UN Office of Geneva, 24 August 2007
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The Meeting of Experts from States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was held in Geneva from 20 to 24 August 2007. The Meeting of Experts is the first part of a four-year programme mandated by the 2006 Sixth Review Conference of the BWC aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Convention and improving its effectiveness as a practical barrier against the development or use of biological weapons.

UN office of Geneva, Office for Disarmament Affairs, 20 August 2007
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GENEVA, 20 August (Office for Disarmament Affairs) -- The international community’s efforts against the threat of weapons of mass destruction receive a boost with the inauguration today of the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, based in the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

Jez Littlewood, Arms Control Association, March 2007
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At 6:15 p.m. on Friday, Dec. 8, 2006, the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was brought to a close with smiles, handshakes, and the resounding applause of 103 delegations in Geneva. Less audible was a collective sigh of relief that the conference ended amicably, unlike its predecessor five years ago. Without opening up old wounds, states-parties reached an agreement that reaffirmed the basic prohibitions against biological weapons and endorsed decisions on further work to strengthen implementation of the convention.

Oliver Meier, Arms Control Association, January/February 2007
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The sixth review conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) concluded Dec. 8, approving a range of measures to strengthen the 1972 treaty. The agreement on a final declaration at the end of the three-week meeting marks the first successful review of the bioweapons ban since 1996.

Michael Mair, MPH, Beth Maldin, MPH, and Brad Smith, PhD, Center for Biosecurity, December 20, 2006
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On December 19, 2006, President Bush signed the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (S. 3678) into law. Passage of S. 3678 marks a major milestone in improving public health and hospital preparedness for bioterrorist attacks, pandemics, and other catastrophes and for improving the development of new medical countermeasures, such as medicines and vaccines, against biosecurity threats.

BioWeapons Prevention Project , December 8, 2006
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The final draft of the 6th Review Conference of the states party to the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons and on their destruction.

Oliver Meier, Arms Control Association, November 2006
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Representatives from 155 states meeting in Geneva Nov. 20-Dec. 8 to review and advance the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) are expressing cautious optimism that the once-every-five-years gathering will prove more successful than its immediate predecessor and other similar recent international gatherings.

Arms Control Association, November 17 2006
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On Nov. 20, representatives of many of the 155 states-parties to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will gather in Geneva for three weeks of deliberations on strengthening the treaty’s prohibitions against biological weapons. This will be the first opportunity for states-parties to conduct a full review of the accord since a fractious meeting of states-parties in 2001 dissolved after the United States blocked further negotiations on adding a verification protocol to the treaty.

Jennifer Mackby, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 16 2006
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This Strategic Study on Bioterrorism, sponsored by the CSIS Strengthening the Global Partnership Project, was conducted to increase the awareness of the threat of bioterror and to identify means by which States can prevent and respond to such threats to increase their biosecurity. It addressed bio-threat and response scenarios, risk assessment, modern diagnostic techniques and methods to strengthen capabilities for early detection, surveillance and response to natural and bioterror disease outbreaks, the technical issues to be solved and political, social and psychological aspects of bioterrorism.
 

Kenneth N. Luongo, Derek Averre, J. Raphael Della Ratta, Maurizio Martellini, Spring 2006
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In April 2005, RANSAC and LNCV held a meeting titled Advancing. International Cooperation on Bio-Initiatives in Russia and the CIS in Rome, Italy. The event was the second in a series of meetings on how to further cooperation between these governments and NGO's to prevent biological terrorism by promoting biosecurity, biosafety, and the involvement of commercial entities in key biological institutes.

Oliver Meier, Arms Control Today, November 2006
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Representatives from 155 states meeting in Geneva Nov. 20-Dec. 8 to review and advance the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) are expressing cautious optimism that the once-every-five-years gathering will prove more successful than its immediate predecessor and other similar recent international gatherings.

Nicholas A. Sims, Published in Disarmament Forum Toward a Stronger BTWC, 2006
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Compared with most other multilateral treaties for arms control and disarmament and notably its “nearest neighbour”, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) suffers from an institutional deficit. Structures are needed to strengthen the BTWC, to channel collective support for this relatively fragile treaty regime and to enable states parties to work together more effectively in the common interest. The Sixth Review Conference should afford a good opportunity to exchange views on such strengthening structures. This article analyses different options for remedying the institutional deficit, starting with a long-term prospect and working back to more immediate options.  

Jennifer B. Nuzzo, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense, Strategy, Practice, and Science Volume 4, Number 2, 2006.
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US water supplies are critical to the maintenance of many vital public services. Disruption of these systems would produce sever public heath and safety risks as well as considerable economic losses. Thus, water systems have been designated as critical by national security to the US government.

Clarence Lam, Crystal Franco, and Ari Schuler, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense, Strategy, Practice, and Science Volume 4, Number 2, 2006.
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This article provides the figures with budgeted amounts for the 2007 fiscal year specifically analyzing the budgets and allocations for bio defense in different agencies. This article is the latest in a series analyzing budgets since 2001.

Dean A. Wilkening, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, March 27, 2006.
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Several models have been proposed for the dose-response function and the incubation period distribution for human inhalation anthrax. These models give very different predictions for the severity of a hypothetical bioterror attack, when an attack might be detected from clinical cases, the efficacy of medical intervention and the requirements for decontamination. Using data from the 1979 accidental atmospheric release of anthrax in Sverdlovsk, Russia, and limited nonhuman primate data, this paper eliminates two of the contending models and derives parameters for the other two, thereby narrowing the range of models that accurately predict the effects of human inhalation anthrax.