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Updated April 2006

Missile Chronology
redline

1994

5 January 1994
The Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun reports that China has developed its first intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching U.S. territory, citing U.S. military sources. The Chinese-designed missile could be capable of carrying 8-10 independently targeted nuclear munitions.
— Andrew Varlamov, "China Develops a New Ballistic Missile, Sankei Shimbun," The Russian Information Agency ITAR-TASS, 5 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

6 January 1994
The Clinton administration announces it is set to lift a ban on the sale to China of the Echostar satellite, worth $150 million, and an Asiasat II satellite, worth $55 million. Both satellites are built by Martin Marietta. In exchange, China agrees to begin talks on issues regarding weapons proliferation. The U.S. government has been under pressure from the U.S. business lobby to lift the sanctions that were imposed on China during the summer of 1993 because of China's sale of M-11 missile technology to Pakistan.
—Bob Davis and Robert S. Greenberger, "Clinton Set to Cut China Textile Quotas, Lift Ban on Sale of Satellites to Beijing," Wall Street Journal, 6 January 1994, p. A2.

18 January 1994
China's state-run Great Wall Industrial Corporation (CGWIC) signs the contract to launch its first U.S. satellite. The contract is signed with Hong Kong-based Asia Pacific Satellite Communications Co., who will launch a Hughes International Corporation HS601 satellite, the Apstar-2, into space aboard the Long March 2E (CZ-2E) rocket. During the signing ceremony, CGWIC President Zhang Tong calls for a removal of U.S. sanctions on CGWIC and providing licenses to other related satellites. Zhang states that ending the ban "would not only benefit satellite owners, but also protect the interests of U.S. satellite producers."
—"China to Launch First U.S. Satellite since Sanctions Last Year," United Press International, 19 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

25 January 1994
Jiu Jiyuan, president of the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC) and administrator of the China National Space Administration (CNSA), states that U.S. sanctions imposed on China in August 1993 for the alleged November 1992 sale of missile parts to Pakistan are hurting China's space program. According to Jiu, the U.S. sanctions have caused delays in the development of the Dong Fang Hong 3 (DFH-3) satellite, loss of launch sales, and have damaged the reputation of Chinese space organizations.
—Andrew Lawler, Space News, 14 February 1994, pp. 1, 25.

27 January 1994
Michael McCurry, a State Department spokesperson, says that after three days of talks on nuclear nonproliferation, the United States and China have failed to reach an agreement. The United States focused on its proposal of a "cutoff in the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons," McCurry says, while the Chinese side focused on its own proposal for a treaty among the five nuclear powers for an agreement on no first use of nuclear weapons. Neither side agreed on either proposal. Another proposal discussed at the talks was bilateral agreement on missile nonproliferation. Reaching an agreement on this possibility would prevent the transfer of missiles and missile technology to Pakistan, McCurry says, however, negotiating the agreement will take time, he says. At the same time, China disapproved of the U.S. decision to deploy Patriot missiles in South Korea. In a briefing in Beijing, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Wu Jianmian expresses his disapproval, stating that "the preservation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula meets the vital interests of the Korean nation and promotes peace and security in this region." He also states that China finds the actions to be detrimental to peace on the Korean Peninsula.
—U.S., China Fail to Agree on Non-Proliferation," Agence France Presse, 27 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Vladimir Fedoruk, "China Protests Against American Patriots in South Korea," Russian Information Agency ITAR-TASS, 27 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

27 January 1994 China is replacing nuclear warheads on intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with conventional loads. According to military sources, the Dong Feng 21 (DF-21) is being reconfigured to better prepare China in the event of a limited local war.
—"China Switches IRBMs to Conventional Role," Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 January 1994.

1 February 1994
Military ties between China and Russia are in trouble due to a dispute over the sale of advanced fighter aircrafts by Moscow to Beijing. As Russia is one of China's biggest suppliers of arms and defense technology, the dispute stands to harm China's modernization of their weapons arsenal. The dispute is regarding the purchase of a second batch of Russian Su-27 fighter aircrafts by China's air force. China had purchased 26 Su-27s two years ago, and Beijing-based diplomats were under the impression that they were to purchase 24 more. Under the agreement, Russia began to build the aircrafts. But now, Chinese military officials have told Russia that they are only interested in purchasing the production rights and technology to produce the Su-27s, which Russia finds to be detrimental to their own security and commercial interests. The disagreement could affect other deals that China and Russia are negotiating, such as China's purchase of surface-to-air missiles.
—"Stalled Jet Deal Threatens Sino-Russian Ties," Central News Agency-Taiwan, 1 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 February 1994
China successfully launches two satellites with the new Long March-3A (CZ-3A), a newly developed rocket designed to lift heavier loads. It is capable of launching a 2.5-ton satellite beyond the 1.4-ton capability of the standard Long March-3 (CZ-3) model. Long Lehao, vice-president of the China Academy of Rocket Carrier Technology and general architect of the Long-March 3A, said that the launch marks "a new stage in the development of China's rocket technology."
—"Space Programme Director Comments on Chinese Rocket Launch," British Broadcasting Corporation, 2 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com, Peter Nordahl, "Events," Christian Science Monitor, 9 February 1994, p. 24, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

7 March 1994
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher announces in Canberra, Australia, that the Clinton administration is lifting the ban to allow $1 billion worth of satellite launches by China's Long March boosters after Hughes Corporation agreed to remove a sensitive decryption chip from their Optus B3 communications satellite. Optus B3, a Hughes HS 601, was built for the Australian National Satellite System (Aussat) and is a replacement for the Optus B2, which was destroyed in a Long March-2E accident last December. Craig Ellevsen, an Aussat official, says that his company did not realize that the chip was the only hold up in the spacecraft's launch and that the satellite does not need the chip in order to function. Ellevsen maintains that the chip was built in Hughes' quest for ongoing product development and that Aussat never wanted it. Transferring the chip, which functions to guard the satellites steering controls, is a violation of MTCR guidelines and is automatically blocked by the State Department. The removal of the chip shifts the authority to approve the satellite from the State Department to the Commerce Department.
—Michael Mecham and Michael A. Dornheim, "Chip Removal Clears Way for Chinese Launches," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 14 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Moves to Ease Beijing Sanctions," New York Times, 8 March 1994, p. 8, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

11-14 March 1994
The visit of U.S. State Department officials to China fails to break the impasse in the negotiations to get China to sign the MTCR. The U.S. offers to lift the sanctions on China, which were imposed on 25 August 1993 for selling M-11 missiles to Pakistan, if China formally signs the MTCR and comes to an understanding concerning future Chinese missile and missile technology transfers to Pakistan. China wants the United States to remove the sanctions before it signs the MTCR, and said that it already abides by the MTCR. In a subsequent statement, U.S. Undersecretary of State for International Security Lynn Davis stated that the United States is closely watching China and is willing to impose stricter sanctions if China steps out of line.
Inside the Pentagon, 24 March 1994. pp. 9-10; Defense Daily, 23 March 1994, p. 436; "U.S. to Continue Sanctions Against China," Arms Control Today, April 1994, p. 28.

15 March 1994
The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency analysts report that they suspect China has been aiding North Korea build a new long-range missile, citing the diameter of the missile as evidence. The issue further complicates China's Most Favored Nation Status, which is set for Congressional renewal in June. President Clinton has said he will push Congress to revoke their status if they fail to show significant improvement in their human-rights record. The North Korean missile, the TaepoDong-2, has a diameter similar to China's CSS-2 missile (DF-3), which leads officials to believe that the only way North Korea could build a missile of such proportions is through either physical transfer or with the help of engineers familiar with the program. Analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency disagree and question what would motivate China to transfer advanced missile technology to North Korea.
—Thomas E. Ricks and Jackie Calmes, "Reports that China aided North Korea on Missiles Complicates Trade Issue," Wall Street Journal, 15 March 1994, p. A3 in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

17 March 1994
In a brief statement issued by Beijing's Foreign Ministry, China denies having transferred advanced missile technology to North Korea. An unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesman called the Wall Street Journal's report on the transfer of Chinese technology to North Korea "totally groundless."
—"China Denies Transfer," Jane's Defence Weekly, 26 March 1994; "Denies Providing Missile Technology to DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 17 March 1994; "China Denies Giving North Korea Missile Technology," United Press International, 17 March 1994.

24 March 1994
The Bangladesh navy carries out their first exercise in the Bay of Bengal by testing an unspecified number of Chinese missiles. Each missile is fired from one of two frigates and missile boats, both provided by China. The test is carried out in the presence of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. While the defence ministry of Bangladesh is secretive about their weapons arsenal, diplomatic sources say that China is a major supplier of arms to Bangladesh.
—Rahman Jahangir, Saudi Gazette Correspondent, "Bangladesh Tests Chinese Missiles in Bay of Bengal," Moneyclips (GCC) Ltd., 25 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

25 April 1994
The Clinton administration is set to approve the Allied Signal sale of the Garrett gas-turbine engine. Some nonproliferation specialists fear the engines could be used to develop a longer-range cruise missile able to hit Japan or India with potential nuclear delivery capability. However, other experts assert that the Garrett engines involve neither military secrets nor cutting edge technology, and point out that such engines are easily available on the international market from other suppliers.
—Kevin Fedarko, "Confounded by the Chinese Puzzle," Time Magazine, 25 April 1994, p. 39.

26 April 1994
Russia has given China a list of 44 advanced weapons for reference in purchasing weapons, according to Russia's General Staff Headquarters. A representative from Russia's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, identified as Atonchev, says that "according to the latest statistics, Russia owes 1.5bn dollars to mainland China, of which 1bn dollars is loans and 500m results from the change in the form of clearing foreign exchange. The Russian government offered to pay off the debts with weapons. Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin will discuss the matter with the mainland hierarchy during his visit to Beijing in late May." On the list are five kinds of new fighters: The Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30, the Mig-29 and Mig-31, and the Tu-22M3 and the "Arrow"-10M and "Needle" air defense missile systems. The General Staff Headquarters stressed that the weapons they sell to China are mainly defensive. The list does not include strategic weapons such as rockets and nuclear weapons, they say.
—"Russia Reportedly Offers to Pay Debt to China with Most Modern Weapons," British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 28 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

10 June 1994
China conducts its 40th nuclear test. The test does not increase their nuclear capabilities, but rather serves as way to develop smaller, higher-explosive-yield, and more-accurate warheads for the development of a set of more advanced "second generation" ballistics missiles.
—Evan S. Medeiros, "Use China's Bomb Test to Start New Talks," Christian Science Monitor, 21 June 1994, p. 19, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 July 1994
Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian sign an agreement in Moscow to prevent military clashes along their border. In the agreement, both countries vow to use diplomatic action, rather than violence, to resolve conflicts such as maneuvers, accidental missile firings, and unintended frontier violations.
—"Russia, China Sign Accord to Prevent Border Clashes," Agence France Presse, 12 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

13 July 1994
President Clinton waives sanctions for the Echostar satellite's export for launch from China.
—Shirley A. Kan, "China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers from U.S. Satellite Export Policy-Actions and Chronology," CRS Report for Congress, 5 September 2001, p. 44.

21 July 1994
China's Long March 3 (CZ-3) rocket launches the ApStar-1 satellite built by the U.S.-based Hughes Corporation. The Hong Kong-based Asia Pacific Telecommunications Satellite Company, a consortium of Chinese-backed companies, operates the satellite.
—"Apstar Launched," Flight International, 27 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

28 August 1994
China's Long March-2E (CZ-2E) rocket launches the Optus-B3 satellite built by Hughes. The communications satellite is owned by Australia's Optus Communications Ltd. The Optus-B3, in conjunction with the Optus-B1, will provide Australia and New Zealand with data, telephone, television, and other telecommunication services once it reaches its orbital station.
Japan Economic Newswire, 28 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "China gets Australia's Hughes-built Optus B3 off the Ground at last," Aerospace Daily, 30 August 1994, p. 336, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

3 September 1994
In the first visit to Russia by a Chinese president in 37 years, Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin discussed the re-targeting of Russian and Chinese nuclear missiles away from their respective countries. The visit, says Mikhail Bely, head of the Asia department in Russia's foreign ministry, is "proof of the recent deepening in political and economic ties between Russia and China." The two also sign joint documents on avoiding nuclear wars and enhancing overall bilateral ties.
—"China and Russia Agree to Cease Aiming Missiles at each other," Agence France Presse, 23 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com, "Yeltsin Confers with Chinese Leader on Re-targeting Missiles," Deutsche Presse-Argentur, 3 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Russia, China Sign Joint Statements to Boost Ties," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

7 September 1994
According to a U.S. Navy commander, Iran is acquiring four or five Chinese missile boats as a means to update their military. Vice Admiral Douglas J. Katz says that the 114-foot-long Hugong missile boats are capable of carrying anti-ship missiles, though they haven't yet been equipped with such missiles. Western military sources are also speculating that Iran may purchase a larger missile craft from Beijing.
—Nabila Megalli, "Iran Now Has Chinese Missile Boats, U.S. Commander Says," Associated Press, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

4 October 1994
The "Joint Statement on Missile Nonproliferation," is signed by the United States and China. As part of the deal to secure China's signature, the United States announces the lifting of the August 1993 sanctions on Chinese entities. Upon signing the statement, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher states: "the United States will move to lift the sanctions it imposed against China in August 1993 for transferring missile parts to Pakistan. Once the sanctions are lifted, China has agreed not to export ground-to-ground missiles covered by the agreement. In effect, this communiqué today goes beyond the MTCR requirements. It represents a global and verifiable ban on Chinese exports of missiles capable of a range of at least 300 kilometers and a payload of at least 500 kilograms. This is a very important step forward, and I urge you not to let the complexity of it blind you to the achievement that resulted here today. This agreement also resolves a previous difference of opinion between the United States and China on the interpretation of the MTCR. Under the terms of this agreement, China accepts the MTCR definition of a missile's inherent capability. That means that any missile that has the inherent capability to be modified to meet the MTCR thresholds is also under the control of the regime. Both of our countries have reaffirmed our respective commitments to the MTCR guidelines and its parameters. As a second step in this regard, the United States and China also have agreed to hold further in-depth discussions on the MTCR, including discussion of China's possible MTCR membership in the near future."
—"The Credibility of China's Nonproliferation Pledges and United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," compiled by the minority staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996.

4 October 1994
China further clarifies the nature of its adherence to the MTCR in a joint statement with the United States. China agrees to work together with the United States to promote the nonproliferation of missiles, and to promote a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It later included those verbal assurances in a February 1992 letter to the Bush administration. The letter is currently classified. In that document, China makes two key commitments. First, China agrees to completely ban the export of ground-to-ground missiles; this pledge goes beyond the MTCR's requirements which only call for a "strong presumption of denial" for such exports. Second, China agrees to the concept of inherent capability, which states that the missile would be included in the ban if it could generate sufficient energy to deliver a 500 kg payload at least 300 km, regardless of its demonstrated or advertised combination of range and payload. This second commitment from China is especially important because it was aimed at preventing the export of missiles that could violate the MTCR if their range and payload were adjusted. For example, China argued in the past that its M-11 missile exports to Pakistan did not violate the MTCR because the range and payload of the missile (290km/800kg) do not strictly meet the MTCR parameters of 300km/500kg.
—"Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation, Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement on Stopping Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons," 4 October 1994, Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org>.

6 October 1994
Steven D. Dorfman, president of Hughes' Telecommunications and Space Sector, says that while the lifting of U.S.-imposed sanctions on the export of advanced satellite components to China is "a step in the right direction," the damage they caused is "irreparable." Dorfman also states that his company has lost investments opportunities in China to other foreign investors such as Germany. Before the United States placed sanctions on China, Hughes was in the process of negotiating a deal that would have given them an edge in China's burgeoning satellite market. "We are determined that satellites would become a purely commercial entity," he says. "Satellites are not weapons, they don not belong on the munitions control list."
—"Damage from China Sanctions 'Irreparable,' Hughes Exec Says," Aerospace Daily, 7 October 1994, p. 33, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

8 October 1994 China continues testing a new set of ballistic missile warheads. The test, similar to the one in June, entails exploding a nuclear device underneath the desert at the Lop Nor testing site. One Chinese scientist defends the test by stating that if China obeys the international request to stop testing nuclear weapons, then it means China would have to cancel its ballistic missile program without developing its second-generation ballistic missiles.
—Patrick E. Tyler, "Chinese Test Atomic Bomb Underground," New York Times, 8 October 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 October 1994
According to "The Military Balance," an annual report issued by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), China is developing "a number of new nuclear weapons." The report states that China has conducted two nuclear tests in the past 12 months and that it is the only nation on earth to have done so during this time period. [The October 8th testing was conducted after the IISS report had been printed.] The report states that the "differences in yields tested suggest that a number of new weapons are being developed." The first missile being developed is a dual-purpose missile capable of both submarine (JL-2) and ground launches (DF-31). Both have an estimated range of 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles). The second missile, DF-41, is estimated to have a 12,000 kilometer (7,500 mile) range. While all three missiles have solid fuel propulsion, only the DF-31 and DF-41 can be fired from mobile launchers. The DF-41 is expected to be in service by the year 2000; however, no reports confirm a submarine development for the launching of the JL-2. IISS analyst Colonel Andrew Duncan says that virtually any missile has the power to be dual-purpose in both conventional and nuclear capabilities. Colonel Duncan maintains that there is "not sufficient information available to know the Chinese plan."
—International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance 1994-1995, (London, United Kingdom: Brassey's Ltd., 1994), p. 165, "China Developing New Nuclear Weapons: IISS," Agence France Presse, 12 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

18 October 1994
In the first visit to Beijing by a U.S. Defense Secretary since the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, Secretary William J. Perry encourages China to be more open about its defense budget and strategic planning. He states that China's strengthening of its armed forces paired with secrecy has led many nations to be suspicious of China, but the tension could be eased with a more transparent defense budget. Perry also said that China needs to restrain its sale of missiles and other forms of military technology, citing that the arms race between India and Pakistan could lead to a nuclear conflict along China's southern border. As part of a reciprocal exchange of information, Perry's aides confirm that China is willing to send defense officials to the Pentagon to review their military plans until the year 2000.
—Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. to China: Be More Open on Arms Plan," New York Times, 18 October 1994, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

1 November 1994
The United States waives the 24 August 1993 missile sanctions against China's Ministry of Aerospace Industry (MAI) for national security reasons. U.S. Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis issues a determination that waives the sanctions against 9 Chinese firms identified as subsidiaries of MAI. The sanctions against the Pakistani Ministry of Defense, however, remain in place and are set to expire in August 1995.
—Dianne E. Rennack, "China: US Economic Sanctions," CRS Report for Congress, 1 July 1996, p. 31; "The Credibility of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," compiled by the minority staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996; "US Nonproliferation Sanctions Against China and/or Chinese Entities," 31 July 2003, Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org>.

6 November 1994
According to a report issued by Zhengming magazine, banned from publication since the summer of 1994, China's limited nuclear arsenal is aimed at big cities in enemy countries. The magazine quoted He Zhaxiu, a professor at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, who said that these "soft targets" would be difficult to defend as they are concentrated population centers of economy and ordinary military power. He, the former secretary to Qian Xuesen, honorary chairman of the China Association for Science and Technology and known as the "father of Nuclear Missile Development, took part in formulating the nuclear strategy but would not reveal how many nuclear weapons China has in its arsenal.
—"China Aims Nukes at Big City Enemies, Magazine Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 November, 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

30 November 1994
China launches the Dongfanghong-3 (DFH-3) satellite. The satellite was lost in sub-geosynchronous orbit after Chinese officials used its propulsion system when the apogee kick stage failed.
—Federation of American Scientists' World Space Guide, "China and Communications Systems DFH-3", <www.fas.org>; "China Has Lost," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 16 January 1995, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "China Successfully Launches No. 3 Dongfanghong Telecommunications Satellite," British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 1 December 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

30 November 1994
China concludes its second major arms deal under which U.S. $400 million worth of military equipment was sold to Myanmar (Burma). The first agreement, an initial defense package worth U.S. $1.2 billion, included armored vehicles, trucks, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft artillery, and surface-to-air missiles.
—Bertil Lintner, "$400M Deal Signed by China and Myanmar," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 December 1994; "Burma Orders 400 million dollars in Chinese Arms-Jane's," Agence France Presse, 30 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com.

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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008 by MIIS.

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