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Updated October 2008
Nuclear Capabilities
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
China first produced weapon-grade uranium on 14 January 1964 at the Lanzhou Nuclear Fuel Complex in Gansu Province. China reportedly halted uranium enrichment for military purposes in 1987, but has only unofficially confirmed this in 1990.[1] Most sources believe that China stopped producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) by 1989 at the latest. A 2001 Pentagon report stated that "China is not currently believed to be producing fissile material [highly enriched uranium and plutonium] for nuclear weapons."[2]
In the early 1990s, China declared that it would eventually replace its gaseous diffusion facilities with facilities using gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Because of a black-box technology transfer deal with Russia, China now operates three gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants-two located at Hanzhong in Shaanxi province that are subject to IAEA safeguards, and one called Lanzhou 2, located near the now-decommissioned gas-diffusion Lanzhou site. A November 2007 agreement between Russia and China confirmed plans for the construction of a fourth gas centrifuge enrichment facility, also in Hanzhong. China maintains a gaseous diffusion plant in Heping, which reportedly is still in operation. [3]
Open source information about the size of China's HEU stocks is very limited. China has not published or made any official statements regarding the size of its HEU stockpile nor has it provided any information about the production capabilities of its HEU facilities, but according to reports about the Russia-China enrichment agreement, China's three operating gas centrifuge enrichment facilities have a combined yearly output of approximately 1 million SWUs, to which the fourth facility will add an additional 500,000 SWUs. The Heping facility adds a further potential 400,000 SWUs, based on estimates from when its HEU production was brought to a halt in 1989.[4] David Albright and Corey Hinderstein have estimated, based on predictions of separative output of the Lanzhou and Heping plants, that China has produced roughly 21.5 tons of weapons-grade uranium. Given that less than 500 kg have been assigned to research reactors in the civilian sector, Albright and Hinderstein put the military stockpile of HEU at about 21 tons.[5] This would be sufficient to produce 700-1050 additional nuclear weapons, using a range of 20-30 kg per warhead.[6]
URANIUM ENRICHMENT TECHNIQUES:
China's main method of uranium enrichment until the mid-1990s had been gaseous diffusion. This process relies on the separation effect achieved through molecular effusion in which two gases of different molecular weight are placed in a vessel with semi-permeable walls. The gas with the lower molecular weight (uranium-235) travels faster and hits the walls more often, relative to its concentration, than the heavier and more abundant uranium-235. This results in more of the U-235 molecules flowing through the wall than the heavier U-238. Therefore, the gas that escapes the vessel has a higher concentration of uranium-235.
Beginning in the early 1990s, China began working with Russia on building enrichment plants using a second method-gas centrifuge. This process uses a large number of inter-connected rotating cylinders to form what is known as a cascade. When the uranium hexafluoride (UF6) is fed into the centrifuges, it is rotated at a high speed, creating a strong centrifugal force that draws the heavier gas molecules (containing the U-238) towards the outside of the cylinder. The lighter gas molecules (containing the U-235) are found closer to the center. This enriched stream is then removed and fed into the next higher stage, while the rest (slightly depleted) is moved into the next lower stage.
One gas centrifuge stage can produce substantially more enriched U-235 than a single gaseous diffusion stage, which is one of the reasons that China moved to develop this technique. The gas centrifuge facilities utilizing this technique became operational in 1998 and produced low-enriched uranium (LEU) for China's commercial power reactors. Since 1973, China has also conducted research on Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) and Molecular Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (MLIS) techniques. Since 1985, however, China has focused its efforts mainly on the AVLIS process. In October 1991, China was successful in using the AVLIS method to enrich uranium to over 3 percent in one step.
China's uranium enrichment capabilities have been categorized as follows: [7]
|
ENRICHMENT TECHNIQUE |
CHINA'S CAPABILITY |
|
Gaseous diffusion |
Industrial capacity; China operated two facilities at Lanzhou and Heping with an enrichment capacity of 200,000 SWU/yr or more; Lanzhou was shut down in 1997 and decommissioned in 1999; Heping is still operational and has a 400,000 SWU/yr enrichment capacity. |
|
Gas centrifuge |
Industrial capacity; Sino-Russian project begun in 1992 resulted in two plants at Hanzhong with a total capacity of 400,000-500,000 SWU/yr; a third Sino-Russian facility at a site near Lanzhou with a capacity of 500,000 SWU/yr; and a fourth facility under construction at Hanzhong with an estimated 500,000 SWU/yr output. |
|
Ion/Chemical exchange |
Research and development. |
|
Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) |
Research and development. |
|
LAP (CRISLA) Laser Technique |
Research and development. |
Uranium Enrichment Facilities
For decades, China produced HEU at two gaseous diffusion plants: Lanzhou and Heping. Since 1989, the two plants were reportedly producing only low-enriched uranium (LEU) for commercial uses. With the Chinese government's 1999 decision to decommission the Lanzhou facility, the Heping plant is the only gaseous diffusion plant in China still in operation. However, China has in operation two Russian-built gas centrifuge enrichment facilities located at Hanzhong,-a third centrifuge facility associated with this project near the now-decommissioned Lanzhou site, and ongoing construction of a fourth such facility, also at Hangzhong.
The existence of the Heping Uranium Enrichment Plant, also known as the Third Line Gaseous Diffusion Plant, has yet to be officially acknowledged by the Chinese government. It was constructed as part of Mao's "Third Line" strategy, under which new strategic facilities were ordered to be constructed in the interior of the country, away from the more vulnerable border areas and coasts. This strategy began in 1964, and the Heping facility was designed to duplicate the Lanzhou facility in that it also used gaseous diffusion to produce enriched uranium.[8]
The plant most likely became operational in 1975. Three years earlier, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had estimated the Heping facility, based on the size of the building which was larger than those at Lanzhou, would be able to produce 750-2950 kg of weapons-grade uranium per year.[9] However, the capacity of the facility is assumed to have improved over the next decade or so, though the dearth of information about the Heping plant makes such assumptions tenuous at best. The Heping facility is most likely still operational, producing low enriched uranium for China's civilian nuclear program.
Beginning in the early 1990s, Chinese officials had stated that China would eventually replace its gaseous diffusion facilities at Lanzhou and Heping with facilities using gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment, which are much more efficient.[10] China and Russia signed an agreement in 1992 for Russia's MINATOM to construct uranium enrichment plants at a site near Hanzhong in Shaanxi Province for China. Russia and China then established a joint venture in January 1996 to build three commercial-scale gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities, involving the Russian firm Zarubezhatomenergostroy.[11]
The two plants at Hanzhong became operational in 1996 and 1998, respectively and are currently producing low-enriched uranium (LEU). The first plant has a reported capacity of 200,000 SWU/yr and the second one has an expected capacity of 200,000-300,000 SWU/yr.[12] Both plants are under IAEA safeguards. A third gas centrifuge facility was originally expected to be built at the Hanzhong site but was relocated to a site 25 km north of the Lanzhou enrichment facility. This new facility, completed in November 2001, reportedly has a capacity of 500,000 SWU/yr, larger than both of the facilities located at Hanzhong.[13]
In October 2004, China reportedly approached Russia for assistance in the construction of a third gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility near the Hanzhong facilities. This project would be the fourth stage in the joint cooperation between the two countries.[14]
China reportedly has built a replica of the CRISLA (chemical reaction by isotope selective laser activation) process developed by U.S.-based Isotope Technologies from published drawings at Fudan University. Also, there is a possible enrichment facility for weapons-grade uranium located in Xian, Shaanxi Province.[15]
Plutonium
China completed its first plutonium reprocessing plant in Juiqian in 1970, based on early Soviet technology. A second facility was subsequently built in the same location, but both were shut down in 1984 due to technical problems. A set of reprocessing facilities using the PUREX process was built in 1974 in Guanyuan, Sichuan, and was operated until the early 1990s. Most recently, a reprocessing facility was finished in Lanzhou in 2002 to produce commercial plutonium, and another larger one, able to produce 800 metric tons of plutonium per year, is slated to be operational in 2020.[16]
China has another plutonium reprocessing center in Yumenzhen, Gansu. The center is comprised of a spent fuel storage facility and a pilot-scale reprocessing facility that may ramp up production to a full-batch mode in the near future. [17]
A 2007 deal with the French firm Areva yielded a $11.8 billion deal, the "largest contract in the history of nuclear power." The terms of the contract include the purchase of two plutonium reprocessing/mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facilities, originally slated to be built in Guangdong province, but China later decided to move the sites to a more inland location. [18]
Sources:
[1] International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material
Report 2007, October 2007,
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf.
[2] U.S. Department of Defense,Proliferation: Threat and
Response, January 2001,
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf.
[3] James Bodgener, "China's Military Legacy," Nuclear Engineering International, 23
July 2008, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com, "Russia and China
Sign Enrichment Plant Agreement," World Nuclear News, 27 May 2008;
International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report
2006, September 2006, http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr06.pdf.
[4] ibid.
[5] David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Chinese Military Plutonium and Highly
Enriched Uranium Inventories," ISIS, 30 June 2005, p. 6-7.
[6] Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched
Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and
Policies, p. 76-78 and 128-130.
[7] U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993), p. 132; Sean
Tyson, "Uranium Enrichment Technologies: Proliferation Implications,"
Eye on Supply, No. 5, Fall 1991, pp. 87-88.
[8] Albright and Hinderstein, "Chinese Military Plutonium and
Highly Enriched Uranium Inventories," p. 4.
[9] U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet and People's
Republic of China Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy and
Strategy, TCS-65475-72, March 1972.
[10] Mark Hibbs, "With More Russian Centrifuges, China Will Close Lanzhou
Plant," Nuclear Fuel, 6 October 1997, pp. 3-4.
[11] Rodney W. Jones et al., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation 1998: A Guide in Maps and
Charts, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998), p. 66-67; Mark Hibbs, "China's
Centrifuge SWU Plant Up and Running, MINATOM Says," Nuclear Fuel, 27 January 1997, p. 3;
Interfax, "Plans for Phase 2 of China-Russia Uranium Enrichment Plant," 8 April
1998, FBIS-SOV-98-098.
[12] Mark Hibbs, "China's Centrifuge SWU Plant Up
and Running, Minatom Says," Nuclear Fuel, 27 January 1997, pp. 3-4.
[13] "Russian Atomic Ministry Delegation to Participate in Launch of
Third Line of Gas-Centrifuge Plant in China,"
Economic News, 13 November 2001.
[14]
"China Asks Russia to Help Build New Stage of Uranium Enrichment Plant," Global
News Wire-Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 21 October 2004, in Lexis-Nexis,
http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[15] See "Uranium Enrichment," China WMD Profiles,
http://www.nti.org/db/china/uenrich.htm.
[16] M.D. Zentner, G.L. Coles, R.J.
Talbert, Nuclear Proliferation Technology Trends Analysis, (Washington:
Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Sept 2005), pp. 93-94,
http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-14480.pdf.
[17] Mark Hibbs, "CNNC Favors Remote Site for Future Reprocessing
Plant," Nuclear Fuel, 7 April 2008, in Lexis-Nexis
http://www.lexisnexis.com.
[18] ibid.; and Ann MacLachlan, "Areva, China
Seal Long-Term Mining, Fuel Cycle Pact," Nuclear Fuel, 3 December
2007, in Lexis-Nexis http://www.lexisnexis.com.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008
by MIIS.
