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This section of the Source Documents Library highlights major research reports and web-based publications
related to nonproliferation treaties, IAEA activities and export controls. NTI and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies update this section weekly. (To access documents
published by governmental organizations, see the Governmental Documents section.)
For links to nongovernmental organizations that regularly publish
journal articles, see the
NTI links
page and the Periodicals section.
updated December 7, 2007
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U.S., Russia Swap Arms Ideas |
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Wade Boese , Arms Control Association, November
2007
 View
report
Senior U.S. officials recently offered proposals to their Russian counterparts to ease escalating bilateral tensions, particularly on U.S. plans to base strategic anti-missile interceptors in Europe. The Kremlin said it would study the offers but indicated they were inadequate. Russia’s government also warned it might leave a bilateral treaty limiting certain classes of missiles if other countries remained free to acquire the proscribed weapons.
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IAEA Director General's Report |
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IAEA Director General's Report, Arms Control Association, November
16, 2007
View
report
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevent provisions of
Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic
of Iran.
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Report Urges U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile and Posture Overhaul
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Sidney D. Drell, James E. Goodby, and Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association, November 2007
View
report
The independent Arms Control Association (ACA) today released a report that concludes ambitious nuclear weapons reductions by the United States would help lessen distrust with Russia and aid global efforts to curb the spread of nuclear arms. Such cuts could be implemented without imperiling U.S. security, argue the report’s authors, who recommend a total U.S. force of 1,000 nuclear warheads in 2012. Current U.S. plans envision at that time a stockpile between 5,000 to 6,000 nuclear warheads. Drell and Goodby also say that “each of the dejure and de facto nuclear-weapon states will have to be involved in some fashion in the effort to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international security relations.”
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Arms Control Resources on Iran's Nuclear Program |
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Daryl G. Kimball and Peter Crail, Arms Control Association, November 2007
View
report
International efforts to persuade Iran to restrain its nuclear program have fallen short, leaving Tehran to continue expanding its nuclear program, particularly its uranium enrichment activities. Later this month, the permanent five members of the Security Council plus Germany will consider an additional sanctions resolution to persuade Iran to suspend its nuclear efforts. For analyses, recommendations, and background information on Iran’s nuclear program, please visit the following resources from the independent Arms Control Association (ACA).
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UN Extends Committee on Terrorists and Arms |
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Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, June 2007
View
report
In a unanimous vote April 27, the UN Security Council extended for two years a
committee charged with monitoring efforts by states to prevent nonstate actors
from acquiring or developing biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. The vote
on Resolution 1673 reflected general satisfaction with the committee’s
activities to date but also an acknowledgement that much work remains to be
done.
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Arms Issues Divide U.S. and Russia |
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Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, September 2007
View
report
To be sure, the two governments took some bilateral nuclear cooperation steps but failed to settle sharp disagreements on U.S. anti-missile plans and a European conventional arms pact. Indeed, Putin subsequently charged Washington with ignoring Russian proposals on missile defenses and announced a possible suspension starting in December of Russia’s participation in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Putin also authorized the resumption of long-range Russian strategic bomber patrols.
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U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal Advances |
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Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, September 2007
View
report
The United States and India completed negotiations July 27 on a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, edging them closer toward erasing long-standing U.S. and international nuclear trade restrictions on India. But before realizing that goal, the two governments must still win over their own lawmakers and other countries, some of which, most recently Australia, are already angling to do business with India.
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Dangerous Dealings: North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of
Export to Iran |
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Siegfried S. Hecker and William Liou, Arms Control Association,
March 2007
View
report
On Oct. 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test and proclaimed itself a world nuclear power. The explosion yield was less than one kiloton, much less than the first nuclear test of other states and even less than the expected yield of four kilotons that North Korean officials forecast to their Chinese counterparts.
Nonetheless, the test demonstrated Pyongyang’s mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle and at least rudimentary nuclear-weapon design and manufacturing capabilities.
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Securing a Global Fissile Material Production Cutoff: Options for the
Conference and Beyond |
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Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association,
December 15, 2006
View
report
Ending the production of fissile material—plutonium and highly enriched uranium—for weaponspurposes has been on the international arms control and nonproliferation agenda for decades. Afissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) would reinforce the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)and lock in the halt on production of fissile material for weapons appropriately observed by allfive original nuclear-weapon states: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the UnitedStates. Perhaps more significantly, a verifiable FMCT would cap the production of bomb byNPT holdouts India, Pakistan, and Israel.
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A Nonproliferation Disaster |
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Daryl G. Kimball and Joe Cirincione, Arms Control Association,
December 11, 2006
View
report
As the 109th Congress rushed to a close this past week, it jammed through a
controversial nuclear trade bill that blows a hole in the fabric of U.S.
nonproliferation law. The legislation makes an India-specific exemption to
decades-old rules restricting civil nuclear commerce with states, such as India,
that have refused to allow “full-scope” international safeguards over all of
their nuclear facilities.
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Nuclear Suppliers Updated on U.S.-Indian Deal |
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Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, November 2006
View
report
Indian officials recently met for the first time with representatives of nuclear supplier states to sell them on a controversial U.S.-Indian deal to expand global civilian nuclear commerce with India. But New Delhi failed to address all the concerns and questions group members have raised.
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Missile Control Regime Focuses on Iran, NK |
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Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, November 2006
View
report
A group of countries devoted to stemming the spread of missiles vowed recently
to intensify efforts to deny Iran and North Korea exports that could aid their
missile programs. China’s alleged failure to curtail such exports to Iran is a
key factor frustrating Beijing’s campaign to join the group.
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Impact of the U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal on India’s Fissile Production
Capacity for Weapons |
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Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association, November 15, 2006
View
report
This week, the Senate might debate and vote on proposed legislation (S. 3709) to
relax long-standing restrictions on U.S. nuclear trade with India, which is not
a member of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not accept
full-scope safeguards as required by current U.S. law and guidelines established
by the major nuclear supplier states.
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''The Demise of the Global Arms Control Regime'' |
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Dr. Harsh V. Pant, PINR, October 19, 2006
View
report
Now that North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon, perhaps the time has come to
openly accept the demise of the global nuclear arms control and
non-proliferation regime. From Iran and North Korea to the nuclear black market
of Pakistan's A.Q. Khan, new challenges continue to emerge and threaten to
undermine the global arms control architecture.
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Why a Globalised Trade Needs Global Controls? |
Oxfam international, Arms Without Borders, October 2006
View
report
Globalisation has changed the arms trade. Arms companies,
operating from an increasing number of locations, now source
components from across the world. Their products are often
assembled in countries with lax controls on where they end up.
Too easily weapons get into the wrong hands.
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News Analysis: North Korea: Are the Six-Party Nuclear Talks Dead? |
Paul Kerr, Arms Control Association, September, 2006
View
report
Last September, the six-party talks regarding North Korea’s
nuclear program produced a joint statement that was hailed as a
significant diplomatic breakthrough. But a year later, the talks
are on the verge of collapse, with negotiators from China,
Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States
last having met as a group in November.
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Farewell to Arms Control |
Center for Security Policy, March 6, 2006
View
report
The deal struck last week by President Bush and his Indian
counterpart, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, effectively
recognizes reality: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
is dead. The demise of that 1968 accord was, of course, not
caused by the U.S.-India agreement to provide American nuclear
power technology to a country that had become a nuclear weapons
state despite the NPT's effort to prevent such developments.
India never signed the treaty and was, therefore, not bound by
its non-proliferation restrictions. |
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Resolving the Nuclear Dispute with Iran by Negotiation |
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Keith Putnam-Delaney and Paul Ingram,
August 31, 2006.
View report
The EU and US, through UNSC Resolution 1696, have required
nothing less than the full suspension of enrichment, but the
Iranians will not accept that precondition. Iranian proposals
have emphasized a broad regional security approach, including
action against terrorism, further agreement to reinforce respect
for sovereignty and national security, and technical and
economic cooperation. In the end, the outcome of policy choices
in Washington will probably determine the future of this
dispute. |
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Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms |
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Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Stockholm, Sweden), June 1, 2006.
View report
On June 1, 2006 the WMDC Chairman Dr. Hans Blix presented the Commission report "Weapons of Terror" to the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in New York. The report contains sixty concrete proposals on how the world could be freed of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
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The Urgent Need to Strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime |
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Pierre Goldschmidt, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, January 2006
View report
In this Policy Outlook, Pierre Goldschmidt calls for the United
Nations Security Council to adopt a generic and binding
resolution that would automatically authorize three steps when a
state is found in non-compliance by the IAEA. Goldschmidt posits
that it is waning political will that hinders the IAEA. The
fault, he warns, is an international community that has failed
to strengthen the authority of the IAEA to exercise its improved
capacity precisely when a state has been found to be in
non-compliance.
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Toward Transatlantic Cooperation in Meeting the Iranian Nuclear Challenge |
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George Perkovich, French Institute of
International Relations (IFRI), Winter 2005
View report
The United States and the European Union share basic objectives
in nuclear nonproliferation. Both recognize this convergence of
interest and therefore, largely, trust that they are aligned in
their purpose. Where transatlantic tensions arise is over
divergent assessments of the most effective means of achieving
shared objectives. The current challenge over Iran’s nuclear
program provides an opportunity, indeed a necessity, for the
U.S. and the European Union to converge.
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 This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.
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