Archived, November 1996

In November 1996, Belarus shipped the last of the nuclear warheads and missiles remaining on its territory back to Russia. While the withdrawal of these weapons was stipulated in international agreements, the final act of the denuclearization process came as something of a surprise. Only two weeks prior to the departure of the missiles from Belarus, the Belarusian president, Aleksandr Lukashenka, had hinted that he might use the SS-25 ICBMs as bargaining chips in an attempt to slow or halt NATO expansion. Indeed, Lukashenka and his government had issued many contradictory comments on the missile withdrawal throughout 1996. The final decision to withdraw the missiles appears to have been driven by internal political considerations and perhaps by Russian pressure. In late November, Lukashenka was embroiled in a grave constitutional crisis that threatened to erupt in violence. Russian attempts to mediate the crisis, as well as Russian support for Lukashenka, were critical. Circumstantial evidence suggests that Lukashenka agreed to the final transfer in a meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who was visiting Minsk on a special mediating mission; shortly after their meeting, reports began to indicate that all weapons were removed from Belarus. Indeed, the Russian authorities had a strong incentive to remove the weapons given the potential for unrest in Belarus, and they had leverage over Lukashenka because of his precarious position. In any case, the final removal of the warheads and weapons appears to have moved forward very rapidly, with sources indicating that up to fourteen missiles were removed from Belarus within a very short space of time.

Lukashenka does not seem to have realized any benefit from the delayed missile transfer. While Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov reaffirmed Russia's commitment to defend Belarus under the terms of the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, he does not appear to have proffered any more specific security guarantees. Nor does it appear that Belarus received any additional compensation for the fissile material in the warheads, or the environmental damage caused by the missile sites. Lukashenka also failed to use the missiles to stall NATO enlargement. And while Rodionov stressed that the withdrawal of the missiles represented the final stage in the relocation of all Russian nuclear weapons, the move does not seem to have given a boost to Russian and Belarusian calls to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Central Europe.

Background: Delayed Denuclearization

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Belarus emerged as one of the four successor states with nuclear weapons on its territory. By signing the Almaty agreement on December 29, 1991, Belarus committed itself to transfer all nuclear weapons on its territory back to Russia. The initial phase of denuclearization proceeded smoothly, and all tactical nuclear weapons were rapidly and uneventfully moved out of Belarus by the beginning of May 1992.

The government of Belarus, under the leadership of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Stanislau Shushkevich, moved rapidly to accede to strategic nuclear arms agreements. Belarus signed the Lisbon Protocol to START I in May 1992, and in early 1993 the Supreme Soviet ratified the START I treaty and the Lisbon protocol without substantial opposition or amendment. Belarus initially committed itself to transferring all nuclear weapons to Russia by 1994, although later agreements delayed the target date to 1995, and then 1996.

With only 81 nuclear missiles on its territory, Belarus appeared likely to be the first former Soviet republic to completely denuclearize. Rather than being the first, however, Belarus became the last, lagging behind Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The reasons for this delay were political: the election of President Aleksandr Lukashenka in July 1994 led to radically different policies in both the domestic and foreign policy spheres. Lukashenka advocates closer ties, and even political and economic union, between Russia and Belarus, but he also used the presence of nuclear weapons in Belarus for his own political purposes. Despite conflicting statementsfrom Belarusian officials, Lukashenka appears to have decided in July 1995 to slow the process of transferring the last 18 SS-25s to Russia. Lukashenka attributed his decision to the threat of NATO expansion, and further argued that since Russia and Belarus would soon be united as a single country there was no need for Belarus to return the missiles.

Subsequent statements by Belarusian leaders have been contradictory, with some suggesting that the withdrawal of the weapons has been neither hindered nor halted. Nevertheless, a Russian-Belarusian agreement to withdraw all nuclear warheads by June 1996 was not fulfilled. According to Russian officials, the agreed timetable also called for the removal of all missiles from Belarus by the beginning of September 1996. During the summer and early fall of 1996, Belarusian official sources continued to state that the missiles would be withdrawn on schedule (by the end of 1996). Indeed, two missiles (but not their associated launchers) appear to have been withdrawn between January and July 1996, bringing the number of deployed systems down from 18 to 16. It remains uncertain, however, whether the two warheads from the missiles were also transferred to Russia at that time.

The reasons behind Lukashenka's unexpected decision to try playing the "nuclear card" are unclear, but several different explanations have emerged:

Economic: When explaining the government's decision to curtail the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, President Lukashenka was reported to have said, "The Belarusian leadership cannot do charity at the cost of the interests of the Belarusian people." Belarus would not carry the burden of the arms race. He also said that the cost of delivering strategic armaments to Russia was nearly $400 million, which is nearly equal to the Belarusian debt to Russia for energy supplies. In July 1995, Lukashenka complained that Russia had not provided "a single kopek" of compensation for strategic weapons withdrawn from Belarus. (See the database entry for 7/24/95.)

Belarus apparently has an agreement with Russia that provides compensation for the uranium contained in the strategic nuclear warheads shipped back to Russia. (See database entry for 2/27/96). It is unclear, however, whether this agreement provides for compensation for the tactical nuclear warheads withdrawn in early 1992. (See the database entry for 2/19/96.) The distinction is important, for several hundred tactical warheads were withdrawn, compared to only some 81 strategic nuclear warheads. (Note also that the SS-25 warheads withdrawn from Belarus will not be dismantled, as is the case with warheads from Ukraine and Kazakhstan, but will be redeployed on SS-25s in Russia.) The amount of money involved could be as much as $1 billion, an amount that is particularly important in view of Belarus' indebtedness to Russia. By delaying the withdrawal of the last 18 warheads the Belarusian government may have been trying to force Russia to raise its payments for the warheads.

NATO Enlargement: Some Belarusian leaders have suggested that if NATO were to expand, Russia would have to counter by deploying nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory once again. Retention of the SS-25s might thus be portrayed as a "pre-emptive" move against NATO enlargement. There is little logic to this position, however. SS-25 ICBMs have an intercontinental range and made no difference to the tactical nuclear balance in Europe. Their deployment was therefore irrelevant to the issue of NATO enlargement, except in the symbolic sense that it tied Russia and Belarus more closely in the military sphere.

Environmental Considerations: Belarusian officials have repeatedly complained of the environmental damage caused by former Soviet military bases and especially the damage associated with the destruction of SS-25 launch sites. Estimates of the cost of the cleanup of the launch sites and other former Soviet military facilities vary widely, but the Belarusian estimates have tended to increase over time. By withholding the last few SS-25s, Belarus may have sought to win increased compensation for environmental damage either from Russia or, more likely, from the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ): Belarus first called for the formation of a NWFZ in Eastern and Central Europe in its declaration of sovereignty of 27 July 1990. The proposal lay dormant, however, until President Lukashenka revived it on 3 July 1996, on the occasion of the 52nd anniversary of Minsk's liberation from Nazi occupation. Since July 1996, Belarus has made the promotion of a Central European NWFZ a key element in its foreign policy, tying it explicitly to NATO expansion. On 13 November 1996, addressing the Russian State Duma, Lukashenka implied that the transfer of the remaining SS-25s to Russia might be made conditional on NATO's guaranteeing the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in new NATO states. (See the database entry for 11/13/96.)

Other Political Considerations: It has been suggested that Belarus acted as a Russian "front" by pushing the issue of NATO enlargement and threatening to disrupt existing arms agreements. This theory presupposes a substantial degree of Russian control over Belarusian politics and politicians. The converse may be more likely. President Lukashenka is a wily, but somewhat erratic, politician who has been prodding a reluctant Russia into an ever-closer union. Lukashenka's aim is to bind Russia to Belarus in an attempt to solve his country's deepening political and economic problems while avoiding real reform. Lukashenka may have tried to use his control over the withdrawal process to bolster his own position and force Russia to recognize his indispensability and importance. If this was the case, the plan may have backfired, since Russia appears to have taken advantage of Lukashenka's weakened position in November 1996 to effect the final pullout of the weapons.

	Updated August 2007