This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

Early 1950s
Aided by European technicians, Egypt successfully develops missiles with ranges of several hundred miles.
—Maurice Eisenstein, "Third World Missiles and Nuclear Proliferation," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1982; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1950s
Egypt develops rockets with the assistance of German scientists. Egypt begins three missile programs based on the German V-2 missile with plans to build 900 missiles of the three models by 1970.
—"Tactical missiles: survey of a dynamic year," Defense & Foreign Affairs, March 1985; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East: Regional trends, national forces, warfighting capabilities, delivery options, and weapons effects," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 31 January 2002, p. 12; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1950s to 1960s
The Soviet Union sends short-range Frog-4 and Frog-5 missiles to Egypt.
—"Journal Discusses Spread of Missile Technology," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Beijing), No. 3, 13 July 1990, pp. 29-36.

1951
As part of the program to modernize Egypt's military in the wake of defeat in the 1947-49 war with Israel, Egyptian Premier Mustafa Nahas initiates a program to build military rockets in Egypt. Egypt contracts German armaments expert Dr. Wilhelm Voss to oversee the program and hires a firm owned by Herr Fuellner that employs several German rocket experts. The experts begin developing a small rocket, probably solid fueled, with a range of several kilometers.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1952
Tests of the rocket developed for Egypt by Herr Fuellner's firm are unsatisfactory, and Egypt proposes that the firm be put under government control. Herr Fuellner refuses and is forced to leave the country along with some of the German experts. The rocket project is incorporated into the Compagnie des Engines a Reaction pour Vol Accelere (CERVA), a government-controlled enterprise in the Heliopolis section of Cairo. CERVA is a joint military and civilian enterprise headed by Count de Lavison. Its research and production facilities are probably at al-Mazar airfield outside Cairo. The Helwan munitions factory may also help CERVA with research and production. General Muhammad Naguib, who seized power from King Farouk in July, appoints Wilhem Voss as director of the Central Planning Board and chief advisor to the Ministry of War. Voss hires Dr. Rolf Engel as the senior German expert within CERVA, and he becomes a dominant force. Wolfgang Pilz and Paul Goercke, a German electronics expert, also join CERVA.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

March 1952
Having achieved some progress in the design of a tactical rocket, Egypt begins considering production of a longer-range guided missile. However, problems with development of the tactical rocket, including difficulty in acquiring high-quality steel, propellants and fuses, cause the delay of the guided rocket program and the eventual cancellation of the tactical rocket program.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1953
Egypt establishes the Sakr factory to develop and produce rockets and missiles.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

8 September 1953
The Egyptian Astronautical Society is founded to support CERVA.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1954
Paul Goercke leaves Egypt's rocket program and returns to Europe amid declining support for CERVA.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1956
Wilhem Voss leaves Egypt and its rocket program.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1956
Following the 1956 Suez War, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser asks the Soviet Union for help in obtaining artillery rockets with ranges of 50 to 70km. The Soviet Union refuses this request.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1957
Following the financial losses and political upheaval of the 1956 Suez War, Egypt abandons the goal of equipping its army with tactical rockets, cancels the program and disbands CERVA. Rolf Engel leaves Egypt. The main problems for the program were acquisition of high-quality steel, propellants and fuses.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1958
Nearly all German advisors and technicians that were in Egypt to work on the rocket program have left the country.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1958
Egyptian President Nasser launches a program of military industrialization to include the development of ballistic missiles.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

April 1959
In response to constant pressure from Egyptian President Nasser on the Soviet Union to provide Egypt with artillery rockets, Premier Krushchev responds in a letter:
"Probably, Mr. President, you will also remember well that when you approached me with the proposal that we supply you with medium-range bombers and intermediate-range rockets, I remarked that the territory of your country was so small that you would find it difficult to use these weapons. I then asked you what in your opinion were intermediate-range rockets. You replied that you needed rockets with a range of fifty to seventy kilometers. I told you that our intermediate-range rockets were designed for a distance of 2,000 to 4,000 kilometers and that they certainly would not suit you. If the need to use these rockets should arise, I said it would evidently be best to launch them from our territory. Therefore you have no need for such rockets, but you can count on us rendering you assistance with these rockets from our territory if the aggressors unleash war against you. I do not want to conceal from you the fact that when we did not agree with your proposal that we supply you with bombers and intermediate-range rockets, we had in mind that in a state of excitement largely caused by the prevailing situation you might have undertaken some undesirable action leading to war." Nasser responds: "I asked you for some medium-range artillery rockets and you said in your letter —and this is true— that I asked for rockets with a range of 57 kilometers, and we were surprised by your comment on this request saying that you told me that the medium-range rockets that the Soviet Union possesses are for a range between 2,000 to 4,000 kilometers. I defined what I asked for and defined its range. Perhaps the translation and the ambiguity between the word "rockets," the thing which I asked for, and the word "missiles," the thing which I did not ask for, are responsible for this mistake, though it is difficult to believe that this is the explanation in the light of the series of differences between the facts as they were and your version of them." The rocket that Egypt was asking for was the Luna 1 (Frog-2), which the Soviet Union had only recently deployed, making it unlikely the Soviets would provide it to Egypt.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1960
The Egyptian General Aero Organization is established. Al din Mahmoud Khalil is in charge and reports directly to Egyptian President Nasser. The organization controls five factories. The five factories include Factory 333 (the Sakr factory) in Heliopolis, headed by Eugen Saenger, which designs and builds ballistic missiles. The Krader Factory, founded in 1950 in Heliopolis, develops missile guidance systems. One of the other three factories probably makes rocket fuels and warhead explosives. This factory may be Factory 81 (the Heliopolis Company for Chemical Industries) or Factory 270 (the Kaha Company for Chemical Industries). Egypt also builds a 200km test range about 100km from Cairo.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1960-1961
Approximately 1,000 people work at Factory 333, and of them, roughly 250 are German scientists and technicians.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1960s
A missile project involving West German aerospace company Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) is stopped by technical difficulty and Israeli letter bombs. Israeli superspy Rafi Eitan plays a role in eliminating German scientists making surface-to-surface missiles for Egypt.
—"Overhead," MidEast Market, 13 November 1989; "Israel's former master spy is taking his lumps quietly," 14 June 1987; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1960s
Egypt develops the al-Zafir missile with a 350km range, the al-Qahir ballistic missile with a 600km range, and the al-Raid, a two-stage commercial rocket with a 1,500km range. The al-Qahir and al-Zafir are successfully test-launched. They are believed to be ready for production by 1965 or 1966, but this is not confirmed. After the June 1967 war, Egypt halts the al-Qahir and al-Zafir programs to focus on rebuilding its conventional forces.
—"A Dangerous race in a multi-axial world: The missiles club in the Middle East: The century of mass destruction," Al-Wasat (London), 30 August 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990903000290, 30 August 1999.

1961
Israel learns the details of Factory 333 and uses political and covert means to prevent the German experts from providing further assistance.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

5 July 1961
Israel launches the Shavit II (Comet II) solid-fueled sounding rocket to 77,000 meters. The launch reinforces Egypt's determination to develop missiles. Immediately after the launch, Egypt announces that it is negotiating to buy sounding rockets from the Zimney Corporation of California. Few, if any, of these rockets ever arrive in Egypt.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

Late 1961
Eugen Saenger resigns as head of Factory 333 and returns to Germany under pressure from West Germany. This slows work, but two missiles are already complete. Wolfgang Pilz takes over the factory.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

Early 1962
Egypt's first two missiles reach test phase.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

September 1962
Dr. Heinz Krug, a German scientist believed to be working for Egypt, disappears and may have been killed by Mossad agents.
—"Report: Shamir headed Mossad assassination squad," Associated Press, 3 July 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1963
Two Mossad agents are arrested in Bern for "intimidating a female member of the family of a German scientist who had been offered a job in Egypt's missile development program."
—"Daily says the Swiss Should Clarify their View on Mossad Spy Affair," Kayhan International, 28 February 1998, British Broadcasting Corporation, 5 March 1998.

1963
The Mossad hires Otto Skorzeny, the notorious Nazi commando leader, to persuade former Nazis to abandon work on Egyptian missiles.
—"Ex-SS man worked for Mossad against Egyptian rocket project," The Jerusalem Post, 20 September 1989; in Lexis-Nexis,<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

February 1963
Israel sends a squad to assassinate Dr. Hans Kleinwachter, a Germany scientist believed to be working for Egypt's missile program. The squad is unsuccessful despite two attempts.
—"Report: Shamir headed Mossad assassination squad," Associated Press, 3 July 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

April 1963
Egypt tests two missiles, probably the al-Zafir and probably using specially designed transporter-erector launchers (TELs), which raise the perceived threat of the missiles to Israel.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

July 1963
Egypt displays four two-stage al-Raid (Pioneer) missiles in a military parade. Egypt describes the missiles as space research rockets. The al-Raid is reportedly able to carry either a 1,800kg high-explosive warhead or a 900kg payload into low earth orbit. The range is about 1,000km. It is liquid fueled, probably with kerosene or nitric acid. Egypt announces that using the al-Raid or a three-stage variant of the al-Raid, it will launch into orbit a satellite named the al-Najm (Star) by July 1964.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1964
Israeli efforts to disrupt Egypt's missile program using assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings lead to a mass exodus of German scientists from Egypt.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1965
Egypt's recognition of East Germany causes many German scientists to leave Egypt's missile program.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

Late 1965
The chief of the Egyptian armed forces, Field Marshal Mohammed Abdel Hakim Amer, travels to Moscow and secures Soviet agreement to provide three brigades of Frog-2 missiles in mid-1967. Egyptian personnel go to the Soviet Union to train for the missiles.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1965-66
German scientist Wolfgang Pilz leaves Egypt for the People's Republic of China (PRC) to work on their ballistic missile program. The PRC launches a ballistic missile in 1966, and the Soviets believe Egypt helped with this because of Pilz's involvement. Egypt denies complicity.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1966
Egyptian scientists claim they have made a working missile guidance system.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1 January 1967
A US Defense Intelligence Agency report on Egypt's missile program states that none of Egypt's three surface-to-surface missiles will be operational before 1970. The report estimates that Egypt has 10 al-Qahir and 10 al-Zafir missiles, and an unknown number of launchers and warheads. The report says both systems have "problems in guidance system [that] affect stability."
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

June 1967
Egypt's missiles are not used during the June 1967 Six-Day War with Israel, according to most accounts, and Israel does not bomb Egypt's missile facilities, judging them to be no threat based on Israel's accurate intelligence picture of Egypt's missile program.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

June 1967
After the June 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt halts the al-Qahir and al-Zafir missile programs to focus on rebuilding its conventional forces. The Sakr Factory has built approximately 100 of these two types of missiles. The program's personnel are reassigned and its equipment placed in storage at the Egyptian Armed Forces Technical Institute.
—"A Dangerous race in a multi-axial world: The missiles club in the Middle East: The century of mass destruction," Al-Wasat (London), 30 August 1999, in FBIS, Document FTS19990903000290, 30 August 1999; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

21 October 1967
The Egyptian Navy sinks the Israeli destroyer Eilat near Port Said with Soviet-made Styx surface-to-surface missiles.
—Frank H. Winter and F. Robert van der Linden, "25 years ago—October 1967," Aerospace America, October 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1967-1970
During the "War of Attrition" [1967-1970], the Israeli Air Force attacks Egyptian missile manufacturing facilities at Heliopolis.
—"Ballistic Missile in the Third World: Egypt and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1991, pp. 531-537.

Late 1960s through late 1970s
Egypt purchases approximately 1,000 70km-range FROG-7 and 280km-range Scud-B missiles from the Soviet Union. [Note: See "Post-1967" and "September 1972 to September 1973" entries.]
—"Journal Discusses Spread of Missile Technology," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Beijing), No. 3, 13 July 1990, pp. 29-36.

April 1968
Egyptian President Nasser goes to the Soviet Union and renegotiates the 1965 deal for Frog-2 missiles. Instead, the Soviet Union agrees to deliver a brigade of 36 Luna M (Frog-7A) missiles with TELs. The missiles are delivered in 1970.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1 February 1969
A US intelligence estimate of Egypt's indigenous surface-to-surface missile program says it is "at a standstill."
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1970
The Soviet Union delivers a brigade of 36 Luna M (Frog-7A) missiles with TELs to Egypt.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

1970
Egypt receives $250 million worth of Soviet weapons, mostly aircraft and missiles, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
—"Information Bank Abstracts," New York Times, 14 June 1972; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early 1970s
In preparation for renewed attacks against Israel in the early 1970s, Egypt brings the al-Zafir and al-Qahir missiles out of storage and tests them. The al-Qahir's range is only 8km with a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 1,600 meters; the al-Zafir has an even shorter range. The names of the missiles are changed: al-Zafir becomes al-Zeitoon and al-Qahir becomes al-Tin.
—"Ballistic Missile in the Third World: Egypt and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1991, pp. 531-537.

1971
Egypt receives $420 million worth of Soviet arms, mostly in aircraft and missiles, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
—"Information Bank Abstracts," New York Times, 14 June 1972; in Lexis-Nexis; <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 September 1971
Egypt takes out of storage and test fires al-Zafir and al-Qahir missiles in preparation for plans to recapture the Sinai Peninsula. The tests show that the al-Qahir's range and direction can be controlled only by the angle of the launching rail, with a maximum range of 8km instead of 600km. Its CEP is shown to be 1,600 meters at 8km. Lt. Gen Saad el-Shazli, the Egyptian chief of staff, later calls the missile "medieval." The al-Zafir proves to have a range less than the al-Qahir, instead of 370km, and is only slightly more accurate. Shazli concludes that "anything is better than nothing," and orders the missiles deployed. He changes their names from al-Zafir to al-Zeitoon (Olive) and al-Qahir to al-Tin (Fig).
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

5 October 1971
The New York Times reports that US officials fear the Soviet Union will feel compelled to deploy a comparable missile in Egypt, perhaps the Scaleboard missile, in response to Israel's manufacture of the new Jericho missile.
—"Information Bank Abstracts," New York Times, 5 October 1971; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1972
Egypt test-fires the al-Zeitoon and al-Tin missiles with disappointing results.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

7 March 1972
Due to Egypt's lack of funds, Libya agrees to buy Soviet weapons, including surface-to-surface missiles, and deliver them to Egypt.
—"Information Bank Abstracts," The New York Times, 7 March 1972; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 March 1972
The Soviet Union agrees to assist Egypt with the guidance system problems of its medium-range missiles.
—"Information Bank Abstracts," New York Times, 21 March 1972; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

May 1972
In preparation for war with Israel, Egyptian Lt. Gen. Shazli goes to Iraq to ask for aircraft and Scud missiles. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein agrees to deliver the planes and missiles, and later claims the Scuds were delivered in 1973. Whether or not the Scuds were delivered by Iraq, Hussein's approval convinces the Soviet Union to give Scuds to Egypt.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

13 June 1972
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports that Egypt is the largest recipient of Soviet weapons. Egypt received $250 million worth of weapons in 1970 and $420 million worth in 1972, mostly in aircraft and missiles.
—"Information Bank Abstracts," New York Times, 14 June 1972; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 September 1972
The New York Times reports that US analysts believe Egypt expelled Soviet advisors because the Soviet Union refused to provide Egypt with advanced offensive weapons, such as the 450-mile-range Scaleboard surface-to-surface missile.
—"Information Bank Abstracts," New York Times, 29 September 1972; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

September 1972-September 1973
The Soviet Union delivers 150 FROG-7 missiles to Egypt.
—"Ballistic Missile in the Third World: Egypt and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War," Jane's Intelligence Review December 1991, pp. 531-537.

1973
A US intelligence official recounts in 1994 that "the Egyptian chief of staff told me after the 1973 war that Egypt not only needs nuclear weapons but ballistic missiles, because Israel has both."
—Steve Rodan, "The battle for parity," Jerusalem Post, 11 March 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1973
Iraq delivers Scud missiles to Egypt, according to Saddam Hussein.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

March 1973
Following the visit of a high-level Soviet delegation to Cairo, the Soviet Union agrees to provide Egypt with an additional 150 Frog-7A missiles as well as the support needed to deploy two Scud-B brigades composed of 12 transporter-erector launchers (TELs) each.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

April 1973
Soviet-supplied Scud-Bs arrive in Egypt, accompanied by a large contingent of Soviet advisors. The Soviet Union had agreed to provide training and equipment for two Scud-B brigades of 12 TELs each.
—"Ballistic Missile in the Third World: Egypt and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1991, pp. 531-537.

July-August 1973
Soviet advisers continue to arrive in Egypt to help form Egypt's 65th Artillery Brigade of Scud-Bs. In August, the brigade participates in army-wide exercises.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

October 1973
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat decides to go to war against Israel, in part based on Egypt's receipt of Soviet Scud-B missiles.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic missile development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1992, pp. 452-458.

October 1973
During the Yom Kippur War, Egypt fires Frog-7 missiles at the Israeli base at Big Gafgafka on the Sinai Peninsula.
—Drew Middleton, "Influx of arms caused by war worries Israel," New York Times, 2 November 1980; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 October 1973
At the start of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt has a brigade of 12 FROG-7 TELs, a brigade of nine Scud-B TELs, and two batteries of two al-Tin and two al-Zeitoon launchers, comprising a total of 100 missiles. [Note: See 8 October 1973.]
—"Ballistic Missile in the Third World: Egypt and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War," Jane's Intelligence Review December 1991, pp. 531-537.

8 October 1973
Since the onset of the 1973 Yom Kippur War on 6 October 1973, Egypt has used all of its al-Tin and al-Zeitoon rockets and 60 to 70 FROG-7 missiles. [Note: See 6 October 1973.]
—"Ballistic Missile in the Third World: Egypt and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1991, pp. 531-537.

24 October 1973
Columnists Jack Cloherty and Bob Owens, quoting unnamed sources, report that a Soviet ship arrives in the Egyptian port of Alexandria carrying nuclear weapons. According to the columnists writing in 1977, US and Israeli intelligence believe the weapons are nuclear warheads for Scud missiles. Reports of their arrival leads the United States to trigger a worldwide alert, but the weapons are never unloaded after discussions between US and Soviet officials.
—Associated Press, 14 March 1977; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 November 1973
Senior US defense officials confirm the Soviet Union has sent Scud missiles to Egypt, which are capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional warheads. [Note: See 5 November and 21 November 1973 entries.]
—"Information Bank Abstracts," New York Times, 22 November 1973; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 November 1973
Aviation Week and Space Technology reports that the Soviet Union has nuclear-armed Scud missiles in Egypt that are capable of hitting Israel.
—"Information Bank Abstracts," New York Times, 20 November 1973; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 November 1973
US defense officials reveal intelligence that suggests the Soviet Union may have moved nuclear warheads into Egypt during the Yom Kippur War in October. Some administration officials including US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger say the evidence is not conclusive. On 2 November, US defense officials confirmed the Soviets sent Scud missiles to Egypt, which can carry nuclear or conventional warheads.
—"Information Bank Abstracts," New York Times, 22 November 1973; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1974
The Soviet Union transfers 24 SS-1C surface-to-surface missiles to Egypt.
—"Congress Takes Aim At Mideast Arms Sales," Business Week, 3 March 1975; Lexis-Nexis, in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

1974
It is believed that Egypt transfers samples of the Soviet PUR-64 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) ATGM and 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail) SAM to North Korea. [Note: These systems were subsequently reverse-engineered by the DPRK and placed into service in North Korea in the late 1970s.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 8.

16 April 1974
Ali Amin, editor of Al Ahram, says Egypt will use missiles against Israel if Israel increases its military action against Syria and Lebanon. He says surface-to-surface missiles "were among several other modern weapons we did not use during the October war."
—"Information Bank Abstracts," New York Times, 17 April 1974; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 October 1974
Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon says recent Soviet arms shipments to Egypt and Syria cannot be defensive because they include medium-range missiles capable of hitting every Israeli city.
—"Information Bank Abstracts," New York Times, 5 October 1974; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 October 1974
During a military parade marking the anniversary of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt displays the Soviet-made FROG-7 surface-to-surface missile.
—"Information Bank Abstracts," New York Times, 7 October 1974; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 November 1974
The New York Times reports that Israeli sources say a major factor in a new Middle East war will be Israel's ability to destroy Egyptian and Syrian Scud missiles, which they expect to be used against Israeli cities.
—"Information Bank Abstracts," New York Times, 16 November 1974; in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.