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Updated August 2007
Missile Chronology
1990
This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
1990
By this time, the third developmental phase of the Cóndor was to be completed.
—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 26.
1990
The United States increases pressure on the Argentine Air Force to terminate the Cóndor.
—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 69.
25 January 1990
Foreign Minister Cavallo sends a private letter to Juanarena accusing him of making grave political errors, specifically of allowing missile technology to be shipped from Argentina.
—Daniel Santoro, Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 68.
26 February 1990
Argentina and Britain formally reestablish diplomatic relations, which had been severed with the 1982 conflict over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands.
—"Flags Fly again as Links with Argentina Resume," Daily Telegraph, 27 February 1990, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
March 1990
General Larry Welsh, US Air Force Chief of Staff, presses Brigadier General Juliá regarding the Cóndor.
—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II. Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992, p. 69.
March 1990
The Iraqi ambassador to Rome, Muhammad Sa'id al-Sahhaf, reportedly denies that the Iraqi Cóndor Project received financing from Italy. He also denies that Iraq is cooperating with Argentina on the Cóndor.
—"Italian Role In Missile Project Denied," Ansa (Rome), 31 March 1990; cited in Nuclear Developments, 31 March 1990, p. 16.
March 1990
Jonathan Moyle, a reporter for Defence Helicopter World, is found hanging in a hotel room in Santiago, Chile. Chilean police initially rule the death a suicide. A Chilean judge later reopens the case and it is found that Moyle had been drugged, suffocated with a pillow, and injected in the heel with a lethal substance, with his body left to appear as if he committed suicide. It is theorized that Moyle is killed in response to his investigation of arms trafficking between Iraq and Chile, particularly his investigation of Carlos Cardoen, a Chilean arms manufacturer with links to Saddam Hussein.
—AFP, "Misterioso asesinato," Clarín, 28 February 1998, <http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/98-02-28/i-04202d.htm>; Colin Baraclough, "Who Killed Jonathan Moyle? A British Journalist and the Iraqgate Factor," Columbia Journalism Review, July/Aug 1993, <http://www.cjr.org/year/93/4/moyle.asp>.
April 1990
Argentina reportedly has produced five prototypes of the Cóndor II at Falda del Carmen. Project head Colonel Louis Guerrero (name as reported in original) says that there is an international campaign against Argentine production of the Cóndor II, "because the United States never forgave us for transferring technology to Iraq that permitted that country to build its own missiles in a much shorter time."
—"Motivation Discussed," EFE (Madrid), 28 April 1990; cited in Nuclear Developments, 15 May 1990, pp. 9-10.
1 April 1990
According to a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Intelligence Assessment, "[a]ll the solid propellant missile production projects in Egypt, Argentina, and Iraq are highly dependent on the influx of Western technology obtained from the Consen Group. Similarly these Consen companies need these overseas markets to keep afloat financially. Because of the creation of the Missile Techonology Control Regime (MTCR) in April 1987, covert cooperation took on added importance."
—US Defense Intelligence Agency, "The Grey Arms Market: Methods of Maintaining Covert Business Relationships," Intelligence Assessment declassified and partially released, available through the Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>.
21 April 1990
After eight months of political pressure, Argentine Defense Minister Humberto Romero announces that although the Cóndor "in no way signified a risk or danger to anyone," the project has been "halted. It is not going ahead because of a political decision and lack of funds. The project is frozen." This is the first official announcement of the halting of the project.
—"Condor Missile Project Halted," AP, 22 April 1990, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; "Defense Minister Says Condor II Project Halted," Clarín, 27 April 1990, p. 3, cited in FBIS-LAT-90-082, 27 April 1990, 12; Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 67; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 67; Martin Granovsky, Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman, (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 195.
25 April 1990
President Menem announces that construction of the Cóndor II was halted "some time ago" for lack of resources. He also admits that the decision was made to avoid a confrontation with the United States and other countries. The Argentine government expects that freezing the project will help Argentina gain access to the US aeronautics market. In a subsequent statement, Air Force Chief of Staff Juliá rules out the possibility that the Cóndor II could have upset the balance of power saying, "I am amused by everything said abroad about the project because it is incredible for anyone to think that the 'Condor II' project could endanger peace in the Middle East or that it could upset the balance of power."
—"Menem Says Missile Scrapped Over US Concern," Clarín, 25 April 1990, p. 8, cited in FBIS-LAT-90-081, 26 April 1990, p. 20; "Air Force Chief's Statement," Telam (Buenos Aires), 27 April 1990, cited in FBIS JPRS-TND-90-009, 15 May 1990, p. 10.
14 May 1990
Juliá meets in Washington, DC, with US State Department official Reginald Bartholomew, who presses for an end to the Cóndor project. In response, Juliá declares "But the project no longer exists. It died." To which Bartholomew responds, "Yes, the project has died many times, but still it continues dying."
—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 69.
June 1990
Juliá meets with Welsh again in Washington, DC and reaffirms that the Argentine government has decided to suspend the Cóndor project.
—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 69.
30 June 1990
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assesses Iraq's ballistic missile programmatic efforts, including those based on the Cóndor program. At this time, Iraq is developing five distinct missile programs. Although the more ambitious Cóndor II will take longer to develop than the Iraqi-produced Al-Husayn and Al-Abbas missiles, it will be "easier to handle, require less preparation time before launch, offer more payload options, and provide better accuracy and range." The CIA estimates that the solid-fueled Cóndor II missile system will have a range of 750-1,000km, carry a payload of approximately 500kg, and employ a submunition warhead design. When Iraq begins to produce the system, it will likely modify the warhead submunition design to enable it to deliver chemical and/or biological weapon agents.
Judging that it will be "difficult, if not impossible, to stop" Iraqi ballistic missile projects, the CIA estimates that with continued foreign assistance, Iraq will commence production of the Cóndor II by the early 1990s; however, halting external aid could delay production to the mid-to-late 1990s. Iraq will likely face technical challenges in "guidance and control, second-stage configuration, and flight-testing," which could be surmounted through external assistance. Through its work on the Cóndor, Iraq may gain experience applicable to its other missile programs, e.g., in such areas as stage separation. Regardless of the status of the Argentine and Egyptian Cóndor II projects, the CIA anticipates that Iraq will continue to seek technical assistance from both countries with its Cóndor project. While Egypt had been Iraq's main contact in the past, the CIA expects closer ties with Argentina in the future. The agency reports, "Our growing concern is that Argentina and Egypt—despite claims of withdrawing from the program—will continue development of the Cóndor II through Iraq. Argentine and Egyptian engineers may train at Iraqi production facilities, which are similar to these in Argentina and almost identical to ones in Egypt. Argentina and Egypt could begin indigenous production with little or no notice shortly after its [sic] engineers return from Iraq. We believe Iraq will be the first of the three to produce the Cóndor II."
This CIA assessment is based on information available as of 29 May 1990, and is largely based on analysis of Iraqi foreign procurement efforts. The CIA also declares, "Although we have not identified a formal, coordinated nuclear weapons program, we believe Iraq's activities, especially its covert nuclear procurement, strongly suggest a weapons program exists."
—US Central Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments: An Intelligence Assessment (Washington, DC: Directorate of Intelligence, 30 June 1990), classified "Top Secret," declassified excerpts released 5 March 1998, <http://www.foia.ucia.gov>, pp. 4-6, 10, 12, 20-21, 29.
July 1990
The last Cóndor test is conducted at the Chamical airbase in La Rioja Province, in which a stage of the missile travels over 160km.
—"Defense Minister Denies Missile Pact With Iraq," DYN (Buenos Aires), 21 April 1990; cited in Nuclear Developments, 7 May 1990, pp. 29-30.
20 July 1990
President Menem signs Secret Decree 1373, which dissolves the INTESA consortium and rescinds its contracts to develop and export missile technology, and also places Falda del Carmen under the jurisdiction of the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The decree orders the technical staff of the Cóndor effort to transfer all elements of the program to the National Space Research Commission (CNIE).
—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), pp. 34, 72; Martin Granovsky, Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 200-201; César Docampo, Desarrollo de vectores espaciales y tecnología misilística en Argentina: el Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: EURAL, 1993), p. 52.
2 August 1990
Iraq invades Kuwait. Coalition forces attack Iraq and Iraqi forces in Kuwait on 16 January 1991, and Iraq accepts a cease-fire agreement on 6 April.
—US Department of Defense, "The Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Timeline," undated, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2000/n08082000_20008088.html>.
7 August 1990
Responding to UN Security Council economic and military sanctions imposed against Iraq, Defense Minister Humberto Romero declares that Argentina has never sold weapons to Iraq.
—"Defense Minister Denies Sale of Weapons to Iraq," Buenos Aires DYN, 7 August 1990, cited in FBIS-LAT-90-153, 8 August 1990.
22 August 1990
Foreign Minister Cavallo announces that Argentina will eliminate all possible shipments of aerospace technology to Iraq.
—"Aerospace Technology Shipments to Iraq Eliminated," Buenos Aires Domestic Service, 22 August 1990, cited in FBIS-LAT-90-164, 23 August 1990.
September 1990
Foreign Minister Cavallo reaches a verbal agreement with Lawrence Eagleburger regarding the Cóndor project. Argentina agrees that it will not export the missile technology, that its missile development activities will be transparent, that the two countries will cooperate on missile issues, and that Argentine and US diplomats will plan meetings to discuss nuclear issues.
—Daniel Santoro, Operación Cóndor II: la historia secreta del misil que desmanteló Menem (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992), p. 55.
September 1990
The United States reportedly steps up pressure on German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB), through a coded telex to the German Foreign Ministry stating that MBB's "alleged deliveries" for a "fuel-air explosive" project is "particularly critical." Iraq is the first third world country to possess this MBB product.
—"MBB Said Main Supplier of Weapons to Iraq," Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 24 September 1990, pp. 32-34; cited in Nuclear Developments, 16 October 1990, pp. 10-11.
6 September 1990
Todman submits an unsigned "nonpaper" to the Argentine chancellor, minister of defense, and chief of the General Staff of the Air Force, requesting information regarding the Cóndor program.
—Martin Granovsky, Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman, (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 199.
12 September 1990
Commodore Miguel Guerrero, president of the National Space Research Commission (CNIE), chairs a meeting of US and Argentine officials regarding the Cóndor program. The encounter includes the executive secretary of the Space Activities Program of the Ministry of Science and Technology, Jorge Ferrante; Chancellery official Gustavo Zlauvinen; the Science Counselor in the US Embassy, Paul Maxwell; and US embassy officials Douglas Shaffer and Stephen Geis. The US officials press Guerrero to clarify questions regarding the Cóndor, and Maxwell reportedly states that he "has instructions from my government to definitively clarify the Cóndor issue as an unavoidable condition for proceeding with bilateral space cooperation. If we do not clarify it, there will be no launch of a joint satellite." The US officials request that a group of US technicians be permitted to visit Falda del Carmen.
—Martin Granovsky, Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 199-200; Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), pp. 70-71.
Mid to late September 1990
Following Commodore Miguel Guerrero's meeting with US officials on 12 September, President Menem publicly announces the halting of the Cóndor program, and secretly orders the Air Force to desist from developing the missile.
—Martin Granovsky, Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman, (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), pp. 196-201.
18 September 1990
Chancellor Cavallo and Defence Minister Romero appear before the Argentine Congress to inform legislators of the decision to send troops to the Persian Gulf. Cavallo also informs Deputy Conrado Storani (UCR) that Iraq had participated in development of the Cóndor. To prove this allegation, he shows Storani Secret Decree 1315 that Alfonsín signed in 1987. Cavallo thus begins his political campaign against the Cóndor II.
—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 42; Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 113.
19 September 1990
Clarín publishes a statement by Juanarena, who asserts that Iraq was never involved in any way in the Cóndor project.
—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 42.
October 1990
Defense Minister Humberto Romero and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces José Juliá conclude that the proposed visit by US technicians to Cóndor facilities cannot be avoided.
—Martin Granovsky, Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 201.
October 1990
An unattributed report asserts that Project Betreuungs GmbH (PBG) of Germany assisted in arming Iraq. Senior Public Prosecutor Friedrich Bethke states that PBG conveyed sensitive technologies to Iraq via Argentina and Egypt. PBG allegedly delivered German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm's (MBB) blueprints for fuel-air bombs to Iraq through Egypt, as well as parts of MBB's Cóndor missile system through Buenos Aires to Iraq. The German government could not confirm whether PBG had helped establish an R&D center for missile construction in Iraq.
—"Firm Probed for Sending Arms Technology to Iraq," Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 22 October 1990, p. 15; cited in Nuclear Developments, 15 November 1990, p. 25.
October 1990
Following Menem's meeting with President Bush, Chancellery and Ministry of Defense officials consider political and legal aspects of dismantling or recycling Cóndor components for civilian use. Justice Minister León Carlos Arslanian provides a memo finding that the destruction of such components would not constitute a crime of treason, as Air Force officers argue on the basis of the Code of Military Justice.
—Martin Granovsky, Misión cumplida: La presión norteamericana sobre la Argentina, de Braden a Todman, (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 331.
1 October 1990
Meeting at the White House, President Menem tells President Bush that the Cóndor program has been "completely deactivated." In a subsequent press conference, US Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson says that US officials believe Menem is sincere in his commitment to terminate the Cóndor, and describes this as "a major achievement in reducing the threat of missile proliferation." Aronson notes that Iraq and Libya had been potential customers for the missile and associated technologies.
—Bernard Aronson, "Transcript of Briefing," Federal News Service, 1 October 1990.
November 1990
The Consen firms, including Consen itself, IFAT, Delta Consult, Delta System, and Tema, are being liquidated. Former German firm Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm's (MBB) missile specialists have retired, as a result of adverse publicity, government pressures, and threats to their physical safety.
—Alan George, "Condor Missile Firms on Verge of Collapse," Independent, 13 November 1990, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
22 November 1990
Cavallo divulges even more clandestine aspects of the Cóndor II project, revealing President Alfonsín's authorization of the project by secret decree. He emphasizes the necessity for complete transparency regarding the program.
—Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, Relaciones carnales: la verdadera historia de la construcción y destrucción del misil Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), p. 114.
December 1990
Menem appoints Cavallo as Minister of Economy, Di Tella as Chancellor, and González as Minister of Defense.
—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 73.
December 1990
The US-based (Minneapolis) firm Honeywell begins an internal investigation of its involvement in development of fuel-air explosives for Egyptian and Iraqi ballistic missiles. Honeywell appoints an outside law firm to investigate its involvement.
—"Honeywell Implicated in FAE Work," Flight International, 12 December 1990, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; "A Bigger Blast," Middle East, January 1991, p. 15-16.
3 December 1990
Fourth and final carapintada ("painted faces," referring to camouflage adopted by the disaffected junior Army officers) military uprising takes place. Menem orders loyal troops to crush the rebellion and the uprising ends in less than 24 hours resulting in 13 deaths. President Menem's firm handling of the situation draws praise from President Bush, who visits two days later.
—Deborah L. Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), p. 149; Luigi Manzetti, Institutions, Parties, and Coalitions in Argentine Politics (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), pp. 195-196.
5 December 1990
Despite a violent military uprising of the carapintada ("painted faces," referring to camouflage adopted by the disaffected junior Army officers) just days earlier, George Bush visits Buenos Aires in part to show support for Menem and for democratic rule in Argentina. In a joint press conference, an Argentine journalist asks Bush and Menem what the United States will do for Argentina, in light of its contribution of two naval vessels to the US-led Gulf War coalition. Menem states the Argentine contribution was to world order and international law, not for any reward. He declares, "We have a friendship with the United States which is really unprecedented. But it was not in that framework that we acted. We do not seek any retribution or any reward. That would be undignified. And if there is anything that the Argentines are known for, it is their sense of dignity. We don't want any help or aid. We want to work with the United States and other countries to preserve peace, which is tantamount to saying to preserve life. We do not seek any counterpart or anything in return. And in fact, were it offered, we would not accept it."
—"Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Buenos Aires, Argentina," Public Papers of the President, (College Station, TX: George Bush Presidential Library, 5 December 1990), <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1990/90120500.html>.
10 December 1990
US Ambassador Todman sends a letter to the Economics Minister Erman González (as well as a copy to Chancellor Cavallo), stating that Argentine public officials had demanded substantial payment for the import of machinery from the US firm Swift-Armour.
—Anabella Busso, Relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos en los noventa: el caso Cóndor II (Buenos Aires: Edición CERIR, 1999), p. 72, who cites Página 12 as reporting the allegation.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
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does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008
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