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	China Profiles Database: Nuclear Nonproliferation
	China Profiles Database: Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation
	China Profiles Database: Missile Nonproliferation
	Treaties and Organizations
	China's Nuclear Missile Submarine Base
	FAS: Ministry of Information Industry
	Chinese nuclear forces, 2006
	Australia-China Nuclear Material Transfer Agreement and Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
	GlobalSecurity: China
	China and Nuclear Transparency
	China: CIA World Fact Book

Updated November 2005

Nuclear Capabilities

Nuclear Weapons

According to a study of China's nuclear forces conducted by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC):

"China maintains an arsenal of about 400 warheads: some 250 "strategic" weapons structured in a triad of long-range land-based missiles, bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles; and some 150 "tactical" weapons--presumably lower-yield bombs for tactical aircraft, possibly artillery shells, atomic demolition munitions..."[1]

Although approximately 400 warheads are estimated to be in the Chinese nuclear arsenal, its military lacks appropriate delivery vehicles for many of these warheads. More specifically, only about 120 nuclear-capable ballistic missiles are deployed on four different types of ballistic missiles: 18-20 Dong Feng-5 (DF-5) inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 12 DF-4 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and approximately 40 DF-3A and 48 DF-21A medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).[1] While China possesses 12 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)--the Ju Lang-1 (JL-1)--the U.S. intelligence community does not consider them to be deployed due to numerous problems with the Xia-class submarine on which they are located. Additionally, the antiquated state of many of China's nuclear-capable aircraft, coupled with the observed lack of storage facilities for nuclear weapons at Chinese airfields, has led some to question the relevance of including these warheads in estimates of China's nuclear weapons arsenal.[2]

Land-based Ballistic Missiles

China has four types of operational land-based, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles: the DF-3A, the DF-4, the DF-21/21A, and the DF-5/5A. China has 40 MRBM launchers deployed at sites in Jianshui, Datong, Liujihou, Tonghua, Dengshahe, Yidu, and Lianxiwang.[3] These launchers were originally intended for the DF-3A, which are gradually being replaced in favor of the solid fueled, two-stage DF-21. This phasing out has reportedly already taken place for the launchers located at the Tonghua, Jianshui and Lianxiwang sites. Additional reports point to DF-21s also being based at Chuxiong. It is unclear whether or not these launchers have refire capabilities.

The DF-4 is a longer range missile deployed in silos or caves at Da Qaidam, Delingha, Sundian, and Tongdao. Though often referred to as an ICBM, the DF-4, with its 5,500 km range, is not capable of reaching the continental United States. Instead, it is thought to serve as a "retaliatory deterrent against targets in Russia and Asia."[4] The DF-5A, China's longest range missile and its only true ICBM, is capable of striking targets throughout the continental United States. Eighteen to twenty of these DF-5A missiles are deployed in silos and caves at Luoning and Xuanhua.[3]

Although sometimes referred to as nuclear-capable, China's short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) force--comprised of the DF-11 (or by its export name, M-11) and the DF-15 (M-9)--has yet to be confirmed as such. Instead, the Pentagon's 2005 report on China's military power refers to the missiles as "conventionally armed," whereas mention of their potential nuclear capability is absent from other public or declassified U.S. intelligence assessments and reports.[5]

China is currently working to make its missile force more survivable by introducing a new generation of mobile, solid-fueled ballistic missiles--the DF-31 and the longer range DF-31A. These two missiles are intended to replace China's aging cave and silo-based DF-4 and DF-5/5A missiles. Both the DF-31 and DF-31A are designed to be road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles and have shortened launch preparation times. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that they will be operational by 2006 and 2009, respectively.[5]

Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)

While China has placed increasing emphasis on modernizing its strategic submarine fleet, it currently only has one ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and it has been in and out of service since it was launched in 1981. China's single Xia-class SSBN has launch tubes for 12 JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). However, the Xia has experienced ongoing operational problems and has yet to sail beyond China's regional waters. Likewise, the U.S. intelligence community characterizes the submarine's missile system as not being fully operational, and refers to the JL-1s on board as not yet deployed.[6] The warheads for the JL-1 are believed to be stored at the Jianggezhuang Submarine Base.

China is developing a longer range SLBM known as the JL-2, which is the sea-based version of the DF-31. On 16 June 2005, China test fired a long-range SLBM that is believed to be the Julang-2. According to various reports, the missile was fired by a nuclear submarine off the coast of the port city Qingdao, and landed in a Chinese desert several thousand kilometers away. Despite this test, the JL-2 is not expected to have operational capacity until 2008-10, and would most likely be deployed on the SSBN type-094, which is still under development.[7]

Bombers

China has 30 Qian-5 (A-5/FANTAN) and 100 Hong-6 (B-6/BADGER) bombers that are believed to be intended to deliver nuclear weapons. The Qian-5 has a limited range of 400 km and can only carry one nuclear bomb, while the Hong-6 has a range of 3,100 km and can carry up to three bombs. As China's antiquated bombers have been in service for over 30 years, they are unlikely to defeat adversaries with modern air defenses.

While there were initially some reports that a medium-range bomber, the H-7, would have a nuclear role, more recent evidence points to that not being the case, due to its limited range and small payload capabilities. Instead, there is increasing focus on the Russian-supplied Su-30 and its Chinese derivatives (Su-30MKK and Su-30MKK2) as a potential nuclear delivery platform, due to its range and payload, which are similar to the H-6.[8]

Nonstrategic (Tactical) Weapons

While China is widely believed to possess tactical nuclear weapons, these reports are difficult to confirm and the details contained therein vary widely. The evidence mostly stems from China's testing of lower yield nuclear weapons during the late 1970s. These tests suggest that China began developing tactical nuclear weapons earlier in the decade and that research continued into the 1980s. Tests in September 1977, March 1978 and October 1980 all produced yields under 20 Kt and in 1983 the PLA published a manual explaining the different types and functions of tactical nuclear weapons.

However, a 1984 declassified Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report estimated that "the Chinese maintain atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) in their inventory, although there is no evidence confirming their production or deployment." The DIA report noted that China probably did not possess "artillery-fired nuclear projectiles." Additionally, the DIA report admitted that "it knew very little about the extent of tactical or theater nuclear weapons for use by the Chinese People's Liberation Army."[9]

In 1988, China conducted a test of what is believed to have been a neutron bomb for nonstrategic purposes. [See "Warhead Designs" section below for more information on the China's neutron bomb development.] Recent U.S. government reports on China's nuclear forces do not mention China's possession of tactical nuclear weapons however.

Warhead Designs

China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, tested its first hydrogen weapon in 1967, began series production of nuclear weapons in 1968, and initiated production of thermonuclear weapons in 1974. Robert Norris of the NRDC estimates that China has tested and deployed six nuclear warhead designs:

• a 20-40 kiloton (kT) fission gravity bomb;
• a 20 kT missile warhead;
• a 3+ megaton (MT) thermonuclear missile warhead;
• a 4-5 MT warhead for the DF-5 ICBM;
• a 3+ MT thermonuclear gravity bomb; and
• a 200-300 kT warhead possibly for the for the DF-31/31A, and the JL-2 SLBM.[10]

China may also possess low-yield fission warheads for tactical nuclear weapons. Additionally, in July 1999, the Chinese government announced that in the early 1980s it had "mastered neutron bomb design technology," but Beijing did not indicate whether it had actually produced or deployed any neutron bombs. This statement about the neutron bomb was the first time that China had publicly discussed any of its military nuclear programs. China reportedly tested an experimental 1-5 kT enhanced radiation (neutron) warhead in September 1988. This step would seem to validate the recent Chinese statement about having developed a neutron bomb. China likely developed the neutron bomb to protect against the possibility of a large Soviet invasion of the mainland during the height of the Cold War.[11]

Command and Control

Very little is known about China's chain of command for authority over nuclear weapons. Chinese nuclear forces are thought to be under the control of the Central Military Commission (CMC), which is led by current Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and PRC State President Hu Jintao. It is believed that ultimate authority to use nuclear weapons rests with the Chairman of the CMC (also assumed by Hu) after top leaders have reached a consensus. A decision to use nuclear weapons may also require a consensus decision within the Central Military Commission and among other senior military leaders.[12]

It is estimated that China's nuclear forces are deployed at about 20 locations throughout the country. China is believed to store most of its nuclear warheads and bombs separate from its delivery vehicles, and the warheads and bombs are only mated with the missiles or aircraft during launch preparations. In this sense, China's nuclear forces are not on alert. Also, China may have central storage locations for its missile warheads and gravity bombs which are accessible by a number of missile and bomber bases.[13] China is not thought to use PAL (permissive-action-link) devices, which prevent unauthorized or accidental launches of nuclear weapons through technical means.[14]

As China moves to a more mobile missile force, its new ICBMs and SLBMs will be mated with nuclear warheads, which decreases the effectiveness of physical security methods in stopping unauthorized launches. As Phillip Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan state, "these missiles will push operational launch authority to lower levels, require a more sophisticated command and control system, and likely rely more heavily on technical means to prevent unauthorized launches."[14]

Arsenal Size

Only a few U.S. government sources have discussed the size of China's nuclear arsenal. In the Pentagon's January 2001 report entitled Proliferation: Threat and Response, the U.S. Defense Department stated that China has over 100 nuclear warheads operationally deployed on ballistic missiles while additional warheads are in storage.[15] In April 2004, the Chinese government for the first time numerically commented on its nuclear arsenal, stating that "among the nuclear weapon states, China...possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal." Given that the British arsenal is accepted as possessing approximately 200 nuclear weapons, this statement implies that China has less than that.

In terms of targeting, a classified CIA study reportedly stated that 13 of China's 18-20 DF-5A ICBMs are targeted at the United States while the remaining five are targeted at countries closer to China. Yet, this targeting strategy may have changed after the U.S. and China signed a "non-targeting agreement" in June 1998 in which each side promised not to target its missiles at the other.[16]

As for future deployments, in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, National Intelligence Officer Robert Walpole stated, "By 2015, China will likely have tens of missiles targeted against the United States, having added a few tens of more survivable land- and sea-based mobile missiles with smaller nuclear warheads..."[17] Another analyst, Ming Zhang, agrees. He writes that "ten years down the road... the Chinese nuclear arsenal...may grow from today's 20 ICBMs (with warhead yields in the megaton range) to perhaps 50 or 100 ICBMs with multiple warheads with yields in the kilotons."[18]

However, predictions about China's nuclear arsenal have historically proven to be exaggerated and inaccurate. The U.S. Pacific Command estimated in the 1960's that by 1973 China would have as many as 435 nuclear weapons, when at that time they really only had around 150.[19] Then, in the mid-1980s, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) predicted that by 1989, the Chinese arsenal would number 586 nuclear warheads and 818 warheads by 1994.[20] In fact, China's nuclear arsenal plateaued at around 400 warheads by the early 1980s, highlighting the problems inherent in making predictions about a nuclear force structure about which very little is known.

China's Current Nuclear Arsenal--Stockpile, Delivery Systems, and Deployments[21]

"DF" stands for "Dong Feng" ("East Wind")
"JL" stands for "Julang" ("Giant Wave")
"CSS" stands for "Chinese Surface-to-Surface"
"CSS-N" stands for "Chinese Surface-to-Surface Naval"
"CSST" stands for "Chinese Surface-to-Surface Tactical"

H stands for "Hong" (bomber)
Q stands for "Qian" (fighter/attack aircraft)
B designates bomber aircraft; A designates attack aircraft

China's Estimated Nuclear Weapons Stockpile: 1964-2005[22]

China's Estimated Tactical Nuclear Weapons Stockpile[23]

The Chinese government has not, to date, officially confirmed its possession of tactical nuclear weapons.

Sources:
[1] Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, "NRDC: Nuclear Notebook: Chinese nuclear forces, 1999," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1999, p. 79-80.
[2] Jeffrey Lewis, "The Ambiguous Arsenal," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2003; Jeffrey Lewis, "Letters to the Editor: Nuclear Numerology Chinese Style," Arms Control Today, March 2005.
[3] Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, "The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence," in James Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army as Organization (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2002); Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, "The Chinese Strategic Rocket Forces: Transition to Credible Deterrence," unpublished study presented at China and Weapons of Mass Destruction, a seminar sponsored by the National Intelligence Council, November 1999.
[4] Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate: Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001, www.cia.gov.
[5] U.S. Department of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," July 2005, www.defenselink.mil; Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese nuclear forces, 2003," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2003, p. 77-80; Jeffrey Lewis, "Letters to the Editor: Nuclear Numerology Chinese Style," Arms Control Today, March 2005.
[6] National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, August 2003; U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, www.defenselink.mil.
[7] U.S. Department of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," July 2005, www.defenselink.mil; Bill Gertz, "China Advances Missile Program," Washington Times, 22 June 2005.
[8] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese nuclear forces, 2003," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2003, p. 77-80.
[9] Defense Intelligence Agency, "Nuclear Weapons Systems in China," DEB-49-84, 24 April 1984, p. 4, available at http://www.nukestrat.com/china/diachina.htm.
[10] Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).
[11] Robert S. Norris, "French And Chinese Nuclear Weapon Testing," Security Dialogue, March 1996, pp. 49-50; Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 326, 358; Viktor Vasilyevich Stefashin, Mirovaya Ekonomika (Moscow), 19 August 1995, in "Chinese Nuclear Strategy And National Security," FBIS-UMA-95-206-S, 25 October 1995; Robert S. Norris, "Nuclear Arsenals of the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China: A Status Report," presented at the 5th ISODARCO Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, Chengdu, China, November 1996, p. 5; Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 1999," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May/June 1999, p. 79; "China acknowledges development of neutron bomb technology," CNN News, 15 July 1999, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9907/15/china.bomb/.
[12] Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, "The Chinese Strategic Rocket Forces: Transition to Credible Deterrence," unpublished study presented at China and Weapons of Mass Destruction, a seminar sponsored by the National Intelligence Council, November 1999.
[13] Robert S. Norris, "French And Chinese Nuclear Weapon Testing," Security Dialogue, March 1996, pp. 49-50; Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume 5, pp. 326, 358; Richard W. Fieldhouse, Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 16; Viktor Vasilyevich Stefashin, Mirovaya Ekonomika (Moscow), 19 August 1995, in "Chinese Nuclear Strategy And National Security," FBIS-UMA-95-206-S, 25 October 1995.
[14] Phillip C. Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan, "Strategic Force Modernization," in China's Nuclear Future, eds. by Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner, (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), p. 94-95.
[15] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, www.defenselink.mil.
[16] "China targets nukes at U.S.," The Washington Times, 1 May 1998.
[17] Robert D. Walpole, "The Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States," Statement to the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, 9 February 2000, http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/walp0200.htm.
[18] Ming Zhang, "What Threat," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September/October 1999, Vol. 55, No. 5. p. 54-55.
[19] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese nuclear forces, 2003," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2003, p. 77-80.
[20] Defense Intelligence Agency, "Nuclear Weapons Systems in China," DEB-49-84, 24 April 1984, p. 4, available at http://www.nukestrat.com/china/diachina.htm.
[21] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese nuclear forces, 2003," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2003, p. 77-80; John W. Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals," International Security, Fall 1992, pp. 9-11; Mirovaya Ekonomika Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya (Moscow), 19 August 1995, pp. 35-46, in "Chinese Nuclear Strategy And National Security," FBIS-UMA-95-206-S, 25 October 1995; Bates Gill, "Determinants And Directions For Chinese Weapons Imports," The Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 1995, p. 374; "Report: China Upgrading Short-Range Missile Systems," CNN World News, 11 July 1997; Bill Gertz, "New Chinese Missiles Target All of East Asia," Washington Times, 10 July 1997, p. 1; Phillip C. Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan, "Strategic Force Modernization," in China's Nuclear Future, eds. by Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner, (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), p. 94-95.
[22] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese nuclear forces, 2003," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2003, p. 77-80; "Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-1997," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1997, p. 67; "Estimated Nuclear Stockpiles 1945-1993," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 1993, p. 57; Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 359; Robert S. Norris, "Nuclear Arsenals of the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China: A Status Report," Presented at the 5th ISODARCO Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, Chengdu, China, November 1996.
[23] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese nuclear forces, 2003," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2003, p. 77-80; Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 359; in Gregory B. Owens, "Chinese Tactical Nuclear Weapons," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 1996, p. 4.

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About This Section

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008 by MIIS.