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Updated November 2005
Nuclear Capabilities
Methodology
China's current nuclear arsenal is estimated to contain about 450 warheads, though it has reportedly produced enough fissile material (highly enriched uranium [HEU] and plutonium) to double or triple its arsenal. China has never publicly discussed the size of its nuclear stockpile. Likewise, China has not publicly stated that it has stopped producing weapons-grade nuclear material, but Chinese officials have informally told several U.S. officials and scholars that such production has stopped. Additionally, in its January 2001 report entitled Proliferation: Threat and Response, the U.S. Defense Department stated that "China is not currently believed to be producing fissile material for nuclear weapons, but it has a stockpile of fissile material sufficient to increase or improve its weapon inventory."[1]
Given the substantial amount of ambiguity and secrecy surrounding China's nuclear arsenal, as well as its fissile material production facilities, it is difficult to state with any degree of certainty the size or capabilities of its nuclear program. Nonetheless, China's nuclear weapons program has been the subject of intense scrutiny by nonproliferation analysts, intelligence agencies, and other observers since its inception in the 1950s. Over time, a fuzzy picture emerged from the analysis, albeit with some gaps in understanding. The resulting analysis can set bounds on the uncertainties, while producing a range of estimates of the country's capabilities and stockpiles. Analytic tools include: examining statements and articles in the Chinese state-run news media; both Chinese and foreign government reports including unclassified intelligence estimates and white papers; interviews of insiders who have had access to information about the program; reviewing secondary sources such as reports, books and journal articles by analysts; and making scientific calculations based on the best available information about China's nuclear infrastructure.
Technical analysis of such highly secret nuclear programs like China's is based on the widely known physical and engineering aspects of nuclear materials and weapons, which enable estimates of capabilities based on fragmentary and uncertain information. Nuclear weapons programs require specialized materials, facilities, equipment, and training in order to produce the raw material for weapons--either HEU or plutonium--and then to fabricate explosive devices using this fissile material. Weapons programs can be based on indigenous (i.e., domestic) production capabilities, or they can rely on foreign supplies and technologies. Virtually all weapons programs use some foreign inputs, if only technical information culled from scientific and engineering sources. In China's case, it received early assistance from the Soviet Union until Moscow cut off all nuclear aid to Beijing following the Sino-Soviet split in 1960. However, all countries known to have successfully acquired nuclear weapons have done so primarily on the basis of indigenously produced fissile material. China is no different, as the first nuclear bomb it exploded on 16 October 1964 consisted of highly enriched uranium that was produced at its uranium enrichment facility in Lanzhou, Gansu Province.[2]
There are two paths to follow in making materials for a nuclear weapon--HEU and plutonium. A uranium-based bomb program requires capabilities to mine and mill uranium, and to enrich it to weapons-grade or near-weapons-grade (the Hiroshima bomb used less-than-weapons-grade uranium). While uranium enriched to levels above 20 percent are considered "highly enriched," only isotopes enriched to levels above 90 percent are considered weapons-grade.
A plutonium-based bomb program requires capabilities to mine and mill uranium, process it into reactor fuel, transform the isotopic content of the fuel by "burning" it in a reactor, extract plutonium from the spent fuel, form the plutonium into the core of a fission-implosion weapon, and develop and test high explosives used to initiate fission. Although technically sub-optimal, even reactor-grade plutonium can be used as fissile material in nuclear weapons.
An advanced weapons program would require the capability to manufacture tritium, a radioactive gas that can be used to enhance the explosive power of nuclear weapons, for fabrication of boosted-yield weapons. It is speculated the China produced tritium at least at its Baotou Nuclear Fuel Component Plant in Inner Mongolia, and possibly at the Yibin Fuel Plant in Sichuan Province.[3]
In China's case, it initially pursued parallel development of both HEU and plutonium programs. However, following the suspension of all Soviet nuclear assistance and withdrawal of all technicians and engineers, the political leadership in Beijing had to decide on which program to focus its limited technical resources. The uranium approach was ultimately identified as the program to receive top priority, since compared to the plutonium effort, it was fairly well advanced. For example, approximately 80 percent of the engineering design and a substantial part of the civil construction, most notably at the Lanzhou Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Plant, had been completed. Comparatively, the plutonium program never received approximately 95 percent of the equipment for the plutonium production reactor supposedly sent by Moscow, while much of the equipment that did arrive lacked blueprints.[4]
After the successful explosion of China's first atomic bomb on 16 October 1964, emphasis focused on mastering the complete nuclear fuel cycle, resulting in the construction of the plutonium reprocessing plant to regain momentum. Starting in December 1965, China possessed the capability to produce both enriched uranium and plutonium.[4]
China's Estimated Fissile Materials Stockpile[5]
The table below is a compilation of varying estimates as to China's total HEU and plutonium stockpiles. Such a wide range of estimates demonstrates the difficultly in identifying one specific figure as the best estimate. However, taken together, these estimates can help establish a general agreed upon range for China's fissile material stockpile.
|
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) |
PLUTONIUM (PU) |
SOURCE |
|
N/A |
1.7-2.8 tons weapons grade; |
1999 Department of Energy estimate; Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, "World Plutonium Inventories," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September/October 1999, p. 71. |
|
20 tons; 7 tons in operational weapons |
3.5 tons; 1 ton in operational weapons |
SIPRI Yearbook 1995 |
|
4-14 tons |
1 ton |
Albright, et al, 1992 World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium |
|
20 tons |
4 tons |
Albright, et al, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 |
|
3 tons |
1 ton |
Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright and Yong Liu, "China and a Fissile Material Production Cut-off," Survival, Winter 1995-96, p. 151. |
|
15 tons; 7 tons in operational weapons |
3 tons; 1.8 tons in operational weapons |
Frans Berkhout, Oleg Bukharin, Harold Feiveson, and Marvin Miller, "A Cutoff In The Production Of Fissile Material," International Security, Winter 1994/95, p. 174. |
|
20 tons (+/-5) |
4.8 tons (+/-2) |
David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Fissile Material: Stockpiles still Growing," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2004, p. 14-16. |
|
23 tons |
4 tons |
The Risk Report, 1999 Update |
Sources:
[1] U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil.
[2] John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
[3] See "Plutonium and Tritium Production," China WMD Profiles, http://www.nti.org/db/china/puprod.htm.
[4] Yan Kong, "China's Nuclear Bureaucracy," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1993.
[5] According to Alastair Johnston, "Current estimates of China's fissile material stockpile suffer from a large margin of error." See Alastair Iain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control," China Quarterly, June 1996, p. 562.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008
by MIIS.
