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Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism
Chemical Weapons
Missiles, Missile Defenses, and Space Weapons
Nuclear Terrorism
Nuclear Weapons and Materials
U.S. Nuclear Policy
Country Resources

Arms Control
Arms Issues Divide U.S. and Russia
U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal Advances
Dangerous Dealings: North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of Export to Iran
Securing a Global Fissile Material Production Cutoff: Options for the Conference and Beyond
A Nonproliferation Disaster
Nuclear Suppliers Updated on U.S.-Indian Deal
Missile Control Regime Focuses on Iran, NK
Impact of the U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal on India’s Fissile Production Capacity for Weapons
''The Demise of the Global Arms Control Regime''
Why a Globalised Trade Needs Global Controls?
News Analysis: North Korea: Are the Six-Party Nuclear Talks Dead?
Farewell to Arms Control
Resolving the Nuclear dispute with Iran by Negotiations
Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms
The Urgent Need to Strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
A Standing United Nations Verification Body: Necessary and Feasible

 

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NGO Documents: Arms Control

This section of the Source Documents Library highlights major research reports and web-based publications related to nonproliferation treaties, IAEA activities and export controls. NTI and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies update this section weekly. (To access documents published by governmental organizations, see the Governmental Documents section.) For links to nongovernmental organizations that regularly publish journal articles, see the NTI links page and the Periodicals section.

updated September 14, 2007

Arms Issues Divide U.S. and Russia
Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, September 2007
View report
 
To be sure, the two governments took some bilateral nuclear cooperation steps but failed to settle sharp disagreements on U.S. anti-missile plans and a European conventional arms pact. Indeed, Putin subsequently charged Washington with ignoring Russian proposals on missile defenses and announced a possible suspension starting in December of Russia’s participation in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Putin also authorized the resumption of long-range Russian strategic bomber patrols.

U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal Advances
Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, September 2007
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The United States and India completed negotiations July 27 on a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, edging them closer toward erasing long-standing U.S. and international nuclear trade restrictions on India. But before realizing that goal, the two governments must still win over their own lawmakers and other countries, some of which, most recently Australia, are already angling to do business with India.

Dangerous Dealings: North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of Export to Iran
Siegfried S. Hecker and William Liou, Arms Control Association, March 2007
View report
 
On Oct. 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test and proclaimed itself a world nuclear power. The explosion yield was less than one kiloton, much less than the first nuclear test of other states and even less than the expected yield of four kilotons that North Korean officials forecast to their Chinese counterparts. Nonetheless, the test demonstrated Pyongyang’s mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle and at least rudimentary nuclear-weapon design and manufacturing capabilities.

Securing a Global Fissile Material Production Cutoff: Options for the Conference and Beyond
Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association, December 15, 2006
View report
 
Ending the production of fissile material—plutonium and highly enriched uranium—for weaponspurposes has been on the international arms control and nonproliferation agenda for decades. Afissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) would reinforce the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)and lock in the halt on production of fissile material for weapons appropriately observed by allfive original nuclear-weapon states: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the UnitedStates. Perhaps more significantly, a verifiable FMCT would cap the production of bomb byNPT holdouts India, Pakistan, and Israel.

A Nonproliferation Disaster
Daryl G. Kimball and Joe Cirincione, Arms Control Association, December 11, 2006
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As the 109th Congress rushed to a close this past week, it jammed through a controversial nuclear trade bill that blows a hole in the fabric of U.S. nonproliferation law. The legislation makes an India-specific exemption to decades-old rules restricting civil nuclear commerce with states, such as India, that have refused to allow “full-scope” international safeguards over all of their nuclear facilities.

Nuclear Suppliers Updated on U.S.-Indian Deal
Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, November 2006
View report
 
Indian officials recently met for the first time with representatives of nuclear supplier states to sell them on a controversial U.S.-Indian deal to expand global civilian nuclear commerce with India. But New Delhi failed to address all the concerns and questions group members have raised.
 

Missile Control Regime Focuses on Iran, NK
Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, November 2006
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A group of countries devoted to stemming the spread of missiles vowed recently to intensify efforts to deny Iran and North Korea exports that could aid their missile programs. China’s alleged failure to curtail such exports to Iran is a key factor frustrating Beijing’s campaign to join the group.
 

Impact of the U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal on India’s Fissile Production Capacity for Weapons
Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association, November 15, 2006
View report
 
This week, the Senate might debate and vote on proposed legislation (S. 3709) to relax long-standing restrictions on U.S. nuclear trade with India, which is not a member of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not accept full-scope safeguards as required by current U.S. law and guidelines established by the major nuclear supplier states.
 

''The Demise of the Global Arms Control Regime''
Dr. Harsh V. Pant, PINR, October 19, 2006
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Now that North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon, perhaps the time has come to openly accept the demise of the global nuclear arms control and non-proliferation regime. From Iran and North Korea to the nuclear black market of Pakistan's A.Q. Khan, new challenges continue to emerge and threaten to undermine the global arms control architecture.
 

Why a Globalised Trade Needs Global Controls?
Oxfam international, Arms Without Borders, October 2006
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Globalisation has changed the arms trade. Arms companies, operating from an increasing number of locations, now source components from across the world. Their products are often assembled in countries with lax controls on where they end up. Too easily weapons get into the wrong hands.
 

News Analysis: North Korea: Are the Six-Party Nuclear Talks Dead?
Paul Kerr, Arms Control Association, September, 2006
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Last September, the six-party talks regarding North Korea’s nuclear program produced a joint statement that was hailed as a significant diplomatic breakthrough. But a year later, the talks are on the verge of collapse, with negotiators from China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States last having met as a group in November.
 

Farewell to Arms Control
Center for Security Policy, March 6, 2006
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The deal struck last week by President Bush and his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, effectively recognizes reality: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is dead. The demise of that 1968 accord was, of course, not caused by the U.S.-India agreement to provide American nuclear power technology to a country that had become a nuclear weapons state despite the NPT's effort to prevent such developments. India never signed the treaty and was, therefore, not bound by its non-proliferation restrictions.

Resolving the Nuclear Dispute with Iran by Negotiation

Keith Putnam-Delaney and Paul Ingram, August 31, 2006.
View report

The EU and US, through UNSC Resolution 1696, have required nothing less than the full suspension of enrichment, but the Iranians will not accept that precondition. Iranian proposals have emphasized a broad regional security approach, including action against terrorism, further agreement to reinforce respect for sovereignty and national security, and technical and economic cooperation. In the end, the outcome of policy choices in Washington will probably determine the future of this dispute.

Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms

Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Stockholm, Sweden), June 1, 2006.
View report

On June 1, 2006 the WMDC Chairman Dr. Hans Blix presented the Commission report "Weapons of Terror" to the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in New York. The report contains sixty concrete proposals on how the world could be freed of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
 

The Urgent Need to Strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Pierre Goldschmidt, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2006
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In this Policy Outlook, Pierre Goldschmidt calls for the United Nations Security Council to adopt a generic and binding resolution that would automatically authorize three steps when a state is found in non-compliance by the IAEA. Goldschmidt posits that it is waning political will that hinders the IAEA. The fault, he warns, is an international community that has failed to strengthen the authority of the IAEA to exercise its improved capacity precisely when a state has been found to be in non-compliance.
 

Toward Transatlantic Cooperation in Meeting the Iranian Nuclear Challenge

George Perkovich, French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Winter 2005 
View report

The United States and the European Union share basic objectives in nuclear nonproliferation. Both recognize this convergence of interest and therefore, largely, trust that they are aligned in their purpose. Where transatlantic tensions arise is over divergent assessments of the most effective means of achieving shared objectives. The current challenge over Iran’s nuclear program provides an opportunity, indeed a necessity, for the U.S. and the European Union to converge.
 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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