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC), October 2004
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The following report is written for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC). It will focus on development and use of biological and toxin weapons (BTW). In particular it will focus on different motives and requirements when BTW are to be developed and used by states and by non-state terrorists. In order to understand today’s objectives and incentives of potential developers, we shortly review the history of some former offensive BTW programs. The so called programs for “dirty tricks” that may be sources of inspiration for terrorists are also mentioned. We conclude that most states already have or will have the technical competence for BW development. However, even if they have this capacity we argue that the motivation to develop BW is low and will be even further reduced with improved global security and increased transparency of states. We also conclude that bioterrorism is an increasing threat. The motif is already there, but at present some key competences are still missing. Although we often find the bioterrorism issue exaggerated in the public debate, we still high-light the value in reducing the proliferation of key competences. 

Jonathan B. Tucker, Arms Control Today, October 2004
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Of growing concern to U.S. biodefense officials is the possibility that rapid advances in genetic engineering and the study of pathogenesis (the molecular mechanisms by which microbes cause disease) could enable hostile states or terrorists to create “improved” biowarfare agents with greater lethality, environmental stability, difficulty of detection, and resistance to existing drugs and vaccines. It is known, for example, that the Soviet biological weapons program did extensive exploratory work on genetically engineered pathogens. The Bush administration’s response to this concern has been to place a greater emphasis on “science-based threat assessment,” which involves the laboratory development and study of offensive biological weapons agents in order to guide the development of countermeasures. This approach is highly problematic, however, because it could undermine the ban on offensive development enshrined in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and end up worsening the very dangers that the U.S. government seeks to reduce.  

National Vaccine Strategy Working Group, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute (CBACI), September 2004
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In recent years, biological threats have emerged as a primary national security concern. A partial answer to the biological threat – whether in a military or domestic terrorism context – rests in vaccines for use prior to or immediately following a biological attack. Considerable time, energy, and money are being expended to provide a vaccine capability for the nation to meet biological threats. As we face the possibility of designer agents, facilitated by advances in biotechnology, we must reconsider our current extremely conservative and cumbersome system for development and production of vaccines. To make a difference, future vaccines must be developed in timeframes shorter than 8 to 12 years and at costs less than the approximately $800M needed currently to field a vaccine today. This project has laid the groundwork for exploring realistic options in order to move forward. 

Brian Rappert, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, September 2004
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In the last few years, much interest has been expressed in establishing an international code of conduct for those engaged in the life sciences as part of efforts to minimize present and future threats from biological weapons and bioterrorism. While not a new idea, today there is a greater amount of attention being given to considering what form such a code might take and to drawing a code or codes up. Yet despite the apparent wide ranging enthusiasm, so far the functions of such a code have been ill defined and little detailed elaboration has been offered in terms of its content or how such a code might be promulgated and implemented. This Briefing Paper examines the potential contribution of professional codes such as codes of ethics, codes of conduct and codes of practice. 

Jonathan B. Tucker, Disarmament Diplomacy, July/August 2004
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Although the draft BWC Protocol has been relegated to political limbo and is unlikely to be revived, many countries contend that some type of multilateral agreement is still needed to bolster the Convention. This article examines the form and substance of a new multilateral process that might be undertaken to strengthen the BWC.

Ulla Jasper, Disarmament Diplomacy, July/August 2004
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The EU WMD Strategy sets out appreciable goals for global arms control efforts, but it remains rather silent concerning steps to be undertaken by the EU and its member countries to polish their own performance in the arms control and nonproliferation domain. The following analysis will elaborate upon steps that ought to be undertaken by the EU and its member states in order to establish a genuine and comprehensive approach towards the effective nonproliferation and disarmament of biological weapons.

Kenneth N. Luongo, Derek Averre, Raphael Della Ratta, and Maurizio Martellini, Arms Control Today, July/August 2004
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Preventing a biological weapons attack—long a terrifying battlefield danger and now a serious threat to civilian populations as well—is a major contemporary global security priority.

Mark Wheelis, Arms Control Today, July/August 2004
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We can anticipate that some countries would use forced medication to produce troops who are not only alert for days, but who have heightened sensory awareness, enhanced aggressiveness, decreased fear and sensitivity to pain, and a dulled moral sense.

Jeffrey N. Rubin, Journal of Homeland Security, January 2004
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Recent events have focused attention on the ability of communities to respond to acts of terrorism. In addition to intentionally generated incidents, most communities have been struggling with preparedness against a range of natural and technological hazards. Public safety and emergency management personnel have developed and tested response plans, and considerable federal resources have been expended toward the same end—albeit with inconsistent results. With some exceptions, community preparedness efforts have faltered at a common, though not exclusive, point: hospitals. Those involved in preparedness and response recognize the quandary: hospitals are essential, irreplaceable resources for planning, response, and recovery associated with disasters, but they carry a unique set of constraints that makes effective participation in such efforts challenging at best.

Trust for America's Health, December 2003
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TFAH's new report discovers that after two years and nearly $2 billion of federal bioterrorism preparedness funding, states are only modestly better prepared to respond to health emergencies than they were prior to September 11, 2001. The TFAH report, “Ready or Not? Protecting the Public's Health in the Age of Bioterrorism,” examines 10 key indicators to assess areas of improvement and areas of ongoing vulnerability in our nation's effort to prepare against bioterrorism and other large-scale health emergencies.

Nicholas A. Sims, 20th Pugwash Workshop Study Group on the Implementation of the CBW Conventions: The BWC Intersessional Process towards the Sixth Review Conference and Beyond, November 8-9, 2003
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The author argues in this working paper, presented at a 2003 conference, the states party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) should set a goal of completing all actions which have been agreed upon by consensus by March 26, 2005, the thirtieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention. The author outlines these commitments, which include enacting national legislation related to the biological weapons nonproliferation, reporting requirements, and introducing confidence-building measures.

M.S. Mehelson and J.P. Perry Robinson, 20th Pugwash Workshop Study Group on the Implementation of the CBW Conventions: The BWC Intersessional Process towards the Sixth Review Conference and Beyond, November 8-9, 2003
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The authors of this working paper, presented at a 2003 conference, argue that the growing interest in exempting non-lethal weapons from the international chemical and biological weapons bans is a serious threat to the nonproliferation regime.

Jez Littlewood, 20th Pugwash Workshop Study Group on the Implementation of the CBW Conventions: The BWC Intersessional Process towards the Sixth Review Conference and Beyond, November 8-9, 2003
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In this working paper presented at a 2003 conference, Jez Littlewood suggests issues for nongovernmental organizations to focus on in preparation for the 2006 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) review conference. These issues include technological developments, the relationship between the BWC and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), effectiveness of confidence-building measures, and the use of non-lethal weapons in law enforcement. Littlewood discusses options for improving the confidence-building measures of the BWC and for increasing the number of signatories to the convention.

Michael M. May, Zachary Haldeman, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISC), June 2003
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This report examines whether earth-penetrating nuclear weapons could be effective against buried biological agents. The authors consider many variables, including how the bio-agents are stored, proximity of explosion to the storage areas, and aboveground effects of such an explosion.

Jonathan B. Tucker, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Arms Control Today, June 2003
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This report states that efforts to counter bioterrorism should focus on restricting access to deadly pathogens and toxins, in addition to formulating health responses in case of an attack.  Tucker believes that global security standards would restrict access to dangerous pathogens and reduce the threat of bioterrorism, while reinforcing the legal prohibitions on the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons contained in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

Nicholas A. Sims, Disarmament Diplomacy, April/May 2003
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The Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) concluded on November 15, 2002 with the adoption of a single Decision, which created a new multilateral process consisting of three weeks of meetings in each of the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 before a Sixth Review Conference to be held in 2006. This article reflects on the state of the BWC and its treaty regime after the Fifth Review Conference: How can it be steered out of the doldrums, and what would enable a reasonable agenda to be shaped for recovery of its true course?

Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Working Group on Biological Weapons, November 2002
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Biodefense is vital for protection against biological warfare and for deterrence. However, biodefense programs that blur the distinction between offensive and defensive activities could provoke the very danger they are intended to combat. The goal of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention would be nullified if "protective purposes" in Article I were to be misconstrued as permitting threat assessment involving the conduct of almost any potentially offensive activity short of large-scale stockpiling. Thus, there is an urgent need to ensure that, in conducting their biodefense programs, States Parties reject this interpretation as inconsistent with the letter and the spirit of the Convention. A group of NGOs has drafted this brief document of recommendations for a Code of Conduct that could be useful in judging the good faith of States Parties to the Convention in the conduct of their biodefense programs.

Nicholas A. Sims, London School of Economics, Dept. of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, July 2002 (PDF, 6 pages)
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In this brief report, the author calls for renewed efforts to create an Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW)—a “parallel” organization to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In 2001, the effort to create an OPBW fell victim to the stalling of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Protocol, blocked by a deadlock in the Ad Hoc Group brought on by the United State's withdrawal from negotiations on the Protocol. Questions of how to proceed, whether to proceed without the United States, and other obstacles are examined.

Graham S. Pearson and Malcolm R. Dando, eds., Dept. of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, June 2002 (PDF, 41 pages)
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The Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) opened in Geneva on November 19, 2000 and was adjourned on December 7, 2001 until November 11, 2002. The reason for adjournment was the absence of agreement on how to take forward various proposals to strengthen the BWC. On April 29, 2002, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary launched a Green Paper that discusses U.K. priorities and the next steps forward for the Fifth Review Conference. This paper examines the U.K. Green Paper and analyzes the proposals identified.

Mark Whellis, The Nonproliferation Review, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Spring 2002
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Biomedical sciences and the pharmaceutical industry are in the midst of a revolution in the science and technology of drug discovery that will significantly complicate the control of chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Scientists in fields that are contributing to this revolution must understand these implications of their work. Likewise, arms control experts must recognize that there is a profound revolution underway in biology and that the technical landscape of chemical and biological arms control is rapidly changing. This article seeks to bridge the gap between science and arms control in order to raise awareness in both fields of the potential ramifications that this scientific and technological revolution may have on CBW proliferation.

The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) / The Oxford Research Group (ORG), March 2005
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For nuclear weapons there is no treaty of general prohibition as there is for biological and chemical weapons. Save where nuclear weapons are prohibited by particular treaties, like those creating Nuclear Weapons Free Zones the legality of their use and threatened use must be determined with reference to the UN Charter and the law of armed conflict.

The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) / The Oxford Research Group (ORG), March 2005
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Nuclear weapons have played a key role in NATO’s military strategy since its inception in 1949. NATO’s current Strategic Concept (1999) states that the: Fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. NATO nuclear forces include strategic weapons provided by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, along with US ‘sub-strategic’ or ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Within NATO these substrategic weapons are seen as symbolic of the transatlantic link between the United States and its European allies.

Robert E. Hunter, Arms Control Today, December 2004
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Iran’s possible development of nuclear weapons has now come front and center in U.S. foreign policy, as well as in consideration overall of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It has assumed particular importance because of its potential to reshape the security and politics of an already turbulent and critical region. In the middle of the Middle East, such a capability would at the very least lead to a basic reassessment by countries near and far of a full range of security, political, and other issues. As the saga of a widely presumed but not admitted Iranian nuclear weapons program unfolds, with its on-again, off-again character, something else is happening: the need for a reassessment of nonproliferation—both how to prevent proliferation and what to do if prevention fails. There is dwindling confidence that a country bent on developing nuclear weapons can forever be prevented from doing so by the now-traditional technological safeguards. In particular, it appears less possible to block the indigenous development of either plutonium or highly enriched uranium, the essential materials for nuclear weapons. Talent and knowledge are not a constraint, and access to fissionable materials may be an ever decreasing one to a country’s nuclear ambitions.

Joseph Cirincione, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2005 
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"The hope of civilization," President Harry S. Truman said in his message to Congress in October 1945, "lies in international arrangements looking, if possible, to the renunciation of the use and development of the atomic bomb." One month later, Truman joined the leaders of Britain and Canada to propose to the new United Nations that all atomic weapons be eliminated and that nuclear technology for peaceful purposes be shared under stringent international controls. By 1946, he had a detailed plan that included many of the nuclear nonproliferation proposals still debated today, including a ban on the production of new weapons and fissile material for weapons; international control of nuclear fuel; a strict inspection regime; and complete nuclear disarmament. But in the United States, opponents of the proposal said America should hold on to its nuclear monopoly. In the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin wanted his own bombs. Both nations opted to seek security through atomic arsenals, not atomic treaties. The end result? The number of nuclear weapons grew from the two fission bombs held by the United States in November 1945 to more than 27,000 nuclear and thermonuclear bombs held by eight or nine nations
today.

Jack Boureston and Charles D. Ferguson, Arms Control Today,
December 2005
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In June, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors created a special committee to further strengthen its safeguards system—the inspections, accounting, and analyses the agency uses to detect and deter diversion of nuclear material and technology for weapons programs. The decision was made under pressure from the United States following a February 2004 speech by President George W. Bush in which he proposed creating the committee as part of a seven-point plan to combat nuclear proliferation.
Still, the United States had to compromise to win backing for the decision, which many states feared would hamper peaceful nuclear activities. China, for example, said that the committee should serve only as an adviser to the IAEA board and should not interfere with the board’s authority or role. The new committee will be fully advisory in nature and wholly subordinate to the board. Also, the committee will not intervene in the day-to-day operations of the secretariat, although it could probably draw on the expertise of the IAEA’s safeguards department or other agency offices.

Charles L. Pritchard, The Brookings Institution,
December 1, 2005
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The success of round four of the Six Party process is due in large measure to a reversal in the manner in which the Bush administration approached and carried out its North Korea policy within the multilateral talks framework. Heretofore, the first term of the Bush presidency was marred by overt strife in its policy approach to North Korea from within its own ranks. The fourth round of talks gave rise to cautious optimism—at least from a procedural point of view—that the administration had rejected the failed policy approach of the first four years and was committed to giving serious diplomacy a try.

Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, November 2005
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The 2005 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference featured a panel chaired by Henry Sokolski, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, and included David Fite, U.S. House of Representatives, Sverre Lodgaard, Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs, Andrew Semmel, U.S. Department of State, and Baker Spring, Heritage Foundation.

Mark Leonard, Center for European Reform, November 2005
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European negotiators are trying to align two timescales to address Iran's nuclear program: one technological, the other political. Tehran is still open to outside pressure as it has not yet mastered the processes needed to develop nuclear weapons. At the moment, Tehran needs help from outside
sources such as Russia, China or Pakistan to build centrifuges, acquire highly enriched uranium, and master the whole fuel cycle. However, once it reaches the ‘point of no return’ the West’s influence over Iran will all but disappear. This paper argues that European diplomacy has already been very successful: slowing Iran’s nuclear programme, opening it up to international inspections, mobilising a global diplomatic coalition against Iran’s enrichment programme, and persuading the United States to abandon its policy of isolation. This paper calls on the European Union to strengthen its current approach.

Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2005
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The 2005 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference featured a panel chaired by Leon Sigal, Social Sciences Research Council and included Sigfried Hecker, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Daniel Poneman, The Scowcroft Group.

Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2005
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The 2005 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference featured a panel chaired by William Potter, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and included Henry Sokolski, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Lewis Dunn, SAIC,
Harald Mueller, Frankfurt Peace Research Institute.

Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2005
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The 2005 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference featured a panel chaired by Dori Ellis, Sandia National Laboratories, and included James Goodby, The Brookings Institution, Alexei Arbatov, Carnegie Endowment, Paula DeSutter, U.S. Dept of State and Michael Krepon, Henry L. Stimson Center.

Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2005
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The 2005 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference featured a panel chaired by Carnegie Vice President for Studies George Perkovich. The panel included Pierre Goldschmidt, Carnegie Endowment, Thérèse Delpech, Center for International Studies, Eli Levite, Atomic Energy Commission, Vlad Orlov, Policy Studies in Russia Center.

Lars Olberg, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, November 2005
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On 28 April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 on non-state actors and weapons of mass destruction. It was welcomed by the UN Secretary- General, Kofi Annan, as a supplement to the non-proliferation regime. Others regard the resolution not just as a supplement, but rather as perhaps the most far-reaching international policy re-orientation since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force 35 years ago. The resolution calls upon member states to report on implementation measures they have taken or intend to take. The reports were to be submitted by October 28, 2004. While only about 50 states met that deadline, by June 1, 2005 about 120 states had reported. It is therefore now possible to perform a preliminary assessment of the reports and the measures the states took or plan to take.

Ingolf Kiesow, Swedish Defence Research Agency, November 2005
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This paper will try to give a background to the deadlock that exists today between North Korea and USA, focusing on the North Korean side of the problem. First, the economic factors will be analyzed as well as the consequences for North Korean military thinking in the conventional field. Moreover, the strategy in the field of nuclear weapons, as well as the second Non-nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) withdrawal crisis, will be described. Finally, some observations and conclusions will be
made.

Joshua Rovner, Strategic Insights, November 2005
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The Central Intelligence Agency has been burned badly in recent years. It was criticized, however unfairly, for failing to prevent the September 11 attacks. It suffered again for exaggerating Saddam Hussein’s WMD capabilities before the invasion of Iraq. Both events greatly undermined the CIA’s credibility and led to a massive reorganization of the intelligence community. Now the agency faces another critical issue over nuclear proliferation, as Iran progresses towards the ability to create weapons-grade material. How should it approach the Iranian problem? After losing so much prestige with policymakers, how can it possibly influence U.S. policy towards Iran? Assuming that Tehran is serious about developing a weapons program, the CIA can reestablish its role by helping policymakers prepare a coherent strategy before Iran goes nuclear. The CIA should address two puzzles that, once solved, will help deter Iran from proliferating nuclear materials and using its own arsenal coercively.

James A. Lewis, Arms Control Today, November 2005
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As the United States and Europe wrestle over European plans to sell conventional arms to China, many Americans would like to see a new transatlantic treaty regime. They disparage the existing regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement, which coordinates export policies on conventional arms and related industrial technologies. European officials also acknowledge the limitations of the current arrangement; British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has even proposed a new arms trade treaty. Yet, it is unlikely that any replacement or change to the Wassenaar Arrangement can provide meaningful restraint in conventional arms transfers and still be acceptable both to the United States and Europe. The negotiations during the early 1990s that led to the creation of the Wassenaar Arrangement made clear that mutual restraint in transfers of advanced technology and arms is impossible when foreign policies diverge. And with the end of the Cold War, any Atlantic consensus was fast eroding over sales to commercially important nations in Asia and the Middle East.

Anupam Srivastava, Arms Control Today, November 2005
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At their September plenary in Madrid, members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) decided not to take up the question of inviting China to join the group. China had applied to join the voluntary export control regime in July 2004, and that year’s October plenary in Seoul had “failed to reach a consensus” on Beijing’s bid. China’s failure to win consensus support underlines a more fundamental challenge Beijing poses to global nonproliferation efforts and institutions.
Recent interviews with U.S. and British officials reveal the reason for not formally considering Chinese membership again this year was continued concern over Beijing’s implementation of pledges to adhere to export control standards equivalent to the MCTR. Russia and the United Kingdom were more willing than the United States to acknowledge that China had made progress. But all of the other countries agreed that Beijing still needed to do much more to block certain weapons of
mass destruction (WMD)-sensitive exports.

Edward Ifft, Arms Control Today, November 2005
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The late Charles Floweree, who worked on arms control issues for many years at the Department of State, once observed that “compliance is like a poorly crafted Act 3 that plays to a distracted and drowsy audience.” If we continue his analogy, we might observe that Act 1 of the typical arms control drama would be the decision to seek a particular arms control agreement and the intense and careful interagency preparation that precedes the negotiation phase. Act 2 would be the actual negotiation, carefully monitored in Washington and carried out by a dedicated team of experienced professionals from several agencies. Once the agreement is completed and enters into force, sometimes following long, painful debates in the Senate, it enters Act 3. Implementation may involve very professional, on-site inspection activities by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the smooth handling of notification requirements by the State Department’s Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, and diligent work by intelligence analysts in following relevant developments worldwide. Nonetheless, it would be fair to say that the attention of the policy community, as well as the nongovernmental arms control community, tends to turn quickly elsewhere. There is the general hope that nothing will go wrong with the agreement, and if something does go wrong, someone else will take care of it. If this has usually been the trend for the United States,
it is even more so for most other countries.

Alexei Arbatov, Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference “Sixty Years Later,” November 2005
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Four decades of US-Soviet and then US-Russian bilateral
negotiations and agreements on nuclear disarmament have
accumulated a fascinating experience of the dialectics of arms
limitation and reduction, verification methods and technologies and political will or reluctance to make the two meet. In principle, the greater scope of disarmament - the higher requirements for reliable verification capabilities, but this function has not been linear. Sometimes most radical disarmament agreements alleviated the need for intrusive verification. And some of the most sweeping disarmament steps were taken without any verification provisions at all (i.e. parallel US and Soviet elimination of a predominant parts of their tactical nuclear weapons). Although the evolution of verification systems, which were being basically perfected as means of reconnaissance ("spy satellites", “electroning eavesdropping” etc.), gave an initial push to strategic arms control, its progress has not been determining the pace and directions of disarmament. True, the development of technology has been
constantly improving verification systems and capabilities. But at the same time technical progress has been giving birth to new weapon systems with features and performances, that made them elusive for verification or enabled them to break through established definitions and criteria for limiting various classes and types of nuclear arms (MIRV systems, cruise missiles, mobile ICBMs etc.).

Edited by Henry Sokolski, Patrick Clawson, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) October 2005
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Little more than a year ago, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) completed its initial analysis of Iran’s nuclear program, Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. Since then, Tehran’s nuclear activities and public diplomacy have only affirmed what this analysis first suggested: Iran is not about to give up its effort to make nuclear fuel and, thereby, come within days of acquiring a nuclear bomb. Iran’s continued pursuit of uranium enrichment and plutonium recycling puts a premium on asking what a more confident nuclear-ready Iran might confront us with and what we might do now to hedge against these threats. These questions are the focus of this volume. The essays in this book are divided into four parts and cover in-depth discussions of problems and solutions regarding Iran's nuclear program.

Edwin S. Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists, October 2005
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The challenges to the nonproliferation regime over the last fifteen years posed by the crises in Iraq, North Korea and Iran have led to an increased preoccupation among the international community with the lack of capabilities of the IAEA to detect undeclared facilities for production of fissile material. However, the foundation of IAEA safeguards remains the ability of the Agency to effectively verify the absence of diversion of special
nuclear material from declared facilities. One must assume that the vast quantities of weapon-usable plutonium flowing through commercial reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication plants will continue to present attractive targets to those looking to covertly acquire small stockpiles of nuclear explosives. Likewise, the huge SWU capacity of large commercial gas centrifuge plants will provide a temptation for those who may wish to divert a small fraction of that capacity toward HEU production. Consequently, such activities should be forbidden in the absence of highly credible assurances that all significant diversions will be detected in a timely manner. The nuclear industry will rightly not be able to increase public confidence in the security of the nuclear fuel cycle if it continues to operate facilities where dozens of bombs’ worth of plutonium or HEU
could conceivably go missing annually without being detected.

Andreas Persbo, VERIFOR, October 2005
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Sixty years ago, the world witnessed with horror the force of the split atom unleashed on a civilian population. Consequently,
the very first resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly
(UNGA) in 1946 established a commission to deal with the
discovery of atomic energy and related matters. It was tasked
with developing proposals for the control of atomic energy,
to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful
purposes, and for effective safeguards by way of inspection
and other means to protect complying states against the
hazards of violations and evasions.

Donald G. Gross, Comparative Connections, October 2005
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For the first time in more than two years, diplomats at the Six-Party Talks made significant progress this quarter on the nuclear issue with North Korea. In a joint statement of principles, Pyongyang committed itself to “abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning at an early date to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.” In return, North Korea received security assurances, a U.S. and Japanese promise to take steps toward normalization of relations, a South Korean offer of 2 million kilowatts of electricity, and a commitment to implement the agreement sequentially on a reciprocal basis. In the Chinese-brokered joint statement, the U.S. and North Korea further agreed to discuss Pyongyang’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy and its demand for light-water reactors at a future meeting. Trade issues over Hollywood movie quota, U.S. beef, and U.S.-Korea FTA remained unresolved.

Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 2005
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Tehran believes it needs advanced nuclear technology that could be used in weapons production for numerous reasons: weapons of mass destruction were used by Iraq against Iran in their 8-year long war; Iraq was working on a nuclear weapons device in the 1980s and Iranians assume Baghdad will want them again; Israel, India, Pakistan, and the United States have them; Iran is strategically isolated and needs self-sufficiency to defend itself in the event of attack; and the possession of such weapons would give the regime legitimacy, respectability, and protection. All these reasons give the regime a substantial interest in pursuing the nuclear option. However, concern about possible intimidation or blackmail by the United States is probably paramount in Tehran’s calculus, and the expanded
U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia since 2001 has likely heightened the regime’s sense of vulnerability.

Fred McGoldrick, Harold Bengelsdorf, and Lawrence Scheinman, Arms Control Today, October 2005
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In a July 18 joint declaration, the United States and India resolved to establish a global strategic partnership. The joint declaration was a bold and radical move that was clearly motivated by and reflects the mutual interests of both states in counterbalancing the rise of Chinese power. It also promises other potential security benefits, notably enhancing U.S.-Indian counterterrorism cooperation. In these respects, the joint declaration has laid the foundation for promoting the long-term strategic interests of the United States. The key question is whether the United States could have accomplished its geostrategic objectives by strengthening ties with India in the economic, scientific, and military fields without having compromised important principles of its nonproliferation policy. It is open to serious doubt whether the proposed Indian concessions were significant enough to justify the accommodations promised by the United States and whether the steps the United States and India agreed to take in the civil nuclear area will, on balance, be supportive of global nonproliferation efforts. Congress should approve the administration’s proposals to implement the joint declaration only under certain conditions. First, the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should clearly support permitting peaceful nuclear cooperation with India. Second, India needs to bring an early halt to the production of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives. Third, New Delhi must accept safeguards in perpetuity on its civil nuclear facilities.

Sharon Squassoni and David Fite, Arms Control Today, October 2005
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Seven years ago, Brazil joined the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Standing in the gilded treaty room on the top floor of the U.S. Department of State, then-Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia formally deposited the instrument of ratification before Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and a small group of nonproliferation experts. Calling Lampreia the “Sammy Sosa and Mark McGwire of international diplomacy” for ratifying both the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Albright noted that Brazil’s NPT accession would have been unthinkable 15 years earlier. For Lampreia, his appearance in Foggy Bottom symbolized a 30-year odyssey since serving on Brazil’s 1968 NPT negotiating delegation. To him, Brazil’s ratification of the NPT was a natural consequence of its leadership in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation. In fact, Brazil’s diplomatic offensive was truly noteworthy: in three short years, Brazil joined the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which establishes a Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone. Weeks before its ratification of the NPT, Brazil and six other states formed the New Agenda Coalition, which has pushed for concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament.

Shinichi Ogawa and Michael Schiffer, Arms Control Today, October 2005
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Ever since it was attacked with nuclear weapons six decades ago, Japan has been at the forefront of international nonproliferation efforts. Yet, as the world has focused recently on the dangers posed by some elements of the civilian nuclear power industry, Japan has found itself in the crosshairs of proliferation concerns. The international community has focused particularly on Japan’s planned plutonium reprocessing facility in Rokkasho-mura, which is scheduled to begin operating as early as July 2006. It would be the first active, civilian reprocessing facility in a non-nuclear-weapon state. It would also be one of the first and largest of such facilities to come online since President George W. Bush and Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), called for limits on the construction of new plutonium reprocessing or uranium-enrichment facilities. These facilities can be used to develop nuclear fuel for civilian nuclear plants but also can provide the essential fissile material for nuclear weapons. Those who favor limiting the spread of such facilities argue that the Rokkasho facility should be sacrificed for the greater good of nonproliferation and the prevention of a risky “virtual nuclear arms race.” Japanese officials have in essence taken another tack in their attempt to square their quest for a more complete nuclear fuel cycle with their desire to play a constructive nonproliferation role. Japan’s long and proud nonproliferation record, they say, should become the effective standard against which to judge other countries that want such facilities.

Susan Willett, Disarmament Forum, October 2005
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There is no getting away from it—arms control and disarmament are a costly business. The bigger the arsenal, the more destructive the weapons, the more costly it is to disarm. The 2003 UNIDIR study Cost of Disarmament—Disarming the Costs: Nuclear Arms Control and Nuclear Rearmament estimated that the costs of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process to the United States, between the period 1991–2001, totalled US$ 2.38 billion.1 In addition, the US has found itself shouldering the burden of the former Soviet Union’s START implementation costs via the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme, which amounted to US$ 5.1 billion over the same period. Other countries are finding the burden of arms control equally onerous, which in no small measure has contributed to the growing marginalization of arms control as a desirable and attainable international goal. The perception that arms control has become too costly arises when costs are examined in isolation from the benefits, and when the costs of alternative scenarios such as rearmament are not factored into the equation. At the same time there has been a tendency for the security costs and benefits of arms control to be assessed in the context of short time frames, defined by the political life of an administration, rather than longer-term security costs and risks to future generations. The first section of this paper provides some methodological insights into calculating the costs and benefits of arms control. It seeks to clarify which costs should be included under the arms control heading and which should be allocated to military expenditure. The second section on counter-scenarios identifies those costs that are likely to be averted as a result of complying with arms control treaties. Averted costs constitute some of the quantifiable benefits of arms control and are therefore an important component of any cost-benefit analysis. The third section discusses the relationship between arms racing and military expenditures. This is followed by a section on the opportunity costs of military spending. And the final section examines the costs of war.

William C. Potter, The International Spectator,  September 2005
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This was not a good year for theater productions on or off Broadway. By far the most costly and disappointing spectacle staged in New York this past season was the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference – an ill-conceived amalgam of farce and tragedy performed with little direction by an uninspired cast and with an all too predictable ending. As a bit player in the recent drama and as a veteran of two prior Review Conference “blockbusters”, as well as six Preparatory Committee rehearsals, the author’s current task is as a theater critic. Since the script itself is well known, attention will be concentrated primarily on two themes: 1) Why did the production fail? and 2) What are the implications of its failure?

Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, September 2005
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This monograph examines the structure and operation of the Chinese government’s evolving system of controls on exports of sensitive equipment, materials, and technologies that could be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related delivery systems. The author identifies the key organizations involved in export control decision making, the laws and regulations that form the basis of the government’s system of controls, and the interactions among government organizations involved in vetting sensitive exports. This study assesses the strengths and weaknesses of this system’s ability to implement and enforce government export controls and highlights areas that deserve more attention from Chinese policymakers.

Wade L. Huntley, Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research, September 2005
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Nuclear nonproliferation advocates worldwide welcomed September 19’s agreement on principles concluding the current round of the ”Six-Party Talks“ aimed at denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. But the road ahead is fraught with challenges and achievement of a final settlement is by no means assured. Wade Huntley’s essay reviews the terms of the agreement,
examines factors leading to its achievement, and assesses prospects for future negotiations. Although the obstacles to successful negotiated denuclearization of the Korean peninsula are daunting, opportunities for broader improvements in regional security emanating from the six-party talks process may also strengthen the capacity of the parties to overcome the
obstacles of the nuclear crisis itself.